

Dr. VATSYAYAN

Indian Philosophy

[IN QUESTIONS & ANSWERS]

FIFTH REVISED EDITION

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PREFACE

This book solves degree and post graduate examination questions of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Punjab, Karnatak, Mysore, Gujrat, Baroda, Saugar, Nagpur, Osmania, Bihar, Allahabad, Agra, Poona, Vikram, Gorakhpur, Rajasthan, Jodhpur, Bihar, Banharas and other Indian Universities. The reader will find the following special characteristics in this book,—

- * Subject matter of 1st division standard on every topic
- * Simple plain and lucid language
- * Quotations from reputed authors and scholars
- * Points in separate type to facilitate revisions
- * Every point in a separate paragraph
- * Charts and tables to elucidate issues
- * Simplest explanation of issues with examples from Indian life
- * Integral and balanced approach in the treatment of the subject
- * Covering the syllabi of all the Indian Universities and solving latest questions of the above mentioned universities

However suggestions for improvement will be gratefully acknowledged

—Vatsyayan

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q 1 What are the basic features of Indian Philosophy? Define the meaning and scope of Philosophy in India

(Orissa 1967 Banaras 1963 Karnataka 1968)

MEANING OF DARSHAN

To understand Indian philosophy it is imperative to grasp the meaning of the word Darshan. The connotation of Darshan is radically different from that of philosophy. The term Darshan applied to philosophy clearly indicates Indian attitude towards this highest knowledge. The word Darshan is derived from the root Dṛśh and lut prtyaya has been added to it in the sense of instrument. It means that by which something is to be seen. This function can be performed both by external as well as internal eyes. The latter have been variously termed as divine eyes (Divya Chakṣu) Pratyakṣa Chakṣu or Jñāna Chakṣu. Matters of both the kinds gross and subtle form the subject matter of 'Darshan Shastra'. Hence the use of the word Darshan in both concrete and abstract temporal and spiritual senses. From the practical point of view the arguments given for and against the existence of these elements fall within the purview of the word Darshan. Hence the use of terms like Charvaka Darshan, Bauddha etc. But ultimately the realisation of the Ultimate Being is regarded as Darshan by almost all systems of Indian Philosophy. This is the bed rock on which they meet. This is the summum bonum of Adhyatma Jñāna Dharma and Niti Shastra. In it lies the culmination and consummation of all philosophy.

Q 2 Explain the distinction between the heterodox and orthodox schools of Indian philosophy and show briefly (a) if these two groups share any common features and (b) how Indian thought as a whole consists in the intermingling of these two trends.

(Cal 1970 Rajasthan 1965 Meerut 1971)

Much value has been attached to the Vedas in Indian Philosophy. The roots of most of the Indian philosophical systems can be traced in the Vedas. This Vedic tradition has two aspects viz.,

the aspect of knowledge (*Jñāna Kānda*) and Ritualism (*Karma Kānda*). The *Brāhmaṇa* scriptures have developed the *Karma Kānda* and the *Āraṇyaka*s and *Upaniṣads* have developed the *Jñāna Kānda*. This small rivulet of knowledge which originated in the *Vedas* attained such width and depth in *Upaniṣads* that it was difficult to recognise it as the same. It was further directed into various currents forming different Indian philosophical systems, all of which did not recognise the *Vedas* as their origin.

CLASSIFICATION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

ASTIK AND NASTIK CLASSES

Thus, with the criterion of respect for the *Vedas*, Indian philosophical systems have been divided into two classes, viz., *Astik* and *Nāstik*. Literally the word '*Āstik*' means theist or one who believes in God while the word '*Nāstik*' means atheist or one who does not believe in God. But in Indian philosophy these words denote believer and non-believer in the testimony of the *Vedas*. *Āstik*, here, does not mean one who believes in rebirth since even the *Nāstik* systems of *Jaina* and *Bauddha* believed in rebirth.

III. ASTIK CLASS


Thus, *Āstik* are those systems of Indian philosophy which believe in the testimony of the *Vedas*. This class includes six systems of Indian philosophy which are collectively known as *Sad Darshan*. These are *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vedāntā*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*. It must be noted that among these *Mīmāṃsā* does not believe in God. Hence the meaning of *Āstik* as believer in the *Vedas*. The *Āstik* is not limited to these six systems alone. According to *Madhava*acharya even the branches of grammar and medicine belong to this class. But generally speaking, *Āstik Darshan* denotes these six systems named above.

Now, in the *Āstik* class itself, there are two types of philosophical systems—(i) Those which are directly based upon *Vedic* scriptures. These include *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. Of these the first emphasises the ritualistic aspect of the *Vedas* and the second the knowledge aspect. As directly based on the *Vedas*, both these are sometimes called *Mīmāṃsā*. To make distinction, *Vedānta* is known as *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* or *Jñāna Mīmāṃsā* and the other is known as *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* or *Karma Mīmāṃsā*. Both these systems have their own value in Indian philosophy. (ii) Those which are not directly based on *Vedic* scriptures but have an independent basis. These, however, accept the testimony of *Vedas* and try to

show harmony of their own thought with that of the Vedas. The include Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika.

The Nāstik class of Indian philosophical systems includes the Cārvāka, the Jaina and the Bauddha systems. These do not believe in the testimony of the Vedas. As a matter of fact, they owe their origin to the reaction against Vedic traditions. The Charvaka philosophers have openly abused the Vedas. They say that the Vedas are full of lies and repetitions; they are made by cunning priests who intended to play their own game by foolish ignorant persons. The tall talk of heavenly pleasures is meaningless jargon and so are Vedas which claim to give heavenly pleasures to men. It goes without saying that this prejudicial attack on the Vedas has been vehemently condemned by able philosophers like Udayana and Vānkathnath. Again the Jains also do not believe in the Vedas. Instead they believe in the words of Tīrthankaras. The Bauddha philosophers have also condemned blind faith in the Vedas. But neither Jaina nor Bauddha have abused the Vedas nor shown utter disrespect to them like Charvaka. As a matter of fact in spite of belonging to Nāstik class they are nearer to the Āstik systems as compared with Charvaka.

The above classification of Indian philosophical systems can be more easily grasped by the following chart:



Q 3 Give an account of common features of Indian systems of Philosophy (Karnatak 1968)

State the distinctive characteristics of Indian Philosophy. Is Indian philosophy otherworldly? Give reasons for your answer.

(Madras 1966, Poona 1963)

e common characters of the systems of Indian
(Karnatak 1964 ; Baroda 1965. 1963)

f the common features of Indian Philosophy .

(Gujrat 1964 ; Meerut 1971 ; Kanpur 1970) .

ie characteristics common to the six systems of
Indian Philosophy.
(Gujrat 1961)

What is the nature of philosophy ? Explain the specific nature
of Indian Philosophy.
(Agra 1973)

COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

Philosophy is the realisation of eternal truths in the back-ground of time, clime and culture. Of course these eternal truths transcended the barriers of time and place, yet their manifestation is conditioned to a certain degree by these factors. Therefore, one finds that though similar in their fundamentals, the philosophical systems of different countries are profoundly impressed by their own culture. As has been already pointed out, some of the Indian philosophical schools are Āstik, while others are Nāstik. The anti-Vedic Darshans include Chārvāka, Bauddha and Jain schools of philosophy. Some of the pro-Vedic Darshans are derived from Vedic thoughts e.g., Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika etc. The philosophical schools derived from Vedic thoughts are further divided into Mīmāṃsā based on Karma Kānda the Vedānta based on Jñāna Kānda. Despite this diversity, the Indian philosophy is characterised by a fundamental unity. Following are the common characteristics of Indian philosophical systems.

1. *Spiritual Nature* -- Indian philosophy is spiritual. Indian philosophy believes in soul and seeks to realise it in its true form. The realisation of the soul was the common goal of all Indian philosophical schools. All of them from upanishads to Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta were inspired alike by the same inquiryiveness. It is their essentially spiritual aim which elevates Indian Darshans above the field of religion and ethics.

2. *Philosophy is close to life* Indian philosophy is close to life. Therefore, Indian philosophy does not merely seek to quench intellectual thirst. It has a higher and profounder aim in view. It wants to tackle the ultimate problems of life. It is born and bred in life. The classical books of Indian philosophy e.g., the Gītā and the Upanishads are not divorced from human life. In them are faithfully mirrored the ideals and feelings of common

3 *Spiritual dissatisfaction*—Indian philosophers were not content with merely mundane pursuits. As a matter of fact, Indian philosophy owes its origin to the discontent of the spirit from mere temporal life. It aimed at a divine transformation of life. The spiritual discontent of Indian philosophers however, is not pessimism. Buddha laid great emphasis on the seamy side of the world yet it was he who suggested the Eightfold Path (Aṣṭanga Marga) as the panacea for all worldly travails and tribulations. Thus Indian Philosophy, though beginning with pessimism goes forward towards optimism and happiness.

4 *Liberation is the Ultimate End*—Knowledge in India Philosophy means divine transformation of the life and emancipation from worldly miseries. Barring Charvaka all Āstika and Nāstika Indian philosophies though differing in details about their conception of liberation however unanimously hold that liberation enables a man to free himself from the shackles of ignorance and from the bondage of worldly misery. It renders him immune from the thousand ills that flesh is heir to. This is a spiritual stage which transcends ethics (Nīti) and religion (Dharma).

5 *The root cause of bondage is ignorance*—That misery and bondage are the offspring of human ignorance is the common corner stone of all philosophical schools of India. This ignorance is not only intellectual but also spiritual and psychological. The four great truths (Ārya Satyas) and the Advaita Vedānta are the nostrums suggested by Buddha and Shankar respectively for banishing the bane from the world. Hence the unavoidable necessity of getting rid of ignorance if one wants to be impervious to manifold afflictions of the world.

6 *Practice of Yoga for Moksha*—All Indian philosophers regard some sort of practice (Abhyāsa) or yoga as a pre requisite for getting freedom from psychological and spiritual ignorance. The Aṣṭanga Path, of Patañjali Yoga has been incorporated in some degree in almost all Indian philosophies. The practice of Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Samādhi and Nididhyāsana etc. is regarded essential for removing ignorance. The transmutation of life according to knowledge is the aim of Sadhana. Indian Philosophical systems lay equal emphasis on both the knowledge aspect (Jñāna) and Sādhana. This practice (Abhyāsa) was not only negative it had a positive side too. In fact Indian philosophers emphasise Sadhanā of all the human faculties intellect, mind and body.

7. *Indian Philosophy is based up on Psychological facts*—Therefore, Indian philosophers have minutely and vividly explained human psychology. From Buddha down to Patanjali, Shankara and Ramanuja all of them have considerably emphasised the psychological aspect of philosophy. Even now Yogic exercises are held as most efficacious for curing physical and mental maladies and attaining concentration of mind. The Vedānta gives a minute analysis of the different stages of human consciousness—Jāgrta Svapna, Suṣupti and Turiya. Based on the experiences of life, Indian philosophy seeks to X-ray these experiences.

8. *Synthesis of Religion and Philosophy*—The most striking common feature of all Indian philosophies lies in the fact that problems of Religion (Dharma) and those of Philosophy (Darshan) have not been divided into watertight compartments. Dharma in India has been used in a wide and comprehensive sense. In fact, the transformation of life and emancipation from wordly misery constitute the common goal of both Darshan and Dharma. We find no yawning gap between man, matter and God in Indian philosophical systems. Philosophical principles were tested on the touchstone of experience. Intellectual and spiritual experience were the criteria for ascertaining the soundness and worth of religious principles.

9. *Intellectualism*—Despite being religious, Indian philosophical systems seek truth in their own independent way. They approach the problems with an open mind and unprejudiced eyes. In them we can trace the germs of almost all the 'isms' of the world. The Indian philosopher had not only to put forth strong and sound arguments for propounding his contention, he had to repudiate other schools also. Thanks to the age old custom of Shāstrārtha and logic, Pramāṇa Shāstra got a free play in Indian Philosophy. These branches found in it a congenial atmosphere for their free and full development.

10. *Synthetic Approach*—Though intellectuals, the Indian philosophers were synthesisists. They have never laid exclusive emphasis on any single aspect of human life. Though recommending individual Sādhanā, they have yet kept universal welfare in view. Shankara, Mahāvīr and Buddha were not only eminent philosophers, but also equally eminent social reformers. The Indian philosophical systems had as their aim not only individual salvation, but also the spiritual transformation of society. This transformation, according to them, is not only spiritual but physico-also cal and mental.

11 *Dynamism*—Indian philosophical systems are dynamic. When one particular system of philosophy became very popular, it was countered by some other system. Through the farrago of Materialism (Jadavada), Spiritualism (Ādhyamāvada), Dualism (Dvaita Vada), Non dualism (Ādvaitavada) and Qualified Monism (Viśiṣṭādvaitavada) etc., one can see the unbroken chain of action and reaction and the dynamic evolution of Indian philosophy as a spiral whole.

12 *Faith in the past*—Notwithstanding their logical approach to problems, all Indian philosophical systems have common faith in the Vedas, Gita and Upanisads. All Āstika Darśhans regard Shruti as Pramāṇa, though Shruti Pramāṇa is based not on word but on intuitive truth. As a matter of fact, the Vedas are the repositories of the intuitive knowledge of the seer Rishis. This faith in ancient wisdom accounts for a particular order, which we find in all the Indian philosophical systems. But it cannot be equated with blind faith. Even philosophers like Shankar, who regard themselves as no more than commentators, favour the use of logic when faced with contradictions in Shruti.

13 *Faith in Rta*—Indian philosophy sees a moral system in microcosm and macrocosm alike. This universal moral system is termed *Rta* in Vedas, 'Apoorva' in Mīmāṃsā and Adṛṣṭa in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to it, gods, living beings and plants all move in accordance with one universal moral pattern.

14 *Faith in Karma*—This moral system is manifested through the theory of Karma in the life of an individual. Almost all the Indian philosophers believe in the theory of Karma. According to it, the results of actions (Karmaphala) are always with us in the form of 'Samskāras' and they direct the course of our life. Thus the world is a stage where everybody is preordained to perform his part according to his Karma. Liberation is nothing but emancipation from the bondage of Karma. Different philosophical systems have suggested different recipes for the attainment of liberation.

15 *Faith in Rebirth*—The theory of Karma and that of rebirth go hand in hand. Due to the bondage of Karma, human soul has to assume different bodies. Liberation frees a person from rebirth also. Cārvāka school does not believe in these theories. So the common characteristics of Indian philosophy mentioned here, do not apply to it. All the other schools of Indian philosophy, however, share these features in varying degrees.

Q. 4. What is pessimism ? In Indian Philosophy pessimistic ?
(Calcutta 1971)

Write a short note on pessimism in Indian Philosophy.
(Karnatak 1965)

State the principal change usually brought against Indian philosophy and say whether they are irrefutable. (Karnatak 1966)

Many Western scholars are unaware of the real nature and profound undertones of Indian philosophy and so they have an erroneous conception. They find it pessimistic. In his book '*Administrative Problems*', Chailley declares that Indian philosophy springs 'from lassitude and a desire for eternal rest'. Pessimism denotes a peculiar mental outlook. For a pessimist the world is nothing but a place full of misery.

Indian philosophy is, of course, pessimistic in the sense that it originates in dissatisfaction with the present conditions of materialistic world. The world is, no doubt, fraught with innumerable hardships. Hopelessly embroiled in the vicious circle of enjoyment (Bhoga) and tendencies (Sanskāras), man never gets tranquility of soul and equanimity of mind. Indian philosophers analyse this wretched plight of the world. In this sense, however, all the philosophical systems of the world are pessimistic. But for this discontent with the present, there would be no philosophy worthy of its name. At a matter of fact, this sort of pessimism is indispensable for the progress of life. It serves as a spur, it goads us on towards our destination. As Prof Bosanquet puts it, "I believe in optimism, but I add that no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it. This, I am convinced, is the true spirit of life, and if any one thinks it dangerous and an excuse for unjustifiable acquiescence in evil, I reply that all truth which has any touch of thoroughness has its danger for practice."

Indian philosophy, on the other hand, is wholly optimistic about the ultimate goal of human life. All Indian philosophical systems aim at liberation, which is not an escape from or end of life. It is the transformation of it which enables man to save himself from the dire agonies and delusions of the world and to lead a life of ever-lasting bliss after realising his true self. Felicity, not sorrow, is the aim of spirituality. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "Indian thinkers are pessimistic in so far as they look upon the world order as an evil and a lie, they are optimistic since they feel that there is a way out of it into the realm of truth, which is also goodness."

Q. 5. Does the authority of sruti amount to dogmatism in Indian Philosophy? Assess, in this connection, the validity of the charge of dogmatism against the orthodox system of Indian philosophy. (Cal 1967)

Discuss the scope of the authority of the Vedas in relation to the six systems of Indian Philosophy, and state how far it is correct to say that the six systems are dogmatic and otherworldly. (Gujrat 1961)

Examine the charge that Indian Philosophy is both dogmatic and pessimistic (Bombay 1961 68)

A sense of reverence for time honoured tradition is always to be discerned in Indian philosophy. Shruti is generally regarded as an authoritative source of knowledge. The Vedas, the Upanisads and Gītā have been quoted so often by Indian philosophers. This has led many Western scholars to lay the charge of dogmatism at their doors. But with all regards to those scholars, their attitude betrays their ignorance about Indian philosophy. Granted that Indian philosophy has its long chequered history and has undergone many a vicissitude, it has its dark periods too, when the soul of philosophy was well nigh crushed under the dead weight of hair splitting pettifoggery and scholastic controversies. But these were invariably followed by a strong reaction and the spiritual thought was soon unfettered from dogma.

Faith in the Vedas should not be misconstrued as dogmatism. In them are enshrined the intuitive experiences of the seers, which can be shared by each and every person, if he scales those spiritual altitudes. Faced with contradictions in these experiences, Indian philosophers have sought the help of intellect, and logic celebrities like Shankara, Rāmanuja, Madhva, Nimbārka etc though appearing in the modest role of commentators have yet propounded profound philosophical theories in the light of their own personal experiences. One must admit that, thanks to this common faith in tradition, one perceives an order in Indian philosophy, a characteristic which any philosophy can legitimately feel proud of.

Q. 6 "The motive of Indian Philosophy is predominantly ethical". Discuss this remark and say whether you consider it as defect (Karnatak 1966 Cal 1966)

"The aim of Indian Philosophy is not merely to satisfy our intellectual curiosity but to give us a way of life." Explain fully.

(Karnatak 1965 Bombay 1967)

According to Farquhar, There is practically no ethical

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE VEDAS

Q. 7. Point out the importance of Vedas in Indian Philosophy. What are the different interpretations of Vedic hymns ?

Write short note on Naturalism of Vedic Mythology.

(Bombay 1967)

Describe the currents of philosophical thought in Rig Veda

(Bombay 1966)

It was the dissatisfaction with the mundane life which gave birth to Indian philosophy. So Indian philosophy is as old as human experience of sorrow and suffering. Its ultimate aim was to get rid of this sorrow. Ignorance is the fountain head of this sorrow, so it is clear that mere Sadhana will not suffice. If one wants to realise his life mission, knowledge is also equally essential. Knowledge, coupled with Sadhana, will enable a man to attain his destination. 'Veda' means knowledge and 'Darshan' mean the realisation of that knowledge. The Vedas form the oldest records of human knowledge.

The Vedas are the oldest authority on Indian philosophy. The Rṣis had a vision of the Ultimate Being in the form of Abhaya Jyoti through penance. They manifested their divine experience in Veda Mantras. Based as they are on the intuitive perception of the Ultimate Reality, these Mantras do not reflect the individuality of the Rsis. So they are considered to be 'Apauruṣeya' (अपौरुषेय) i.e., the Ultimate being has manifested Himself in the form of the Veda Mantras and the Rsis are no more than the media chosen by the Being for this purpose. It explains the attitude of the Āstik Indian philosophers, who considered the Vedas to be the Ultimate Authority. The Vedas, according to them, enshrine the eternal and ultimate truths. The Vedas have been preserved through the unbroken tradition of teacher and pupil from times immemorial. Therefore, they are christened as Shruti.

In the words of Wilson, an eminent Western scholar, "the Vedas give us abundant information respecting all that is more interesting in the contemplation of antiquity." In them are vividly described all the aspects of primitive human life. They are the

fountain-head not only of philosophy, religion and rituals (कर्मकाण्ड) but also of many sciences. They are not merely philosophical treatises, relegated to the limbo of spirituality, they dwell on all conceivable topics spiritual as well as mundane. Karma is necessary for Jñāna. Hence the detail description of Karma-kānda found in the Vedas.

There are four Vedas. *viz.* Rig, Yajur, Sāma and Atharva. Every Veda comprises three parts : Mantra, Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad. The Sanhitās are the collections of the Mantras. The Brahmanas deal with Karma-kānda. Philosophical thoughts are enshrined in the Upaniṣads and Āraṇyakas. The latter fall between the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. In addition name (नाम), form (रूप) language (भाषा) and matter (वस्तु) also figure in the first three Vedas. Atharva Veda differs from the other Vedas. In it one finds historical narration also. Although outwardly four, the Vedas are one and the same. Like the one and eternal Abhaya Jyoti (अमय ज्योति) the Vedas are also one eternal.

DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VEDIC HYMNS

Divergent views have been expressed by Eastern and Western scholars as regards the interpretation of the Vedas. The most important of them are as follows :—

1. *Naturalistic Interpretation*—The eminent Indian commentator, Sāyana (सायन) interprets the Vedic Mantras in terms of various gods, who are the embodiments of natural powers. The Vedas are the symbols of primitive religion. Nature worship is their religion. The modern Western scholars also propound the same views. Pfeleiderer refers to the "primitive, childlike and naive" prayers of the Vedas. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, "In the main, we may say that the Rig Veda represents the religion of an unsophisticated age. The great mass of the hymns are simple and naive, expressing the religious consciousness of a mind yet free from the later sophistication."

2. *Ritualistic Interpretation*—Bloomfield, on the other hand, holds that the Rig Veda is the work of a primitive race, which laid great emphasis on Karma-Kānda. In the Mantras are described, according to him, the various methods of sacrifices. The gods and goddesses, mentioned in the Vedas, represent the manifold articles required for the Yajna and so they do not represent anything profound and deep.

3. *Allegorical Interpretation*—Bergaigne regards all the Vedic

Mantras as allegories To him the gods and goddesses of the Vedas are symbols of social customs and conventions

4 *Monotheistic Interpretation*—According to Pictat, monotheism, howsoever dim and primitive its form may be, is clearly visible in the mantras of the Rig Veda. Underneath the sarrago of gods and goddesses, one can perceive a tendency towards monotheism. Many mantras refer to the God of gods (इन्द्राधिदेव). It implies that according to the Vedas the supreme God is only one though there are many semi gods. Roth and Swāmi Dayānanda also hold the same view.

5 *Monistic Interpretation*—Rāja Ram Mohan Roy holds the view that the Vedic gods allegorically represent the qualities of ultimate God. The different Gods and Goddesses of the Vedic mantras are the different facets of the one God who has sometimes been called Masheshwar (महेश्वर),

6 *Mystic Interpretation*—Sri Aurobindo finds the Vedas replete with mystic philosophy and occult knowledge. To him these Gods and Goddesses are the symbols of psychological processes. Sun, for example, symbolises intellect while fire and soma represent determination and feeling respectively. The Vedic religion resembles Orphic and Eleusinian creeds in its essentially mystic nature. In the words of Sri Aurobindo, "The hypothesis I propose is that the Rig Veda is itself the one considerable document that remains to us from the early period of human thought of which the historical Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries were the failing remnants when the spiritual and psychological knowledge of the race was concealed for reasons now difficult to determine, in a veil of concrete and material figures and symbols which protected the sense from the profane and revealed it to the initiated. One of the leading principles of the mysteries was the sacredness and secrecy of self knowledge and the true knowledge of the Gods. This wisdom was, they thought, unfit for perhaps even dangerous to the ordinary human mind or in any case liable to perversion and misuse and loss of virtue if revealed to vulgar and unpurified spirits. Hence they favoured the existence of an outer worship affective but imperfect for the profane, and an inner discipline for the initiated and clothed their language in words and images which had equally a spiritual sense for the elect and a concrete sense for the mass of ordinary worshippers."

All these views, though appearing to be contradictory on the surface, see the same truth from different angles. All of them con-

fountain-head not only of philosophy, religion and rituals (ऋतम्) but also of many sciences. They are not merely philosophical treatises, relegated to the limbo of spirituality, they dwell on all conceivable topics spiritual as well as mundane. Karma is necessary for Jñāna. Hence the detail description of Karma-kānda found in the Vedas.

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Divergent views have been expressed by Eastern and Western scholars as regards the interpretation of the Vedas. The most important of them are as follows :—

1. *Naturalistic Interpretation*—The eminent Indian commentator, Śāyana (शायन) interprets the Vedic Mantras in terms of various gods, who are the embodiments of natural powers. The Vedas are the symbols of primitive religion. Nature worship is their religion. The modern Western scholars also propound the same view. Bleilerer refers to the "primitive, childish and naive" prayers of the Vedas. According to Dr. Radhakrishnan, "In the main, we may say that the Rig Veda represents the religion of an unspoiled race. The great mass of the hymns are simple and naive, expressing the religious consciousness of a mind yet free from the later sophistication."

2. *Evolutionary Interpretation*—Bloomfield, on the other hand, holds that the Rig Veda is the work of a primitive race, which did not embark on Karma-kānda. In the Mantras are described, named as to him, the early methods of sacrifice. The gods and goddesses mentioned in the Vedas, represent the manifold articles, referred to by the Yajur and so, they do not represent anything profound and deep.

3. *Altruistic Interpretation*—Bergsone regards all the Vedic

Mantras as allegories To him the gods and goddesses of the Vedas are symbols of social customs and conventions

4 *Monotheistic Interpretation*—According to Pictat, monotheism, howsoever dim and primitive its form may be, is clearly visible in the mantras of the Rig Veda. Underneath the farrago of gods and goddesses, one can perceive a tendency towards monotheism. Many mantras refer to the God of gods (इन्द्रदेव). It implies that according to the Vedas the supreme God is only one though there are many semi gods. Roth and Swāmī Dayananda also hold the same view.

5 *Monistic Interpretation*—Rāja Ram Mohan Roy holds the view that the Vedic gods allegorically represent the qualities of ultimate God. The different Gods and Goddesses of the Vedic mantras are the different facets of the one God who has sometimes been called Masheshwar (महेश्वर).

6 *Mystic Interpretation*—Sri Aurobindo finds the Vedas replete with mystic philosophy and occult knowledge. To him these Gods and Goddesses are the symbols of psychological processes. Sun for example, symbolises intellect while fire and soma represent determination and feeling respectively. The Vedic religion resembles Orphic and Eleusinian creeds in its essentially mystic nature. In the words of Sri Aurobindo, "The hypothesis I propose is that the Rig Veda is itself the one considerable document that remains to us from the early period of human thought of which the historical Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries were the failing remnants when the spiritual and psychological knowledge of the race was concealed for reasons now difficult to determine, in a veil of concrete and material figures and symbols which protected the sense from the profane and revealed it to the initiated. One of the leading principles of the mysteries was the sacredness and secrecy of self knowledge and the true knowledge of the Gods. This wisdom was, they thought, unfit for perhaps even dangerous to the ordinary human mind or in any case liable to perversion and misuse and loss of virtue if revealed to vulgar and unpurified spirits. Hence they favoured the existence of an outer worship affective but imperfect, for the profane and an inner discipline for the initiated and clothed their language in words and images which had equally a spiritual sense for the elect and a concrete sense for the mass of ordinary worshippers."

All these views, though appearing to be contradictory on the surface, see the same truth from different angles. All of them con-

tain some grain of truth. Different Ṛṣis were the seers of different mantras and so they differ in their meaning and import. None of the above mentioned views can be regarded as absolutely correct. The Vedas do not deal with some exclusive subject. In them one finds philosophy and religion on the one hand and science and magic on the other. Naturally, therefore, all the mantras cannot be interpreted in a uniform manner. It is proper to interpret the Vedas in the light of the historical and social context of the primitive stage of human race, keeping in view the eternity of spiritual visions.

Q. 8. What is the Ultimate aim in Vedas? Discuss their concept of Karma and Rta.

Explain the philosophical significance of the concept of Rta in the Rg Veda. (Meerot 1972)

THE ULTIMATE AIM

The Vedic Ṛṣis were fully alive towards the worldly miseries. On the one hand the phenomena of Nature stimulated their curiosity and goaded them on to fathom the mysteries of nature; on the other they longed for emancipation from worldly ills. Hence search for perfect bliss, along with that of perfect knowledge, is the aim of the Vedas. The Vedic Ṛṣis were naturally anxious to conquer death. Hence the prayers for longevity in the Vedas. They knew the different methods of prayer for propitiating different deities. They had implicit faith in the efficacy of prayers. They regarded the knowledge about weal and woe, eternal and ephemeral, freedom from old age, death and fear, and about both the worlds as a stepping stone for the realisation of 'Abhaya Jyoti'. They have prayed for knowledge and bliss. Keenly desirous of ultimate knowledge the aspirant sheds off all egotism and surrenders to God. To quote, "O Aditya! I have no discretion of right and left and I am feeling stupefied and faint. By your grace and kindness I can realise the Abhaya Jyoti". Only the communion between soul and God can lead to knowledge and happiness. So, according to the Vedas, the realisation of one 'Abhaya Jyoti' is the only recipe for emancipation from the ills and evils, which mar the dismal world. This is the only royal road to Sanatnam Brahma (truth etc.)

The Vedic literature has been divided into two parts - Jñāna Kānda and Karma Kānda. Speculation and prayer form the chief matter of Jñāna Kānda and Karma Kānda respectively. Different sorts of prayers have been suggested for different sorts of people in accordance with their desires. All and sundry are not

entitled for each and every prayer (Upāsana) Upāsana by an uninitiated person proves abortive and foment trouble So the Vedas enjoin us to perform prayer and rituals according to our merit (अधिकार मर) Consideration for innocuous deeds and pure conduct is also as necessary as knowledge Penitence, prayers, simple diet, gentleness in thoughts and purification of heart are essential for the realisation of the Ultimate Being Greed, hypocrisy, pride, anger and callousness are despicable and must be resolutely eschewed Sinful people, marplots, deprecators of Gods, thieves and those who are close fisted and averse to Brahmins should be kept at an arms length Magicians and licentious people have been dubbed as hellish creatures (नारकीय जीव) Gods, who pursue the path of righteousness only are variously described 'शुद्धत नासाया, सत्यवरायण, सत्यधर्म सतकमपालक, सत्कृतृत्वं etc

THE THEORY OF KARMA

The Vedas propound the theory of Karma Epithets like धर्मरक्षि (protector of good deeds), धर्मरक्षि (protector of Dharma), धर्मरक्षि (seer of good and evil actions), धर्मरक्षि कर्मणा धर्मा (master of all Karma) have been used for the gods in the Vedas That good actions lead to immortality has been explicitly mentioned in many a mantra Soul undergoes many a cycle of birth and death according to its deeds Vamadeva alludes to many of his previous life terms The Vedas trace the evil propensities of the present life to the evil actions committed in the previous life According to the Vedas, man in this life has to suffer the consequences of the actions of his previous life Some of the Veda Mantras pray for the condonation of their misdeeds of the previous life They also refer to Sanchita (accumulated) and Prarabha Karma People doing good deeds go to Brahmaloaka via Devayana (देवयान) while those doing ordinary deeds go to Chandraloka via Pitrayana (पितृयान) Some enter inanimate bodies like those as trees, creepers etc, to reap the consequences of their sins Sometimes soul is punished vicariously also for the sins of others Thus the doctrine of Karma has been discussed in all its manifold aspects in the Vedas

THE THEORY OF RTA (ऋत)

The place of Rta in the cosmos corresponds to that of Karma in human life Rta means the course of things It shows an order in the objects of the universe The principle underlying the cosmic order has been termed as Rta by the Vedic Rsis The observation of systematic movement of the sun, the moon, stars, day, night and

seasons might have aroused this idea in their mind. Rta is antecedent to all the objects of the universe and the external universe is but its manifestation. Universe is changeable. Rta is unchangeable and eternal. It fathers all the objects of the universe. Heaven and hell owe their present existence to it. Originally, Rta denoted the fixed course of the universe comprising the sun, the moon, stars, morning, evening, day and night etc. But afterwards its connotation became more comprehensive and it was taken to signify the ethical course of gods and men. The sun follows the course of Rta. The whole universe depends on Rta and moves with it. Thus physical order is afterwards infested with moral significance. The theory of Rta brought a change in the conception of the gods. The universe for the R̥ṣi was not an accidental creation, but something with profound purpose and order.

Q. 2. Write a short note on the conception of the universe in Vedas.

CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSE

The Vedas contain different views about the origin of the universe. The origin of the universe is traced to Agni. After that earth, heaven, day, night, water and medicines came into existence. All the souls were born out of Tvṛṣṭā. Indra produced earth and heaven. He has also originated the three worlds and the living beings. Similarly, Vishva, Karmā and Varuna have been described as the creators of the universe. All this clearly indicated that the Vedic R̥ṣi attribute this credit to the God, when they wanted to mollify at a particular juncture. It may also be taken to mean that the Vedas do not consider the various gods as separate entities.

The Nāṛādiya-sūtra in R̥g Veda describes vividly the various stages in the process of the creation of the universe. It opines that Sat, Antaraṅga and Vyoma did not exist in the beginning of the universe. Only the One existed. None else was there. All enveloping darkness was there. There was water, but not light. That 'One' originated from 'Tapas'. This 'Tapas' was a latent conscience in the beginning of the universe. Later on the wonders of the world were manifested out of it. This 'Tapas' is an omnipotent power. It is the fountainhead of three processes of knowledge, desire and action. The person Śukra (5.1.1) of Yajur Veda, who holds the omnipotent power as the originator of universe. The all-potent power is also described vividly by Ṛṣi Atiśa Karmā

(विश्वरूपी) the unique, omnipresent, invisible Abhayam Jyotiḥ, Param vyoman (परम अद्योमन्), param pad (परम पद) and Avyakta (अव्यक्त्त) That is the Ultimate Being It is he, whose realisation breaks off the shackles of worldly misery for good

Q 10. Distinguish between Henotheism and Polytheism Is Vedic philosophy monotheistic or monistic ? Discuss

(Poona M. A. 1968)

Give a critical account of monotheism and mantras in the pre-upaniṣadic Vedic religion

(Bombay 1968)

Almost all the mantras in the Rg Veda eulogise gods These gods were the masters of moving spirits of the different powers of Nature Unlike the Greek gods, they cannot be separated in watertight compartments Like the natural powers they represented, they were also co related with one another Almost similar encomiums are bestowed on different gods in the Vedic mantras These gods are not invested with some crystallised individuality

POLYTHEISM HENOTHEISM AND MONOTHEISM

This large number of gods may induce one to think that the Vedas are polytheistic Some people on the contrary, hold that they are purely monotheistic Both these views are, however, one sided In fact all the Vedic mantras are not identical in their approach and content nor are they products of any specific Rsi of a particular period The Vedic ideology also shows a gradual evolution In fact, both monotheistic and polytheistic tendencies run side by side in the Vedas Unlike gods of a polytheistic creed, the Vedic gods do not have separate individual existence Either they pale into insignificance or they are elevated to the high pedestal of the supreme God Living in the lap of Nature, they defied the powers of nature which overawed them or surprised them The particular power of Nature, which impressed them most as a tendency, which is termed as Henotheism or Kathenotheism by Prof Max Muller, means "A belief in single gods, each in turn standing out as the highest And since the gods are thought of as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special concerns and desires call most of all on that god to whom they ascribe the most power in the matter, to whose department, if I may say so, their wish belongs This god alone is present to the mind of the suppliant with him for the time being is associated everything that can be said of a divine being he is the highest, the only god before whom all others disappear, there being in this, however, no offence or depreciation of any other god "

Thus according to many scholars, the Vedas proceed from polythesim to monotheism through henotheism. In other words, polytheism, henotheism and monotheism are the three different stages in the evolutionary history of the Vedic gods. Macdonell contradicts this view because, according to him, the Vedic gods are not wholly interdependent from the rest. They, on the other hand, are independent to the backbone. Varuṇa and Surya depend on Indra. Varuṇa and Ashwin are at the disposal of Vishnu. "Every where a god is spoken of as unique or chief, as is natural enough in laudations, such statements lose their temporarily monotheistic force, through the modifications or corrections supplied by the context or even by the same Verse." Macdonell further holds that, "Henotheism is therefore an appearance rather than a reality, an appearance produced by the indefiniteness due to undeveloped anthropomorphism, by the lack of any Vedic god occupying the position of a Zeus as the constant head of the pantheon, by the natural tendency of the priest or singer in extolling a particular god to exaggerate his greatness and to ignore other gods, and by the growing belief in the unity of the gods each of whom might be regarded as a type of the divine." But whether we call it henotheism or the mere temporary exaggeration of the powers of the deity in question, it is obvious that this stage can neither be properly called polytheistic nor monotheistic but one which had a tendency towards both of them.

MONISM IN VEDAS

The Vedic philosophy does not stop even at monotheism. This tendency towards the One culminates in monism. There are mantras in the Vedas which allude to monism, e.g.,

1. Sat is one ; the wise regard Him as many.

एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ।

2. All that was, that is and that will be is but the puruṣa.

पुरुष एवेद सर्वं च यद् भूतं यच्च भाव्यम् ॥

3. We make offerings to the supreme God of the universe, who is pervading the whole existence and each and every nook and corner of the universe ; who is full of Ānanda (supreme bliss) and inexpressible.

कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥

कस्मै अन्नं किं मादोऽग्निर्ज्ञातस्वरूपत्वात् प्रजापती व्रतंते ॥

यद्वां कं सुप तद्रूपत्वात् ॥

4 The true essence of the gods is only one

महत् देवानाम् सार्वभौमम् ॥

5 His is the soul of this universe, detached, self dependent, immortal, full of bliss the choicest jewel of jewels full of everlasting youth and eternal

तमेव विद्वान् न विभाय भूधोरारामान् सुवानम् ।

तमेव विदिवाऽमृत्युमेति मायं पथा विद्येतज्ञाय ॥

6 Though pervading the whole universe He transcends it all

पदोऽस्य विष्वा भूतानि त्रिषादस्यामसि दिवि ॥

7 All the gods are but the organs of the body of the soul of the universe

एकं स्मारतोऽये देवा प्रवयानि भवन्ति ॥

8 That inexpressible is the substratum of all names and the whole universe

उच्छिष्टं नाम रूपं चोच्छिष्टे शोकं प्राप्नुहि ॥

The belief in the identity between Atman and Brahman expressed so often in the Brahmanas, is to be traced back to these hymns of the Vedas. This is further developed in the Upanishads and then becomes one of the cardinal principles of Indian philosophy. Thus the Vedic hymns are much more than the scriptures of the primitive Aryan race. In them one finds the germs of the thought currents of Later Indian philosophy. The Karma Kanda and Jnana Kanda were fully developed by the Brahmanas and the Upanishads respectively. Even the theism of the Bhagavad Gita derives its inspiration from the worship of Varuna described in the Vedas. The principles of Rta and Karma propounded in the Vedas, get a fertile soil and acquire a new significance in the philosophical works of the later period. Though only in an incipient stage, the Vedic philosophical thought strikes us with its robustness and inspiring quality. In it one finds a welcome combination of knowledge and religion. It contains the first human reactions towards the marvellous phenomena of Nature. Above all, the organic relationship between man and nature and the qualities of the supreme power pervading both of them are beautifully dilated upon in these great works. The realisation of this supreme power was the be all and end all, the alpha and omega of the Indian philosophy. Though in a disarmingly simple and primitive garb, the philosophy of the Vedas is the fountain head of the Indian philosophical thought.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF UPANISADS

Q. 11. Trace the development of thought from Vedas to Upanisads.
Write a note on the peculiarities of pre-Upanishadic thought.

(Bombay 1967)

TRANSITION FROM VEDAS TO UPANISADS

When the spontaneous and natural philosophy of the Vedas was lost in the activism of Brāhamanas, a philosophical reaction followed in the form of the Upanisads. In the development of Vedas to Upanisads, one finds enough differences in thought.

In the history of Indian philosophy the Upanisads represent the age when Indian philosophy, originating in Vedas and passing through the narrow and hard ground of the Brāhamanas divided into many under-currents finding suitable ground in the Upanisads, so much so that it became difficult to imagine its small origin by seeing its present vast form.

DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT FROM VEDAS TO UPANISADS

In the development of thought from Vedas to Upanisads one notices the following points of difference :

1. *Transition from objective to subjective religion*—In the Vedas there are hymns in the praise of the natural powers represented by different gods and goddesses. Thus the Vedic religion was extrovert while the religion of the Upanisads was introvert. The Vedic seers wondered at the multiplicity of the creation and found God in the natural powers. The seers of the Upanisads found god in the soul. Thus in the Upanisads the Vedic prayers and ritualism was substituted by thinking, concentration and meditation.
2. *Difference in the practical aspects of philosophy*—In the evolution of thought from Vedas to Upanisads one also notices difference in the practical aspect of philosophy. Sādhanā in the Vedas was extrovert while in the Upanisads it was directed towards internal experiences. Thus Upanisad necessary for the realisation of the s

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According to Kathopanishad, human mind is naturally extrovert. Hence introversion of the mental tendencies was considered as the first step to Sadhana in Upanisads.

3 *Moral purpose in thought*—As a general rule, the Vedic thought is full of moral purpose, but this appears to be more explicit in the Upanisads. The ultimate end, according to Upanisads, was the realisation of the soul. The aim was neither science nor philosophy, but an integral life. The intellectual efforts were subordinated to the moral evolution. It should be noted here that in spite of having different thoughts from the Vedic seers, the seers of the Upanisads had a strong faith in the past. As a matter of fact, the Upanisads have liberated the Vedic thought from ritualism.

4 *Monism*—Monistic thought is the most important current in the philosophy of the Upanisads. This monism has its root in the Vedic thought. In the Purusa hymn of the Vedas one finds a reference to the universally present Reality. It was this insight into reality which developed in the concept of Sachchidananda in the Upanisads.

5 *Thought and Logic* The Vedic philosophy was full of imagination and emotional expressions. In the Upanisads imagination and emotion were substituted by thought and reasoning. The seers of the Upanisads aimed at the enquiry into truth. Their ideal was not to please Gods or Goddesses, but to realise the self within and without. Thus in the Upanisads, the naive child like attitude of the Vedic seers is substituted by dissatisfaction at the existing order of things.

6 *Negligence of the Vedas*—Thus several Upanisads absolutely neglected the Vedas. The seers of the Upanisads were mystic philosophers. For a mystic the self realisation is the end all and be all, the alpha and omega of philosophy. He has no purpose in the Vedas or other scriptures after the realisation of the self.

Q. 12. What is the meaning of Upanisad? Discuss its importance in Indian Philosophy and point out how different Indian philosophical systems have their origin in the Upanisads.

Or

What are the main teachings of the Upanisads? Indicate their importance in Indian Philosophy. (Bom 1958)

MEANING OF UPANISAD

Literally speaking, the word Upanisad means 'sitting down near'. It means sitting down near the teacher to receive instructions.

The Upanisads are full of instructions given by the teacher to the disciples. Gradually the word Upaniṣad itself came to mean what was received from the teacher, a sort of secret doctrine, 'Rahasya'. It is possible that the word Upaniṣad may have been used for the cryptical great sentences (Mahā Vākya) 'Tat Twām Asi' etc. According to Prof. Max Muller, Upanisads originally meant a session, particularly a session consisting of pupils assembled at a respectful distance round their teacher. In his *Philosophy of Upaniṣads* Paul Deussen maintains that Upaniṣad means "Secret Instructions." According to Dr. Radha Krishnan, sometimes Upaniṣads mean the knowledge which destroys error and enables one to approach the truth. In his Introduction to the Commentary on Taittiriya Upaniṣad, Shankar points out : "True knowledge of Brahman is called Upaniṣad, because in the case of those who devote themselves to it, the bonds of conception, birth and death etc., become un-loosed or because it destroys them altogether, or because it leads the people very near to Brahman or because there-in the highest God is seated." The Upaniṣads have also been called Vedānta, meaning Veda+Anta, i.e., the essence of Vedas. All these views essentially point to the spiritual nature of the Upaniṣads. All these throw light on some significant aspect of it. Upaniṣads mean all this and much more. Like Vedas they are the sources of Indian philosophy.

IMPORTANCE OF THE UPANISADS

Whenever great revolutions took place in the history of Indian philosophy, the philosophers sought for guidance in the Upaniṣads. The period of the Upaniṣads after that of the Vedas was one of the most revolutionary periods in the history of Indian philosophy. After Upaniṣads came Gītā which was an effort to present a practical treatise embodying the essence of the Upaniṣads. After Gītā the great edifice of the Vedānta philosophy was founded on the basis of the Upaniṣads. Even now when the world needs a synthesis of philosophy, religion and science, perhaps Upaniṣads alone can guide the thinking beings. The thinkers of East and West have profited from the study of the Upaniṣads since ancient times. Geden has pointed out that all the movements of religious reformation in India have taken inspiration from the Upaniṣads. The social reformers like Ramesh Chandra Dutt and Raja Ram Mohan were inspired by the Upaniṣads. Mead calls the Upaniṣads 'the world scriptures'. Besides this many

thinkers, including Schopenhauer, Gandhi, Aurobindo, Shankar, Ramānuja etc., got light from the Upanisads, from time to time.

SOURCES OF THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In the *Religion of Vedas*, writes Bloomfield "There is an important form of Hinduthought, heterodox Buddhism included, which is not rooted in Upanisads" Sankhya-Yoga, Nyāya Vaisheṣika, Vedānta etc., all derived their basic tenets from the Upanisads. As Prof. Ranade points out, "Upanisads contain no one system of Philosophy, but systems of philosophising one over another like Alps over Alps."

UPANISAD AND BUDDHISM

According to Oldenberg Upanisads prepared the way for Buddhism. The principle of Karma of the Upanisads, became the source of inspiration for almost all the systems of Indian philosophy including Buddhism. The pessimism and the doctrine of momentariness and many other doctrines of Buddhism had their origin in the Upanisads. As Rhys Davids points out, "Gautam was born and brought up and lived and died a Hindu." The following points also prove the intimate relation of Buddhism and the Upanisads—

(1) Buddhist ritualism has its source in Chandogya Upanisad where it is said that in the beginning there was only Asatya and later on Satya came out of it. Shankar has also endorsed this fact.

(2) The theory of no soul as found in Buddhism also has its source in Upanisads. Its origin can be traced to the Kathopanishad where it has been said that when a man dies, different persons think differently about his soul, some say that it has still some existence, others say that its existence has finished.

(3) The roots of the pessimism and momentarism of Buddhism can be traced to the Upanisadic philosopher Nachiketa when he says that "All is misery" and "All is momentary".

(4) The Buddhist system of monasteries can be traced into Bṛhadāranyaka Upanisad, where it has been said that the man who feels apathy to the world should transcend the desires of money and progeny etc., and lead the life of a hermit.

(5) The Metaphysics and Epistemology of the Vijnānawāda can be traced to the Aitereya Upanisad, where it has been said that every thing in this world has its origin in consciousness and is established in consciousness.

(6) The Buddhist idea of re-birth has its roots in Kathopanishad where it has been said that the souls assume new bodies according to their actions and knowledge.

Thus the essential principles of Buddhism, e. g., nihilism, doctrine of no-soul, pessimism, Vijnānwāda, momentarism, doctrine of Karma, metaphysics, epistemology, etc., are based on the Upanisads.

SANKH A AND UPANISADS

Garbe has thrown light on the relation of Sāṅkhya and Upanisads. Though the word 'Sāṅkhya' has been used for the first time in the Svetāśvatār Upanisad, the principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy can be traced even in the earlier Upanisads. Relations of Sāṅkhya and Upanisads can be described as follows :—

(1) The conception of Prakṛti with three Guṇas can be traced to the Svetāśvatār Upanisad, where it has been said that the original Prakṛti contains red, white and black colours.

(2) The Sāṅkhya conception of Mahat, Buddhi, Avyakta and Puruṣa etc., are found in Kathopanishad.

(3) The conception of astral body found in the later Sāṅkhya philosophy can be traced in Prasnopanishad, where the different constituents of the Puruṣa have been enumerated.

According to Prof. Ranade, "If we first add the Yama and the Niyama of later Yogic philosophy to the various elements of Yoga as mentioned in the old Upanisads, viz., the Āsan, the Prāṇāyām, the Pratyāhār, the Dhāraṇā and the Dhyāna, all as preparation to Samādhi, we have the full fledged eightfold scheme of Yoga." Most of the Yoga philosophy is found in Svetāśvatār Upanisad. One relation of Yoga and Upanisads is also found in the following :—

(1) In Svetāśvatār Upanisad, one finds the description of Āsan, Pratyāhār, Prāṇāyām, the physical effects of Yoga and Samādhi.

(2) Dhāraṇā has been mentioned in Kathopanishad where it has been taken as the highest state of Yoga and the balance of senses, mind and intelligence.

(3) Dhāraṇā has been described in Svetāśvatār Upanisad, where one is asked to search for God in the heart by concentrating upon Him.

(4) The God of Yoga has been described in Kathopanishad where it is said to be beyond the worldly miseries, just as the sun is beyond the eye of the world which is beyond the defects.

(5) The physical aspect of Yoga has been described in Kaushitaki and Maitri Upanisads

NYAYA VAISESIKA AND UPANISADS

In spite of sufficient distinctions between the standpoint of Nyaya and Vaishesika and Upanisads, one finds at least some between the two. This relation can be observed as follows —

(1) The Nyaya Vaishesika principle of 'Puritat' has been borrowed from the Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad

(2) Of the categories of Vaishesika philosophy the five elements — time, mind, soul and ether, are mentioned in Śvetasvatār Upanisad

(3) The quality of Ākash according to Vaishesika philosophy has been mentioned in Chandogya Upanisad

(4) The Nyaya Vaishesika conception of liberation is also based upon Upanisads

Mīmāṃsa is based upon ritualism while Upanisads follow the path of knowledge. Hence the two are not very much related. But the synthesis of knowledge and action as found in Isavasyopaniśad is very much similar to the view of Kumarila

The Vedānta philosophy is based upon Brahma Sūtra, Gīta and the Upanisads. Of these Gītā and Brahma Sūtra contain the essence of the Upanisads. Hence it is clear that Vedānta philosophy has its foundation in the Upanisads. The Vedānta philosophy is mostly represented by Sankara and Rāmaṇuja, which shall be dealt here

Sankara has developed his monistic philosophy on the basis of the Upanisads. It goes without saying that he has not taken the Upanishadic thoughts as they are, because in spite of being called a commentator, his philosophy stands as one of the most significant among the world philosophies. The basic purpose, however, is the same as that of Upanisads. Some of the similarities are as follows —

(1) In the Upanisads, Brahman has been said to be without qualities, substratum of the universe, all pervading, the cause of the world etc. In the context of the discussion between Svetaketu and Āruni in the Chandogya Upanisad, Brahman is said to be the substratum of the world. In the Bṛhadaranyak Upanisad, Yajñavalkya in his discussion with his wife Maitreyee, points out that whatever exists in the world is self. Yajñavalkya has further called Brahman or self, the knower. 'Who can know that who knows

everyone ? He has the eternal knower by whom can he be known." In this same Upaniṣad Brahman has been described by saying "not this, not this."

(2) Sankara's doctrine of the relation of Brahman and Ātman is also based upon the Upaniṣads. It has been said in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, "The soul living in the body is really the Brahman and as soon as it transcends this mundane bondage, it will be merged into Brahman. In the same way, in other Upaniṣads, *e.g.*, Mundak, Kath, Svetāśvatāra, etc., Brahman and Ātman have been identified and Brahman is held to be the alpha and omega of the soul.

(3) Sankara's doctrine of Māyā also has its roots in the Upaniṣads. One finds the mention of blindness, ignorance, Asatya, death, non-existence, falsehood, illusion, God's power, Prakṛti, network, reflections, name and form etc., mentioned in the Upaniṣads to describe the world. Even the very word Māyā has been taken by the Upaniṣads in these senses.

VISISTADVAITA AND UPANISADS

Like the philosophy of Sankara, the philosophy of Rāmānuja is also based upon Upaniṣads. As a matter of fact both Sankara and Rāmānuja saw the Upaniṣads from their own individual stand point and emphasized different portions to endorse their own views and interpreted others according to their own conception of reality. It has been rightly said that the Upaniṣads do not contain one philosophy, but several philosophies. Roots of the qualified monism of Rāmānuja can be found in the Upaniṣads in the following context :—

Rāmānuja has taken the trinity of Jīva, Prakṛti and Īśvara as the ultimate reality. In the Svetāśvatār Upaniṣad, it has been said, "There are three ultimate realities which are all eternal and indestructible and together constitute Brahman, *i.e.*, the powerless ignorant Jīva, all-powerful and omniscient God and eternal Prakṛti which is made for the enjoyment of the Jīva and by which it attains the fruit of its action."

(2) In the context of the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Āruni in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, God has been taken as the all-pervading in the universe. This pantheistic idea is the basis of the philosophy of Rāmānuja, where he has taken God as the soul of Prakṛti. Yājñavalkya has taken God as the soul of both the world and the Jīva. Such references can also be found in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

(3) According to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, God is the soul of everything, living or non living. Just as the spokes of a wheel are bound with axis, similarly all the living beings, all gods of the world, all souls are centred in God—God is the mind of all.” Other quotations like this can also be found in this Upaniṣad.

(4) Rāmānuja's conception of liberation can be traced to the Mundaka Upaniṣad, where it has been said, “When the devotee sees the Puruṣa of golden complexion which is the doer of all, controller of all and the eternal source of the universe, then he leaves both merits and demerits and attains similarity with the divine form being liberated.” Similarly, according to Mundaka Upaniṣad, the man established in Brahman consciousness being freed from all sins reaches the land of Brahman. Rāmānuja has accepted gradual liberation, liberation by attainment of divine form, the liberation by living in God's land.

Q 13. Briefly discuss the problems of the Upaniṣad. What method did they employ to solve them?

(Madras 1962 Mysore 1963 Baroda 1964)

What are the main themes of the Upaniṣads? What is their philosophical value?

(Bombay 1965)

PROBLEM OF THE UPANISADS

Before studying the philosophy of the Upaniṣads in details, it is necessary to survey the main problems which were dealt with by the seers. These problems are as follows —

(1) *What is that by knowing which everything else can be known?* The seers of the Upaniṣads wanted to know the aim of knowledge. On the basis of personal experience, they had a faith that behind the multiple things of the universe there is some such Reality by reaching which the mind, the intellect and the senses can attain peace. The philosophical enquiry begins in the dissatisfaction with the existing order of things. Our senses do not give us the real knowledge. The mind is always shifting among qualities. The search for the One in many is the natural urge of human beings. In the words of Upaniṣads, “What is that by the knowledge of which all this can be known?”

(2) *What remains after death?*—The basic question behind the enquiries into rebirth, the eternity of soul, the consequences of actions etc., is that which remains after the body is dead, where from have we come and where will we go. In the words of Yājñavalkya, “Which is the real root from where in spite of being

repeatedly caught by the death, the tree of life springs again and again."

(3) *Search for Ultimate Reality*—Thus the Upaniṣads were in search of the Ultimate Reality in the psychological as well as physical world. It is this reality which has been sometimes called Prāṇa, sometimes mind, sometimes reason and sometimes soul. "What is that which remains even while the body is in the sleeping stage and which is always creating?" In the psychological field, the Upaniṣads aimed at the search of that reality which is existent in all the stages of man, the working, the dreaming and the sleeping. In the Kena Upaniṣad, the disciple asked the teacher, "By whose wish the mind goes to its aim? By whose order the first breath begins, by whose desire do we speak? Which God guides the eyes and the earth?"

(4) *Search for the Creator the Sustainer and the Destroyer of the world*—In brief the Upaniṣads were set to enquire into the original cause, the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the world. They searched for Him first in the physical world. When they were disappointed, they searched for him in the psychological field. Lastly, they found Him in the mystic experience and their spiritual, moral and psychological enquiry culminated into mysticism.

(5) *The practical problem*—The problems of the Upaniṣads were mostly practical, moral, religious and that of life. They did not aim only at the knowledge of truth, but also at its realization. How can that truth be attained? How can that truth be interpreted in the integral life? It is hence that the seer of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad has prayed the Almighty to take him from the ignorance to truth, darkness to light, the death to immortality.

METHODS OF UPANISADS

The philosophers of the Upaniṣads have utilised various methods in their discussions and teachings. Their main methods were as follows :—

1. *Enigmatic method*—The best illustration of the enigmatic method is found in the Svetāsvatār Upaniṣad, where it is said that Reality is like a great circumscribing felly whose tyres are the three Guṇas, whose ends are the sixteen Kālas, whose spokes are the fifty Bhāvas or conditions of Sāṃkhya philosophy, whose counter-spokes are the ten senses and their ten objects, whose six sets of eight are such as the eight Dhātus, and eightfold Prakṛti and so on,

whose rope is the Cosmic Person, who three paths are the Good, the Bad and the Indifferent or yet the Moral, the Immoral and A-moral, and finally which causes the single infatuation of the ignorance of self on account of the two causes, namely good and bad works. Puzzles can also be found in Isavāsyopaniṣad and other Upaniṣads.

2 *Aphoristic method*—Aphoristic method of Upaniṣads has been widely used in the later philosophical treatises as well. In this method, much knowledge is compressed in small aphoristic sentences, which require sufficient intelligence to understand them. It is for this reason that the same sentences have been interpreted differently by different commentators. In the Mandukya Upaniṣad it has been said "The syllable Om is verily all that exists. Under it is included all the past, the present and future, as well as that which transcends time. Verily, all this is Brahman. The Ātman is Brahman. This Ātman is four footed. The first foot is the Vaiśwanar, who enjoys gross things in the state of wakefulness. The second is the Tajasa, who enjoys exquisite things in the state of dream. The third is the Prajna, who enjoys bliss in the state of deep sleep. The fourth is the Ātman who is alone, without a second, calm, holy and tranquil." This passage has been differently interpreted by the systems of Vedantic philosophy.

3 *Etymological method* In the etymological method, the meaning of the word is explained according to its root. In the Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad, we are told that "Purusa is really Puruṣa" i.e., inhabiting the citadel of heart. Examples like this can be seen in other Upaniṣads also.

4 *Mythical Method*—Mythical method has been mostly used in teaching. In Upaniṣads, e.g., in the Kena Upaniṣad, the parable of the Indra and demons has been told to preach humanity. Sometimes the myth is introduced for aetiological purpose, as for example the myth of the sun coming out of the huge world egg. Sometimes one finds the transcendental myth, e.g., in the Aitareya Upaniṣad, it is said, how the Ātman entered the human skull and became individualised as the human soul. Similarly, a myth is sometimes introduced for the sake of parody also.

5 *Analogical Method*—Things which cannot be explained by reasoning are explained by analogy e.g., Yajñavalkya introduces the analogy of the drum of the conch in order to explain the processes of the apprehension of the self. Āruni explain the non-difference of the individual soul from the universal soul by the ana-

logy of the juices in constituting honey or the rivers in flowing into the ocean and being merged into it.

6. *Dialectic Method*—The dialectical method is one of the most widely used methods of the Upaniṣads. In this method, the philosophers assembled at some place and dramatically discussed different problems among themselves. In the Upaniṣads such discussions and symposiums have been mentioned at many places.

7. *Synthetic Method*—In the synthetic method, the discussion of the dialectical method is substituted by the creative synthesis of the synthetic method. In the fourth chapter of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya synthesises the several standpoint explained by the king Janak. Examples like this can be found in Chāndogya, Praśna and other Upaniṣads.

8. *Monologic Method*—Though the philosophers of the Upaniṣads speak very seldom, but when they speak, sometimes they forget the presence of others and go on talking to themselves for a long time. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Yājñavalkya, replying to the questions of the king Janak, regarding the nature of the soul, is lost in self-speech. In the Kathopanishad, in the discussion of Yama and Nachiketā, Yama goes on talking to himself for a long time while replying the third question of Nachiketā.

9. *Adhoc or Temporising method*—The teachers of the Upaniṣads taught the disciples according to his mental and psychological level. In the temporising method, as the spiritual level of the enquirer increases the teacher not only shows him the path ahead, but tells him the whole truth at once. This method has been accepted as very much important by the modern psychology of education as well. In the famous parable of Indra and Virochana, Virochana is satisfied by the first answer of the teacher Prajāpati, but Indra is not satisfied and goes on questioning. Prajāpati tells him the secret of soul first in the body, then in the dream and sleeping stages and it is after that alone that he tells him the real nature of soul. In his method, the enquirer himself struggles to understand the truth and the teacher only guides him. Hence this method is very much important in the spiritual evolution.

10. *Regressive Method*—The regressive method is in the form of many successive questions in which every new question carries us behind the answer to the previous one. Thus when Janak told Yājñavalkya about the light of man Yājñavalkya told that as the sun. Janak went behind answer after answer, carrying

from the fire to the Ātma which exists behind them all as the light in itself. In the same Upanisad the regressive method has been used in the discussion between Yajñavalkya and Gargi.

Q 14 Scan the philosophic speculation of the Upanisads and explain how they reached their logical culmination in the identity of the Self and the Brahman. (*Gujrat M A 1961 Meerut 1971*)

What according to the Upanisads is the relation between Ultimate Reality and the Soul. (*Madras 1966 Baroda 1965*)

The philosophy of the Upanisads was the philosophy of the life of the seers. The solution of the problem of metaphysics was the search of their life. Hence one finds gradual evolution in the idea of Ultimate Reality in the Upanisads. The seers enquired in Ultimate Reality from different standpoints and persisted in their inquiry till the Reality was fully known. Hence the philosophy of the Upanisads is not a cut and dried philosophy of one or more philosophical minds but a spiritual evolutionary process progressing from generation to generation.

According to Prof. Ranade the metaphysical problem of the Upanisad was a cosmo-theo-psychological problem. The seers of the Upanisads first sought the Ultimate Reality in the creation of the world. When they were not satisfied in their search in the cosmic field, they tried to enquire from the religious standpoint. After being disappointed here also they searched for it in the psychological field. It is here that they found the ultimate principle of Self. Later they realised that the truth got from the cosmological and theological enquiry is also the same as that got by the psychological enquiry. Thus in the end they reached that ultimate knowledge which is the essence of the self—the Prakṛti and Isvar, i.e. that of psychological, cosmological and metaphysical field. This is the One Ultimate Reality—the secret Brahman. Thus the metaphysical problem of the Upanisads was ultimately solved in mysticism.

The Vedas represent the infancy of Indian philosophy and religion when man took the physical powers as ultimate. In the Upanisads human thought had become more mature and so they realised that the natural powers are not the Ultimate Reality, but only external powers. In the Chandogya Upanisad in the parable of Satyakāma Jabāla and his disciple Upakosala, this transition has been verified. But here the place of natural powers has been taken by the bodily power. Thus according to the Chandogya Upanisad

the Ultimate Reality is the eyes or the energy of the body. In the Maitri Upaniṣad, it was conceived as the sound which is heard when the ears are closed.

But gradually the enquirers could not be satisfied by these physical elements so they moved to enquire into the psychological realm. In the Kausheetaki and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one finds references to psychological phenomena.

But gradually even the psychological phenomena failed to satisfy the enquirers and they sought for the Ultimate Reality in the creation. In the Upaniṣads axiological argument has been used to prove the existence of Brahman. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the word *Tajjalān* has been used to explain that the creation, sustenance and the destruction of the world, are in Brahman. According to Maitri Upaniṣad, "That from which all these living things have been born, in which they live and lastly into which they will be merged, that is Brahman." Thus even the natural powers were taken as the powers of the Ultimate Reality. In the parable of the war between the gods and the demons in the Kenopaniṣad; it has been pointed out that there is One Ultimate Power behind the Prakṛti and mind, that is Brahman.

All the objects of the world shine due to Brahman. In the words of Kathopaniṣad, "The sun does not shine before Him, the moon, the stars, the lightening do not shine before Him, what to say of the fire. By its shining all these shine, by its light all these are lighted."

Brahman is a subtle essence pervading the whole living and non-living world. In the parable of the fruit of the Nyagrodh tree in Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is this principle which has been explained. The physical world is the external manifestation of that subtle essence. The soul is the essence of all things. Thus there is one essence behind the mind and nature and metaphysically both are the same and one.

Along with the cosmological argument there is the physico-theological argument. The teleological argument is also a form of this argument. According to physico-theological argument, Brahman controls the whole order of the universe and saves it from going on the wrong path. According to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the sun, the moon, heaven, earth, days, nights, months and years, seas and rivers, etc., follow their own course due to the order of Brahman. Besides the cosmic field the inquisitive seers searched for the Ultimate Reality in the spiritual field as well. This search began

with the discussion about gods. In the Vedas hundreds of gods and goddesses have been accepted. Gradually their importance became less and less. Ultimately the idea of a God of gods was found. In the Upanisads this God of gods was identified with the self. In the Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad in the discussion between Yajñavalkya and Vīdagdha Sakalya it was concluded after much reasoning that Brahman alone is the God of universe, whose body is the earth, physique is the fire, mind is the night and which is the ultimate end of all human souls.

In the Śvetasvatār Upaniṣad one finds theistic type of thoughts. According to theistic conception, God has a personality. He is one. He is the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the universe. He is the master of all. He is the omnipresent and omnipotent. The Nature and Time are guided by Him. He is the only knower. He has all the qualities. He is beyond the present, past and future. His power is expressed in the form of knowledge and activity. He is neither the cause nor effect. He is the only cause of everything. It should be noted here that according to Śvetāśvatār Upaniṣad, God is also the self of all.

At some places, the Upanisads have described God as immanent. According to Śvetasvatār Upaniṣad, God is present in the fire, water, herbs, plants and the whole universe. In the Chandogya Upaniṣad, self has been explained to be all pervading by the example of the dissolution of salt in the water. Just as the salt is present in every part of the saline water, similarly the imperceptible soul is present everywhere. God had also been described as transcendent. In the Śvetāśvatār Upaniṣad God has been described as immanent and transcendent in the same verse. God is standing silently in the heaven like a tree and yet the whole universe is filled by him. After failing to get satisfaction by the search of the reality in the creation and physical world, the enquirers tried to find it in the psychological field. In the Bṛhadaranyaka Upaniṣad, the king Janaka presents several psychological views regarding the ultimate reality in the context of the discourse between him and Yajñavalkya. Yajñavalkya calls all of them as partial truths, because only the soul is the Ultimate Reality. In the Kenopaniṣad, the self has been called as the ear of the ears, the mind of the minds, the speech of the speeches and the life of the lives. In it the soul is said to be the innermost element of the physical and

psychological phenomena. In the parable of Indra Virochana and Prajāpati in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the self has been called the state of waking, dreaming and sleeping respectively and lastly- it is said to be the pure self-consciousness arrived at by the psychological analysis of the three states, *i.e.* waking, dreaming and sleeping.

The Upaniṣads have presented ontological proof for the existence of the self by taking truth as knowledge. In the words of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, "The ultimate Brahman is existence, knowledge and infinite." Similarly, in the Aitareya Upaniṣad, the Prajñā has been described as all gods, five elements, all beings, the eye of all material and non-material things and of the whole universe and lastly the Brahman itself. Thus the Ultimate Reality has been accepted as Prajñā or consciousness. This Prajñā is the net result of the Upaniṣadic enquiry into the creation, the spiritual and psychological world. It is to prove this Ultimate Reality that various types of proofs have been used. It is the Existence, the Knowledge and Infinite. It is the Brahman. It is God and it is the essence of the entire mental and physical universe.

Q. 15. How far has the concept of Brahman been given in the Upaniṣads? What is the relation of Atman and Brahman?

(Mysore 1962)

"The cardinal principle of the Upaniṣadic teaching is the identity of Atman and the Brahman." Discuss. (Poona M. A. 1958)

Explain the Upaniṣadic terms Brahman and Atman and tell how they are identified by the sages.

(Pombay 1968)

BRAHMAN

According to Upaniṣads, the essence of the universe and the Ultimate Reality is Brahman. Brahman is infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient and pure consciousness. It is the self of all.

Brahman is Existence. It is the subtle essence and substratum of all the things in the universe. In the words of Chāndogya Upaniṣad, it is by Him that the world has a beginning and end and its sustenance. The powers of the Nature are only parts of Brahman. It is the power of Brahman which works through them. In the words of Taittirīya Upaniṣad, all the elements are borne in Him, in Him all of them live and in Him they culminate. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad this truth has been explained with the help of a parable. The teacher asked the disciple to bring a fruit of the

Nyagrodh tree When the disciple brought the fruit asked him to break it When the disciple broke it teacher asked what is there in it ? The disciple saw a small seeds in the fruit. Now the teacher asked him to of these seeds and enquired what is there in the seed ? The disciple broke the seed and replied that there is nothing in it Now the teacher told the disciple that this 'Nothing' is the subtle essence by which the Nyagrodh tree is born This parable explains how Brahman is the subtle essence of the whole universe

Brahman is knowledge It is described earlier as to how the Upanisadic seers arrived at the self consciousness as the ultimate reality after the psychological analysis of the waking, dreaming and sleeping stages Self-consciousness is the directing power of the eyes, the ears the nose the mind and everything else It is beyond mind and intellect In the great sentences of 'That Thou Art', 'I am Brahman All is Brahman', etc, the fact is explained that the self-consciousness is the essence of the whole universe It is the self and also the Brahman

The Brahman is infinite It is transcendent as well as immanent The world is made out of all parts of His essence According to the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, the three worlds have been created out of one foot of Brahman, the three types of knowledge of the Vedas is included in another foot the third includes the three vital breath, while the forth shines in the form of the sun beyond the earth The living beings and the universe have been born out of the Brahman The self has come out of Him The self is full, but there is no deficiency in Brahman even when the full self comes out of Him This puzzle has been explained by the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad as follows

"That is full, this is also full, the full comes out of full But whatever remains after taking the full is also full

Thus the finite comes out of infinite and to reach infinite is its goal

To call Brahman infinite does not imply that he is unknowable as well Such sentences can be found in the Upanisads where Brahman has been called as the knower It is the subject hence it cannot be the object of knowledge In the words of Brhadāranyaka Upanisad, "That through which everything else is known, how can it be known ?" In the Taittirīya Upanisad it has been said

about Brahman, "That from which the mind returns along with speech and cannot attain it, that is the Ultimate Reality." But this does not mean that Brahman cannot be known. The aim of the Upanisad was the realisation of Brahman. In the words of Yajñavalkya, "If self-consciousness is not possible then nothing is possible at all." It is true that the Brahman cannot be known by the senses, mind or intellect, and yet is the object of the immediate experience. It is the knowers' knowledge. No knowledge is possible without its knowledge. Just as perception of anything also proves the existence of the eye, similarly the knowledge of any type also proves the existence of the self, the knower. According to Mundaka Upanisad, "Om is the bow, self is the arrow and Brahman is its aim. We should pierce the aim with concentration so that the arrow and aim may become one."

The Upanisads have described two forms of Brahman—Para and Aparā. Para Brahman is higher while the Aparā Brahman is lower. Para Brahman is infinite, attributeless, un-conditioned, without names and form and transcendent. The Aparā Brahman is limited, attributed, conditioned, with name and form and immanent. The first is beyond space, time, causality and the world. The other is master of the universe and entangled in the cause-effect principle. The first is Existence, Consciousness and Bliss. The other is eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, the master of Karmas, the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the universe and immanent. It is God. The first is the aim of Parā Vidyā, while the other is the object of the Aparā Vidyā. Para Brahman and Aparā Brahman, both are two aspects of the same one Brahman. Para Brahman, has been described through "Neti-Neti". Aparā Brahman has been described through, "Iti-Iti".

The Para Brahman is one, impersonal, beyond time, inactive, calm, without pain, untouched, without form, beyond earth, air, water, fire and ether, without speech, mind, ears, tongue etc.; eternal, infinite all-pervading, multiple, indescribable and the self of all. In the words of Kathopaniṣad, "It is without beginning, eternal, permanent and ancient." In the words of Mundaka Upanisad, "It is eternal, omnipresent, everywhere and subtle." The Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanisad has described it as neither gross nor subtle, neither small nor big. The changes do not effect Para Brahman. It has no distinctions, dualism or multiplicity. In it there is no distinction of the subject. It is Existence, Conscious-

ness and Bliss It is the ultimate end It is the witness, the knower and seer It is known through self consciousness

The God is the creator of all the beings, elements and everything else in the universe The Chandoyga Upanisad has called Him "Tajjalān" The natural powers act by His order It is the inner dweller and the self of all beings It is the cause of differences and that of the whole universe It is perfect and the controller of the Karmas, though himself beyond merit and demerit It is He who rewards punishments according to merits and demerits It is infinite, eternal, immutable, moving everywhere, omniscient, omnipotent, beyond all sins, pure and perfect Mayā is his power It is the creator of the four Vedas It is the ultimate destiny. Thus the Upanisads have regarded Brahman both as attributed and without attributes In their commentaries on the Upanisads, Sankara and Rāmānuja have emphasized the second and first respectively As a matter of fact according to Upanisads, both are two forms of the same Brahman

Q. 16. Give a brief account of the Upanisadic approaches to the problem of self (Poona M A 1960)

According to Upanisads, the individual self and the supreme self reside in the same heart of the same body like darkness and light The first has been called as jīva while the second has been called to be the self The jīva enjoys the consequences of his action and feels pleasure and pain and the self is beyond all these Both are without beginning and eternal The jīva is ignorant and its pain and bondage are due to ignorance By the knowledge of the self this ignorance along with its pain and bondage is destroyed The self is one Its knowledge destroys all dualism Some Upanisads have not distinguished between Jīva and self while in others the distinction is very clear The self has been identified with God or Brahman while the Jīva has been taken as different from them

The Jīva is different from the body mind, intellect and senses It is beyond these It is the knower, the enjoyer and the doer It is eternal, conscious and many It is without beginning and without end But it does not possess infinite knowledge It is beyond birth and death and does not die with the body It has the freedom of will It is caught in the bondage due to its action It gets merits

and demerits, pleasure and pain according to its good and bad deeds. It has desire, will, activity and character. It is subject to re-birth. Its re-birth is according to its karmas.

THE JIVA HAS FOUR STAGES

1. *Waking* In the waking stage, the Jīva is called 'Vaiśvānara' which enjoys the worldly objects through eternal senses.
2. *Dreaming*—In the dreaming stage, the Jīva is known as "Taijasa", which knows the subtle internal objects and enjoys them through the mind.
3. *Sleeping*—In the sleeping stage the jīva is called "Prajña" which is one, uniform, conscious and bliss and does not perceive internal objects.
4. *Turiya*—In the Turiya stage the Jīva is known as "Ātman" which is neither conscious nor un-conscious, but one, non-dual, universal consciousness. This Ātman is Brahman.

The Jīva is within the five sheaths, i.e., subtle bodies. These five sheaths are as follows :—

1. *Physical Sheath (Annamaya Kośa)*—This sheath is formed by the sense organs and the body are maintained through this sheath.
2. *Vital Sheath (Prāṇamaya Kośa)* The vital sheath is within the physical sheath. It is full of the vital energies which create motion in the body, and it is sustained through them.
3. *Mental Sheath (Manomaya Kośa)*—The mental sheath is within the vital sheath. It depends upon the mind in which there is selfish volition.
4. *Consciousness Sheath (Vijnānamaya Kośa)*—This consciousness sheath is within the mental sheath. It depends upon the intellect and its activities. In it there is the dualistic knowledge of the subject and object.
5. *Bliss Sheath (Ānandmaya Kośa)*—The bliss sheath is within the consciousness sheath. It is full of bliss and without distinction of subject and object. It is infinite, transcendent and perfect. It is not a sheath of the self, but of its essence. This self is the real essence of the jīva, i.e., Brahman. By its knowledge the bondage of the jīva is loosened. This knowledge is attained through direct experience. In the Kathopanisad this self has been called the ultimate reality, immortal, self-evident and self-enlightened.

parables of Yama-Nachiketa and Indra-Virochana, this self has been explained as the ultimate reality. In the words of Yajanavalkya, "The self is the ultimate knower, it is knower of all things, hence it cannot be known in the form of an object." And yet it is not a mere nihil. Even after the setting of the sun and moon and the extinction of the fire, the soul shines in its own effulgence. According to Kathopanishad, "It is by the shining of the self that everything else shines, it is by light that all this is lighted." In the words of Mundaka Upanishad, "The fire is its head, the moon and sun are its eyes, the four directions of the space are its ears, the Vedas are its speech, the air its breath, the universe is its heart. Because, in fact, it is the inner dweller, self of all jivas." Sankara has referred to a verse in which the self has been taken in various meanings. According to this verse the self means that which is present in all, which is subject and knower, which experiences and enlightens all objects, which is immortal and always the same.

Q. 17. Write a short note on the Upanishadic idea of the world.

THE WORLD

The world according to the Upanishads is the manifestation of Brahman. It originates in Brahman, is sustained through Him and culminates into Him. Brahman is the cause of the names and forms of the physical world. Space, time and nature etc., are the coverings of Brahman. Brahman is everywhere. Just as the plants are born in the earth, hairs come out of the body or the web comes out of the body of the spider, similarly the world comes out of the perfection of the Brahman and returns into it. Water, earth, air, fire and ether etc., the *pranas* (sense organs) and mind all originate from Brahman. The rivers, oceans, mountains, plants, human beings, gods, animals, birds, four Vedas and *karmas* etc., have their origin in Brahman. Just as the spider creates the web and then takes it back inside it, similarly the Brahman creates the world and then takes it back inside Him. He does not create it out of some matter, already present, as there was no matter before creation. Before creation there was only one soul. He determined that I will create the world and He created the universe. He created the subtle and the gross, the formless and with forms. Ether was born out of self, the air originated in ether, fire came out of air, the water was born in fire, the earth originated in water and finally from the earth came out the plants etc. Thus the world was in the Brahman in the unmanifested form. He manifested. He

created the names and the forms and the objects. He created the distinction.

In the Śvetāśvatāra Upanisad, Brahman has been called "Īśa". He is also called Siva, Rudra, Hara and Maheśwar. God is the master or Īśa of the Nature and the jīva is ignorant and subordinate. God, Jīva and Nature are absolutely separate from one another. As a matter of fact the Brahman manifests through three forms, the experiences, the phenomenal world and the God, which guides both and creates the worldly experiences in the jīva. The God creates the world through his power of Māyā or Prakṛti. He has multiple powers. These powers are the Prakṛti or Māyā. Prakṛti is one, eternal, mode of Satva. Rajas and Tamas. It is dynamic and creates things through these guṇas. The Māyāmaya God creates universe by His power and rules over it. He is the controller of Guṇas. The Prakṛti is the creating self power of the multiple and varied universe.

According to Subāla Upanisad, in the beginning there was neither existence nor non-existence, nor both. Out of this Tamas was born. From Tamas originated Bhutādi, from Bhutādi the ether, the air, the fire, the water, the earth and finally from the earth all beings were born. Then in the stage of pralaya all the living beings culminated in the earth, the earth disappeared into the water, water is absorbed into fire, the fire goes back into air, air is absorbed into ether, the ether culminates into sense organs, the sense organs go back to subtle essences which culminate into Bhutādi, the Bhutādi then goes back to Mahat, the Mahat disappears into Avyakta, the Avyakta goes to Akshara and the Akshara is absorbed into Tamas and finally the Tamas disappears into Paradeva. Beyond this there is neither existence (Sad) nor non-existence (Asad) nor both (Sadāsad). All the objects of the world are the modifications of this original reality. According to hāndogya Upanishad, the modifications are mere names and forms. Sankara and Rāmānuja have separated their theories of varta and Pariṇāma respectively by different interpretations of s view.

Q. 18. Outline the features of Upanisadic mysticism.

BONDAGE AND LIBERATION

According to Upanisads, ignorance is the cause of bondage. Liberation is the result of knowledge. In the ignorance there

(Baroda M.A. 1959)

is no distinction of the eternal and ephemeral. In it there is dualism, egoism and plurality. It is the intellectual knowledge having the distinction of the subject and object. It is the knowledge of the objects in the context of space, time and causality. It is the field of action. It is the cause of re-birth. By knowledge one gets liberation and the bondage of transmigration is broken. It is the knowledge through immediate experience. It is beyond intellectual knowledge. It is not determined by space, time or causality. It is the field of the higher knowledge through identity.

The ego is born through ignorance. This ego is the real cause of bondage. Due to it the jiva identifies himself with the sense organs, mind, intellect or body. The knowledge of the physical world creates bondage. The causes of bondage are the egoism, the selfishness and the attachment.

Annihilation of ego through knowledge and the realisation of the real nature of Brahman by identity, cause the disappearance of the bondage. The knowledge of the Brahman implies "Being Brahman". This is to see Brahman everywhere and to see oneself in all. It is to see the same self in everything and to see self of all. It is the multiple status. In it there is unity and identity of the jiva and God. In it there is no fear of merit and demerit, attachment and aversion, pleasure and pain etc. It is the indescribable, eternal peace. It is the self-play, self-enjoyment, absolute freedom and bliss. It is without dualism and pluralism. It is a unity. It is the ultimate self-consciousness, selfless will and attributeless consciousness and the stage of indescribable bliss.

The Upanisads have not only theoretically discussed about bondage and liberation but also discovered means to achieve liberation. As a matter of fact the Upanisads do not make distinction between knowledge and activity, philosophy and life. The meaning of knowledge of Brahman is to become Brahman. Hence the Upanisads have discussed in details the means of achieving liberation. This includes the entire ethics of the Upanisads because liberation is the ultimate end sought by them. Self-realisation or Brahman realisation is the only means of liberation. But in the evolution towards perfect self-realisation many other means have to be utilised. It is necessary to discuss these subsidiary means also.

The spiritual life has its own conditions peculiar to it. With

out fulfilling these conditions one should not hope for self realisation. According to the Upanisads these conditions are as follows :

1. *Introversion*—The soul is inner dweller. It cannot be realised by running after the worldly objects, though running after external objects is the natural tendency of man. Introversion is the concentration of the mind on the inner soul by restraining this tendency and taking away the senses from the external objects. This is the first condition of self-realisation.

2. *Catharsis*—According to Kathopanisd, the self cannot be realised either by speech or by intellect or by hearing many things. In the Mundaka Upanisd, truth, austerity, real knowledge and the life of celibacy, have been taken as essential for self-realisation.

3. *Initiation from the teacher*—In the Chândogya Upanisd, Satyakāma says that he has heard from many persons great like his spiritual teacher that no one can reach his aim in the path of self-realisation without initiation from the teacher. In the words of Kathopanisd' "Arise, awake and learn from those who are better than you, because the path of self-realisation is difficult like the edge of the knife." The wise seers have called it the most difficult path. In the same Upanisd, it has been said that if the teacher has not himself realised the soul, how can he initiate others? In the Chândogya Upanisd, in the parable of the man living in the country of Gāndhār, it has been said that the dacoits closed his eyes and took him to the forest in the far country and left him there, he came back to his country only when another man told him the path. In this parable the need of the teacher in the path of self-realisation has been very beautifully explained.

4. According to the Swetāśwatār Upanisd, unless the enquirer has sufficient devotion for God and the teacher he should not be initiated in the path of the self-realisation. Some Upanisads have renunciation as the necessary condition for self-realisation, but this has not been admitted by others.

After devotion, catharsis, introversion etc., and after initiation from the teacher, the enquirer proceeds on the path of self-realisation. There are two important aids of this path—the practice of Yoga and the concentration on Om. When this concentration is complete, the self becomes one with Brahman and is realised.

According to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisd, the control of the body on the mind and the catharsis of the chitta through Yoga, makes one suitable for Brahman realisation. Penance is helpful in the catharsis of the chitta. Sama, Dama, Uparati, Titikṣa, and

Samādhi are necessary for self-realisation. One should practice the sixfold Yoga of *Pranāyām*, *Pratyāhara*, *Dhāraṇa*, *Dhyana*, and *Samādhi*. *Āsana* or postures have also been described, but not included in the sixfold Yoga. In the *Sandilya Upanisad*, one finds the description of the eightfold *Pātanjali Yoga*. Ten forms of *Yama* have been described, i.e., non violence (*Ahimsa*), Truth (*Satya*), Non stealing (*Asteya*), Celibacy (*Brahmacharya*), Pity (*Daya*), Arjava, Forgiveness (*Kṣama*), Forbearance (*Dhṛti*), Restrained diet (*Mitahara*), and Cleanliness (*Śauca*). Ten forms of *Niyama* have been described i.e., penance (*Tapas*), Contentment (*Santosha*), Faith in God (*Āstikya*), Charity (*Dana*), Worship of God, Hearing of spiritual principle (*Siddhanta Śravaṇa*), Shame in immoral actions, Faith (*Śraddha*), Repetition of divine names (*Japa* and Fasting (*Vrata*). In the *Śvetāsvatara Upanisad* the physical effects of the practice of Yoga have been described.

After ascending the various steps of Yoga, concentration on *Om* is necessary. The *Upanisads* have given much importance to *Om*. *Om* has been divided into four stages which are the four stages of the consciousness and suit different types of soul. These four stages are, waking, dreaming, sleeping and *turiya* while the four types of souls are *Vaiśvānar*, *Taijasa*, *Prajñā* and *Ātman*. The meditation on *Om* removes other stages and establishes in the *Turiya* stage in which the pure self is realised.

According to Prof. Ranade there are five steps in the ladder of the spiritual evolution, described in the *Upanisads*. These five steps are as follows —

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

(2) In the second stage the enquirer experiences that he is really the very self and that he is neither the bodily nor vital nor intellectual nor emotional and that he is in his essential nature entirely identical with the pure self. According to *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad* the Being which calls itself the 'I' within us must be identified with the self.

(3) In the third stage the enquirer realises that the self which he has realised is identical with Brahman. *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanisad*, along with *Isa* and its cognate *Upanisads*, explained, the identification of *Ātman* and Brahman of the individual spirit and the universal spirit, of the self and Absolute. Thus in the third stage, the enquirer sees no difference between the self and the

Absolute. In the *Iśa Upanisad*, it has been proclaimed that it must be regarded as verily Brahman, that *Ātman* is infinite in its nature and also the Brahman, that the *Ātman* derives its being from Brahman, that subtracting the infinity of the *Ātman* from the infinity of Brahman, the residuum is infinite.

(4) In the fourth stage the enquirer realises that since he is the Self and the Self is the Absolute, it follows syllogistically that he is the Absolute. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, it has been said that one must identify the 'I' with the Absolute. In the *Chāndogya Upanisad* the same doctrine is proclaimed where the 'THOU' comes also to be 'projectively' identified with the Absolute.

(5) In the fifth stage it is realised that everything that we see in this world; man and nature, self and the not-self, equally constitutes the Absolute. The Brahman, according to *Chāndogya Upanisad*, is verily the "All". This is the position of Absolute monism. The realisation of this Absolute is not merely intellectual but mystic.

This mystic realisation results into the following consequences. These consequences are the signs of mystic realisation as well :—

(1) According to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, when the desires of a person have been satisfied and the aim achieved after the realisation of the self, why should the man indulge in the physical activities. This means that when the perfect seer takes himself as the pure self, then all his physical attachment and desires are destroyed.

(2) The mystic realisation results into disappearance of all doubts and illusions. All problems are solved after self-realisation. According to *Mundak Upanisad*, "All the knots of his heart are opened, all his doubts are removed and the effects of his karmas are destroyed."

(3) Self-realisation also gives much strength. The *Mundak Upanisad* has compared the strength preceding and succeeding self-realisation, when it says, "Though the individual self and the worldly self live together on the same truth yet he was attached and miserable due to his absolute purileity. But once he is related with the ultimate reality, the source of all power, all his miseries disappear and he shares in the infinite strength of the world-soul."

(4) Union with world-soul results into absolute bliss. In the *Taittirīya Upanisad* this bliss has been elaborately described. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, this bliss has been compared with the bliss of sexual union with one's dear wife. In this bliss the man

forgets himself as well as the other

(5) The initial effect of the realisation of this bliss is the disappearance of all fears. The feeling of bliss removes the feeling of fear. In the words of Taittiriya Upanisad. He becomes fearless because he has found a place in that imperceptible bodiless indescribable fearless and the baseless basis of all.

(6) Lastly self realisation results into the satisfaction of all desires. In the words of Chandogya Upanisad. One who finds the self after its search, he attains all the universe and all his desires are fulfilled. Thus after self realisation one feels satisfaction of all the physical desires, disappearance of all doubts, attainment of infinite power, realisation of absolute bliss, disappearance of all fear and the fulfilment of all desires. Self realisation is the ultimate end according to Upanisads, because self is the real essence of man. Self is in all and self is Brahman. This is the pantheism of the Upanisads. But the pantheism of the Upanisads is not a lower type of pantheism. Brahman is in the world, but Brahman is more than the world. This pantheism does not take away the freedom of will. As a matter of fact, the best type of ethics can be established on the basis of the Upanisadic philosophy. The synthesis of selfishness and altruism, the freedom of self, the determination of right and wrong and the search after the integral ultimate and can be meaningful only after admitting the self as the ultimate reality. To call man divine does not imply to make him an irresponsible instrument. Brahman is the real essence of man, but the man forgets this real essence due to ignorance. This ignorance is the nature of the world. It is beginningless. To remove this ignorance by sustained efforts and by achievement of knowledge is the aim of the Upanisads. It is only by the achievement of this knowledge that one gets liberation and freedom from all miseries.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHAGVAD GITA

Q. 19. Point out the relation between Gita and the Upanishads

GĪTĀ AND THE UPANISADS

The relation of Gīta and the Upanisads has been only too well known to the Indian philosophers. According to the Vaisnaviya Tantrasāra, "The Upanisads are like cow, Krishna like a milkman, Arjuna like the calf that is sent to the udders of the cow before milking and the Bhagwad Gītā like the milk-nectar that is churned from the udders of the cow." Thus it has been traditionally well known that Gītā is the essence of the philosophy of the Upanisads. As a matter of fact, the Upanisads are so deep, multiple and extensive that it is difficult for the ordinary man to find out his duties in the world by their study. Hence it is Gītā alone which is helpful to the ordinary man in understanding his duties. Thus Gītā has a very important place in Indian philosophy.

There are some phraseological and ideological similarities found between the Upanisads and Bhagawad Gītā. Some phraseological similarities between the two can be found as follows :

(1) It has been said in the Kathopanisad that, "The Ātman is never born nor is ever killed, he never comes from any thing, nor becomes anything. he is un-born, imperishable, has existed from all eternity and is not killed even when the body is killed." This verse from the Kathopanisad has been almost exactly reproduced in Bhagwad Gītā II. XX

(2) In the Kathopanisad, it has been said that "When a killer thinks he is killing and the killed thinks he is being killed neither of them verily knows, for the Ātman is neither killed nor ever kills." This verse has been reproduced in Bhagwad Gītā II XXIX

(3) The following verse from Kathopanisad has been paraphrased and adopted in Bhagwad Gītā II XXIX.
"The Ātman is not even so much as heard of by many, that even after hearing him people do not know him, that the speaker of the Ātman is a miracle that the obtainer of him must have

exceeding insight, that he who comes to know after being instructed by such a wise man is himself a miracle

(4) The following verse from Kathopanad has been exactly reproduced in Gita VIII 13

What word the Vedas declare the penances busy themselves about what word inspires the life of spiritual discipleship that word briefly I tell thee is Om

(5) The conception of Deva Yan and Pitr Yan the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers which the Upanisads followed from the Vedas was handed over by them to the Bhagwad Gita In chapter VIII 24 25 Bhagwad Gita tells us like the Upanisads that Those who move by the path of Gods move towards Brahman, while those who go by the path of the fathers return by the path by which they have gone

Besides these phraseological similarities Bhagwad Gita has many ideological similarities with the Upanisads The theme of the Swetaśwatara Upanisad and the importance of devotion and worship has been borrowed by Gita The philosophy of Karma Yoga of Bhagwad Gita has been based upon a verse from the Īsavyo panishad in which it has been said that a man who spent his life time only in doing actions it is only then that he may hope to be untainted by action The description of the Viswa Rupa in the XI chapter of the Bhagwad Gita has its root in the Mundakopanishad where the Cosmic person with fire as his head the sun and moon as his eyes the quarters as his ears the Vedas as his speech air as his prana the universe as his heart and the earth as his feet is described The Bhagwad Gita has retained the psychological categories mentioned in the Upanisad and simplified its scheme In the Bhagwad Gita III 42 it has been said that beyond the senses is the mind that beyond the mind is intellect and that beyond intellect is the Purusa In the Kathopanishad we find a more elaborate scheme of psychological and metaphysical existence which is such that it is beyond the senses or the object beyond the objects is mind beyond the mind is intellect beyond intellect is Mahat beyond the Mahat is the Avyakta and finally beyond the Avyakta is the Purusa beyond whom and outside whom there is nothing else The emotional attitudes and the devotional impulses exhibited in the Upanisads become the foundation stone for the theistic mystic philosophy of the Bhagwad Gita

The Bhagwad Gita however differs from the Upanisadic text and maintains an almost antagonistic position in the description of

the Aśvattha tree. The Aśvattha tree has been described in the Kathopanishad. Exactly the same description one finds in the V chapter of the Gītā. But whereas the Kathopanishad describes the Aśvattha tree as Brahman and imperishable, Gītā takes it as the world and unreal and hence preaches for its uprooting.

It should be remembered here that Gītā is not merely a repetition of the philosophy of the Upanishad, it has developed much on its basis. If the philosophy of the Gītā were identical with that of the Upanishads, there was hardly any need for its creation. As a matter of fact, the methods of the Gītā and the Upanishads are very much different. The dialectical spirit of the Upanishads is not found in Bhagawad Gītā. In the Upanishad it often becomes difficult to understand the real meaning due to conflicting and sometimes contradictory senses. In the Gītā, the various essentials in the Upanishads have been beautifully harmonised so that the enquirer may not find any difficulty to understand the reality. This essentially was the purpose of the Gītā. In the beginning of the Bhagawad Gītā Arjuna requests Sri Krishna to tell him some definite path and in the end of the Gītā he clearly understands his duty and prepares to follow it. In the Upanishad one finds the three paths of knowledge, action and devotion. But either none of them has been established as the best or sometimes the path of knowledge is held to be better than others. Gītā is more practical and synthetic than the Upanishads. It emphasizes more the action and devotion. It has synthesized activism and renunciation.

Q. 20. Explain the Gita doctrine of Karma Yoga.

(Madras 1966)

Give an account of the Ethics of the Bhagawad Gita.

(Madras 1962)

What in your opinion, is the central problem of the Bhagwad Gita? Give an account of the solution offered by the author.

(Baroda 1959, Mysore 1962)

Examine the relation between Ethics and Metaphysics as implied in the Gita.

(Baroda M. A. 1959)

Not the renunciation of Karma but in karma is the preaching of the Gita. Discuss.

(Poona M. A. 1960)

Does Gita teach a life of contemplation or a life of action?

(Baroda 1965)

Describe the Karma Yoga of Gita and tell why it was debited against nivrati or the negative ideal of renunciation.

(Bombay 1953)

Perhaps no other subject is so clear and side by side so much subject to discussion in Indian philosophy as the central teaching of Bhagwad Gītā. Gita has been regarded as the most important scripture in Indian literature. Hence most of the eminent philosophers in India have commented upon Gītā and tried to propagate their own views through it. Thus a wide difference of opinion is seen relating the central teaching of Gita. Some persons think that it presents different paths without synthesizing them. But such persons forget that if it is so, there was no need of Gita after Upanisads. Again, the aim of Bhagwad Gītā was to show a definite and clear path to Arjuna and he admitted that after hearing Gītā all his doubts have been removed. Then how can it be said that Gita has no central teaching? It is, however, true that Gita has not established any of the three paths of knowledge, devotion and action as superior to others. Gita presents the path of Niskām Karmayoga, in which the knowledge, devotion and action are synthesized and the intellect, emotion and will attain their highest culmination. This Niskām Karmayoga is the central teaching of Gita, its meaning however requires a clarification. But before the discussion of this central teaching of Gita, it is relevant to critically discuss the various views of different philosophers, regarding the central teaching of Gītā. In Gītā one may easily find some apparently contradictory remarks. It is due to this apparent contradiction that the different commentators have established widely different isms on the basis of Gita. But by seeing this problem from the integral and spiritual standpoint these apparently contradictory remarks will appear to be complementary. In the integral vision, the mutually contradictory views are seen as complementary.

RESULT OF GITA'S PREACHINGS

After hearing the whole teaching of Gita, Arjuna became prepared to fight. Pointing out to this end of the Bhagwad Gītā, Tilak remarks that after hearing Gītā, Arjuna neither became a recluse nor a dancing devotee but what he did was to begin a bold fight. Thus by the analysis of the end of Bhagwad Gītā, Tilak proves that its aim is action.

OCCASSIONAL REPETITION

Again, Tilak points out that during the whole course of Bhagwad Gita, Krishna has been repeating the same goal of activism which is its central teaching. The argument is continually interspersed with the constant refrain 'therefore fight'.

NOVELTY OF GITA'S PREACHINGS

But the most important factor to decide the central teaching of Gītā is the novelty of its subjects. It is due to this that Sri Krishna presented Gītā even though the essential principles have been already explained by the Upaniṣad. Gītā stood for the propagation of activism. Before the origin of Gītā, there were two paths wide apart from one another *i.e.*, Pravṛtti, and Nivṛtti, the material and the spiritual path. Some followed one while some followed another. The novelty of the Gītā consists in pointing out to a golden mean between these two extremes of activism and renunciation. Thus Gītā finds a *via-media* between this world and another. This novelty of the subject points out that the central teaching of the Gītā was activism.

THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF GITA'S PREACHINGS

Now what, was the immediate result of the teaching of Gītā ? None can deny that after hearing Gītā from Lord Krishna, Arjuna declared that his mind is now clear about his duties and that he will fight. He agreed to do as the Lord wanted him to do and the Lord asked him to fight. This makes the whole thing clear about the purpose of the Gītā.

SUBSIDIARY MATTER AND ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT

Besides the above significant points, the subsidiary matter and the argumentation in support also prove that the central aim of Gītā was action. The whole chain of beautiful arguments presented with sound logic aimed to convince Arjuna of fighting. The cosmic vision, the distinction of the eternal and non-eternal, the description of self, the elaboration of the different types of Karmas etc., are subsidiary elaborations of this central teaching of Gītā. Thus Sri Krishna has tried to convince Arjuna about action from the beginning to the end of Gītā. In the beginning he presented a pragmatic and commonsense argument by saying that if you die, you will find the heavens and if you win, you will enjoy the kingdom of the earth. But when this pragmatic argument did not convince Arjuna, Sri Krishna preached the immortality of soul. But when all arguments failed to convince Arjuna, Sri Krishna showed him His cosmic form and thus made him realise that the real doer is the God himself and man is merely an instrument in His hands and so his duty is only to follow divine commands.

TILAK'S VIEW IS ONE-SIDED

Tilak's view has been supported by many other thinkers including Swami Krishnanand and Prof Deussen. But it will be seen in sequence that the conclusion to which Tilak arrived though based on sound premises, is equally one-sided. Gita undoubtedly preaches action, but this action is not the ordinary action as we take it. It is *Niṣkama Karma*. *Niṣkama* does not mean action without desire or detached action. It is rather to act according to God's will. Acting according to God's will is possible only in the stage of identity with God. Hence *Niṣkama Karma* means to act as a successful instrument in God's hands through complete identity with Him. Such action will not breed bondage. In this stage, however, it is not the action which is so much important, but rather self-surrender and identification with God. Identity with God is impossible without devotion and complete self-surrender. In the absolute integral identity the contribution of intellect is equally necessary. Hence the knowledge cannot be rejected. Thus to reach the stage of *Sthita Prajna* (स्थिता प्रज्ञा) the ideal man in Gita a synthesis of knowledge, devotion and action, thought, emotion and will through identity with God is necessary. The actions of the ideal man according to Gita are not for himself, but for God. Even the actions according to one's own *Varna* and *Āshram*, are also for God because it is He who has established the *Varnāshram* system. This integral identity with God leads to divine transformation of man by which he can become a successful instrument to fulfil divine purpose in the world.

GITA PRESENTS SPIRITUAL SYNTHESIS

As a matter of fact the spiritual seeing is always whole and integral. In it the contradictories become complementaries. Thus in Gita the apparently contradictory paths of knowledge, devotion and action are really complementary to each other. This synthesis is neither a pragmatic compromise nor a golden mean nor an organic relation. It is the stage of spiritual unity. It cannot be understood or explained by intellectual concepts. One can only say that here the will, the thought and the emotions all become homogeneous, transformed and divine. Thus Gita takes man to a stage where all the aspects of his personality are integrated, transformed and divinised.

KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN AND SCIENCE OF YOGA

So far we have tried to understand the central teaching of Gita

by a discussion of the views of different commentators. But without an analysis of the verses from Gītā itself, this discussion will not be final. In order to understand the central teachings of Gītā, let us look into Gītā itself. At the end of every chapter in Gītā, it has been called, "the knowledge of Brahman, the science of Yoga". Thus Gītā is a science of Yoga. A science means a systematic study of a certain subject. Thus as science of Yoga, Gītā systematically studies Yoga. It is not a science of knowledge or devotion or action, but Yoga. Hence the central teaching of Gītā is Yoga. The knowledge of Brahman is the basis of this Yoga but the basis is not more important than edifice. It only points out that Gītā is based upon a sound metaphysical foundation.

MEANING OF YOGA

Hence to understand the central teaching of Gītā, let us clarify the meaning of the term "YOGA". Here also one finds various interpretations by various commentators. To grasp at the truth in all this variety of opinions, one should keep his eyes steadily on the Gītā itself. The word Yoga has been derived from the root 'YUJ' which means union or identity. It is due to this that Rāmānujā has so much emphasized the union of the Jīva and the God. This view of Rāmānuja is not untrue, but it is necessary to point out here that in the absolute union, the self and the God become one while Rāmānuja does not admit such a complete identity between individual and God even at the highest stage. Action, as it will be seen in sequence, is an important aspect of Yoga in Gītā. Hence the devotional interpretation will be incomplete.

According to Sri Krishna, "Yoga is perfection in action". It is by this alone that one can attain the ultimate end *i.e.*, realisation of God or the consolidation of the society. It is here that the God can be realised and the social good can be attained. As a matter of fact, consolidation of society is an essential aspect of God realisation in Gītā, because the man who has realised God should work as the divine instrument in the world to achieve divine purpose.

NISKAMA KARMA YOGA

Hence the central teaching of the Gītā is a Nişkāma Karma Yoga. The meaning of the Nişkāma Karma Yoga must have been clear by now. Nişkāma does not mean without personal desire, since an action without motive is not psychologically possible. It means an action in identity with the divine will or to be a success-

ful instrument in the hands of divine power. Karma in Gita means acting according to one's own Varna and Āshram. Gītā believes in the Varna Āshram system. It has been established by God himself that he is the initiator of the Varna system in society. The Gita has given a divine sanction to the scientific principle of division of labour in society. This division of labour was not hereditary. It was based upon one's own temperament and capacity. As Carlyle has said, "Know what you can do, and do it like a Hercules." Thus Gītā has synthesized the modern psychological findings with the spiritual truths. The actions according to one's own Varna Āshram, however, are not for the individual or for the society, but for the God. Gītā does not believe in Kant's dictum of "duty for duty." It preaches duty for Deity. Yoga in Gita means identity with God and this identity with God is the ultimate end of Gītā. But the concept of identity is dynamic and the man does not seem to be inactive after realising God. As a matter of fact he becomes even more active than ever, due to his union with original source of energy. Thus Niṣkāma Karma Yoga is favourable to the physical, psychological and spiritual nature of man. It synthesizes selfishness with altruism. It harmonises the good of the individual with that of society. It fulfils the good in the world and the good in the world to come. Thus Gītā has preached a life of Yoga, established in divine self-consciousness, in which the man forgetting all other rights and duties passes his life as divine instrument, working in the hands of God. After giving all reasoning to Arjuna, Śrī Krishna asked him to leave all other dharmas and to find shelter in him. He promised that he will be relieved of all sins and that he should not bother about his destiny. Hence the interpretations of the central teaching of Gita as given by Sankara or Rāmānuja do not seem to be appropriate. Similarly, the meaning of the Yoga does not appear to be Patanjali Yoga because Arjuna was himself prepared to renounce the world and become a recluse while Śrī Krishna stopped him from doing this precisely. It is true that Gītā has admitted Patanjali Yoga as helpful in the control of the mind, but the eight fold Yoga is merely a means. In Gita Yoga is not an antithesis of activism. As Annie Besant points out, "everywhere in this scripture of Yoga there is the urging to action of the most violent type." Curiously enough Yogeshwar Krishna preached Gītā in the battlefield and not in the secluded corner of a forest as a Patanjali Yogi might do.

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KARMA YOGA AND KARMA SANYASA

Hence Gītā prefers Karma-Yoga to the renunciation of Karma. According to Gītā "Both renunciation and Karma-Yoga may lead to liberation and yet Karma Yoga is better than renunciation of Karma." (V.2) But this does not mean that action is the central teaching. Gītā's teaching is very clear in this respect. "Yogi is better than ascetic, Yogi is better than the knower, is better than doer as well, hence O Arjuna, be a Yogi." (VI.46) These words make it amply clear that while the Yogi is better than the ascetic, learned and the active person. Yoga is different from penance, knowledge or action. Yoga is not action, but perfection in action. Now what is this perfection? In the 17th verse of the VI chapter of Gītā Śrī Krishna says, "Yoga, which rids one of woe is accomplished only by him who is Yutka in diet and recreation, in performing action and in sleeping and waking." It is significant here that the word 'Yutka' does not mean regulated or balanced, but "in union with divine", because if one takes the former meanings it becomes difficult to understand remarks like those which advocate complete self-surrender to God. Also it does not lead to the status of "ideal man is Gita." Again, Yoga has been called Samatwa. This word also cannot be taken in the sense of balance due to the obvious reasons. Sthita Prajna is the highest ideal in Gītā and he has been called a Yogi. Sthita Prajna literally means "one established in the divine self-consciousness" i.e., he who sees God everywhere in waking, dreaming and sleeping stages, while eating, drinking and working, in the elephant, dog, and high caste man etc. Thus he is the one who is in complete union with divine. Therefore, identity with God is the real meaning of the words 'Yukta' or 'Samatwa'. Thus Yoga means continuous identity not determinism even if it may be divine, since the God according to Gītā is also the inner self of man. God determinism means self-determinism. The Yogi is most free when determined by God i.e., determined by his inner self.

ULTIMATE END

From the above discussion of the central teaching of Gītā, it would have transpired that it holds God realization to be the ultimate end. It is the sole end of all actions. Gītā has preached the dharma of Varnāshram, but the fulfilment of this dharma becomes a duty only because it has been ordained by God. In the Gītā, Lord

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God realization also leads to a knowledge of the nature of soul because soul is only a form of God. This soul is to be experienced internally as well as in the external world. An ideal Yogi person experiences God in every state. The soul, according to Gita, is permanent and unchanging. It is indestructible while all the other physical objects of the universe are transient. God is the controller of the self and physical objects. He is the omnipotent and omnipresent. The soul is merely an instrument of His purpose.

Public service has as much importance in the Gita as God realization in view of their postulating that the soul and universe are both parts of the universe. Sri Krishna has said in the Gita that the Yogi who is engulfed or engrossed in the welfare of all beings goes to Him.

Social service propels man towards God. Duty should be done not merely for duty but for the sake of consolidation of society. According to Gita action is superior to inaction. It has been said in the Gita, that liberation cannot be achieved by fleeing from action or taking leave of activity, natural actions being indispensable even to the learned. Actions must be carried out according to one's nature, actions are necessary for the body, actions are the laws of creation, actions are necessary for consolidation of society. Even God himself acts in order to set an example to people and to protect the society from desolation. For a learned person the result of activity and inactivity is similar but in spite of it it is the active person who is superior. Gita has indisputably accorded superiority to Karma Yoga in preference to Karma sanyasa.

SYNTHESIS OF HEDONISM AND ASCETICISM

Here Gita has synthesised hedonism and asceticism. It has stressed self control. Sex and anger are both dangerous enemies of man but they can be won over by synthesis of habitual action and renunciation and a feeling of disenchantment and through practice. Knowledge is coloured by sexual feeling. Anger originates in sex attachment and it in turn destroys memory the consummation coming with the destruction of reason or complete degeneration. The soul can triumph over both of them because mind and reason are merely the instruments of the soul. This way, self control will

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put an end to actions but notwithstanding this, they are essential both for society and the individual. This contradiction can be resolved by detached action. This does not allow the results of action to become encumbrances.

DETERMINED ACTIVITY

The daily duties also have been elaborately discussed in the *Gītā* according to which every man has some native determined actions. He can achieve his personal and the social ultimate end by performing these determined actions. The distinction of quality and action have been utilized for the division of society into four *varṇas-brāhmaṇas*, *kshatriya*, *vaishya* and *śūdra*. *Sattva* abounds in the *brāhmaṇas*, while *rajas* dominates *sattva* in the *kshatriyas*, in the case of *vaishyas* the *rajas* overpowers *tamas* and the reverse is the case with the *śūdras*. Accordingly, the *Gītā's* ethics resembles that of Bradley in the idea of every person having a particular station to fill in society. The only point where they differ is that while Bradley treats self realisation to be the motivating cause, the *Gītā* considers the aim to be the attachment of God or consolidation of society. Thus, the natural activities of *Brāhmaṇas* are self-control, suppression of senses, purity both internal and external, to accept pain for duty and to be forgiving and acquiring simplicity in mind, senses and body, theistic reason, knowledge of scriptures, and experience of the spiritual essence. Valiance, patience, intelligence and nature of not fleeing even in war, benevolence and sense of mastery are all virtues attributed to *kshatriyas*. As for the *vaishya*, they are naturally adapted to activities like farming, dairying and truthful behaviour in buying and selling. And to serve all the other classes falls to the lot of the *śūdras*.

All these activities should be performed with the intention of submission to God. The desire of result is the cause of enchantment and living or abandoning it brings everlasting peace. Such a person is a true hermit or ascetic. Sacrifice of result is real sacrifice. Selfish desires should be negated. The limited love of wife and family should be sacrificed. Thus the *Gītā* preaches Karma Yoga and not escapism. But it is not ritualism. The purity of the conscience has been stressed in the *Gītā*.

VIRTUES

The practice of divine qualities has been emphasized in the Gītā besides the sacrifice of animal passions. The author of Gita has described these divine virtues elaborately. The God realised person is free from malice, friendly, compassionate, forgiving, content, united to God, having control over body, mind and senses, and a firm resolve, free from egoism, delight, anger, perturbation and fear, pure, wise, impartial, neither annoys nor feels offended, neither rejoices, not hates nor grieves nor desires, without attachment and full of devotion.

Q 21. What characteristics do you find in the Gita which make it a book of universal philosophy of life. (Ald 1953)

The ethics of Gita is perfectionist. It arranges for and organises the proper development of all aspects of man. In it devotion is also assimilated in knowledge and action. Extremely important is the quality of self submission (ātma-samarpana) in the Gita. All sins are destroyed if man takes refuge with God after relinquishing everything. Satya is accessible only after purification to one who has faith in knowledge. Gita has preached this same doctrine of complete self submission and devotion to God in a number of ways. Among the other characteristics of the Gita, the major ones are the following —

(1) *Synthesis of the good of society and individual*—Gita's ethics has synthesized both social and individual interests. The individual is not inconsiderable but his soul and the universal soul are not two separate entities. All distinctions are the result of ignorance. The ultimate end is absolute perfection of the individual but this perfection can be attained only through consolidation of society and God realisation.

(2) *Theory of Division of Labour*—Gita's conception of the varna system is not only the equivalent of the modern scientific division of labour but it is superior in some respects since man does not become entangled in actions because he fulfils his duty with the intention of God realisation. In this way Gita's has also achieved a magnificent synthesis of spiritualism and social welfare.

(3) *Synthesis of enjoyment and austerity*—Gita's theory of niṣkama karmayoga is the supreme means not only from the spiritual viewpoint but also from the practical and worldly viewpoints. It has in itself an expert synthesis of action and abstinence, enjoyment and asceticism. Niṣkama karma does not admit of any

probability of being deflected from one's path and supplies the uninterrupted power for staying duty bound.

(4) *Divinisation of passions*—In spite of the ideal of detachment Gītā's path is natural and integral. It preaches the divinisation and transformation of passions and not their repression, as was Kant's contention,

(5) *Directives of daily duties*—In view of the fact that the Gītā contains a long description of duties concurring to a number of different natures of man, it must be admitted that it affords assistance in the understanding of daily duties.

(6) *Based on sound Metaphysics*—The ethics of Gītā is based on sound metaphysics. Although it is theistic, it does not encourage blind faith in any instance.

(7) *Synthesis of Determinism and freedom of will*—Gītā has synthesized determinism and freedom of will. It is God who controls the result of action and the order of the world but in order to become a dynamic instrument of divine action after understanding this order and complete self-submission to God, it is essential to act with determination. Becoming the instrument of divine consciousness implies action according to the internal consciousness because fundamentally the soul and God are identical. Thus true freedom lies in divine transformation. True self-realisation is in self-surrender. The one way of freeing the soul from its various limitations is social service and devotion to God.

(8) *Universal message of Gītā*—The message of Gītā is universally comprehensive and everlasting. In today's atomic age when human society is grievously endangered by excessive materialism some of the message of the Gītā, like 'niṣkāma karmayoga' have assumed an ever greater importance. Gītā treasures elements which can faithfully serve as motives to men of any society and any age. In India from ancient scholars like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja men like Gāndhi, Tilak and Sri Aurobindo have been inspired by it.

Q. 22. How can Niskama Karma be reconciled with war according to Bhagwadgita.

(Mysore 1962)

Gītā is the science or study of yoga. It preaches karma-yoga by which although man remains active he still does not become enchanted or bound. It is also called skill in action. Thus niṣkāma karma is not inactivity but rather action with an intention of submission to God, having relinquished the desire of result. Sri

Krishna preached the same sermon to Arjuna in the Gita. And it was in order to establish the propriety of this that He presented the numerous arguments in Gītā.

TWO TYPES OF ELEMENTS

According to the metaphysics of Gītā, the world has two elements—true and false, permanent and transitory. Truth can never be destroyed and falsehood has no existence. The soul is true. It is unexpendable, indestructible, permanent and immutable. That which is unchangeable is true and that which is changeable is false. Thus the body is false because it is born and it dies. It is vacillating, destructible and transitory. That which is born must die. The scholars do not worry about whatever comes and passes away. All objects of the world are destructible. The body must come to an end one day or the other. None can put a stop to its birth and death.

SUPPORT OF WAR ON THE BASIS OF METAPHYSICS

It is on the basis of this same metaphysics that Lord Krishna advocates the efficacy of war. Having before preached unattached action. At the inception of Gītā's moral situation, Arjuna lays down his weapons considering slaughter bad and sits flustered and undecided. Consequently, Sri Krishna advises him to fight and proves the propriety of this advice by many arguments. Killing and dying are qualities of the body, not the soul. The soul is immortal and undying, being immune to man or any supernatural entity. It cannot even be transformed because it is the only real element. Thus, any apprehension towards killing in war is without foundation and useless. It is body which dies and a change in its form is essential. Thus, to think of it, when confronted with duty, is futile.

PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF WAR

Going to war has its practical advantages. Death will result in heaven and victory means the rule of the world. Even if not looked at from the view point of selfish interest, it is still a duty because fighting is the duty. This duty is essentially to be fulfilled as it is God himself who has divided the different varnas according to quality and actions. Whatever takes place, does so at the will of God. Those who deserve to die have been already exterminated. Arjuna was only an essential instrument in the process. Those who deserve to die will die whether they fight or not. Arjuna's morality

is implied in his becoming a successful instrument of the divine purpose, desiring to do so and contemplating this divine work of his own volition. In this way, if Arjuna joins the combat he will not be attached by his action. If he does abstain from this fighting, he fails in his duty having violated a divine mandate. This soul forms merely an essential cause in the activity of God. Action is man's inherent nature and his senses will engage him in work even if he desires otherwise. Thus, it is sensible to perform one's duty as prescribed.

WAR IS GOOD ACTIVITY

Yajna, tapa and surrender towards God have also been treated as good by the *Gītā*. Activities directed at the feeding of beings of this world are yajna. Actions caused by a desire for the mutual consumption of necessities by humans are *dāna* or benevolence while those done for the appropriation of the soul are called tapa. This viewpoint, too, decrees that it becomes Arjuna's duty to fight.

WAR IS THE DUTY OF KSHATRIYA

Great importance has been attached to social consolidation in the *Gītā*. People with knowledge, and even gods perform activities which are beneficial to the public. *Gītā* maintains the theory of incarnation. It is for a learned person to perform his ordained activities without any desire and having ended all attachments. The inherent duty of kshatriya is to fight, thus it was Arjuna's duty to fight.

WAR FROM THE RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT

Even the religious viewpoint confirms Arjuna's duty of fighting. The implication of realisation of the universal self in the *Gītā* is to show to Arjuna that God is the maker, guardian and destroyer of the entire world. The realisation gleaned from Arjuna, all his doubts. Self-submission, as described in *Gītā*, means becoming an instrument of God. This is *niṣkāma karmayaga*. Arjuna decided to abstain from war only because he came to look upon himself as the doer and destroyer and treated the transient relations of the world as permanent, due to his enchantment. Sri Krishna pointed out that no one is anybody's father, son, etc. All these relations are transitory and destructible. The soul is the sole truth and thus

VOLUNTARY FULFILMENT OF DUTY

The moral importance of approximating the subject of *niskām karmayoga* in different ways contained in eighteen chapters, is that a man should pursue his duties of his own volition. To be deviated from duty or to do it under obligation is immoral. Only that activity which is done with personal motivation and of free volition has any moral importance. *Niskāma karma* and fighting are not contradictory because *niskām Karma* means the fulfilment of God's order without any desire for the result. The *kshatriya* has been ordered by God to defend the society. Thus it is Arjuna's duty to fight without any desire for the result.

In this way Gita has synthesised abstinence and activity in ception and consummation. From all points of view be it knowledge devotion or action *niskām karmayoga* is the practical as well as spiritual end.

Q 23 Compare the *Niskāma karma* theory of Gita with Kant's Categorical Imperative

In Bhagwad Gita the supreme duty is action without desire. Action without desire does not mean unmotivated action but acting with a sagacious intention of submission to God. Thus according to the Gita activities which are conjoined to a desire for result are improper. Gita is not utilitarian. It holds that those who entertain any desire for the result of their activities are extremely poor. In the same way Kant too does not look upon the result as the object of moral judgement. According to him, there is nothing which supersedes goodwill. If the volition is good the action is good whatever may be the result. Moral laws are categorical. Their propriety is self evident being unaffected by the results. The other point where Gita and Kant coalesce is that both emphasize service. Another point of similarity between the opinions of Kant and the Gita is in regard with the control of feelings. Mental tendencies cannot motivate action. And when a person acts under such motives, as love and jealousy he becomes entangled in worldly processes. Sex causes anger and anger leads to confusion which causes memory failings and consequently destruction of reason. Thus the passions guide one in the direction of ignorance. Gita has preached abstention from both love and hatred. The senses should be won over by practice and abstinence. Thus it is best to act unattached. This opinion of the Gita conforms very nearly to the moral theories of Kant according to whom he

supreme duty is the suppression of despicable desires. A pure moral life is the life of pure reason. The sole correct motive is faith in law.

DIFFERENCES

But here it should be remembered that in spite of similarity between the opinions of Kant and Gītā on the subject of feeling, there is also a major difference upon the same issue. Gītā does not treat desire, emotion and feelings as completely evil. Gītā has stressed devotion and worship only for the development of man's emotional aspect. It is necessary to transform or divinise and not to exterminate feelings. On the other hand, Kant crowns feeling itself with immorality and wants to remove it completely from life. In this way his opinion becomes rigorist.

It is Kant's view that one is to "act as a member of a kingdom of ends." It is a theory which resembles very nearly Gītā's Varna organisation and the ideal of loka sangraha. Both Kant and the Gītā have recognised individual and social interests as mutually interrelated and preached public service but while the motivating cause of public service, according to Kant, is faith in the moral law, in Gītā the sole aim of every activity is realisation of God. Thus, for Kant the ultimate end is duty while in Gītā it is God. Kantian ethics is jurat while the ethics of Gītā is teleological. In Kantian ethics the necessity of God arises for the protection of moral law but in Gītā the moral laws emerge from the Godly existence. Kant's ethics is not very much related to religion while the ethics of Gītā is religious and spiritual. According to Kant, ethics is the final step in human progress. According to Gītā religion is beyond ethics and spirituality is beyond it, too.

Kant has extolled the importance only of knowledge and action. His ethics has become heartless and rigorous but by assimilating devotion into the supreme means, Gītā has presented an order conducive to the all round progress of mankind. The ethics of Gītā is more integral than the theories of Kant. Moral qualities, according to the Gītā, include pity, forgiveness, love, sympathy etc.

Kant's ethics has become individualistic due to the negation on his part, of the importance of human feelings because the element which links man with man is emotion and not reason. The ethics of Gītā is universal because it contains the ideal of world community. Love and attachment are distinct. Pure love is the supreme means of the divine consciousness. Thus in the

ethics of Gītā and Kant, inspite of some similarity, there is fundamental distinction. Kant's rationalism is merely a step towards the integralism of Gita.

Q. 24 Estimate the moral value of the ethics of Bhagwad Gita versus Hedonism
(Agra 1963)

Hedonism recognises the ultimate end in pleasure irrespective of the unit to which the pleasure goes, individual or society. In Gita perfection and God realisation are the ultimate end and not pleasure. Gita, however, does not contradict hedonism as it does not emphasize the suppression of senses but its pleasure is the pleasure of the complete self. Its happiness is the happiness of perfection.

Broadly, we perceive the following points of similarity in the ethics of Gītā and hedonism—

1 Both oppose useless ritualism

2 Both are against attaching superfluous importance to religious text

3 Both oppose the repression of sense

But these similarities seem negligible besides the following disparities—

1. Gītā is the religion of duty besides being the science of conduct. Hedonism is materialistic having no relation whatsoever with religion.

2. Gītā is perfectionist. To hedonism the only ultimate end is physical or mental pleasure. Gita is an ethics of synthesis. Hedonism is a one-sided ethics.

3. Hedonism aims at reckless enjoyment. Gita synthesizes control and enjoyment, knowledge and action.

4. Hedonism has stressed physical or sensual pleasure. Taking their transformation to be necessary Gita bridges the gulf between hedonism and rationalism.

Q 25. Explain the different conceptions of God in the Bhagwadgita. Do you find them inconsistent with each other?
(All India 1954)

According to Gītā, there are two types of realities in the world, Kshar and Akshar or Prakṛti and Ātman. Beyond these both is the God, Puroṣottama. He is transcendent and yet immanent. He is eternal Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, the Lord of the whole universe, the sustainer of the world, the master of everything.

the witness, the shelter and the source of everything here and hereafter. He is the substratum of both perishable and imperishable things. Gītā believes in pantheism. This pantheism has been elaborately described in the XI chapter entitled "The Yoga of the vision of the universal form." The God has been called imperishable, omniscient, the ultimate source of universe, the eternal Puruṣa, the first God, the ancient Being and beginningless. Thus Gītā also believes in theism. God is the absolute, but also the supreme person. He is the object of knowledge, but his devotion has also been recommended. He is beyond the universe and yet he is present everywhere as self of all. He is subtle, omnipotent, omnipresent all-pervading, indescribable and the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. He is self-enlightened. He always takes care of his devotees.

The Absolute is the God from the point of view of the universe. In the Gītā, the philosophical aspect of Divine has not been too much emphasized as His practical aspect. Thus Gītā has given a very important place to self-surrender. The more complete is the self-surrender, the nearer man reaches to God. Even the worst man can attain liberation through devotion to God.

Gītā believes in incarnation. Even though God is eternal, infinite, beginningless and transcendent, He limits his infinity through power of Māyā and becomes embodied. The incarnation means the descent of God on human level. It does not mean the ascent of the man to the level of God. As Sri Krishna says in the Gītā, "Though unborn and immortal and also the Lord of Beings, I manifest myself through my Yoga (divine potency) keeping my nature (Prakṛti) under control. Arjuna ! whenever there is a decline of righteousness then I bring myself forth. For the protection of the worthiest, for the destruction of the evil powers and for establishing Dharma (righteousness) on a firm footing. I am born—from age to age."

It has been questioned that if the Gītā believes in pantheism, how can it consistently maintain theism. The pantheism of the Gītā however, is in no way antagonistic to theism. Because pantheism does not mean that the God is beyond the universe. The world is God, but the God is not the world alone. At the end of the X chapter of Bhagavad Gītā, Sri Krishna has very clearly said that God is present everywhere in the universe in subtle form and the world exists by a part of Him. Thus in spite of being all pervading,

God can incarnate as the supreme person. This does not mean that either his omnipresent form or the form of incarnation is imperfect. As a matter of fact, the spiritual phenomena cannot be explained by means of dialectical reasoning. Every level of existence has its own logic peculiar to it. Divine phenomena is different from material phenomena and so the principles of the intellectual logic cannot be applied to it. He can be perfect both as omniscient God as well as supreme person. He is immanent as well as transcendent and beyond all. But how is this possible? This can be understood only through spiritual immediate experience. Before seeing the vision of the universal form, even Arjuna could not understand this mystery. It is the subject of mystic realisation.

Prakṛti is the material cause of the universe. God is the efficient cause. He guides the Prakṛti. The Prakṛti of God has two aspects—Para and Aparā. Aparā or lower Prakṛti includes life, water, air, ether, mind and intellect. These are the material causes of the physical, vital and psychological worlds. The Para Prakṛti or higher nature sustains the limited embodied soul. The Aparā Prakṛti is unconscious, while the Para Prakṛti is conscious. Both are God's powers. Hence ultimately God is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. Prakṛti is the Mayā of God. This Maya is constituted of the three Guṇas, i.e., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Maya is not a reflection of a real power. The God creates the jīvas through his Prakṛti according to their merits and demerits. Both Prakṛti and Puruṣa are eternal and imperishable.

Jīva is the eternal part of God. His body is limited in space and time. It is born and it dies. The soul is unborn, immortal and beyond space and time. It is infinite and eternal. It is indescribable, unchanging, all pervading, immovable and actionless. It is beyond the mind, intellect and senses. It was before this body and shall remain after it. When the body becomes useless it leaves it and enters a new body. It is beyond Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The pleasure and pain, illusion, emotions, passions, mind, intellect and senses, are born from these three Guṇas. Their objects are also born through them. The self is beyond guṇas and their modifications. By going beyond guṇas due to self realisation the man is not touched by pleasure and pain and becomes a mere detached witness. This is the Sthitā Prajñā. Knowledge is the essence of soul. By controlling the senses through the mind and

through the intellect and the intellect through the spirit, one can realise the self and ultimately the God.

But God realisation is not possible without self surrender. In it the man becomes merely an instrument of the divine power. He does not work for God, but as His instrument. In the Gītā the Sthita-Prajna works for the good of the living, but ultimately it becomes spontaneous and natural for him. It is his nature. Thus the Gītā takes man beyond the dualism of ethics into religious field. Even beyond this is the spiritual field in which all the conflict of the moral level and the dualism of the mental level disappears and the man, established in the divine consciousness, acts for the good spontaneously. Some may doubt here that this takes away the entire freedom of man, but this doubt is based upon a dualistic conception of the relation of God and soul. Freedom does not mean indeterminism, but self-determinism and when this self is God or when God is present in man in the form of the self, then the real freedom lies in becoming a divine instrument. Only this has no egoism of will. Thus the meaning of absolute surrender to God is self-realisation which is the ultimate principle of all Indian philosophy, religion and ethics.

Thus the secret of Gītā in philosophy, religion, ethics and other fields, is integral—spiritualism. One-sided spiritualism emphasises renunciation of Karma and God-realisation by leaving the world. On the other hand, the materialism taking the pain as essential to life, emphasises maximum satisfaction of physical urges. In the integral spiritualism both altruism and selfishness, the body, mind and intellect, all find satisfaction. Thus divine status leads towards divine transformation and divine bliss. It is this attitude which can transform human nature in the present age and can give spiritual peace and bliss to human race by synthesizing the individual and social good and it is in this that one can find the ultimate culmination of the physical and mental evolution of mind.

CHARVAKA PHILOSOPHY

Q 26 Determine the value of Charvaka theory in Indian Philosophy Poona 1963)

Discuss in brief the basic idea of the Charvaka system

*(Karnatak 1968 Calcutta 1953 Bihar 1965 Jodhpur 1965
Kanpur 1970 Mysore 1962 Meerut 1971)*

Outline the tenets of Charvaka materialism and Hedonism.
What is the positive contribution of Charvaka to Indian Philosophy ? (Gujrat 1965)

Of the Nāstik philosophical systems in Indian philosophy none is so much anti Vedic as the Charvāka school. It is more a philosophy of life than a theory of ultimate reality. It has its truth in man's eternal urge for pleasure. It has its novelty in challenging all the traditional values. In Metaphysics and epistemology Charvāka stands in defying contrast to all other Indian philosophical systems. That is its weakness and again that is its strength and contribution. To initiate discussion and rethinking on time old principles is always valuable in philosophy. Chārvāka dogmatically rejected all dogmas. As Hume aroused the celebrated philosopher Kant from his dogmatic slumbers by challenging all that was hitherto accepted in philosophy, so Charvaka gave a death blow to all traditional thoughts and values and thus created the need of rethinking and revolution necessary for all living philosophy.

CHARVAK'S MATERIALISM

Materialism in one form or the other is to be found in Indian philosophy from the distant past. It is also occasionally mentioned in the Vedas, Bauddha works, Purāṇas and Sarva Darshan Sangraha etc. It has no independent and exclusive book of philosophy of its own. So we can gather information about it mainly from the repudiation of materialism or of Charvaka school that we find in other philosophical books. Charvāka is materialistic. In fact people with materialistic outlook have been branded as Chārvakas in ancient Indian literature. For persons believing in a materialistic philosophy only gross matter exists and consciousness or mind also springs from gross matter. Krishnapati Misra refers to materialistic

philosophy in the following words. "Lokayat is the only Shāstra, perception is the only authority (Pramāṇa), earth, water, fire and air the only elements ; enjoyment of pleasures is the only aim of human existence ; manas is nothing more than a by product of matter. No other world exists ; death means Nirvāṇa." Similarly, the Chārvāka philosophy is elucidated in Sarva Darshan Sangraha as "There is no heaven, no ultimate salvation. No soul exists in the next world, nor are the actions of the four varṇas fructuous in any way. Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the three stages of the tapasvi and application of dust to the body are the Nature's means of livelihood for worthless and mindless people. If the animal sacrificed in the jyotishtom yajna goes to heaven, why does not the sacrificer sacrifice his own father. If śrāddha on earth satisfies the appetite of souls in heaven, why do you not feed on the lower floor the people, who are standing on the roof ? So long as one is alive one should live enjoying pleasures, should incur debt to drink butter. After the body has been reduced to ashes, how can it come back ?" All this clearly indicates that Chārvāka philosophy is materialistic through and through in every field, i.e., in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics.

THE MEANING OF THE WORD CHARVAKA

The origin of the word Chārvāka is not definite. According to some scholars a seer named Charvāka who is mentioned in the Māhābhārata, enunciated this school of philosophy and so it is named after him. Others consider Chārvāka to be the name of the pupil who was first of all taught this philosophy by its author. The word Chārvāka is derived from the root 'charva' which means to chew or to eat. The special emphasis given on eating and drinking in this philosophy explains the name allotted to it. There is yet another view-point. This philosophy is very pleasing to our ears. So the welcome utterances (Charu-vāka) found in this philosophy account for its name. Chārvāka school is also referred to as 'Lokayat school' because it is spread among the people (Lok-Āyat). But the surest of Chārvāka as the particular name of some individual or merely an epithet of the followers of Lokāyat school. In Lok-Āyat, and Lokāyat texts are used as synonyms in Indian philosophical books.

MATERIALISM

As a result of the above, the Charvāka philosophy is materialistic.

listic Perception being the only authority for them, the Chārvākas recognise no other existence except that of matter. God, soul, heaven, next world, the eternity of life, etc., cannot be perceived and so they are not recognised by the Chārvāka

THE UNIVERSE IS COMPOSED OF FOUR MATERIAL ELEMENTS

Indian philosophers trace the origin of the universe to five elements—earth, water, air, fire and ether (Ākāśa). Charvākas, the materialist, do not recognise ether, as it is known not through perception but through inference. The whole universe, animate as well as inanimate, is composed of these four elements. Beings are born of them and they merge into them after death.

Q 27 Explain and examine the materialistic conception of self advanced by the Charvakas (Cal, 1970)

State and examine the Charvaka view of self. (Poona 1996)

How do the Charvakas deny the existence of self and God?

(Agra 1973)

Being materialistic, the Chārvākas do not believe in the existence of an invisible, unchangeable and immortal soul. Consciousness is, in fact, that quality of body. It does not exist separate from or outside the body. We do not perceive any soul except body in a conscious state. The combination of the five elements is termed as body. Consciousness is produced by the coalition of these five elements. How can a soul or a conscious being originate from inanimate objects? This question naturally crops up. Chārvāka replies that just as combination of betel leaf, nut, lime and catechu produces red colour, in the same way the fusion of these elements sparks off consciousness of Vijnāna. The actions attributed to the soul are really the actions of the body. In our day-to-day practice also we identify body and soul. Sentences in common use like 'I am lame', or 'I am fat' clearly indicate that common people do not differentiate between body and soul. According to the Chārvākas everybody should follow the path pursued by men in general. Knowledge, action, conscience, memory, experience etc., are not the attributes of the soul but of the body. Happiness and sorrow are attributes of the body.

Of the Chārvākas there are two types viz., Dhūrta or cunning Chārvāka and Susikṣit or educated Chārvāka. The former consider the conscious body to be the soul. With body it exists and with body it perishes. Consciousness can be experienced no

where except in the body. So consciousness is not the attribute of soul, which has a separate existence of its own. It is associated solely with body. The *Suśīkṣit Chārvākas*, on the other hand, believe in the separate existence of body. The soul has eternal knowledge and enjoys different experiences. But it perishes with the body. The soul does not migrate from one body to another, had it been so, man would have retained the experience of previous life, just as he remembers his experience of childhood. Thus some of the *Chārvākas* are *Dehātmanvādin*, i.e., those who identify body and soul. Others are *Indriyātmanvādin*, because they consider the senses to be the soul. There are others who regard soul as nothing but *Prāṇa* or vital principle and are therefore termed as *Prāṇavādin*.

There are still others among the *Chārvākas* who see no difference between 'mana' or mind and soul and are known as *Ātmanmanovādin*. *Sadanand* has described these four categories of the *Chārvākas* in his '*Vedāntasāra*'. But all of them unanimously hold that the soul does not survive the body. Hence their repudiation of the theories of rebirth, heaven, hell and karma etc.

CRITICISM OF THE CHARVAKA VIEW OF SOUL.

The above mentioned views about the soul have come under heavy fire. The soul occupies a very high and important place in Indian metaphysics. So the other Indian philosophers have put forth the following strong arguments to contradict the *Chārvāka* view : —

(1) According to *Vātsyāyan*, a prominent *Naiyāyika*, the fact that consciousness resides in body does not necessarily make the former an attribute of the latter. For example, water can be hot, but heat is the quality not of water but of fire. Similarly, consciousness though residing in body is an attribute not of the body but of the soul. Secondly, the body is composed of different parts. Had consciousness been the attribute of the body, it should have been located in some particular part of the body. But it is found in all the parts of the body. The qualities of the body are either perceptible by the external senses or imperceptible. But consciousness is neither perceived by the external senses, nor imperceptible to them, i.e., a quality of the body.

(2) According to *Udayan* body is changeable. If consciousness is the attribute of the body, it should also be changeable. In

that the memories of childhood cannot be retained by a young man. Recollection is not the function of the body, because we remember actions of a particular part of the body, even when that part is served from the body. Nor can we maintain that past experiences, are remembered by the atoms of the body. If it were so, then recollection would not be perceived because the atoms in which it subsists are imperceptible. That consciousness is a quality of the body is clearly ruled out by these arguments. It is immune to change and recollection is possible because of it.

(3) Jayant has also put forth similar argument. According to him if consciousness were the quality of the body, the latter would not be exposed to unconsciousness and death. Further, any increase or decrease in the body would necessarily entail a corresponding increase or decrease of consciousness. It also cannot be a quality of mind or senses. If the Charvāka persists in regarding it as conscious, his mind differs from the self (atman, only in name). In fact, consciousness is the quality of the soul.

(4) Vijnan Bhikṣhu repudiates the Charvāka doctrine of the origin of consciousness. Only that thing can be produced by the combination of some elements which though in a dormant stage is already possessed by the latter. Obviously, therefore, consciousness cannot be the outcome of the fusion of the four inanimate elements. Again, if it were a natural quality of the body it should be always with it since a natural quality persists so long as the substance persists. Moreover, if consciousness were the quality of the body, it would be found in different parts of the body even when they are divorced from the body. But a part of the body, separated from it loses consciousness. The qualities of a thing exist in its material ingredients. So if consciousness does not exist in the component parts of the body, it cannot exist in the body as a whole also. It is more reasonable to believe in an eternal soul, having consciousness as its attribute, than to regard body as full of several powers of consciousness.

(5) Śamkara and Vāchaspati Mīśra have given the following arguments against the Chārvāka philosophy.

(a) If consciousness is the specific quality of the body it should exist in deep sleep, swoon and the like.

(b) If consciousness is the quality of the soul, why is it not perceived by other people? Other qualities are perceptible to others. Why is there an exception in the case of consciousness?

(c) Consciousness is either insentient or sentient. According to the *Chārvāka*s everything in this universe is insentient. So it follows that consciousness is also insentient. But an insentient object cannot be apprehended by another insentient object. Then how does consciousness apprehend other insentient things? Thus it is clear that consciousness is different from insentient matter. Consciousness is self-luminous and illuminates other objects also. Therefore, consciousness can never be denoted with its objects.

(d) Recollection etc., cannot be the function of the changeable body. Only an eternal and unchangeable soul can account for such actions.

Explain and examine Charvaka theory of inference. (Cal 1971)

The metaphysical conceptions and theoretical knowledge are essentially inter dependent Chārvāka is materialistic and so admits only four elements viz, earth, water, air and fire We experience all the four through perception. So, for Charvāka school perception is the only authority Originally they equated visibility with perceptibility but afterwards they widened its scope and maintained a five fold perception, based on our five senses Perception is further divided into two categories—external and internal External perception comes through the contact of external senses with objects Internal perception depends upon external perception Inner actions of the mind are based upon material received through external perception But all perception is not authoritative and authentic Some perceptions are but illusions

REPUDIATION OF INFERENCE

Giving credence only to perception Charvaka philosophy repudiates other means of knowledge (Pramanas) The Charvaka philosophy refutes inference by the following arguments

(a) In Nyaya philosophy inference depends upon Vyāpti According to Chārvāka philosophers Vyapti is impossible because firstly, it is not based on perception and secondly it adduces imperceptible from the perceptible The smoke as an inevitable concomitant of fire cannot be inferred from seeing smoke with fire at some odd places Charvāka agrees with Hume that a general rule can be formed only after seeing all the events of that type Unless one sees fire of all times and all places one cannot vindicate the rule that everywhere fire is invariably accompanied by smoke The condition for making it valid being obviously impracticable Vyapti is also impracticable and therefore impossible Therefore, Vyapti cannot be substantiated by perception Vyapti is the inevitable interrelationship between all actions of cause and effect It cannot be perceived with the help of external sense Vyapti cannot be known by inner perception also, as the latter depends upon external perception

(b) Nor can Vyapti be established by inference, because the inference will also depend on Vyapti and perception will again be required to prove the Vyapti Vyapti is based on inference and vice versa So they suffer from the fallacy of inter dependence

(c) Vyapti cannot be known by testimony because the

authoritly of the latter also is based on inference. Secondly, taking inference to be based on testimony everybody will always have to depend upon the words of some other person for inference. There will be no end to this chain. It will again lead to inter-dependence.

(d) The validity of causation cannot be established but on the basis of perception. *Jāti* or *Sāmānya* cannot be known either by external, or by internal perception. The *Naiyāyikas* try to establish inevitable relationship between fireness and smokeness although they have not seen fire and smoke of all the times and of all the places. Perception of all kinds of smoke is required to know smokeness. It being patently infeasible, smokeness can be equated only with those objects with smoke whose perception it is. Evidently, smokeness is not inevitable and it can not lead to *Vyāpti* *Jñāna*.

(e) *Vyāpti* cannot be established on the basis of comparison. Comparison depends on the universal relation between words and objects signified by them. This, again is not the object of perception.

(f) *Vyāpti* is without conditions (*Nirupādhi*). But it is impossible to know all the conditions of an inference. The relationship between *pratijñā* and *upanaya* depends upon the absence of conditions. But the knowledge of the condition must necessarily precede the knowledge of its absence. The knowledge of all conditions being impossible, we cannot know their absence and we cannot be certain of *Vyāpti*.

CAUSATION IS ALSO NOT VALID

Like the Western philosopher Hume, the *Chārvākas* do not believe in causation and its universality, as it also depends upon *Vyāpti*. For two events are found together on many an occasion and consequently make us to expect that they will invariably go together. But there is, in fact, no certainty about their co-existence. The supposition of causal relation between fire and smokeness, the *vyāpti* of *smoke* with fire several times admits of being false as it overlooks several conditions (*upādhi*) e.g., the temperature of fuel. We do expect it, only if it is wet. The relationship between *smoke* and *fire* can't be established with knowledge of all conditions, and the perception of all conditions cannot be possible. The help of inference or testimony because they themselves are based on *vyāpti* entails the relation of an antecedent

and a consequent cannot indicate Vyapti. So inference cannot be immune from doubts.

CRITICISM OF THE CHARVAKA SCHOOL

Faith in the validity of inference is a common trait of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy. So they have made a common cause against Charvaka philosophy which strikes vehemently at that faith.

(1) According to Buddhist philosophers the Charvakas know it with the help of inference that other philosophical schools have faith in inference. Thus the very refutation of inference by the Charvākas in itself based on inference. The thoughts of other people are not the object of sense perception but that of inference. So the Charvakas cannot refute inference.

(2) Vainkath Nāth a disciple of Rāmānuja asserts that in case the absence of definite knowledge can be a valid ground for denying the validity of inference the same can be used against the authority of perception also as it lacks definite knowledge. If inference conduces to both pravṛtti and Nivṛtti perception also suffers from the same defect. The invalidity of inference can be proved neither by perception nor by inference. In fact inference is not indefinite in character because common sense regards it as definite knowledge.

(3) The absence of causation is advanced by the Charvākas as an argument against the validity of inference. But in doing so they themselves put forth an argument. In fact Charvakas cannot propound their own theories without the help of inference.

(4) The main argument used against Vyapti by the Charvakas is that it cannot be ascertained in all the conditions. This argument is applicable only when it is valid in all the cases. Even if it is not so Vyāpti cannot be proved to be invalid.

The Chārvakas do not accept any argument without conditions. Thus their own argument becomes self-contradicted as it is not without conditions (nirupādhi).

(6) According to Udayana a leading Naiyayika life depends not on probabilities and presumptions but on the definite knowledge of presence or absence. According to him wherever there is doubt there is inference and the absence of doubt conclusively proves the latter. Regarding Vyāpti as sopādhi (with conditions) the Chārvākas point out the probability of its excep-

tion in future or at remote places. The argument is itself based on inference, because the future and the remote place depend not on perception but on inference. As a matter of fact after the start of an action definite knowledge replaces doubts and presumptions.

(7) The Chārvākas have refuted the existence of the cause-effect relation. Udayana sees no reason for doubting the inevitability of the cause-effect relation. Otherwise, any cause may lead to any effect. Truly speaking, the reason for doubt in Vyāpti can be established on the basis of the double method of agreement in presence (Anvaya) and agreement in absence (Vyatireka). The same method also makes Vyāpti a valid source of knowledge.

SABDA IS ALSO INVALID

Scriptures cannot be valid in the case of imperceptible things. According to the Chārvāka, the words of reliable persons are authoritative in the case of perceptible things. These words are also known by perception. But even the Vedas are no authority so far as imperceptible things are concerned. For the Chārvākas the imperceptible things have no existence. Those who choose to talk on such topics, are knaves. The Vedas are fraught with untruths, contradictions and tautologies. The authors of the Vedas happen to be those fraudulent priests, whose sole aim was to exploit ignorant and credulous people for furthering their own selfish ends. The so called bliss of Heaven is nothing but senseless talk of the knaves. So the three Vedas, which dwell on heavenly bliss are the preposterous statements of the knaves.

Word being based on inference is doubtful like the latter. According to the Chārvākas the knowledge gained through words is also based on inference. That the words of all reliable people are valid is the general rule on the basis of which we have implicit faith on these words. But inference itself is not valid. How can, then, the word based on it be valid? Words also, like inference, casually come out to be true. But it does not indicate the view that the word is necessarily and invariably an instrument of authoritative knowledge.

CRITICISM OF THE CELESTIALITY OF THE VEDAS

Udayana, a famous Naiyāika, has strongly denounced the criticism of the Vedas by the Chārvākas. Far from being the product of priests and priests out to deceive the people, the Vedas are the master works of those great seers who were famous for their integrity, uprightness, magnanimity and selflessness. These seers,

were on a high moral plane and were immune from flaws like hypocrisy, selfishness, acquisitiveness and other mundane pursuits. Coming out from such exceptionally spiritual people, the Vedic Mantras are above doubts and suspicions. Vainkathnath has put forth similar arguments. Needless to say that the Chārvāka view of the Vedas is one sided.

Q 29 Attempt as exposition and criticism of Charvaka ethics. What are the presuppositions on which it is based?

(Osmania 1962)

State and explain the main features of Charvaka philosophy

(Madras 1962 Poona 1965)

State the ethical teaching of Charvaka. What are its theoretical foundations?

(Karnatak 1966)

"The Charvaka Ethics follows logically from the Charvaka theory of reality." Discuss

(Cal 1972)

Hedonism has, since times immemorial, characterised Indian philosophy in some form or the other. It has been mentioned in philosophic treatises like Vedas, Buddhist texts, Purāṇas, Sarva Darshan Sangraha and the like. Due to its lack of any individual exposition, its details can be found only in the criticism of hedonism or the Charvaka thought in books belonging to other philosophies. Chārvāka is hedonist and actually in ancient Indian literature the name Chārvāka was applied to hedonists. According to hedonism, matter is the solitary reality and the origin of mind or consciousness. According to the play 'Prabodhachandrodaya', Krishnapati Misra introduced hedonism in these words—"Lokāyata is the only philosophy in which perception is the one source of knowledge, earth, fire, water and air the only elements, wealth and enjoyment the only puruṣārthas, consciousness springs from the elements and in which there is no other world and death is the liberation." Similarly, in the first chapter of the Sarva Darshan Sangraha, Charvāka philosophy is propounded thus—There is no heaven, no absolute mokṣa and neither is there any supernatural self nor any real result of the organised action of the four Varnas. Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the three stages of tapasya and putting ashes on the body—are means devised by nature for people who lack knowledge and puruṣārtha. If the animal sacrificed in the Jyotiṣtoma yajna goes to heaven, then why not sacrifice one's elders? If rites performed for deceased persons satisfy them the people who travel should find superfluous the provisions they carry. As long as life lasts man should live in pleasure going to the extent of borrowing because whence does one return after the body

has once turned to ashes? The above description makes it abundantly clear that in all aspects of metaphysics and ethics, Chārvāka philosophy is materialistic.

Being materialist, Chārvākas do not believe in any imperceptible, unchanging self existing separately from the body. According to them consciousness is a quality of the body, having no separate existence outside or away from the body. Besides the conscious body, no other self can be perceived. Therefore the consciousness should be called the self. An organisation of the five Bhutas has been given names like body, sense organ and object. Consciousness results from the combination of these same five elements. Actually, activities said to be characterising the self are attributes of the body and our daily life proceeds upon an identification of self with the body. "I am fat, I am lame," and other sentences of a similar nature indicate that ordinary people believe the body to be the soul. The Chārvākas claim that every one should follow the path of the common people. Qualities like knowledge, action, consciousness, memory, volition and feeling belong to the body and not to the soul. Pleasure and pain are physical states.

INSULT OF VEDAS

According to Indian philosophers there are four puruṣārthas—Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. The Chārvākas have bitterly antagonised against the Vedas. According to them, the Vedic ritualism is useless, heaven and hell the imaginations of priests, the other world an unproved conception.

LIBERATION IS IMPOSSIBLE

According to the Chārvākas, it is foolish to hope for liberation from pains. It is impossible for the self to gain liberation from bodily ties. Even during life there cannot be even the most remote probability for a complete escape from pain. Pain is always an attendant of the body. Liberation, be it from the body or from pain, can be attained completely only upon death. The Chārvākas state—*śarīraṃ mṛtyuḥ mokṣaḥ* meaning that death is liberation.

PLEASURE IS THE ULTIMATE END OF LIFE

Thus, pleasure is the ultimate end of life. Money is a means to the end and consequently it is necessary to earn it. Pleasure cannot be related on account of its complicity with pain. No intelligent person can forget about it merely because it is mixed with chat. One cannot give up a diet of fish because of the bones in it. Famine cannot be abandoned for fear of animals devouring the crop. One cannot stop cooking merely because of the possi-

reject the pleasures of this life upon the false hope of a future life. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush. A penny exceeds in value the gold of a redoubtable nature. It is silly to give wealth to others. Thus maximum pleasure is the ultimate end. Any action rendering more pain than pleasure is wrong. In this way, Charvakas are hedonists in their ethical considerations.

CRITICISM

The hedonism of the Chārvāka opinion has been bitterly criticised. Although the acceptance of the theory of pleasure as the ultimate end of life involves many difficulties, yet the importance of pleasure in life cannot be denied. Actually, all the Chārvāka principles contain some element of truth, the chief mistake lying in their treatment of their principles as the most superior. As it is, even upon the question of hedonism the Chārvākas are divided in their opinions. The unrefined hedonists support gross hedonism, but refined Charvakas like Vatsyayan established a refined and cultural hedonism in which there is much evidence of profound thought. The author of Kama Sūtra, Vātsyāyana, had described 64 arts and was a firm believer in God and the hereafter and the *puruṣārthas* of which in his opinion Kāma was the supreme. The basis of action is satisfaction of the five elements. And for preservation of the body, the satisfaction of the senses as that of the sex, Vātsyāyana also stressed the importance of celibacy, religion and good citizenship. Mastery over the 64 arts can be attained only after celibacy and study of the Vedas, Vatsyāyana stressed the control of sense organs and transformation of passions to concur with religion and ethics. Proper enjoyment of pleasure can be achieved only by a scientific analysis of the states of and means to pleasure.

JAIN PHILOSOPHY

Q. 30. Give an account of the Jain theory of knowledge.

(Cal. 1959)

Discuss the Jain theory of knowledge. Does it lead to scepticism ?

(Baroda M. A. 1954)

In the fields of both knowledge and metaphysics, Jain philosophy is pluralist and relativist. Metaphysics is based on knowledge, so it is necessary to understand epistemology as a prelude to understand metaphysics. Consciousness (*chaitanya*) is the essence (*sattva*) of the soul (*Jiva*). It has twofold manifestation, *viz.*, philosophy (*Darśan*) and knowledge (*Jñāna*). Philosophy does not contain exhaustive knowledge. Knowledge, on the other hand, admits expansion. Philosophy is based on natural perception. *Jñāna* is a matter of concepts. Philosophy deals with the generals not with particulars.

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS CATEGORIES

Like other philosophical schools, the Jains have also critically examined the valid sources of knowledge. But *Naya* is a distinctive feature of the Jain system. According to Jain philosophers knowledge is of two kinds *viz.*, *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*. *Pramāṇa* refers to the knowledge of a thing as it is. *Naya* is the knowledge of a thing in a particular context or relationship of the knower. *Naya* in other words, is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgment about a particular thing.

Nayas also differ with difference of standpoints. Thus every *Naya* gives us relative knowledge. According to the Jains, everything possesses an infinite number of qualities (*dharma*). When we affirm a thing by one of these manifold qualities we apprehend *Naya*. But when we know a thing in different ways by different qualities, this knowledge comes through *Pramāṇa*. Thus both *Pramāṇa* and *Naya* are essential for the full and true knowledge of a thing.

KINDS OF PRAMANA

Like other philosophers, the Jains also divide knowledge gained through *Pramāṇa* in two categories *viz.*, indirect (*Parokṣa*) and direct (*Aparokṣa*). But there is only relative difference between

the two. These are only relative terms. Indirect is only relatively indirect and direct is relatively direct. According to Siddhasena Divakar, *Pramāṇa* is that knowledge which illuminates itself and others without any hindrance. Therefore, *Pramāṇas* both direct and indirect enlighten themselves as well as others. Obviously, direct knowledge is the correct knowledge of a thing. It is gained by the soul (*Jīva*) unaided by *manas* or the sense organs (*Indriyas*). For *Umāswami* '*Pratyakṣa*' is that knowledge which the soul attains without any help. So *pratyakṣa* is valid in its own right (*Śvataḥ Pramāṇa*). In *Parokṣa Pramāṇa* a thing is known by *hetu*. This process of knowledge is known as *Anumān* (inference). It is to be noted here that originally the Jain philosophers were very fastidious about their conception of direct knowledge. For them only that knowledge was direct which was unaided by mind or sense organs (*Indriya*). But later on the Jain philosophers, who followed the earlier ones, widened its scope from the practical point of view and included knowledge through *manas* and sense organs also within the orbit of direct knowledge (*Pratyakṣa Jñāna*).

KINDS OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

Direct knowledge is either practical (*Vyavahārika*) or other worldly (*Paramārthika*). *Paramārthika pratyakṣa* is immune from the effect of actions (*Karma*), and illuminates independently without the help of mind or sense organs (*Indriya*). In it exists a direct connection between the knower and known. Unless one is free from the shackles of action one cannot have this kind of knowledge, so the destruction of action is a *sine qua non* for the attainment of *Paramārthika pratyakṣa*. This is the genuine *pratyakṣa* and it is this which sheds light on all the objects of the universe. *Vyāvahārika* or *Laukika* (mundane) *pratyakṣa* is to be distinguished from *Pāramārthika*, in as much as the former is achieved through mind and sense organs (*Indriya*). The latter is not achieved by all and sundry, while the former is found in the common folk.

MATI AND SRU A JNANA

Direct practical knowledge is of two kinds—*Matī* and *Sruti*. Following are the differences between *Matī jñāna* and *Sruti jñāna*—

- (1) In the former the object of perception is present, but in the latter the objects may belong to past, present or future.
- (2) The latter is related to *Jaināgama*. So it is superior to the former.
- (3) The latter, being the utterance of the great (*Āpta-vachana*)

is pure and beyond pariṇāma, while the former is subject to the effect or pariṇāma.

KINDS OF MATI JNANA

According to the Jaina philosophy, Mati jñāna springs in the following order :—

(1) *Avagraha*—It is the first stage of knowledge produced from the contact of sense-organs with the objects. It is also known as Sammugdha, Ālochanā, Grahana and Avadhāraṇa. Avagraha has been subdivided into Vijnānāvagraha and Arthāvagraha. In the former there is nothing other than the contact between the subject and object, while in the latter the subject not only apprehends the object, but also feels it.

(2) *Ihā*—This stage follows that of Avagraha. In it the soul is able to appreciate the qualities of the visible object. For example, on hearing some noise, we do not in the beginning know whose voice it is. This is the stage of Avagraha. Ihā comes when we feel the curiosity of knowing the source from which the noise is coming forth.

(3) *Avāya*—In it we come to know definitely about the object. To pursue the above mentioned example, we enter the stage of Avāya, when we are able to locate definitely the source of the noise.

(4) *Dhāraṇā*—This stage comes, when the full knowledge about the object leaves an impression (Samskāra) upon the heart (Antahkaraṇa) of the man. This is the final stage of direct knowledge. Recollection (Smṛti), pratyaksha and inference (Anumāna) are all included in this stage.

KINDS OF SRUTA JNANA

It is knowledge derived through words. It is produced by the words which we hear. It is to be gained from authoritative books and words of great sages. Perusal of authoritative books and listening to the sermons of saints are essential for this kind of knowledge. Knowledge of the sense-organs is, thus, a prerequisite for Śruta jñāna. Mati jñāna precedes Śruta jñāna. The preachings of the Tirthānkars fall in the latter category.

Śruta jñāna is divided into two categories, viz., Angavāhya Angapraviṣṭha. The former is mentioned in the Jaina scriptures while the Śruta jñāna, outside the pale of the religious books of the Jainas, falls in the latter category. Angapraviṣṭha is regarded superior to Angavāhya.

KINDS OF PARAMARTHIKA KNOWLEDGE

Paramarthika direct knowledge falls into two subdivisions viz kevala jñāna and vikala jñāna. Paramarthika direct knowledge automatically dawns upon man without the help of sense organs or mind as soon as he is free from the effect of Ghatiya and Aghatiya actions. If it is correct knowledge of the whole subject it is termed as kevala or sakala jñāna. It is achieved only by Arhatas who are free from attachment and jealousy. This is the best of all knowledge. But when this knowledge pertains to only a specific subject it is known as vikala jñāna.

KINDS OF VIKALA PARAMARTHIKA APAROKSA JÑĀNA

Vikala Paramarthika aparoksa jñāna has also been divided as Avadhī and Manah paryāya jñāna. The former follows partial emancipation from action. A person endowed with it can perceive substance (Dravya) which is at a distance or which is invisible or indistinct. When the shrouding knowledge is removed this type of knowledge is attained by gods instinctively and by men and other lower beings with efforts on their part. Being the knowledge of only limited things it is known as Avadhī jñāna. It can be achieved by all but Manah paryāya jñāna is the privilege of the saints only. The latter is a refined and subtle type of knowledge. With its help other people apprehend things of the present which have limited dimensions. When the knowledge is unveiled people attain it by samyak charit. Possessed of the quality of penetrating into the minds of others it is known as Manah paryāya.

All kinds of substance (Dravya) are known with the help of Mati and Sruta. Concrete substance (Mūrti Dravya) is the object of Avadhī jñāna. Subtle substance (Sūkṣma Dravya) is known through Mati. In all these four types of knowledge we cannot know the objects which are produced by the changes (Parināma) of substance or Parvaya. The knowledge of Paryāya is the object of Kevala jñāna.

INDIRECT KNOWLEDGE

Indirect knowledge is of five kinds—Smṛti, Pratyabhijñāna, Tarka, Anumāna and Āgama. It is necessary to study these five kinds in detail.

(1) *Smṛti*—To remember something known directly or indirectly.

past as a result of the awakening of some samskāra is known as śruti. Samskāra is a peculiar capacity of the soul. Not only direct perception of the past, but recollection, recognition, logic and inference of the past also leave impression (Samskāra) upon the soul. So these can also arouse smṛti. For the Jainas, smṛti is valid knowledge because it is the correct form of things perceived in the past.

(2) *Recognition (Pratyabhijñā)*—It is the synthetic knowledge contributed by direct perception and recollection (Smṛti). In it we know resemblance (samānatā), identity (tādātmya), differences (bheda), comparison (Tulanā) etc. In it we know the general (Sāmānya) in the form of similar change (Sadṛśapariṇāma) of different jīvas and ajīvas. Recognition is valid knowledge of a special kind. In the past e.g., this is, that Deva Dutta. Direct perception apprehends 'This'. Recognition enables us to know that 'This is that.' It is the knowledge of such things as cannot be known otherwise. It is a correct knowledge of a thing. It is not in contradiction with other valid sources of knowledge (Pramāṇa). The Jain philosophers do not recognise comparison as a separate valid source of knowledge. They include it in recognition (Pratyabhijñā).

(3) *Logic (Tarka)*—It is the knowledge of Vyāpti between pakṣa and sādhyā. It depends upon the perception whether two things exist together or not in past, present and future. Vyāpti is of two kinds, viz., Anvaya Vyāpti and Vyatireka Vyāpti. In the former the concomitance of two things is established. In the latter Vyāpti is shown in the absence. 'Where there is fire, there is smoke' is an illustration of Anvaya Vyāpti. On the other hand, 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke', exemplifies Vyatireka Vyāpti. The relationship of universal accompaniment—gradual or concurrent—exists in Vyāpti. This relationship is ascertained by logic (Tarka).

Inference is the knowledge of sādhyā with the help of hetu. This inference is either svārthānumāna or parārthānumāna. The former is to grasp for one's own self. Hence it needs no amplification. For example, the frequent visibility of fire and smoke together suffices to convince us of their concomitance. Afterwards, when we see smoke, we infer the existence of fire also with the help of Vyāpti, which is already known to us. It is, svārthānumāna. In it the place of smoke is pakṣa, smoke is pakṣa dharma. In svārthānumāna both Vyāpti and pakṣa dharma are essential.

Parārthānumāna, on the other hand, is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematized and vivid. It is five-fold.

In five fold Parārthānumana an inference is drawn in five sentences. These sentences are called the propositions (Avayava) of inference e.g.

(1) *Pratijna*—The hill is fiery

(2) *Hetu*—because of smoke

(3) *Dṛstanta*—Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as in the kitchen

(4) *Upanaya*—The smoke, which does not exist without fire (i.e. Vyaptivisiṣṭdhūm) is in the hill

(5) *Nigamana*—Therefore the hill is fiery

Bhadra Bahu has mentioned Dasavayava Parārtharumāna on the following —

(1) *Pratijñā*—Eschewing violence is the highest virtue

(2) *Pratijñā Vibhakti*—According to the view of Jain Tīrthāṅkars to eschew violence is highest good

(3) *Hetu*—Eschewing violence is the greater good because he who eschews violence earns the love of gods and to respect them is the religious duty of men

(4) *Hetu Vibhakti*—None but the eschewers of violence are permitted to live in celestial world

(5) *Vipakṣa*—But those are the beloved of gods who despise the Jain Tīrthāṅkars and take recourse to violence. They also deserve to be honoured by religious people. Those who commit violence in Yajna live in heaven

(6) *Vipakṣa Partisedha*—The Jain Tīrthāṅkars are not those persons who commit violence. They do earn respect and regard. They are also liked by gods

(7) *Dṛstanta*—Arhat and Jain sages do not themselves prepare their meals lest they should unwittingly commit violence. They take their meals at the homes of the Gṛhasthas

(8) *Āśamka*—The food prepared by the Gṛhasthas includes that which is prepared for the Jain saints and the Arhats. The preparation for the food involves violence. The Jain saints and Arhats also naturally share the responsibility for this sin of violence. Hence the invalidity of the above mentioned example

(9) *Āśamka Pratiseḍha*—The Arhats and Jain sages do not inform the gṛhastha of their arrival. They also do not go for begging at a fixed time. So it is not correct to say that the gṛhasthas prepare food for them. So the Arhats and Jain saints have no connection whatsoever, with the sin of violence involved in the preparation of food by the gṛhasthas

(10) *Nigamana*--Therefore eschewing violence is the greatest good.

THE BASIS FOR DEFECT IN INFERENCE

There are three chief steps (*pada*) in the process of inference viz., *Pakṣa*, *Sādhya* and *Hetu*. *Sādhya* is to be proved. The basis and the reasons for proving it are known as '*Pakṣa*' and '*Hetu*' respectively. The disintegration in the relationship of the three exposes fallacies of inference. The fallacies are as follows :—

(1) *Pakṣābhās*—Where the basis for *Sādhya* is either distorted or impossible. In other words, though it has a plausible semblance with the *pakṣa*, yet as a matter of fact, it is not *pakṣa*. This is the fallacy of *Pakṣābhās*.

(2) *Hetvābhās*—It is of three kinds :—

(a) *Asiddha*—This fallacy is found in the assertion which cannot be proved. For example, he is handsome, because he is the son of barren woman. This sentence is *asiddha*, because barren woman does not give birth to a son.

(b) *Viruddha*—That which is contrary to visual perception e.g., Fire is not liquid.

(c) *Anaikāntika*—Where we find mutually contradictory truth, for example, soul is ephemeral because it is knowledge and it is eternal because it is existent (*sat*). Here the former sentence suffers from *Anaikāntika*, as its opposite sentence is correct.

The two other kinds of *Hetvābhās* are termed as *Dṛṣṭāntābhās* and *Duṣaṇābhās*.

(3) *Āgam*—It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly, is reliable and *Āpta*. He is free from prejudice. His words befit the object which they are seeking to express. *Āgam* is of two kinds—*Laukik* and *Alaukik*. The words of Janaka etc. are *laukika*. The words of the *Tirthāṅkaras* are *alaukika*. The Jains do not believe in the *Vedas*. They have faith only in the *Tirthāṅkaras*, who have attained perfection and have realised all knowledge. Just as a lamp illuminates a thing so word also manifests a thing by its inherent power. But it depends upon customs and traditions. Its truth or falsehood is determined by the virtues or defects of the speaker.

THREE KINDS OF FALSE KNOWLEDGE

Some Jains believe in eight kinds of knowledge out of which *Matī*, *Śruti*, *Avadhi*, *Manah-Paryāya* and *Kevala* are regarded as

true or authentic knowledge. On the other hand, fallacious knowledge (*Mithya jñāna*) includes *Samasyā*, *Viparyaya* and *Anadhgavya*. The first five of these have already been discussed. *Samasyā* is that knowledge which admits doubt, suspicion and misgiving. It has its effect upon *Matī* and *Sruta jñāna*. Knowledge, which is contrary to truth, is dubbed as *Viparyaya*. It is found in *Avadhi*. False knowledge due to negligence or indifference is known as *Anadhgavya*. According to the Jainas, perfect knowledge suffers from no loopholes whatsoever. It is singularly free from *Samasyā*, *Vimoha* and *Vibhrama*. Delusion, deception or suspicion cannot assail it.

Q 31 State the *anekantavada* of Jainism and bring out its significance. (*Madras 1964 Karnataka 1966 Poona 1961 Kanpur 1965*)

The knowledge of a thing in a particular context or relation ship is termed as *Naya*. Mistaking this relative knowledge for perfect knowledge is an error, which is known as *Nayabhās*. *Naya* is mainly of two kinds, *viz* *Artha Naya* and *Śabda Naya*. The former is concerned with meaning or object, while the latter deals exclusively with words. *Artha Naya* is further sub divided into four categories. These are as follows—

(1) *Naigama Naya*—According to Siddhasena, *Naigama Naya* comes in, when we do not distinguish between the general and the particular attributes of an object, though we are fully aware of them. According to Pūjyapada it is connected with that purpose of an action, which is present throughout in that action from beginning to end. For example, a person is carrying fire, water and pots etc. When questioned about his purpose in doing all this, he will reply that he is going to prepare food. Here all the different actions are governed by one single purpose, *viz* the preparation of food.

(2) *Samgraha Naya*—In it general qualities are specially emphasised. Though the general, divorced from the particular, has no separate existence of its own, yet the observation of the general also leads to the knowledge of many things. Out of the general and the particular if either is emphasised at the cost of the other, it leads to an error known as *Nayābhas Sāmkhya* and *Advaita Vedānta* philosophies have neglected the particular.

On the other hand, the Buddhists do not recognise the general. The *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* philosophers recognise both yet they regard the difference between them as absolute. The Jainas on the contrary regard the difference between the general and the particular as relative. *Samgraha Naya* has been

subdivided into two categories-Para-samgraha is the highest general outlook, for which all the objects are part of one existent object (sad vastu). Aparasamgraha Naya dilates upon the general traits of different kinds.

(3) *Vyavahāra Naya*—It is the outlook of common people, based upon practical knowledge. In it objects are considered in their concrete forms and their particular traits are emphasised. When it pays exclusive attention to peculiar traits and takes them as the whole truth, it tends to overlook the general traits and leads to Nayābhāsa. Materialism (jaṇavāda) and Realistic Pluralism (Yathārthavādi Bahuvāda) are the pertinent instances.

(4) *Rju sūtra Naya*—It shuts eyes completely to the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, and holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. Thus it is narrower in its scope than even Vyavahāra Naya. This Naya is very useful in particular circumstances. But taking it as absolute truth leads to Nayābhās.

In addition to these four Artha Nayas there are three Śabda Nayas :—

(1) *Śabda Naya*—According to it, every word has a special meaning which must be necessarily kept in view. The word denotes some thing, quality, relation or action. In this connection it should be remembered that a word may have more than one meaning or the same meaning may be conveyed by more than one word. Moreover a word and its meaning have relative relationship. If we do not keep it in view, we are exposed to Nayābhāsa.

(2) *Samābhirūḍhi Naya*—It implies the splitting of words according to their roots. For example, the literal meaning of the word Pankaja is 'born out of mud' (Panka). But this word is used exclusively for lotus.

(3) *Evambhūt Naya*—It is narrower than even Samābhirūḍhi Naya. According to it a particular object can be referred to by a particular name, only when the meaning of the particular root, from which that particular word is derived, fully applies to it. Thus the cow can be termed as Gavayah, only when it is moving. Otherwise the cow should be referred to by some other appropriate word.

NAYA NISCHAYA

Of all the above mentioned Nayas, everyone is narrower than its antecedent. Thus Evambhūt is the narrowest and Naiṣam is the

widest Every Naya is one of those many viewpoints from which a thing can be viewed Regarding any of the viewpoints as absolute is fallacious and leads to Nayabhasa Dṛṣṭi According to the Jaina Nyaya Vaiśeṣika Advaitavedānta and Bauddha philosophers regard the first four Nayas respectively as the ultimate and absolute truth For the Jains a perfect vision implies a synthesis of all these different Nayas This perfect vision is termed by them as Naya nīśchaya It is also of two kinds i. Śuddha Nīśchaya and Aśuddha Nīśchaya In Śuddha Nīśchaya we know the real object (Sadvastu) stripped of upādhi In Aśuddha Nīśchaya we know the Sopādhi stages of an object

DRAVYARTHIKA AND PARYAYARTHIKA NAYA

The Jainas have divided Naya into two separate categories viz. Dravyarthika and Paryayarthika Naya The former considers an object in the light of its Dravya or substance while the latter keeps in view the Parva and Upādhi of the object concerned

Q 32 Critically explain the jaina doctrine of Syadvada

Cal 1970

Explain the Jaina theory of Syadvada and evaluate it as an epistemological theory Po a M 4 1968 Mee 19 2 Ka pur 1970

What is syadvada? What in your opinion is its philosophical significance Ku a ak 19 6 968 I ana 1966

Can syadvada escape from the object on arising from answering the question? G a 1961

SYADVADA

Syādvada or Saptabhaṅga Naya is the most important part of Jaina logic Syadvada is neither scepticism nor agnosticism In fact Syādvāta is the theory of the relativity of knowledge Every object exists in relation of its form substance and time and not in relation to the form substance and time as an absolute object Therefore the knowledge of every object is not absolute but relative

ANĒKA TĀVĀDA

According to the Jainas reality is not one but many It also cannot be regarded as absolute or eternal in different forms Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are its different self So every object has many aspects

The kevalīn has all the attributes of an object But when seen from one standpoint it is one and when seen from another must keep in mind that reality is all-sided

etc., is termed as Ānekāntavāda. It is also known as Parīṇāmanīyatvatvavāda. Syādvāda is based on this theory.

According to the Jainas, an object can be viewed in three ways. The knowledge, which views the part as the whole, is known as Durnīti. If knowledge is regarded as it is, without judging it to be either partial or absolute, then it is termed as Naya. When the knowledge is accompanied by the consciousness that it is limited, relative and sopādhi and that it can be interpreted in different ways according to different standpoints, it is termed as Pramāṇa or Syād sat.

To denote Pramāṇa the epithet Syād must precede Naya. Syād is supposed to be the signal of truth. It is relative and it has gradual knowledge. Syād eliminated the contradiction between divergent standpoints. Rejecting syādvāda tantamounts to the adoption of antavāda, which goes counter to all experiences.

According to the Jainas, pramāṇa cannot be nirupādhi and aikāntika. Affirmation and negation both are to be found in every parāmarśa. From the standpoint of Dravya, the object is sat, eternal, universal and one, while from the standpoint of Paryāya, it is asat, particular, ephemeral and many. The Jainas have illustrated Syādvāda by the anecdote of an elephant and six blind persons. These blind persons wanted to have an idea of the shape of an elephant. Touching the different parts of the body of the elephant with their hands, they mistook the particular part for the elephant. Thus different persons touched different parts—ears, trunk, forehead, belly etc. and they formed their own conception about the shape of the elephant accordingly. One of them compared it to a fan, another to a pillar. For another blind person, it resembled a wall and so on. For every one of them, his own knowledge was absolute and correct, while that of others was wrong and contrary to facts. According to the above mentioned illustration all philosophical schools embody one-sided truth. Similarly, all the philosophers harp on their own theories and criticise the theories of others. A person, who has eyes to see, knows that all the blind persons are equally wrong in their conception. From its own standpoint, every philosophy is correct. But if it pretends to be the sole embodiment of absolute truth and dubs other philosophies as false and fallacious, then it is thoroughly mistaken. The modern objective realists have pointed it out to be the fallacy of exclusive particularity.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORD SYĀD

The Jains insist that the word *syād* should necessarily be used before every *Naya*. It denotes that the truth of that statement is confined to that particular context and it may not hold good in other context. So according to them, the use of the word *syād* is imperative for rendering the judgement (*Parāmarśa*) flawless and correct.

KINDS OF JUDGEMENT

The Jainas have divided the judgement into seven categories from different standpoints. The judgement, in which an object is related to its own attributes or symptoms, is called *Astivāchaka Parāmarśa*. On the other hand, the judgement in which the absence of relationship is pointed between an object and the attribute and symptoms of other objects, is known as *Nastivāchaka Parāmarśa*. The following are the seven categories of *Paramarśa*.

1 *Syād Nasti*—The first judgement is that from its own standpoint, the object can exist, e.g., the jar exists as made of clay, in my room, at the present moment, of such a shape and size.

2 *Syād Asti*—From the point of view of the material, place, time and nature of another thing, a thing is not, i.e., it is nothing e.g., the jar does not exist as made of metal, at a different place or time or of a different shape and size.

3 *Syād Astinasti*—From the point of view of the same quaternary, relating to itself and another thing it may be said that a thing is and is not. In a certain sense the jar exists and in a certain sense it does not. We say here what a thing is as well as what it is not.

4 *Syād Avaktavyam*—While in the above mentioned three we make statements that a thing is in its own self and is not, as another successively, it becomes impossible to make these statements at once. In this sense a thing is unpredictable. Though the presence of its own nature and the absence of other nature are both together in the jar, still we cannot express them. The form of the jar some times may also be such that it can be described neither red nor black.

From the philosophical point of view, it is important in many ways :—

(a) According to it, gradual description of an object from different standpoints is possible. A thing cannot be described by simultaneously contradictory natures. So they are termed as *Avaktavyam*.

etc., is termed as Ānekāntavāda. It is also known as Parīṇāmānityatvavāda. Syādvāda is based on this theory.

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one thing contradictory qualities of existence and non existence as it is to bracket light and darkness together. But the clarification given above exposes the ignorance of the Buddhist and Vedantic philosophers about Syadvāda. According to Anekantavādins every thing has more than one quality. Though one *sat* and eternal from the standpoint of *dravya*, it is many *asat* and ephemeral from the standpoint of *pariyaya*. A thing is *sat* from the viewpoints of its own substance, form, time and space. Thus it admits of no contradiction. A thing is regarded existent, non-existent, existent-non-existent (*Sadasat*) and inexpressible not from one standpoint but from different standpoints. Oblivious of this vital and fundamental fact and afraid of imaginary contradictions, foolish people regard the relative as the absolute and thus are led astray from truth.

(2) The second objection raised by Samkaracharya nevertheless points out the real defect of *syadvāda*. If everything argues *Śamkara* is merely probable, then *syadvāda* cannot be an exception. In fact, the theory of *Anekantika* also hinges on *Ekantika*. The relative is based on the absolute. But for one absolute, the seven *nayas* of *Syadvāda* are disconnected and cannot be synthesised. Of course, the Jains believe both in *Ekantika* and in *Anekantika*. But they do not seek to effect any synthesis between the two. While propounding *Syadvāda*, they forget it and regard their own theory as the sole gospel of truth. The Jains criticise *satkāryavāda* by *asatkāryavāda* and vice versa. They differentiate between *Sakala* *desa* and *Vikaladeśa*. The latter term is applied to scattered groups of particular truths; the former refers to the absolute truths. In the words of Yaśovijaya, the Jaina outlook is the best as all the *nayas* are brought together simultaneously in it.

But conglomeration does not mean cohesion. In the mere presence of an absolute element, the diverse relative elements can be united by any means whatsoever. Yaśovijaya further asserts that *Anekantavāda* is characterised by impartiality because it metes out the same treatment to all the different *nayas*. Just as a father loves all his children and should not discriminate among his sons, so *Anekantavāda* does not differentiate among the numerous *Nayas*. But it tends to overlook the diversity. According to Hemachandra, all the philosophical schools except the Jaina are quarrelsome and used and revel in criticising one another. Only the Jaina school affords a welcome relief as it is free from bias and partiality. All *Nayas* are alike.

(b) All the queries cannot be answered in Yes or No. There are many questions which cannot be answered.

(c) Contradiction is defect. Contradictory natures cannot be attributed to a thing simultaneously.

(5) *Syād Asti Avaktavyam*—The remaining three Nayas are formed by adding the fourth Naya to the first three respectively. The fifth Naya is attained by the combination of the first and the fourth Nayas. Thus from the fifth stand point a thing is and is unpredictable also at the same time. The jar can be described red from a particular view. But if the view is not specifically mentioned it becomes impossible to describe its colour. So from a broad standpoint, the jar is red as well as indescribable.

(6) *Syād Nāsti Avaktavyam*—By combining the second and the fourth Nayas respectively, we come across the sixth Naya. According to it a thing is not and is also unpredictable. So we can say that the jar is not red and also that it is avaktavyam.

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A thing may have many natures. But there can be only seven parāmarśas about the different natures. The above mentioned parāmarśas can be imagined in relation to substance, space, time or existence. The Jain philosophy is realistic (Vastuvādin) and relativist (Sapekṣavādin). According to the Jainas, parāmarśa is not only a mental concept, but also a means of knowing the eternal things. A concept, to be true, must necessarily manifest the natures of the external things. Knowledge is relative, even then it depends not on mind, but on the nature of things.

CRITICISM OF SYĀDVAĀDA

Other philosophical thinkers have bitterly criticised the Jaina syādvāda. The reasons for criticism can be summarised as follows:

(1) The Bauddhas and the Vedāntins have regarded it as nothing more than a negative theory. They take syād in the sense of probability and they have fast their criticism on it. The same thing cannot be prevent and fast in the same sense. Philosophers like Dharmakīrti, Śānta Raksit and Śamkarāchārya treat it as the ravings of mad men. For Rāmānuja it is as impossible to roll into

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SEVEN KINDS OF FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS

According to the Jains the natural and supernatural things of the universe can be traced back to seven fundamental elements viz Jīva Ajīva Āśrava Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. The combination of jīva and ajīva is termed as astikāya also. Astikāya is a form of dravya. Thus dravya is of two types viz astikāya and nāstikāya. Dravyas which exist and envelop like body (kāya) or sarīr are astikāya while nāstikāya has no body. In it only time (kāla) is reckoned with Substance is the basis of attributes (dharma). The attributes which we find in it, are known as dharmas. According to the Jains things have many attributes. Broadly, these dharmas are divided into two categories viz, Bhavātmaka and Abhavātmaka. Those attributes which indicate the form and condition of a thing are known as bhavātmaka. On the other hand the attributes which indicate the distinction of a thing from the rest are termed as abhavātmaka. These attributes also change with the change of time (kāla). From this point, the attributes of dravya are either external (swarūpa or nitya dharma) or changeable (Āgantuka and Parivartanśīla). Without swarūpa dharma, a thing cannot exist. So they are always present in a thing. For example, while consciousness is the swarūpa dharma of the soul, desire, determination, happiness and sorrow are changeable attributes (Parivartanśīla dharma).

The universe consists of dravya. Because of the two above attributes it is both eternal and ephemeral. Thus both the philosophical schools—Buddhism and Vedānta—are one-sided and incomplete. Dravya is sat. All the three attributes of existence, viz birth, destruction and eternity are present in it.

JIVA TATVA

The Jains define Jīva or Ātman as conscious substance. Ātman in this world is known as jīva. It has praṇa and physical, mental and sensuous powers. In its pure condition, jīva has pure knowledge and vision (i.e., Nirvikalpa and savikalpa jñāna). But due to the effect of Karma, jīva is yoked with five Bhavāsra viz Auspāśmik, Āśayik, Āśayopāśmik, Audāyik and paripāśmik. Jīva with Pudgala is termed as sansarī. Jain philosophy is parirāmaḍa. So bhāvāsra change into dravya and vice versa.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF JIVAS

Jīva is self-illuminated and illuminates other things also. It is

eternal and pervades the whole body. It enjoys the fruits of actions and tends to go upwards. Karma enters into it due to Anādi Avidyā (ignorance) and it is bound down in shackles. The fettered Jiva is conscious (Chetanā) and Nitya Parināmi. Possessed of the qualities of flexibility and resilience, it assumes the form of the body it enters. The expansion of jiva differs from that of inanimate objects. It does not envelop the body, it feels in its every part. One inanimate object cannot enter into another inanimate object. But Ātman can enter into matter. Similarly, one jiva can enter into another jiva. Jiva has no form and is therefore not the object of eyes. Its existence is determined by self experience. In released state (Mukta Avasthā) it attains samyak jñāna. Jiva has pradeśas, which are also called paryāyas. So jiva is called astikāya (possessing pradeśa or body). Jiva is parināmi. It is ever characterised by birth, destruction and eternity. It happens due to the effect of time.

Jiva is inherently possessed of infinite perception, infinite knowledge and infinite power. Their manifestation is blocked by the clock of action. Feeling or consciousness and the result of consciousness are the special attributes of Jiva. Knowledge is also of two kinds. They are respectively termed as attributed knowledge and knowledge without attribute.

The former is of eight kinds, viz., Mati, Śruta, Avādhi, Manahparyāya and Keval, and three viparyayas viz., Kumati, Kusruta and Vibhanga vādinī. Kevala jñāna is pure and manifests itself after the annihilation of actions.

THE PARYAYAS OF JIVA

There are four prayāyas or parināmas of Jiva, viz., Divya, Māṇṣa, Nārakīya and Tiryak. Paryāya is also of two kinds, viz., dravya prayāya and Jiva prayāya. Dravya paryāya gives us a vision of unity in the diversity of paryayas. Paryāya is a term applied to the change which occurs in the attributes of dravyas due to parināma. For example, mango sheds its green colour and becomes pale, though it retains its mango-ship (Āmatva). Dravya prayāya is also of two kinds viz., samāna jātiya dravya prayāya and brhmāna jātiya dravya prayāya. The former is the outcome of the combination of inanimate dravyas, while the latter is born out of the combination of inanimate and animate dravyas. Skandha and human body are sadbhāva-vādin. The body, no doubt,

perishes but never the soul which though assuming different forms—divine human and hellish—is nevertheless eternal Dravya is eternal prayiya on the other hand is ephemeral. The Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda seeks to explain this belief of the Jainas

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF JIVA

Broadly speaking jiva is of two kinds viz Baddha and Mukta. The former is further subdivided into two categories viz Tṣ or jangama and Sthāvara. The sthavara jivas possess only one sense—organ (Indriya) i.e. Tvak Indriya. Earth water fire air and vegetable world fall in this category. The jivas possessing more than one sense organ are termed as tṣ. Thus human beings birds animals gods and devils are included in the category of tṣ jivas. These jivas have five sense-organs. They have different names which are determined by the different kinds of bodies which they possess. Jivas like stone who assume earth bodies are known as pṛthvī kāya. Similarly Apkāya jivas are those jivas who assume watery bodies. So also we have Vāyukaya and Tejaskāya etc.

THE PROOF OF THE THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL

The proofs for the existence of soul also are of two kinds viz direct and indirect. Lashing out vehemently at the scepticism of the Charvākas Guṇaratna has put forth a direct proof of the existence of soul. When we see the attributes or qualities of soul we directly realise the existence of soul. The perception of attributes tantamounts to the perception of the dravya. I feel that I am happy. This feeling enables me to have a direct realisation of the existence of soul. Similarly the experience of different attributes (dharma) e.g. sorrow memory thought doubt and knowledge etc. leads to the direct realisation of the possessor of these attributes (dharma) i.e. soul.

The following are the indirect proofs for the existence of the soul

(1) The body can be moved according to one's will. So there must be its mover the soul.

(2) The sense organs e.g. eyes ears etc. are the various instruments of knowledge. Without a co-ordinator knowledge cannot be gathered through these sense organs. Soul is the required co-ordinator.

(3) Besides material cause an efficient cause is also required for the production of inanimate objects e.g. a jar or a cloth. The

body also cannot come into existence without efficient cause. Soul is the efficient cause of the body.

REFUTATION OF THE CHĀRVĀKA VIEW OF SOUL

The Jainas have given the following arguments against the Chārvāka view of soul :

(1) There is no direct evidence to indicate that consciousness (Chaitanya) is produced by elements (Bhūtas) nor can it be inferred, because no vyāpti relationship can be discerned between the body and consciousness.

(2) Cause-effect (kārya-kāraṇa) relationship also does not exist between the body and the consciousness, because the growth or decline of the one does not entail the growth or decline of the other. The inanimate elements are merely Upādāna. They cannot produce consciousness, unless aided by efficient cause. Soul is the efficient cause.

(3) Soul is intimately connected with body. So it does not feel its entity, independent and separate from body. Therefore sentences like 'I am fat' etc., are to be taken figuratively, not literally.

(4) The thing, whose existence is refuted, definitely exists somewhere else in some form or the other.

AJIVA TATVA

According to the Jainas, the second element is Ajīva. Ajīva is of five kinds viz., Merit (Dharma), Demerit (Adharma), Ether (Ākāśa), Matter (Pudgala) and Time (Kāla). Out of these five ajīvas, the first four have many bodies (pradeśas). Therefore, they are called embodied (astikāya). Kāla has only one pradeśa and is therefore not astikāya. All the ajīva elements are dravya. They never perish. All these elements, save pudgala, have no form, taste, touch or smell. Pudgala, of course, has all these four attributes. Each of the first three ajīvas, i.e. dharma, adharma and ākāśa is only one, while pudgala and jīva are many. Unlike the first three ajīvas, the last two ajīvas have motion also. The attributes of pudgala are also found in anu and samghāta. These ajīva tatvas should now be considered one by one.

(1) *Dharmāstikāya*—Dharmāstikāya is neither active, nor can it produce action in others. But it helps the active pudgals and jīvas in their actions. It pervades the lokāśāsa. It is bereft of form, taste, touch, smell and sound. Though resultant (pariṇāmī), it is eternal. Though subject to birth and decay, it does not abandon

its form Dharma and Adharma are the causes of motion and status respectively.

(2) *Adharmāstikāya*—It helps jīva and pudgal, when they are at rest. Though the antithesis of dharma, it lacks form, taste. Dharma and adharma coexist in lokākeṣa. Both are eternal, shapeless and motionless.

(3) *Ākāśastikāya*—Akāśa is that which accommodates Jīva, Ajīva, Adharma, Kāla and Pudgal. This is also termed as lokākāśa. Alokākāśa is, where these dravyas find no accommodation. The former has numberless pradeśas, while the latter has limitless pradeśas. Ākāśa is not visible. It is the object of inference. But for ākāśa, the astikāya dravyās can have no expansion. Alokākāśa is beyond lokākāśa. Lokākāśa is the dwelling place of Jīva and other dravyas.

(4) *Pudgalāstikāya*—That which can accommodate Jīva, or that which attains parināma through combination or disintegration is known as pudgala. The smallest part of pudgala is aṇu or atom. It is indivisible. Samghāt or skandha is born out of the combination of two or more atoms. These include human body and other dravyas. Mind, speech and breath are also made of inanimate objects. Matter (pudgal) has four qualities viz, form, taste, smell and touch. These qualities characterise atom (Aṇu) and combination (samghāt) also. Pudgal is a limited and concrete dravya. It has eight kinds of touch, viz, soft, harsh, heavy, light, cold, hot, oily and rough. Smell is of two kinds, viz, fragrance and odour. Colour is of five kinds, viz., black, blue, red, yellow and white. It has two shapes, viz., atomic and skandha. The combination of two atoms produces Dvīpradeśa and that of Dvīpradeśa and one atom produces Trīpradeśa. Thus gross, grosser and grossest dravyas are gradually produced. According to Amrit Chandra Suri, pudgal dravyas are also of subtle, subtler and subtlest forms. Pudgala has many pariṇāmas like sound, bondage, subtle, gross, shape, distinction, parkness, shadow, light and heat etc. By the contact of pudgals, jīvas acquire motion. Pudgala has touch, colour, taste, and smell, while shapeless dravyas lack these qualities.

(5) *Kāla*—According to Umāswāmī, the change, result, motion, newness and oldness of dravyas are possible due to kāla only. Kāla is the cause of the products of pudgal and other dravyas. It is eternal. Hence the perpetual motion, which characterises the pudgal. Kāla is invisible. So its existence is proved only by inference. Kāla

is also known as samaya. Hour, minute, day, night etc., are the different forms of samaya (time). Samaya is *paripāmabhāva* and *kṣaṇika* (ephemeral or momentary) and is also termed as 'Kāla Aṇu'. Kāla Aṇu pervades *pradeśa* only and therefore has no body (Kāya). These 'Kāla aṇus' pervade *lokākāśa*.

They do not meet one another. Every *kāla aṇu* exists separately. They are invisible, shapeless, motionless and numberless. 'Nīchaya Kāla' is eternal and is helpful to the *pariṇāma* of *dravyas*. It is the basis of time. Samaya is also called practical time. Thus the Jaina philosophers distinguish between *Pārmārthika kāla* (Transcendental time) and *Vyāvahārika kāla* (practical time). The latter has beginning and end. The former is eternal and shapeless. *Vartanā* is due to *pāramārthika kāla*. Other changes are due to *vyāvahārika kāla*. According to Guṇaratna, for some Jain philosophers, Kāla is not an independent *dravya*, but only a modification (*pariyāya*) of other *dravyas*. It is an indivisible *dravya* and is therefore *Nāstikāya*. It is all-pervading and without particles.

ASHRAVA TATVA

The entrance of *karma pudgalas* in the body of *jīva* through *yoga* is known as *āśrava*. *Yoga* is a process of action, speech and mind (*manas*). Thus *Āśrava* is a cause of the bondage of *jīva*. *Jīva* and *pudgala* exist in *lokākāśa* from limitless time. The *karman* of *jīva* are also with them. By the contact of *anādi avidyā* (Eternal ignorance) four *kāśāyas*, viz, *Krodha* (anger), *Lobha* (greed), *Māna* (Egotism) and *Māyā* (illusion) also accompany *jīva*. The result of the actions of *jīva* is also present with *pudgalas* in the form of *samskāras*. *Karma pudgalas* are inanimate and therefore cannot enter in the *jīva*. Hence the necessity of the action of body, speech and mind. Before *karma pudgalas* enter in the *jīva* the latter feels a sort of sensation (*spandana*) on account of the activities of body, speech and mind. The sensation due to these activities of the three faculties are respectively termed as *Kāyayoga*, *Vāgyoga* and *Manoyoga*.

KINDS OF ASHRAVA

Āśrava is of forty two kinds. Out of these, *Kāya-yoga*, *Vāgyoga*, *Manoyoga*, five sense organs, four *kāśāyas* and non-observance of five *Vratas*, e.g., non-violence (*Ahimsa*), truth (*Satya*) etc., are specially important. In addition to these, there are near about twenty-five small *Āśravas*. All of them lead to human bondage.

Āśhrava is also divided into Bhāvāśhrava and Dravyāśhrava. The former refers to the changes in the bhāva of jīva before the entrance of the karma pudgalas into it. The changes occurring after the entrance of the karma pudgalas fall in the second category. Karma pudgalas stick to jīva like the particles of dust, which stick to the body massaged with oil. In this instance oil massage is Bhāvāśhrava and sticking of dust is Dravyāśhrava.

BADDHA TATVA OR BONDAGE SUBSTANCE

The overshadowing of jīva by pudgalas due to kāṣāyas is termed as Bondage or Bandha Tatva by the Jains. Mental tendencies are responsible for the bondage of jīva. Conscious thoughts and feelings are the root cause of bondage and the āśhrava of pudgala is the result of such thoughts. Bhavāśhrava is born before the entrance of pudgalas in jīva. The bondage of jīva, which follows it, is known as Bhavabandha. Dravyāśhrava follows the entrance of pudgalas in jīva. The bondage, which involves jīvas after it is termed as Dravyabandha. Āśhrava destroys the real form of jīva and consequently it is exposed to bondage. Apart from these two factors, there are other causes of the bondage of jīva e.g., karma, falsehood, attachment and non observance of the rules of penance. In the state of bondage, jīva and pudgalas enter into one another. Jīva and pudgalas are present in each and every part of living body. Pudgala and jīva intermingle like water and milk or iron and fire.

Q. 34 Give a brief account of the ethical doctrine of the Jain and Buddhist systems
(Poona M.A. 1963)

Examine the Jain theory of liberation
(Cal 1972)

SUMMUM BONUM

The escape of the Jīva from matter is liberation according to Jain philosophy. This mokṣa is the summum bonum. In Jain philosophy, liberation is conceived of in two kinds—bhāva mokṣa and dravya mokṣa. Attachment and the like can be destroyed by obeying laws or by meditation. The āśhrava is destroyed by saṃvar and nirjarā. In this way, freed of the matter and having become supreme and superior preceptor, one experiences freedom. The state is called 'Bhāva mokṣa' or Jīvan mukti. This is the initial state of real mokṣha, in which the four destructible karmas jñāna varṇiṣya, darśanāvārṇiṣya, mohaniṣya and antarāya—are destroyed. After this the respective destruction of the four indestructible kar-

mas—āyu, nāma, gotra, vedanīya—leads to dravya mokṣa. At the same time it is freed from the aupaśamika, kṣhayopaśamika, audāyika and bhavatva states. Then, adopting vertical motion it reaches the limits of the upper world. Dharmāstikāya does not exist in the super natural enlightened world (साक्षीकावस्थ). Thus, Jīva can neither proceed further than the loka nor return to the world. Consequently, it lives eternally in "Sidhashilā".

THE MEANS

SANVAR ELEMENT

In this way the Jains hold that sanvar (संवर) and nirjarā (निर्जरा) are the means to mokṣa. Sanvar element stops āśrava and 'bandha'. With it the jīva is freed from attachment, hatred and love and obtains equanimity for pleasure and pain and becomes free of distortions with the result that material particles do not enter it to cause any limitations. Sanvar has two distinctions—(1) bhāva sanvar, and dravya sanvar. Initially, in sanvar, distinctions like love, hatred and attachment are negated, the state being called 'bhāva sanvar'. Following this the entry of matter is stopped. This is called 'dravya sanvar'. Once the entry of karma particles has been stopped, it can not be started afresh. When all the karma matter of the Jīva has been destroyed he attains mokṣa. In nirjarā mokṣa, the residual karma particles are destroyed.

The Jainas have suggested the following ways of obstructing the entry of karma—(1) samitiān (समिति) (2) guptiān (गुप्ति) (3) panch mahāvṛta (पञ्च महाव्रत) (4) karma (कर्म) (5) anuprekṣāyen (अनुप्रेक्षयेन) (6) puriṣaha (पुलिषह) (7) charitra (चरित्र) or character. These are described below.

(1) *Samitiān*—Samitiān are the five external means of stopping karma. They are five—(1) Erya (ईर्य) samiti—meaning obedience of the law of movement. (2) Bhaṣa (भाषा) samiti—meaning obedience of the law of speech. (3) Āṣṇā (ऐश्वर्य) samiti—meaning obedience of the laws of alms-begging. (4) Ādān nikshepaṇa (आदान निक्षेपण) samiti—meaning, saving a part of the alms for religious work. (5) Pratisthāpanā (प्रतिस्थापना) samiti—meaning refusing alms.

(2) *Guptiān*—Interrupting the conjunction of karma and self is called 'Gupti'. The distinction of gupti correspond to those of physiological activity. (1) Vāg (वाग्) gupti—meaning negation of the conjunction—(1) kṛyā (कर्म) gupti—meaning negation of auditory activity. (2) Mano (मनो) gupti—meaning negation of mental activity like volition.

In samiti, the gravitation towards true activity is a major point. In it man is engaged in good work. The negation of false activity is of major importance in 'gupti'. A stop is put to bad activity.

The panch mahavrata also have importance in stopping the entry of karma particles into the self by following the five vows—ahimsa (non violence), satya (truthfulness), asteya (nonstealing), brahmacharya (celibacy) and aparigraha (noncovetousness).

(3) *Panch mahavrata* (a) *Ahimsā*—This principle of Jainas is based on the postulate that all beings are equal. In ahimsā, the mind, speech and action become permeated with nonviolence. Ahimsā means abstention from annihilation of living beings. It contradicts the killing of any beings, not just some beings. This law is difficult for common household people.

(b) *Satya*—Satya means the complete sacrifice of falsity. The ideal of truth is the truth accepted by and useful to all. Thus, the obedience of the satya vrata means not only staying at a distance from greed, fear and anger but also abstaining from decrying, ridiculing, verbosity, etc.

(c) *Asteja*—Asteya is the nonacceptance of material things from others without giving in return. Ahimsā has intimate relation to asteya. Existence of life depends upon wealth, thus looting of wealth is equivalent to killing of living beings. Thus, thieving is equally bad.

(d) *Brahmacharya*—Sacrifice of or abstention from passion is called brahmacharya (ब्रह्मचर्य) or celibacy. It implies the sacrifice of all actions, not merely sensual pleasures. The complete sacrifice of all desires whether mental or physical, fine or gross worldly or supernatural, egoistic or altruistic is essential for celibacy.

(e) *Aparigraha*—Meaning sacrifice of attachment to objects and implying sacrifice of speech, touch, vision, taste and smell. A lack of attachment towards worldly objects is needed for mokṣa.

(4) *Dharma*—Jains have enumerated ten dharmas the obedience of which is a safeguard against karmas entering the soul. These ten dharmas are—forgiveness (क्षमा), sweetness (मृदुता), simplicity (परलज्जा), cleanliness (शौच), truth (सत्य), self control (स्वयं), penance (तप), sacrifice (त्याग), indifference (अनेकशील), and celibacy (ब्रह्मचर्य).

(5) *Anuprekṣa*—According to Jainas, those who contemplate mokṣa must be embellished with twelve feelings or anuprekṣās.

These twelve are—(1) Anitya (अनित्य)—meaning that everything except religion is to be treated as transient. (2) Asharāṇa (अशरण)—meaning truth is the only shelter. (3) Sansāra (संसार)—feeling of life and death. (4) Aekatva (एकत्व)—Jīva is the sole responsible for his own karmas. (5) Anyatva (अन्यत्व)—meaning that the soul is to be treated as separate from the body. (6) Ashuchi (अशुचि)—meaning to treat body and bodily objects as impure. (7) Āshrava (आश्रव)—feeling of entrance of the karma. (8) Sanver (संवर)—feeling of negation of the entrance of the karma. Success in sanvar comes only after acute meditation and those who contemplate it have to obey strict laws. (9) Nirjarā (निर्जरा)—the feeling to eliminate karma particles embedded in the self. (10) Loka (लोक)—feeling of self, body and objects of the world. (11) Bodhiduralabhatva (बोधदुर्लभत्व)—feeling of understanding proper knowledge and proper character as difficult to obtain. (12) Dharmānuprekshā (धर्मानुपेक्षा)—not to be deviated from the religious path and feeling of introducing stability to it.

(6) *Purīṣha*—According to Umāswāmi "Those who are capable of staying in the religious path and capable of suffering for the destruction of karmas are called 'purīṣha'. These are twenty-two—hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquito-bite, nakedness (to bear nakedness with fortitude), detachment to sex, living in solitude to be undeviated from posture, shayya (शय्या), anger, murder, pleading non-attainment, sickness, Tīrasparśha (तीरस्पर्श), being oblivious to any dirt that may accumulate during meditation and avoid any effort to remove it, hospitality, reward, knowledge, ignorance and non-perception.

(7) *Charitra*—Besides the above purīṣha, it is necessary to generate the following five characters—(1) Samyaka charitra (सम्यक् चरित्र)—meaning staying in equanimity. (2) Doṣa sthāpanā (दोष स्थाना)—confession of one's mistakes in front of the teacher and taking advice. (3) Parihāra viśuddhi (परिहार विशुद्धि). (4) Sulāṁsa sampatāya (सुलान्सा सम्पत्तये)—with the exception of greed, the non-creation of kāṛāya like anger, etc. and (5) Yathākhyāta (यथाकथित)—negation of all kāṛāya.

NIRJARA LLEMENT

The destruction of karma particles, the seeds of limitations, is called nirjarā. These particles are the ones already adhering to the self. The above-mentioned sixty-two methods can prevent any further addition of karma particles but it is equally essential to destroy the old karma particle. That is why nirjarā is needed.

In order to precipitate to this state, it is essential to sacrifice bad qualities like attachment, etc., and to have nudidhyāsana (निदिध्यासन). This makes the mind flexible and pure and the Jiva can recognise the 'soul situated in its own body'. With this, the person endeavouring is bereft of his pain and the ultimate end of life, philosophy and religion, self realisation is experienced.

DISTINCTIONS OF NIRJARA

Nirjara has two distinctions—bhāvanirjarā (भावनिरंजरा) and dravyanirjarā (द्रव्यनिरंजरा). When in the affective state a feeling of nirjarā grows, it is called bhāvanirjara. After this the actual destruction of karma particles residing in the self is called 'dravyanirjara'. Bhāva nirjara too has two distinctions. When the particles are automatically destroyed after enjoyment it is called 'avipaka' (अविपाक) or akama (अकाम) bhāvanirjara. But if these karmas are destroyed even before enjoyment is finished, it is then called 'savipaka' (सविपाक) or sakama (सकाम) bhāvanirjara. The second requires internal meditation. Anashana (अनशन), avamodarya (अवमोदर्य), control in food, vṛtti sankshepa (वृत्ति संक्षेप), Limited diet, rasatvaga (रसतवाग) vivikta shāivasan (विविक्त शय्यासन) kaya klesh (काय क्लेश) are six external penances. Remorse (शयविषत) humility (विनय) Vayya vṛtti (वय्य वृत्ति), or service of saint, self study or svadhyaya (स्वाध्याय), vyutsarg (व्युत्सर्ग) or indifference to objects and meditation (ध्यान) are six internal penances.

TRIRATNA OR THREE JEWELS

Sanvar causes any new influx of karma particles to stop. Nirjara path to mokṣa is 'triratna' or three jewels viz., Right faith (सम्यक् दર્शन), Right knowledge (सम्यक् ज्ञान) and Right character (सम्यक् चरित्र).

(1) *Right Faith*—According to Umaswami right faith implies faith in real knowledge. Faith increases with meditation and it can be perfect faith only when complete knowledge has been obtained.

(2) *Right knowledge*—In right faith the knowledge is merely of the essence of Jain preachings. In right knowledge there is specialized knowledge of the rudiments of the Jiva and Ajiva. It is undoubted and without defect. For this too karma must be destroyed. Kevala jñāna can come only after karmas have been destroyed.

(3) *Right character*—It includes the adoption of beneficial activities and the abandoning of harmful ones. This frees the Jiva

from the karmas. For this the following activities are essential :

- (1) Obedience of the panch mahāvratā.
- (2) Carefulness in moving, talking, accepting favours and excreting urine etc.
- (3) Practice of Gupti (गुप्ति) in mind, speech and religion.
- (4) Conduct of ten dharmas—forgiveness, softness, simplicity, truth, cleanliness, self-control, penance, sacrifice, disenchantment and celibacy.
- (5) Feeling related to the real element in jīvā and the world.
- (6) To bear pains of hunger, thirst, heat and cold.
- (7) Equanimity, softness, munificence and good character.

The foregoing detailed description of the causes of bondage and the means for their removal must have made it quite clear that Jaina philosophers have made deep inroads into this field of human experience. Jaina philosophy has consequently made a significant contribution to Indian thought.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHA

Q 35 State and explain Buddha's attitude to metaphysical problems
(Karnatak 1966 1963)

Every philosophical system reflects the contemporary tendencies found in society. Hence to understand a system of philosophy it is necessary to keep an eye on the contemporary circumstances, thoughts and their actions. It is known through the Tripitak books that in Buddha's time and before him the discussions of self, world, other world, sins and liberation etc., were very common. Politically the country was divided into different small states whose inhabitants used different languages. The philosophical systems did not assume a systematic form so far. The Vedas were considered to be sacred in the spiritual field. Most of the time was wasted in useless discussions and hair splittings. In the moral field reasoning was given more importance than practice. In the philosophical field there were antagonistic views on almost every problem. Thus philosophy became a mental exercise or a verbal jugglery. In the religious field there was more emphasis on miracles rather than communion with God. The ethics was based on religion and religion depended on God. Hence the importance of human efforts and the sense of responsibility was gradually disappearing. Everywhere one could find superstitions, useless discussions and irresponsible behaviour.

Gautam Buddha revolted against these contemporary tendencies and presented rational religion, practical ethics and simple principles of life. The important characteristics of this philosophy are as follows —

(1) *Aversion from discussion*—Though Buddha has always tried to explain his principles intellectually but he usually avoided long discussions. In this sense he was an intellectualist but towards superstitions he had the approach of a modern man. Seeing the degeneration of faith he emphasized personal efforts. Buddha's religion and ethics is based on reason. His teachings of Buddha are more grounded in deep nihilism and experience rather than intellectual discussion. The

was not intellectual discussion on the philosophical concepts, but liberation from miseries. Whether the body is not different from the self, whether the self is immortal or not, whether the world is finite or infinite, eternal or ephemeral, these are the philosophical questions about which he always kept silent. This silence does not exhibit ignorance, but wisdom. It is well known that even after long discussion the philosophers of the East and West have failed to arrive at any final solution of these problems. Intellectual discussions of these philosophical topics have their own merit, but they hardly help in the achievement of liberation. Buddha explained the hollowness of the prevalent philosophical systems and emphasized the importance of the problem of liberation from misery. For a man who is engulfed in misery, the discussion of the fundamental nature of the self and the world seems to be mere folly or at best wastage of time.

According to Potth Pād sutta, Buddha has considered it useless to search for the solution of the 10 philosophical questions and hence did not try for it. In the Pāli literature of the Buddhist religion, these questions have been called, "Avyaktāni". Sometimes their number is even more than 10. These questions are as follows :

- (i) Is the world eternal ?
- (ii) Is it non-eternal ?
- (iii) Is it finite ?
- (iv) Is it infinite ?
- (v) Is the body and self the same ?
- (vi) Is the self different from body ?
- (vii) Was the Tathagat re-born after death ?
- (viii) Was he not born after death ?
- (ix) Is there re-birth and also no re-birth ?
- (x) Are the re-birth and no re-birth both false ?

From the practical standpoint the answers to these questions are useless and from the philosophical standpoint no final solution can be secured. Hence Buddha has not discoursed them.

(2) *Pessimism*—Another main characteristic of Buddha's Philosophy is pessimism. Buddha has taken the world as full of misery. Man's duty is to attain liberation from this painful world. It is folly to hope for pleasure in this world. In this sense the teachings of Buddha can be said to be pessimistic. But then he suggested the remedies of these miseries and indicated the path of

liberation. Thus Buddha's philosophy, though begins in pessimism, culminates into one of the most robust types of optimism.

(3) *Realism*—Buddha has vehemently criticised blind faith in the traditional scriptures like Vedas etc. Due to faith in the doctrine of Karma he has not admitted the existence of God. In his teachings he has emphasized the real experiences of life. He does not admit anything beyond the limits of efforts and understanding.

(4) *Pragmatism*—Thus Buddha's teachings are most pragmatic. It is due to their pragmatic importance that Buddha has discussed the four great truths and said, 'It is by such a discussion that one gets some gain, it is these which are closely related with the basic principles of religion. It is through these that detachment, destruction of passions, the end of miseries, mental peace, knowledge, wisdom and nirvāna may be possible.' Buddha was not an agnostic, otherwise he should not have called himself the Buddha. As a matter of fact his standpoint can be clarified by the following example:—

Once when he was sitting under a Śinsupa tree, Buddha took some of the leaves in his hand and asked his disciples, whether they are all the leaves of the Śinsupa tree or there are more leaves of the tree. When the disciples answered that there are more leaves, Buddha said, "Similarly, it is definite that there is much more than whatever I have told you." Further, Buddha has said that he has not told these things because they are not required for the attainment of peace, knowledge and nirvāna.

Q 36 State and explain the four noble truths as propounded by Buddha. (Poona 1963, Jaipur 1965, Mysore 1962, Kanpur 1970)

Explain the four noble truths taught by Buddha and point out their significance. (Madras 1962)

What are the four noble truths of Buddhism? How were they arrived at and what is their significance? (Osmania 1962)

Set out briefly the "Four Noble Truths" of Buddhism.

(Gujarat 1962, Karnatak 1963)

Ans. During a walk outside his palace, Siddhārtha Gautama came upon an old person, an ill, a dead and a hermit, and was profoundly stirred by the sight whereupon he renounced his kingly pleasures and ventured forth in search of truth. He found the causes of suffering and means of removing them. Obtaining this knowledge he was titled "Buddha". This knowledge is comprehended in four Noble Truths. These Noble Truths are as follows—

(1) *There is Suffering*—Observing the life of human beings and meditating upon it, Buddha came to the conclusion that the life

of human and other beings is painful. "There is pain with birth, destruction too is painful, separation from the pleasant is also painful. Conjunction with the undesired is painful and that passion is painful which remains unsatiated. In brief, Panchaskandha springing from attachment is painful." "The whole world is on fire and not an occasion for celebration." "Pain is the outcome of pleasure. Fear comes out of pleasure seeking." "Pain also comes when objects of sensual pleasure are lost." "Man has shed more tears than there is water in the oceans." "Man can find no place on the face of the earth where death does not hover over him." "Man wounded by the arrow of pain, should extract it." "Life is full of pain." "All objects born give pain and sorrow." "Birth, death, disease, old age, jealousy, ambition spring from attachment and are all, thus, sorrow." In this way, contrary to Chārvākas, Buddha looks upon the momentary things of this world as painful and preaches means of escaping suffering.

(2) *There is cause of suffering*—According to Buddha, the second Noble Truth pertains to the causes of sufferings. Desire, the motivating force sustaining the cycle of birth and death, is the fundamental cause of sorrow. This desire is of three types—(1) sex desire—for sensual pleasures, (2) Life desire—for life, (3) Wealth desire—for worldly wealth. "Actually, the hope initiating coming and going, the hope seeking sensual satisfaction now here now there is the desire for the satiation of passions, desire for a future life or success in the present one and it is the fundamental cause." This second Noble Truth is in regard to the cause of sorrow. All sorrows arise from attachment which itself is the result of ignorance. These causes of sorrow have been explained with tenacity by Buddha in his theory of Dependent Origination, which is included in the second Noble Truth.

(3) *There is Cessation of Suffering*—The third Noble Truth, according to Buddha, is in respect of the destruction of pain. In it passion, desire and love of life are completely destroyed. It is the sacrifice of desire, separation from it, liberation from it and detachment from it and detaching from it any importance. "Actually it is the destruction of the very desire which is left without any passion which is to be placed aside from which separation is desired, from which we are to be liberated and which is to be ousted completely. The object of this Noble Truth is the culmination of sorrow, the destruction of ego. And love of truth draws yet in its wake, attach-

ment, jealousy, doubt and sorrow. Nirvāṇa is the destruction of passion, doubt and sensual pleasures by contemplation of Nothing or Shūnya. It is everlasting and complete infinite nothingness. It is complete peace, free from desires like the calm of deep seas. He who overcomes this strong and dangerous passion, sorrows leave him as water leaves the petals of the lily. "Dig out the roots of desire so that it may not crush you time and again." In this context of truth, Buddha has made a detailed description of Nirvāṇa and has explained it.

(4) *Path of Liberation*—The fourth Noble Truth, according to Buddha, is the way to cessation of sorrow, meaning the road to escape from sorrow. Buddha, not only detailed the causes of sorrow but his showing the path to annihilate sorrow by removing these causes has sent a current of hope in a world of pessimism. This path is eightfold. Pursuing this path, Buddha attained the stage of absolute liberation and others can do the same by pursuing this path. Actually, this is the essence of Buddhist religion. The aim of Buddha was not the presentation of any philosophical system, but rather the evolution of some practical solution for freedom from suffering.

In this way, the four noble truths are—there is suffering, there are causes of suffering, cessation of suffering and path of liberation. These four Noble Truths are the foundation stones of Buddhist philosophy and they also reflect the entire cycle of Gautama's spiritual life originated in consciousness of suffering while the consummation was the discovery of means of escaping suffering. In this way Gautama's spiritualism is based on solid realism. It is this unique feature which is the reason for the wide popularity of his thoughts.

Q. 37 Explain the nature of Nirvana according to Buddhism. Is the idea of liberation compatible with the Buddhist denial of self?

(Cal 1967 Karnatak 1959 Meerut 1971 Agra 1973)

IRVANA THE ULTIMATE END

The ultimate end of Buddha's philosophy is nirvāṇa which literally means 'extinguished'. Some people, according to the origin, interpret it to mean the end of life but this idea is wrong. Had it been so Buddha would not have attained nirvāṇa before his death. It is equally incorrect to interpret Buddha's silence to mean that the person who achieves nirvāṇa has no existence after death. Nirvāṇa means the extinguishing of fires of passion. In it the fires of avarice, jealousy, anger and doubt are extinguished and

impurities of the mind like sexual, ignorant and effective tendencies are vanquished. It effects the end of the cycle of rebirth. In Buddhist literature profuse mention is made of the lighting and extinguishing of fire. Nirvāṇa has been said to be or described as a state of calm or equanimity in which passion and the sorrows accruing from it are completely becalmed. It is neither the destruction of existence nor inactivity. Nirvāṇa can be attained in this life. A rational and social life is not precluded from it. Buddha's own life can exemplify this aspect. Nirvāṇa does not imply abstinence from action but from the attachment, repulsion and labour conjoined to action. The body does exist in the state of nirvāṇa but the thirsting is destroyed. It is similar to the liberation while living, a conception of the Upaniṣads. But there is no rebirth after nirvāṇa. The person attaining nirvāṇa goes out like a light. According to Rhys Davids nirvāṇa is like the calm, sinless state of the mind and it can best be expressed as purity of perfect peace.

Having once attained spiritual consciousness permanently, there is no longer any necessity for persisting in a state of concentration and there is no longer any fear of limitation due to actions. Actually, according to Buddha, attachment, repulsion etc., when present, cause the action to become a limitation. In its absence there are no impressions created and no limitations like rebirth. As in the case of seeds, the plants grow only when the seed is fresh and not fried when sown, so in the case of actions, Actions performed without attachment do not cause any restrictions. In nirvāṇa the individual's ego is destroyed because its substratum, pain and longing etc., have been completely eliminated. Nirvāṇa is in every conceivable aspect a state of unrestricted calm. A free person has perfect insight, perfect impassion, pure peace, perfect control, calm mind, calm word and calm action.

STATE OF PEACE

In Pli religious texts, nirvāṇa is described as a state of peace. In the Pitsakas, nirvāṇa has been described by adjectives such as eternal health, ultimate end, perfect safety and place of no fear. In the Dhammapads it has been called a state of perfect bliss, perfect peace of freedom from creed and doubt.

Nirvāṇa is neither eternalism nor nihilism. It is stated by Buddha that "It is unknown, unique, uncreated and uncultured. Had there not been some eternal, then there would be escape for the fool." According to Oldenberg, that there is some eternal for Buddha, only means that the person burns can be free from the cause

of birth. Nirvāṇa is painlessness, purity, consummation of moral efforts, freedom, real bliss escape, from passions, perfect peace, perfect self-control and complete extinction of birth and sorrows. In this way nirvāṇa is indescribable. As Dr. Keith expresses it all practical words are inappropriate in the description of the indescribable (nirvāṇa). According to Dr. Dasgupta too, nirvāṇa cannot be described in terms of physical or worldly experience. It can neither be said to be positive nor negative. It is an extraordinary, indescribable state beyond thought. It is deep and unfathomable like the ocean. Nāgaseṇa, the famous Buddhist preacher, while describing nirvāṇa to king Milind with the help of similes, had said that those who have no experience of nirvāṇa cannot feel it by means of these similes.

FORMS OF NIRVĀṆA

Some of the oldest Pāli texts look upon nirvāṇa as a moral state achieved in this life. Some of the later Sanskrit texts treat unqualified absolute nirvāṇa as the death of the being after which there is no life. Hinayāna and Mahāyāna have wrought some changes in the meaning of nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa has been attributed two forms— (1) Sopādhi śeṣa (सोपाधि शेष), (2) Nirupādhi śeṣa (निरुपाधि शेष). In the first, some impressions reside due to rebirth, the second means complete extinction.

RESULT OF NIRVĀṆA

With nirvāṇa the reasons for birth come to an end and the probability of rebirth and pain after death is excluded. The person who has achieved nirvāṇa spends a life of perfect knowledge and calm till death. Actually, worldly pleasures and ordinary experience are incapable of describing nirvāṇa. It can only be said that in Nirvāṇa man becomes relieved of all his pains. Even before attaining perfect liberation man sheds his pains as he progresses towards the state of nirvāṇa.

Q. 38 Write a note on Buddha's theory of the middle path

(Punjab 1957)

From the philosophical and moral point of view, Buddha has adopted middle path. There are two limits which the aspirant should never approach. On the one hand pleasures of sensual objects, interest in passions, a low, uncultured, deplorable and undirected pleasure seeking meant only for the low people and on

the other hand the habit of suppressing the self, which is painful, worth discarding and useless. Buddha has discovered a middle path which opens the eyes, and which guides towards peace and insight, supreme wisdom and nirvāṇa. Actually, it is only the noble eightfold path.

EIGHTFOLD PATH

(1) *Right Vision*—The first means in Buddha's eightfold path is right vision. Ignorance generates a wrong view regarding the relation between the world and self, and man mistakes a transient, painful and unspiritual object for a permanent, blissful and spiritual one. The abandoning of this fallacious view and attending to the real nature of objects is said to be right vision. In this way, unflinching meditation on the four noble truths is proper view. This meditation takes one towards nirvāṇa.

(2) *Right resolve*—The second means is right resolve. The determination to root out thoughts which entertain ill will towards others and contemplate their harm and attachment to sensual pleasures, is right resolve. The noble truths can be profitable only if life is led according to them. Proper volition should be with a proper view. Proper volition includes sacrifice, benevolence and sympathy.

(3) *Right speech*—The third mean is right speech. As a first step, man should control his speech by right resolve. Right speech means avoidance of falsity, criticism, unpleasing and false speech. Every man should avoid bad and adopt good speech. One word calming the mind is better than innumerable meaningless words.

(4) *Right conduct*—The fourth means is proper conduct, which means forbearing from activities like destruction of life, theft, sexuality, falsifying, excessive eating, visiting social recreations, artificial means of beauty, jewellery, use of comfortable beds and gold, etc. All these laws apply to hermits. But married people need obey only five laws. Ordinary people have a number of other laws. Parents should protect their children from evil qualities and cultivate good qualities in them, and marry them after their education is over. The offspring should make themselves noble by serving their aged parents. The students should study, respect their teachers, obey them and fulfill their needs. The teachers should be kind towards them and perfect them in the art and sciences by directing good habits in them. The husband should respect his wife, be faithful to her and look after her welfare. The

wife should behave lovingly towards her husband manage the house efficiently, be hospitable to all guests and exemplify marital fidelity. Continuing in the same vein, Buddha has made a detailed description of laws regulating the mutual behaviour between various people related socially. He has preached the lesson of sacrifice, benevolence and sympathy to the multitude in its entirety. His laws aim at making both society and the individual happy. Considering these laws no one can declare Buddha to be an escapist.

(5) *Right livelihood*—Right livelihood means earning one's bread and butter by right means. Without it right activity cannot be fully practised. According to Buddha, one should not trade in weapons, animals, meat, wine etc. It is never good for any person, to earn his money by unfair and bad means like pressure, fraud, bribe, extortion, chicanery, dacoity etc.

(6) *Right effort*. Along with the obedience of law regarding view, volition, speech, action and livelihood, it is also necessary to stop bad impressions and avoid bad feelings. Endeavouring to this end is called right effort. It includes self control, negation of sensuality, stopping bad thoughts, awakening good thoughts and concentrating the mind upon universal welfare. Five modes of restricting bad thoughts have been advocated.

(1) Meditate upon some good thought.

(2) Study the results of acting upon bad thoughts.

(3) Analyse the cause of bad thoughts and stop its results.

(4) Control the mind by physical efforts. Obedience of dharma depends upon the mind; upon the obedience of dharma is dependent the attainment of liberation. In this way even a person who has made some progress along the spiritual path needs proper exercise in order to eliminate the risk of a lapse in future.

(7) *Right mindfulness*—Right mindfulness means the retention of the body, conscience and mental state in their real form. Bad thoughts occupy the mind only by forgetting their real form and when actions take place according to them, pain must be suffered and the tendencies become stronger. Right mindfulness includes the remembering of impurities of the body, pleasure nature of suffering, nature of pain, hatred and doubtful mind, five skandhas, senses, object of senses, means of liberation and the four noble truths. Right mindfulness destroys attachment and releases one from pains.

Gautama Buddha described right mindfulness meticulously. He preached that the body should be treated as constituted of earth.

water, fire and air, is filled, it must be remembered, with deplorable things like bones, skin, intestines, spleen, urine etc. One should see the burning of the body in a crematorium, its destruction, conversion to food for vultures and dogs and becoming dust. Remembering these truths makes one forget or lose love and attachment for one's own or another's body. Due to this, the attachment for other bad tendencies is also destroyed. It results in complete lack of passions and elimination of pains. In this way, man avoids worldly attachment due to the effect of right mindfulness.

(8) *Right concentration*—By pursuing the seven laws propounded above, man's tendencies of the citta or mind are pacified and he becomes capable of entering right concentration. Before nirvāṇa is attained, right concentration has four stages :

(1) In the first stage, the four noble truths are meditated upon with a calm mind. Pure and detached thought creates unique happiness.

(2) In the second stage, efforts like meditation are suppressed and reasoning becomes unnecessary, doubts are removed and faith in noble truths increases. Here intuition replaces thought. Profound contemplation results in peace and permanence in the mind. At the same time, bliss and peace are sensed.

(3) The third stage is one of indifference. Here the endeavour is to remove happiness and introduce indifference in the mind. In this the mind is in equilibrium, but one becomes indifferent to the happiness of concentration.

(4) The stage of absolute peace is the fourth stage in which pleasure and pain are destroyed. In it the tendencies of the mind are negated. It is a state of perfect peace, perfect indifference and perfect negation. In it, pains are completely destroyed and nirvāṇa obtained.

SHEEL, SAMADHI AND PRAJNA

The eightfold path of Buddha has three major parts—Sheel, concentration or Samādhi and Prajñā. Prajñā is real knowledge, superior to intellectual knowledge. Good conduct is impossible without real knowledge. On the other hand, perfection of knowledge, too is not possible without right conduct. Accordingly, in accordance with the tradition of Indian philosophy, Buddha looks upon sheel and prajñā as complementary. Prajñā is [destructive of sexual and ignorant tendencies. Prajñā awakens or arises undisturbed concentration. The first seven laws of the eightfold path

guide one towards the perfection of concentration. Pursuing it leads to the evolution of prajñā and śheel. Perfect prajñā, perfect śheel and perfect peace spring immediately after nirvāṇa is attained. In this way, it is extremely wrong to consider nirvāṇa to be an empty state. Besides preaching the meditation on physical defects or bad feeling Buddha has also stressed the adoption of friendliness towards every one, sympathy towards the suffering and aloofness towards the bad. These four together are called 'Brahma Vihāra'. Non-violence has major importance in the preaching of Buddha. Non violence requires both sympathy and friendliness.

Q 39 Discuss the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. (Cal 1972, 1970)

State and explain the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. How do they account for memory?

(Karnatak 1966, Madras 1960, 1964, Poona 1966)

In the second great truth of Buddha's teachings there has been a reference to the doctrine of 12 Nidānas. This is the doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda i.e., dependent origination. This doctrine is the main principle in Buddha's teachings while all others are based upon it. Doctrine of Karma, momentarism, the theory of no-soul and all other Buddhist doctrines are based on the principle of dependent origination.

Literally speaking, Pratītyasamutpāda means "This being given that follows or that a certain effect follows a certain cause". Thus the doctrine of dependent origination explains the causes of the suffering, etc., in the world. Pratītyasamutpāda is relative as well as absolute. Relatively, it is the world while from the absolute point of view it is Nirvāṇa. Buddha has called it Bodhi as well as Dhamma. "Whoever sees Pratītyasamutpāda, sees Dhamma and whoever sees Dhamma sees Pratītyasamutpāda". The forgetting of the doctrine of the dependent origination is the cause of suffering, and by its knowledge all the sufferings are annihilated.

Pratītyasamutpāda is a middle path between Śāśvatawāda or the principle of eternity and Uchedwāda or the principle of annihilation. According to the former, some things are eternal; they have neither beginning nor end; they are un-caused and do not depend on anything else. According to the latter view, nothing remains after the destruction of things. The doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda maintains a middle way in both these extremes. According to it, things have existence, but they are not eternal. On the other hand,

they are never completely annihilated but something always remains. The origination of a thing is due to another. External or mental happenings are always due to some cause. This chain in causes and effects is ever recurring.

After seeing the scenes of disease, old age and death, Buddha left his palace to find out their solution. This solution he got in the doctrine of dependent origination. "Then the blessed one, during the first watch of the night, fixed his mind upon the chain of causation in direct and in reverse order, from ignorance spring the *samskāras*, from the *samskāras* springs consciousness, from consciousness spring name and form, from name and form spring the 6 provinces of the 6 senses *i.e.*, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or touch and mind, from the 6 provinces spring contact, from contact springs cessation, from cessation spring thirst or desire, from thirst springs attachment, from attachment springs becoming, from becoming springs birth, from birth spring old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, detachment and despair. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. Action is destroyed by the destruction of ignorance, which consists in the complete absence of knowledge, the *samskāras* or the pre-dispositions are destroyed by the destruction of the ignorance, consciousness is destroyed by the destruction of the predispositions, by the destruction of consciousness name and form are destroyed, by the destruction of the name and form the six provinces are destroyed, by the destruction of the six provinces contact is destroyed, by the destruction of the contact feeling is destroyed, by the destruction of the feeling thirst is destroyed, by the destruction of the thirst attachment is destroyed, by the destruction of the attachment becoming is destroyed, by the destruction of becoming birth is destroyed, by the destruction of the birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, detachment and despair are destroyed. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering."

The twelve links in the wheel of cessation maintained by the doctrine of dependent origination, have been divided into three classes *viz.*, the past, the future and the present. Thus the twelve links can be presented as in the following table :—

1. Those due to the past life :—

(a) *Avidyā* or ignorance, (b) *Samskāras* or predispositions or tendencies.

2. Those due to the present life :—

(c) *Vijnāna* or 'consciousness of self. (d) *Nāma-Rupa* or

name and form, (e) *Ṣaḍyatna* or the six sense organs (f) *Sparśa* or the contact (g) *Vedanā* or feeling (h) *Tanhā* or craving (i) *Upādāna* or clinging or attachment

3 Those of future life —

(j) *Bhava* or coming to be (k) *Jāti* or rebirth (l) *Jarāmaraṇa* or old age and death

In Buddha's teachings these links are not always twelve, but the above description is considered to be most valid. These twelve links are present in this chain from the beginning to the end. The cause of the present life is the past life, while the future depends upon the present. *Avidyā* and *samskāra* are included in the second great truth. Similarly, the *Pratītyasamutpāda* can be found in the second and the third great truths. Leaving the first link and the last link, old age and death, the remaining ten links are also called ten *karmas*. Now these twelve links may be discussed in details.

(1) *Ignorance or Avidyā*—*Avidyā* is the basis of the *jīva* hood or ego. This is the substratum of action. Together with *Karma* it forms the *jīva*. It is due to it that the sufferings of the world are conceived. Ignorance causes ego sense and the individual thinks himself separate from the remaining world. This results into attachment to life which is the root cause of all suffering.

(2) *Predisposition (Samskāras)*—Pre disposition means a disposition preceding to or preparing for certain activity. *Samskāra* has been taken both in the sense of origination and the originating activity. It also means actions with purity and impurity, *dharma* and *adharma*. Taking in the wider sense it means that power or principle which creates new existences. As there are pre-dispositions so are the results. The pre disposition of the attachment to *riches*, etc., causes birth in a rich family and the pre disposition of getting freedom from *samskāras* takes towards *Nirvāṇa*.

(3) *Consciousness (Viññāna)*—After the cessation of the body, the senses and perceptions etc., after death the consciousness remains and causes new birth unless after getting *Nirvāṇa* it is completely annihilated. Thus consciousness of self is the real cause of transmigration.

(4) *Name and form (Nāma Rūpa)*—From consciousness is caused name and form. Without the subject the object is meaningless. The name and form and consciousness are mutually independent.

(5) *Sense Organs (Ṣaḍyatna)*—From the name and form and

they are never completely annihilated but something always remains. The origination of a thing is due to another. External or mental happenings are always due to some cause. This chain in causes and effects is ever recurring.

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consciousness are born the six sense organs i.e., the eyes, the ears, the nose, tongue, skin and mind.

(6) *Contact (Sparśa)*—From the six sense organs are born the external organs which make for the contact with the external world. Sometimes it is said that it is not that the seeing is due to eye, but the eye is due to seeing and similarly, ears are due to hearing. Thus the external world is created by the form and the idea etc.

(7) *Feeling (Vedanā)*—The contact with the external objects creates different feelings in the persons. Thus due to the contact with the different types of objects one has different feelings of pleasure, pain, attachment, aversion etc., which bind him with the world.

(8) *Craving (Tanhā)*—The craving born out of feeling is the root cause of suffering in this world. It is this craving which takes the Vijnāna from birth to birth. It is again due to this that the man runs after the worldly attachment like a blind person. The craving goes on ever increasing and as the craving is overcome the suffering disappears like the drops of water on the lotus flower.

(9) *Attachment or clinging (Upādān)*—The fire of the craving is due to the fuel and so where there is craving there must be clinging or attachment. It is the attachment with the worldly objects that causes the bondage of the jīva with the world. It is only after getting liberation from this clinging that Nirvāṇa is possible.

(10) *Coming to be (Bhava)*—According to Chandra Kīrti, Bhava includes thoughts and actions which are responsible for re-birth. Coming to be is due to clinging or detachment. Bhava results into birth and birth leads to the sufferings of the old age, disease and death etc,

(11) *Re-birth (Jāti)*—Bhava creates re-birth and so the Jīva is caught in the wheel of the world and remains in it till he attains Nirvāṇa.

(12) *Old age and death (Jarā and Maraṇa)*—Re-birth causes the whole chain of the worldly sufferings. After the man is caught in the wheel of the world, the diseases, old age, sufferings and death etc., recur again and again.

The above mentioned doctrine of dependent origination has been subjected to various types of criticisms. Of these some of the most important are as follows :

(1) Avidyā or ignorance is the first cause in the doctrine of dependent origination. It is from ignorance that the cycle of the world begins. But if every fact must have its cause then what is the cause of ignorance? Buddha has not given any explicit answer to this question. As a matter of fact, from the psychological standpoint this chain of cause and effect cannot be very much doubted and other philosophers have also admitted ignorance to be the root cause of all sufferings. It is not very difficult to understand why Buddha has not mentioned the cause of ignorance. His problems were rather empirical and pragmatic than philosophical. That ignorance exists is empirically proved and hence the question that why is it there, becomes meaningless. The main question is not why there is ignorance, but how can it be removed. Buddha was busy in finding an answer to this very question. But it should not be forgotten that the philosophical enquiry into the cause of ignorance has also its own importance. In the philosophy of Buddha metaphysics has been subordinated to ethics. The former is secondary while the latter is primary. But the philosophical problems have been always arising in human mind and reason demands their solution however imperfect it may be. It should be noted that Buddha did not give much importance to philosophical problems. As about other philosophical problems, Buddha has remained silent about the cause of ignorance, but like other cases here also this silence does not mean ignorance. As a matter of fact, ignorance is indescribable, eternal and the nature of the world. The latter Buddhist philosophers like Ashwa Ghosh etc., have discussed the cause of ignorance and admitted it as originating from Tathātā. The cause of Avidyā can be discussed only after admitting a cosmic Reality. Ignorance is one of the powers of that cosmic existence.

Q 40. Write a short note on Buddhist doctrine of Karma.

The doctrine of Karma in Buddhist philosophy is based on the doctrine of dependent origination. According to both these doctrines, the present life of man is the result of his past life and the future depends upon the present. According to Buddhist religion, "Because of their karmas, men are not similar, but some are long living some short living, some healthy and some unhealthy etc." When a disciple with broken head and blood flowing from it came to Buddha, Buddha said, "Oh Arhat, bear it as it is you are bearing the fruits of your karmas for which you would have suffered in hell for centuries." According to the doctrine of

karmas, every man is responsible for his actions. The actions must bear fruit. The future of every individual depends on his present actions.

According to the doctrine of karma, the fruits of the actions are according to the character of the actor. If some bad man has committed a sin, he will have to suffer for it in the hell. But if some good man has by chance committed some evil action, he will get rid of it after suffering a little in this very life. "It is like this that if a man puts some salt in a small cup of water, the water will become salty and not worthy of drinking. But if the same amount of salt is thrown in the water of the Ganges, no visible defects will be observed."

When the doctrine of karma becomes all-powerful the human freedom disappears. When everything is pre-determined according to karmas, then how can the individual effect any change in it? Gautama Buddha has not given any clear answer to the freedom of man vis-a-vis the doctrine of karma. But he has accepted the possibility of overcoming the entire law of karma and the actuality of the free actions. According to Buddha the doctrine of karma is not mechanical. Though the present is determined by the past, the future is free and depends on our will. "O priests! if any one says that the man must bear the fruits of his karmas, there is no religious life in that condition, nor is there any opportunity of the absolute destruction of suffering. But if some one say that the reward which a man gets is according to his action then, priests in that condition there is religious life and the opportunity of the destruction of all suffering." As a matter of fact, if the doctrine of karma is mechanical then there is hardly any place for religion and ethics in human life. The doctrine of karma shows an order in the field of spiritual development as well as that of terrestrial process. It does not lessen the importance of efforts and responsibility. The philosophy of Buddha is against absolute determinism as well as against absolute indeterminism.

In the Buddhist philosophy, the succession of the world has been called Bhava-Chakra. In their cycle, the chain of the cause and effects is always operating. It is this effect which has been emphasized in the doctrine of the dependent origination. Both birth and death are two links in the same chain. As the old is destroyed, the new takes birth. Not only human beings, but all living beings are caught in this cycle of the world.

But there is an escape from this wordly cycle. According to the Buddhist philosophy the karma ceases to have any effect in the ultimate spiritual status. In that stage the karmas and their effects are destroyed for ever and the man rises above both merits and demerits. After attaining liberation the actions cease, but this does not mean inactivity. Really speaking, all karmas do not bear fruit, but only those karmas result into effects which are prompted by the passions originating in ignorance. After the attainment of liberation the karmas remain, but they bear no fruit as the burnt seeds do not sprout in the plants.

Q 41. Write a short note on the doctrine of rebirth in Buddhist philosophy

Buddha does not believe in any permanent soul. Consciousness is an eternal process in which there is the relation of antecedent and subsequent between different movements. But there is no unchanging immutable soul behind this process. Hence logically there is no place for rebirth in Buddhist philosophy. After death the *samskāras* of the *jīvas* remain. These *samskāras* are according to his karmas and it is due to these that a link between one birth and another is maintained. This *samskāra* is expressed in the last thought of a dying person. Along with this power of karma attachment or clinging (*Upādān*) is also required. This *Upādān* is the power which is the cause of the new birth according to old karmas. Without it the karmas themselves have no power. After the attainment of liberation the attachment is destroyed and *Upādāna* annihilated, resulting into the negation of the rebirth. There is no similarity between the past and the present individual except that the new is according to the karmas of the old. Sometimes even consciousness has been admitted as remaining after death, "Whatever we are or whatever we have thought is the result of it, consciousness has been rightly conceived as the essence of our soul." In fact this proves the close relation between consciousness action, thought and will. After the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, one is liberated both from the consciousness as well as from actions.

Q 42. Explain the Buddhist denial of soul (Atman) and show how the Buddhist accounts for rebirth and karma.

(Cf. 1959 Karnataka 1954 1953 Meerut 1971)

The theory of no-soul also follows from the doctrine of dependent origination. There is no invisible permanent substance besides the flow of consciousness. As the body is destroyed the

five skandhas disappear into five elements (Pancha Bhūtas) and nothing remains besides the Upādāna or karma. This principle is known as the theory of no-soul in Buddha's philosophy.

Like the view of William James, Buddha also admits the self as the flow of consciousness. In the consciousness the present moment is the result of the past moment and the future is the result of present. Thus one moment succeeds another moment and the actions and the memory of the past moments are transferred to the next moment. The cause of the present mental state is the past mental state. Buddha has explained the continuity of the life with the example of the flame of a lamp. There is cause and effect relation between antecedent and subsequent states of life. The life is a systematic and continuous process of different stages. In this process every stage depends on the stage preceding it, and the subsequent stage is the result of the present stage. Hence the life is homogeneous. Like the flame of a lamp it is changing every moment. The flame of a lamp in every moment depends on the conditions prevailing at that time, but in spite of the difference in flames, they appear to be the same due to continuity. Buddha believes in rebirth and the principle of karma. He, however, does not believe in rebirth in the sense that 'a soul enters in a different body after leaving one body, but rebirth means that another birth follows every birth, or another birth is caused due to one birth. Just as a lamp can be lighted by another lamp and yet the lights of both cannot be identified, similarly in spite of cause-and-effect relations between the two, the two births are different and not identical.

As a matter of fact, Buddha has always asked the disciples not to indulge in useless discussions regarding the soul. If the soul is taken as eternal, one gets attached to it and suffers in the efforts to make it happy. According to Buddha, the love with the invisible and unproved soul is as much ludicrous as the love of some invisible and imaginary beautiful woman. The attachment towards this soul is like preparing a ladder to mount on a place which has not been seen by any one.

According to Buddha man is a name for a conglomeration. Just as wheel and other parts of a chariot are together called a chariot, similarly the body with the external form, mental states and colourless consciousness is together called human being. This conglomeration (Sanghāt) is the man. Besides this there is no soul.

So long as this conglomeration remains, the life of man also remains, death is the name of its destruction

At another place, Buddha has called the man as the sum total of five skandhas. These five skandhas are changing elements and man is more or less a collection of them. As the man dies this collection is scattered. In the five skandhas the first is the 'Rūp' which includes the form, complex and simple etc. of the human body. Another skandha is Vedanā which includes the feelings like pleasure, pain and aversion etc. The third skandha is consciousness or sañjñā. It includes different type of conglomeration and knowledge. The fourth skandha is the saṃskāras which include the tendencies due to the actions of the past birth. The fifth skandha is the Vijnān or consciousness.

Q 43 Explain and examine the Buddha view that what is momentary. (Cal 1971)

State and explain the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.

(Baroda 1966)

According to Buddha, "All the existing things have been originated due to some cause. All these things are non-eternal in every way." "Whatever appears to be eternal and permanent is also perishable. Whatever appears to be great has also its decline. Where there is union there is also separation. Where there is birth there is also death." Five things are absolutely necessary. Whoever can be old he must become old, whoever can be ill he must fall ill, whoever is subordinate to death he must die, whatever is perishable its destruction is imperative and whatever is non-eternal it must go. These rules cannot be violated by any worldly or divine power. This view is a middle way between the views of absolute existence and absolute nihilism. All things exist, this is a one-sided view, nothing exists, this is another one-sided view. Leaving both these one-sided views, Buddha teaches the middle path and the essence of the middle doctrine is that the life is a becoming, it is Bhāvarūp. Everything in this world is merely a conglomeration of perishable qualities. Every thing is momentary. This world is determined by the principle of dependent origination. It has neither beginning nor end. Thus human beings, animals, Gods, plants, things, bodies, forms, substance etc. all are perishable. Every thing has a beginning, existence and extinction.

This doctrine of impermanence (Anityavāda) of Buddha was given the form of the doctrine of momentariness by his disciples. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of momentariness follows from the

principle of dependent origination. Whatever is born will also be destroyed and whatever may be destroyed cannot be thought to be permanent. Hence everything is momentary. Thus the doctrine of momentariness goes further than the principle of impermanence. It not only means that everything is impermanent, but according to it everything exists only 'for a moment'.

The Buddhist philosophers have given several arguments in support of the doctrine of momentariness. Of these one of the most important arguments is that of Arthakriyākāriṇa, *i.e.*, the argument from the power of generating action. According to this principle only that thing can produce effect which has existence and whatever cannot produce effect has no existence. Similarly, so far as a certain thing has the power of producing effect, it has existence. When it ceases to produce any effect, its existence also ceases. Again, one thing can produce only one effect. If at this time a thing produces effect and at the next moment another effect is observed or no effect is observed, then one should suppose that the former thing has ceased to exist, because one thing can produce only one effect in one moment *e. g.*, a seed cannot develop in the same way in any two moments. When the seed is in the bag, it will not sprout in the form of a plant; when shown in the earth, it sprouts in the form of a plant. This plant again develops from moment to moment. In this process of development no two moments are similar or identical. Hence there can be no one cause of the effect observed in two moments or in other words the plant is changing from moment to moment, and so by the principle of the power of producing effect the seed is also changing from moment to moment.

Similarly, all the things of the world are momentary. The soul is momentary because no man can remain identical in two moments. This principle is known as the doctrine of momentariness. The Buddhist principle of karma and the doctrine of no-soul are very much related with the principle of impermanence or that of momentariness. Hence the criticism of the principle of momentariness will be covertly the criticism of the principle of karma and the theory of non-soul.

Śāṅkara has advanced the following main arguments against the theory of momentariness.

(1) If the self is momentary, knowledge is impossible. The Buddhist philosophers have not differentiated between the self and

its modifications. Whatever is subject to modification cannot know another thing which is being modified. The knowledge of change requires an unchanging knower. Samkara differentiates between Bodhi and pratyaya, knowledge and ideation. Idea is changing, knowledge is eternal. Knowledge pre-supposes a knower which can unify the automatic experience coming through different sense organs. Perception requires the unification of the scattered sensations. This is the function of the self. To experience change one must himself be beyond change. Only because of some similarities, some states cannot be called to be the states of one thing. For it, all these states must have some common permanent element. Similarly, if the soul is momentary, the processess of comparison, memory and other mental activities are impossible.

(2) The cause and effect relation cannot be explained on the basis of the principle of momentariness. If a cause remains only for a moment and absolutely disappears next moment, it cannot produce an effect because it not only requires the existence of the cause but the cause must continually act. Thus if the cause is momentary, the effect will be conceived to be born out of nothing and if this is so any effect can be born from any cause or effect can be generated even without cause which is clearly impossible. The relation of cause and effect is impossible without continuity between the two and any sort of continuity is against the principle of momentariness. The origination, sustenance and destruction cannot be in the same moment and if they are in different moments and the different stages of the same thing, that cannot be called to be momentary.

The Jain Acharya Hem Chandra has advanced five arguments against the principle of momentariness.

(a) *Kṛta Prapñā*—The karma of human beings cannot be explained on the basis of the principle of momentariness. This also annihilates ethics. If a man has done an action and the next moment he is another man, how can this other person be given the fruits of the action of the former simply on the basis of similarity. The Buddhist philosophers have not answered this question of the king Milinda that if the self is merely a process of momentary modification, who is the doer of them and who gets their fruits.

(b) *Kṛta Karma Bhog*—Similarly the bearing of the fruits of karma also cannot be explained on the basis of the principle of momentariness. If the self is changing from moment to moment then the bearing of its fruits should be changing.

(c) *Bhava Bhanga*—On the basis of the principle of momentariness the world (Bhava) also cannot be explained nor it has any meaning.

(d) *Moksha Bhanga*—When the individual is momentary then his efforts to get rid of the miseries should be useless because even the miseries must be conceived to be momentary. Again, it is another person who shall get rid of the miseries because one who makes effort is also momentary and ceases to exist after a moment. Thus the principle of momentariness cuts at the root of the first great truth advocated by Buddha and also the remaining three great truths depending upon it. The eight fold path also becomes meaningless and the Buddhist religion itself becomes futile. On this principle Nirvāṇa has no meaning because it is also momentary. As a matter of fact no one can deny the changing nature of the world, but this change is absolutely on the pragmatic level. If it is taken as the basic truth, Nirvāṇa becomes meaningless. Nirvāṇa can have any meaning only if it is taken as the transcendental truth and momentarism as the pragmatic truth. The followers of the Hinayāna sect of Buddhism have tried to present certain solutions in this case, but they are far from being consistent.

(e) *Smṛti Bhag*—Like Śaṅkara, Hem Chandra has also raised the objection that on the basis of the principle of momentariness the various mental processes e.g., memory, recognition etc., cannot be explained.

As a matter of fact, the Buddhist philosophers have exclusively emphasized the phenomenon of change and forgotten the eternal aspect of the self. The self has two aspects, the transcendental and the psychological. Śaṅkara has explained this distinction by the difference between Svayam Siddha and Āgantuka selves. There is constant change in the Vyāvahārika, psychological or Āgantuka self and no one can deny this fact. But behind this changing aspect of the self there is eternal, self-evident immutable self, without admitting which even the changing aspect becomes meaningless. As the Upaniads have pointed out, both Being and Becoming are equally important aspects of the ultimate truth and reality.

aim at cosmic good. Thus the ideal of Hīnayāna is individual while that of Mahāyāna is universal.

(3) In Hīnayāna, there is emphasis on self dependence. According to it man can attain liberation only by his own efforts. As Buddha himself, has said, "Be ye a lamp unto you". The aspirants must themselves try for their own uplift. Before attaining Mahāparinirvāṇa, Buddha said to his followers, "All constructed things or conglomerations are subject to destruction. One should try for liberation by one's own efforts." The other sect Mahāyāna however, also finds place for the worldly persons who are so much busy with the struggle in life that they cannot themselves make efforts for their liberation and need the help of others. According to Mahāyāna sect, the compassion of Buddha can also lead to the liberation of man.

(4) Hīnayāna is athiesm. In it the place of God has been given to karma or the essentials of Dharma. Dhamma (Dharma) moves the whole world. It is due to it that the fruits of karma are not destroyed and every individual attains mind, body and worldly things according to his own karmas. In the Hīnayāna, there is provision for seeking the shelter of Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, but Buddha was never conceived as the ideal of worship or God. In Mahāyāna gradually, the Buddha became the ideal of worship and is identified with the ultimate existence. Siddhārtha Gautama was adored as the incarnation of Buddha or the ultimate truth. In the form of Dharma Kāya, Buddha becomes God. He is the controller of the world and descends on the earth for the purpose of good of the living beings. The sufferers in the world pray to get the help, sympathy and compassion of Buddha by accepting it as God. In this form, Buddha is also known as Ameyakāya Buddha.

clarity of the ideal while Mahāyāna aimed at its utility. In Hinayāna, the early Buddhist principles remain in their original form while in Mahāyāna many new thoughts and principles were added to them.

(8) Due to being conservative one finds asceticism narrowness and superstitions in Hinayāna. Mahāyāna being progressive has a healthy and sympathetic attitude and liberal and progressive ideas.

Q. 45. Give an outline of the philosophy of the Vaibhasikas. How do the Santrāntika criticise the Vaibhasika view of perception? (Cal 1970)

Explain clearly the fundamentals of the four schools of Buddhist philosophy. In what respects do they essentially differ? (Gujrat 1961, Rajasthan 1955)

PHILOSOPHICAL SECTS OF BUDDHISM

Though Buddha was himself absolutely rational and tried to prove everything by reasoning yet he kept silent regarding some philosophical questions and refused to discuss some other problems. It is on these issues and problems, that the later Buddhist philosophers very much differed from one another and presented widely different opinions. One finds the seeds of positivism, phenomenism and empiricism only in the philosophy of Buddha. His views can be called positivist, because according to them one must try for the progress of this life in this very world. It can be called phenomenism since according to Buddha we can have definite knowledge of only those objects which are subject to empirical experience. Thus some have called Buddhist philosophy empiricism because according to it experience is the only proof of knowledge. Regarding the ultimate reality some philosophers interpreted Buddha's approach as agnostic while others explained it as mystic and even transcendentalist. Those who interpreted Buddhist philosophy empirically called him agnostic, because according to empirical principle the knowledge of imperceptible things is impossible. Buddha sometimes referred to such knowledge which cannot be known by rational argumentation due to being worldly. Buddha has accepted prajñā as the ultimate knowledge. Prajñā is beyond the senses. Hence some philosophers interpreted Buddha's philosophy as transcendentalism. Buddha has referred to such knowledge which cannot be proved by experience or logic, which is not subject to worldly thoughts, nor can be described by words. On this basis some philosophers have interpreted Buddha's philosophy as mystic.

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(5) The Hīnayāna sect believes in the tradition of old Buddhist philosophy. As it has been already pointed out, it is conservatively and vehemently opposed to all types of changes. Mahāyāna, on the other hand, is progressive. Hence in the Mahāyāna sect there were great scholars like Ashva Ghōṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asanga, Vasu Bandhu and Ārya Deva etc., who seriously discussed the various philosophical problems.

(6) Due to faith in the ancient tradition, Hīnayāna does not accept self. According to Mahāyāna, on the other hand, only the lower self or Hīna Ātman is illusory, the transcendental self or Mahātma is not false.

(7) In fact, Hīnayāna was more concerned with the purity and

clarity of the ideal while Mahāyāna aimed at its utility. In Hinayāna, the early Buddhist principles remain in their original form while in Mahāyāna many new thoughts and principles were added to them.

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In this way, discussing the various philosophical problems differently the Buddhist philosophers established more than 30 schools. Of these the two most important religious sects, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna have been described earlier. The Mahāyāna sect was however, divided into two classes Sunyavād or Mādhyamik and Vijnānavād or Yogachāra. The Hīnayāna sect was also divided into two classes : Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika. These two classes differ on the question of the existence of external things, but both Sautrāntika and Vaibhāsika accept the physical and mental objects as true. Hence they are called as Sarvāstivādin or those believing in the existence of everything. These two classes, however, differ on the question of the source of knowledge. According to Sautrāntikā the external objects are not known through perception. According to Vaibhāsika, on the other hand, the knowledge of the external objects can also be gained through perception.

SARVASTIVADIN SECTS

As has already been pointed out, the Sarvāstivādins believe in the existence of everything. According to them both Chitta and external objects have existence and both have many elements. These elements were called Dharma. The Dharmas are of 75 types. The substratum of Dharmas was known as Sanghāt. It is hence that Stacherbatsky has called Sarvāstivād as "Sanghātavād." The material sanghāts of chitta are of 11 types. The Chitta is also a sanghāt. The sanghāts of chitta are of 46 types. Only three dharmas are not subject to sanghāt. These are Ākāśa, Apratisankhyānirodh and Pratisankhyānirodh. Atom is the unit of the matter. Atom is of four types : earth, water, fire and air. The five sense organs are made of five types of special atoms. The atoms are beyond the senses, only their combinations be perceived.

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The Vaibhāsikas accept both Chitta and the matter. Both these are constituted of the dharmas. There is no eternal soul. Ākāśa and Nirvāṇa are eternal. There are four dharmas, i.e. earth, water, air, and fire. The earth is hard, the water is cool, the fire is hot and the air is mobile. The eternal things are real. They are the compounds (sanghāt) of atoms. The atoms have no form, sound, taste and colour. They are indivisible and cannot enter into one another. The perceptible things are the conglomerations of imperceptible atoms. Here, a distinction has been drawn between Sanghāt Paramāṇu and Dravya Paramāṇu. The

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former is the subtlest form of atom. The latter is without colour and indivisible. It is of eight types: earth, water, fire, air, smell, taste, colour, touch and karma dhātu.

The Vaibhāsika philosophers have criticised the Sautrāntika view regarding perception. According to Vaibhāsika philosophers the inference of things external to knowledge is self-contradictory. If all the external objects are inferred by their knowledge, then no thing can be known by perception. In the absence of perception there can be no relation of concomitance between the major and the minor premise without which no inference is possible. This is opposed to actual experience. In fact, things are of two types: *Grahana* and *Adhyawasaya*.

Similarly, experience is also of two types: *i.e.* *Grahana* and *Adhyawasaya*. The formless experience by the sense organs in the first stage of knowledge is known as *Grahana*. This is attributeless knowledge. It can be compared with the sensation in the language of psychology. When this very knowledge assumes form and appears as attributed, it is called *Adhyawasaya*, which can be compared with the perception in the psychological parlance. The Vaibhāsikas accept the presence of the external things and conceive them as subject to perception.

The sense organs are material. They know the objects of their knowledge without any contact with them. In such knowledge no external contact of sense organs with the object is perceived. These sense organs include the eyes, ears and mind. Other sense organs must come in contact with the things to know them. Hence due to defect in these senses there is also difference in the knowledge attained through them. By coming in contact with external world, a type of *samskara* occurs in the sense organs (*Indriyas*). By these *Samskaras* the *Chitta* is enlightened and there is the manifestation of *Chaitanya* in it. After it there is the arousal of different types of knowledge in the *Chitta*. According to Vaibhāsika that is *pramāṇa* by which direct knowledge is possible. The *pramāṇas* are of two types: *Pratyakṣa* (perceptual) and *anumāna* (inferential). Both these *pramāṇas* are known as *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge) and it is by these that all the *purusarthas* are attained.

Pratyakṣa is the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This knowledge is of four types:

(1) *Indriya Jñāna*—This is the knowledge attained through senses.

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former is the subtlest form of atom. The latter is without colour and indivisible. It is of eight types: earth, water, fire, air, smell, taste, colour, touch and karma dhātu.

The Vaibhāsika philosophers have criticised the Sautrāntika view regarding perception. According to Vaibhāsika philosophers the inference of things external to knowledge is self-contradictory. If all the external objects are inferred by their knowledge, then nothing can be known by perception. In the absence of perception there can be no relation of concomitance between the major and the minor premise without which no inference is possible. This is opposed to actual experience. In fact, things are of two types: *Grahana* and *Adhyawasaya*.

Similarly, experience is also of two types: *i.e.* *Grahana* and *Adhyawasaya*. The formless experience by the sense organs in the first stage of knowledge is known as *Grahana*. This is attributeless knowledge. It can be compared with the sensation in the language of psychology. When this very knowledge assumes form and appears as attributed, it is called *Adhyawasaya*, which can be compared with the perception in the psychological parlance. The Vaibhāsikas accept the presence of the external things and conceive them as subject to perception.

The sense organs are material. They know the objects of their knowledge without any contact with them. In such knowledge no external contact of sense organs with the object is perceived. These sense organs include the eyes, ears and mind. Other sense organs must come in contact with the things to know them. Hence due to defect in these senses there is also difference in the knowledge attained through them. By coming in contact with external world, a type of *samskara* occurs in the sense organs (*Indriyas*). By these *Samskaras* the *Chitta* is enlightened and there is the manifestation of *Chaitanya* in it. After it there is the arousal of different types of knowledge in the *Chitta*. According to Vaibhāsika that is *pramāṇa* by which direct knowledge is possible. The *pramāṇas* are of two types: *Pratyakṣa* (perceptual) and *anumāna* (inferential). Both these *pramāṇas* are known as *samyagnāna* (right knowledge) and it is by these that all the *purusarthas* are attained.

Pratyakṣa is the knowledge devoid of imagination and error. This knowledge is of four types:

- (1) *Indriya Jñāna*—This is the knowledge attained through senses.
- (2) *Mano-Vijñāna*—In this knowledge there is the sensual

knowledge in the form of samanantara pratyaya after the knowledge through senses. This samanantara pratyaya is a mental modification in the absence of which there is no knowledge even after continued seeing. Thus Mano-Vijnan is born of both the object and the consciousness.

(3) *Atma-Samvedana*—Atma-Samvedana is the manifestation of chitta and its Dharmas are like pleasure and pain in their real form. This is attributeless, without error and of the nature of self-realisation.

(4) *Yogic Jnana*—Yogic Jnāna is the ultimate knowledge of the things perceptible through various pramānas. The object of pratyaksa is swalaksana. Swalaksana is that object in which there is difference in the form of knowledge by the presence and absence of its contact. It is by it that a thing has the capacity to do anything. Hence it is said to be paramārtha satya.

Inference is of two types : Swārtha (for the self) and Paramārtha (for the others). In the former the linga is inferential, e.g., in the inference there is fire on the hill, the hill is linga and the fire is inferential. In it the linga remains in self side (svapaksa), just as in kitchen. The linga does not remain in the opposite side (vipaksā), e.g., a pool of water, etc. In the words of Dharma Keerti 'Swārthānumāna or inference for oneself is the knowledge which is born of Anumeya Niroop Linga.' This is the knowledge (Jnāna) while Parāthānumān or the inference for others is merely description (Kathan). According to Dharma Keerti the description of Tri-Roop Linga is known as Parāthānumāna. These three forms of the linga are as follows :

(1) *Anupalabdhi*—The non-attainment of anything is known as anupalabdhi e.g., if a pitcher is not available at the spot where it is usually found in spite of the presence of the sense of its existence. In this example, the inference is based on the Hetu Anupalabdhi.

(2) *Swabhava*—According to Dharma Keerti, Swabhāva Hetu is that which is found in "Swa-Sattā-Mātra-Bhāvi Sādhyā." Swa-Sattā-Mātra-Bhāvi Sādhyā is the object which is established only by its own Hetu and does not require another Hetu, e.g., this is an animal because this is a cow. Here it is an animal because of being a cow.

(3) *Kārya*—Kārya is the inference of the existence of any thing by seeing its effect e.g., here is fire because here is smoke, in this sentence the fire is inferred by the presence of its effect in smoke.

In the above mentioned three Hetus, the second and the third tell the existence of the object while the first tells its non-existence. The *Parārthānumāna* has been further divided into two forms, *Sādharmyavat* and *Vaidharmyavat*. In these two there is no difference of meaning, but only a difference of application.

METAPHYSICS

In the *Vaiśhāṣika* school the ultimate principles have been discussed from two standpoints. Objective and Subjective. Before discussing these two standpoints in details, it shall be relevant to analyse the meaning of the word 'Dharma' which has been very widely used in Buddhist philosophy. The word *Dharma* has been used for those subtle elements physical as well as that of *Chitta* whose action and reaction cause the creation of the whole universe. Thus the world is a conglomeration of the *dharma*s. All *dharma*s are born out of cause. All are free and every one has its own existence. *Dharma*s are momentary because they are changing from moment to moment. Hence the world made by *dharma*s is also momentary.

THE OBJECTIVE DIVISION OF THE WORLD

From the objective standpoint the *Vaiśhāṣika* philosophers have divided the *dharma*s of the world into two classes. *Asaṃskṛta Dharma*s and *Saṃskṛta Dharma*s. *Asaṃskṛta* means that which is eternal, permanent, pure and which is not born by the help of any cause or *Hetu*. They are unchanging and not due to objects. The *Saṃskṛta dharma*s, on the other hand, are ephemeral, impermanent and impure. They are born of the construction of things.

According to *Srīvaśiṣṭādin*s, *asaṃskṛta dharma*s are of three types. *Pratisaṃkhyānirodh*, *Apratisaṃkhyānirodh* and *Ākāśa*.

(1) *Pratisaṃkhyānirodh*—*Pratisaṃkhyānirodh* means *prajñā* or knowledge. Hence *pratisaṃkhyānirodh dharma*s are those which are negated by knowledge. By it all the *sastrava dharma*s / i.e. attachment, aversion etc. are annihilated.

(2) *Apratisaṃkhyānirodh*—This is the stage where there is annihilation without consciousness e.g., spontaneous destruction of the *sastrava dharma*. The *sastrava dharma* are born out of some causes. The destruction of these causes leads to the destruction of these *dharma*s even in the absence of *prajñā*. The *dharma*s thus destroyed are not born again. In fact, in *pratisaṃkhyānirodh*, there is only awareness of annihilation, which is only in the *apratisaṃkhyānirodh*, when there is actual annihilation.

(1) *Ākāśa*—The absence of covering is known as *Ākāśa*. It neither restricts anything nor is restricted by anything. It is eternal unchanging and of the nature of existence.

The saṃskṛta dharmas have been divided into four types : Roop, Chitta, Chaitasika and Chitta-Viparyukta.

(1) *Roop*—Anything which creates impediment is known as roop. Thus all the physical elements and things of the world are roop. Roop has been divided into 11 kinds, 6 external sense organs (eyes, ear, nose, tongue and skin), their five objects (form, sound, flavour, taste and touch) and Avigyāpti. In Abhidharma Kośa these have also been further divided.

(2) *Chitta*—Chitta is born of senses and the action and reaction of their objects. By the destruction of this interaction, the Chitta is also destroyed. The words Chitta, Mana and Vijnāna have been used in the same sense. According to Vaibhāsika philosophers Chitta is the main element. All the saṃskāras remain in Chitta. It is this which transmigrates from world to world. It has no independent existence because it is born of Hetu Pratyaya. It is changing every moment. It is one, but due to modifications it appears to be divided.

(3) *Chaitasika*—Chaitasika are the mental processes closely related with the chitta. According to Abhidharma Kośa there are 46 types of Chaitasika Dharmas.

(4) *Chitta Viparyukta*—These are the dharmas which cannot be classified either in roop dharmas or in chitta dharmas. They are said to be 14 in number.

THE SUBJECTIVE DIVISION OF THE WORLD

From the subjective standpoint the world has been divided in three parts : Skandha, Āyatan and Dhātu.

The skandhas are changing. The Jiva is made of five skandhas, Roop Vedana, Saṃjñā, Saṃskāra and Vijnāna. All the physical elements and the physical objects are included in the Roop skandha which also forms the physical body of the Jiva. In the Vedanā skandha there are feelings of pleasure, pain etc. In saṃjñā skandha various types of knowledge are included while in saṃskāra skandha there are tendencies born out of the past birth. The Vijnāna skandha is consciousness.

The substratum of knowledge is known as Āyatan. In it the senses and their objects are included. It is on the basis of these that one knows the objects. Āyatans are 12 in number, They

include six sense organs including the mind and their six objects. According to the Vaibhāsikas there is no existence of anything beyond these. Hence the Buddhist philosophers do not admit soul because neither it is known through the sense nor is it the object of any sense. The Mana Āyatan include 64 Dharmas and it is also known as Dharma Āyatan. The remaining 11 Āyatans have one Dharma each.

According to Vasubandhu the Dhātus are those subtle elements whose groupings lead to the generalisation of knowledge. In Buddhist philosophy Dhātu means Swalakṣṇa i.e. having independent existence. The Dhātus are of 18 kinds. Thus the 18 dhātus include six senses, six objects of the senses and six types of consciousness born out of these objects. Of these the first 12 are the Āyatans. In these the dharma dhātu includes 64 dharmas. The 10 dhātus except Mana have one dharma each. Thus as has already been pointed out according to Sarvāstivādin dharmas are 75.

Nirvāṇa is the stage which the Arhata attains by following the path of truth. It is independent, one, eternal and substratum of knowledge. In it there are no distinctions or divisions. It is uncaused. It is of the nature of existence (Bhāva Rūp). The Sarvāstivādins include nirvāṇa among the asamskṛta dharmas. According to Abhi Dharma Kośa it is the attainment of the nirvāṇa dhātu. It has no relation with Chitta or Chaitasika element. It is infinite, unlimited and ineffable like ether. By its attainment all the śāstrava dharmas are destroyed.

SAURANTHIKA SCHOOL

The other school of Buddhism was known as Sautrāntika school. It was based on Sutta Pitaka. Like the Vaibhāsika school they were earlier included in Sthavirvādins but later on they were separated from them. They have no faith in Abhidhamma Pitaka and Vibhāsa. It is due to faith in Vibhāsa that another school has been called Vaibhāsika. As has been already pointed out Vaibhāsikas believe that the external things are known to perception while according to Sautrāntika school they are subject to inference.

EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Sautrāntika school there are four causes of knowledge.

(1) *Ālamban*—Ālamban is the cause of external objects like jug etc., because the form of the knowledge is born due to it.

(2) *Samanantara*—This is so called because it is only after the previous mental stage that the following stage attains consciousness.

(3) *Adhipati*—The senses have been called as the Adhipati Pratyaya of the knowledge. It is the normative cause. Without the senses there can be no external knowledge even after the presence of the first two causes. The knowledge of the form, touch, etc., of the external objects depends on the existence of senses.

(4) *Sahkāri Pratyaya*—These are the subsidiary conditions necessary for knowledge, e.g., light, requisite distance, form, etc., without which knowledge becomes almost impossible.

(1) There is no causality in the two objects having spontaneous existence

(2) There is no past or future besides the present

(3) Sautrāntikas believe that knowledge itself is all proved and requires nothing to prove it. It is self-enlightened like a lamp. Thus they are Swatahprāmāṇyavādin.

(4) Śabda is non-eternal because it has no existence before origination and after destruction.

(5) There is no cause of the destruction of the object, the object is itself destroyed.

(6) The atoms are partless. Hence even with organ they are neither combined nor their quantity increases. Thus even their organisation is atomic.

(7) Against the Vaibhāṣika philosophers Sautrāntikas maintain that there is not much difference between pratisankhyānirodh and apratisankhyānirodh. In the former, all the sufferings of the aspirant are destroyed by the arousal of prajñā and he does not suffer in future. In the latter the sufferings will be removed by the destruction of kleśas and the aspirant will be free from the cycle of the world.

(8) Nirvāṇa is not an āsanskṛita dharma. It is asatya because in it there is the absence of kleśhas and the destruction of kaṣāyas. Nirvāṇa means to be extinguished like the lamp. In it there is absolute destruction of all dharmas. By it the aspirant attains the stage in which there is no kleśha in the attainment of any new dharma.

Q 46 Is Madhyamika philosophy nihilistic? (Kolhapur 1953)

"The empirical and the transcendental are both Sunya."
Discuss (Poona M. A. 1953)

MADHYAMIKA OR SUNYAVĀD

According to Śūnyavādin the ultimate reality is Śūnya. Hence the name Śūnyavād. According to Nāgārjuna the ultimate reality is neither existent nor non-existent, neither both-existent and non-existent nor different from both. Thus the ultimate reality is entirely different from these four categories. It is attributeless. Nāgārjuna has called 'Śūnyatā' by the name of pratityasamutpāda as well. The element is Śvalakṣaṇa. Hence whatever is born of

material cause depends on something other than itself. Its origination is not origination in fact *i.e.*, it is *Sūnya*. These philosophers were called *Mādhyamika* because they adopted the middle path (*Madhyama Mārga*) of Buddha. Buddha adopted a middle path between activism and renunciation. He neither passed his life as a recluse in the forest nor lived as a worldly being. Living in the world, he aimed at the welfare of living beings.

The greatest philosopher of *Mādhyamika* school, *Nāgārjuna* admitted two forms of reality. According to him, "there are two truths on which Buddha's teachings regarding religion are based. One is empirical truth. It is for the ordinary person. The other is transcendental truth. Those persons who do not know the distinction between these truths cannot understand the subtle secrets of Buddha's teachings."

The empirical truth is the only means for the attainment of transcendental truth. According to *Nāgārjuna* the transcendental truth can not be known without the help of the empirical and without knowing the transcendental truth, *Nirvāna* cannot be attained. Truth is known by untruth and ultimate reality by *Māyā*. Similarly, the knowledge of the empirical truth is necessary for the attainment of transcendental truth. Empirical truth (*Samvṛtti Satya*) is also called *Avidyā* (ignorance), *Moha* (attachment) and *Viparyaya* etc. It is other dependent and hence perishable. It is also of two types—*Loka Samvṛtti* and *Mithyā Samvṛtti*.

(1) *Loka Samvṛtti*—*Loka Samvṛtti* is that object or phenomenon which is born out of some cause and through which all the activities of the worldly beings go on. Thus *Loka Samvṛtti* is the truth in the world.

(2) *Mithya Samvṛtti*—This is the phenomenon which is born due to some cause, but which is not admitted to be true by all it helps all in their behaviour.

The *Mādhyamika* philosophers believe in the transcendental Reality. Along with physical world they also discuss the Existence. All the things of the world are relative. Thus the *Śayavād* can also be called relativism. The dharmas of the worldly objects depend upon other objects and their existence requires the existence of other objects. Nothing has its own definite, absolute and independent nature. All these are empirical truths. The transcendental truth is exactly opposed to them. Its experience is absolute. It is attained only in *nirvāna*. It is beyond the empirical objects, eternal, absolute and devoid of the ordinary worldly dharmas. It

is also called *Sūnyatā* *Tathātā* *Dharmā* *Dhītu* etc. In fact the transcendental truth has no nature at all. In it there are no names and forms, subject and object. It cannot be known either through speech or through mind. This truth cannot be explained through words. It is unknown but not indescribable. The knower experiences it through immediate experience.

Nāgārjuna starts his famous book *Mādhyamika Kārikā* by saluting the great teacher Buddha who preached the doctrine of dependent origination and says that from the transcendent standpoint *Pratītyasamutpāda* is itself *Nirvāṇa* and all the multiplicity dwindles into it. From the transcendental standpoint there is neither negation nor origination nor annihilation nor eternity nor *Sūnya*. There is neither deduction nor induction.

Nāgārjuna condemns the entire creation. Using his logic of fourfold categories he proves the non-existence of all the objects. Nothing can be born by itself nor through others nor both through itself and others and nor in the absence of both. Hence creation is impossible. After it Nāgārjuna condemns the four concepts of *Hinayāna* i.e. *Ālamban* *Samanantar* *Adhipati* and *Sahakāri*. Thus he proves that cause and effect are relative and merely empirical truths. Similarly he also proves motion and perception to be impossible.

The five *skandhas* are also non-existent. For example if it is there it will have no cause and if it is not there even then it will have no cause because the non-existent thing like the hare's horn cannot have any cause. Hence the form has no cause. Thus the form is impossible. Similarly Nāgārjuna has proved the non-existence of *Vedana* *Samskāra* and *Vijñāna* etc. The earth, water, air, fire and ether etc. all are non-existent.

Similarly the substance cannot be admitted and then the substance where shall the qualities remain. But the qualities cannot remain either in the substance or outside it. Where are they? The substance and qualities are different. Hence both are relative and non-existent.

The individual self is also non-existent. It is not the *skandhas* nor different from them. It should have origination and annihilation from the *skandhas*. It cannot be known. *Pratītyasamutpāda* neither means etc.

According to Buddha the *skandhas* are not the self. Nāgārjuna questions that anything

end, how can it have a middle ? Hence the beginning, the middle, the end, the birth, status, death etc., all are non-existent. The worldly objects have neither beginning nor middle nor end. If there is nothing unchanging what is that which changes ? If the thing is unchanging, how can it change ? If there is no Nature how can there be other than Nature, and if there is Nature how can there be other than Nature ? Similarly, the time is also non-existent because the past, present and future are all relative. Both cause and effect are non-existent. The subject and object and their relation is also non-existent. Even the Buddha and Tathāgat or merely relative. They are beyond the limited concepts. Nāgārjuna has referred to the famous fourteen antinomies in answer to which Buddha has observed silence. According to Nāgārjuna all these are relative and hence non-existent. The intellect cannot solve them. Similarly, the four great truths, Tri-ratna, Buddh, Sangha, Dhamma etc., all are non-existent (Asata).

Both bondage and liberation are liberated and hence are non-existent. There is none bound, none liberated, none both bounded and liberated and no one neither bound nor liberated. Hence there can be neither bondage nor liberation. Whatever is in the skandhas and whatever is not in them, can neither be bound nor liberated. Similarly, Nirvāna has no existence because then like other things in existence it should also have a beginning and an end, and then it should also have a cause and depend on skandhas like other saṃsāra dharmas. The Nirvāna cannot be non-existent as well, because then it should not be independent since non-existence depends on existence. Nirvāna cannot be both existent and non-existent, because this is self contradictory. Again nirvāna cannot be neither existent nor non-existent, because then it cannot even be thought. Hence the nirvāna is neither existent nor non-existent, nor both nor neither, it is mere illusion.

Philosophers like Śaṅkara have called Śūnyavād nihilism (Vaiśiṣṭika). According to Śaṅkarācārya Śūnyavād is not even worthy of the honour of being condemned because it is contrary to all proofs. But this only shows Śaṅkara's antipathy towards Śūnyavād and not an attempt to understand it. The above mentioned discussion of the views of Nāgārjuna makes it amply clear that according to him non-existent or Sunya is relative. In fact, the word Mādhyamika also proves this, that the Śūnyavādins are on the one hand against positive absolute eternity and on the other hand against absolute nihilism. Their is the middle path, i.e., according

to them the Reality is neither eternal nor non eternal, but both eternity and non eternity are relative. Secondly, when Nāgārjuna proves everything to be non-existent, it is only from the transcendental standpoint. As empirical truths all are real. Saṃkāra has himself declared even God as non-existent from the transcendental standpoint. In fact, the philosophy of Śūnyavāda is so much similar with the non-dualism of Saṃkāra that Saṃkāra is again found trying to distinguish both. This, however, does not mean that Saṃkāra was a crypto-Buddhist. There is no bondage of space and time in the world of thoughts and experiences. In spite of being in a different time and place two philosophers can have exactly similar ideas and this only shows the fundamental unity and similarity of the human experience and thinking.

Hence Śūnyavāda is neither absolute nihilism nor denies all knowledge. It maintains that from the transcendental standpoint all things of the world are self-contradictory and relative and hence mere empirical truths. It is true that the words used by Śūnyavādins i.e. Bhraṃṣa (Illusion), Swapna (Dream) Mṛg Tṛṣṇā (Mirage), Ākāśa Kusum (sky flowers) and Bāṇdhya Putra (son of the barren woman) etc., prove absolute non-existence of things. But the purpose behind all these seems to prove the absolute non-existence of the empirical things from the transcendental standpoint. The Śūnyavādins have themselves repeated again and again that absolute negation is impossible. Both negation and affirmation are relative. Many things which are illusory from the transcendental standpoint are perfectly true in the world. But even in the empirical truth the transcendental truth explains itself. The Reality is absolute, non-dual and beyond the intellect. Though immanent in the world, it is beyond it. According to Nāgārjuna Reality is that which can be only known directly which is calm and blissful in which all the manyness is dissolved which is attributeless, non-dual, homogeneous and perfect. This Reality is Śūnyatā. As a matter of fact, Śūnyatā itself has no aspects. It means that the worldly objects are not transcendental truths, Śūnyatā is dependent origination and relative. According to Nāgārjuna this is the middle path which in the end is both beyond affirmation and negation. The cycle of dependent origination cannot stop with the destruction of ignorance and that is possible only through real knowledge. Hence from another standpoint Śūnyatā is itself Reality. It is Śūnya from the empirical standpoint. From the transcendental standpoint it is neither Śūnya nor not Śūnya, nor both nor neither. Reality is

itself relative and this is empirical truth. Relativism cannot be absolute truth. Nāgārjuna has himself told, "We do not say that our particular statement is true while all else is false. We say that all statements are Śūnya from the transcendental standpoint." He again says, "But from the empirical standpoint we admit the truth of the statement, because the empirical cannot be contradicted by its own logic."

In fact it is the other-dependent nature of things, their changeability and their own effability which has been conveyed through the word Śūnya. All the qualities are Śūnya because the origination of all of them depends on some thing else. The transcendental existence is beyond the perceptible world and is inevitable. It cannot be known through ordinary worldly concepts. Hence it is said to be Śūnya. In the Lankāvatār Sutta it has been said that the real nature of things cannot be known through intellect. As has been shown earlier, Nāgārjuna has used the criterion of fourfold categories to examine the truth of things. Whatever is beyond these four categories is Śūnya. Thus all the things of the world prove to be non-existent because it is not decided by the intellect whether their real nature is (1) true, (2) untrue, (3) both true and untrue, or (4) neither true nor untrue. Nāgārjuna says in Ratnāvalī, "The Reality is beyond all the concepts of intellect." One who has known the meaning of Śūnya, he can understand the real significance of things and can explain them. On the other hand, he who has not understood the truth of Śūnya is unable to understand the significance of things as well as to explain them.

According to Śūnyavād the transcendental truth is known through self-experience. It requires samādhi in the form of the concentration of Chitta. The practice of samādhi leads to the arousal of prajñā and the aspirant has a balanced Chitta. This leads to the experience of the ultimate reality. Samādhi also requires renunciation as well as the knowledge and practice of six Paramitās. These Paramitās are Charity (Dāna), good character (Śīla), Peacefulness (Śānti), Virility (Veerya), concentration (Dhyāna) and spiritual consciousness (Prajñā). Without the practice of these the transcendental truth cannot be known. Penance is the most important duty. It leads to eradication of misery and the attainment of knowledge. Thus the aspirant realises the Śūnya, both through knowledge as well as action.

Q 47. Explain the principal doctrines of the Yogachara school of Buddhism.

Answered by Mr. K. L. Meena (1972)

YOGĀCHĀRA OR VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

Another philosophical school in the Mahāyāna sect is known as Yogāchāra or Vijñānavāda. It is known as Vijñānavāda since according to it all things are mere consciousness. It is also called Yogāchāra because in it the aspirant must go through the practice of Yoga and pass through its ten states before becoming Buddha. The understanding of Ālaya Vijñāna also requires Yoga. Those who have the experience of samādhi very well know that in the state of samādhi the entire physical world seems to disappear in Chitta and after awakening from samādhi the things of the external world are gradually perceived. It is on the basis of this experience that the Yogāchāra philosophers have concluded that Chitta is everything. This Chitta is known as Ālaya Vijñāna. In Mahāyāna Simparigraha sūtra Asanga has enumerated the following important characteristics of the Yogāchāra school —

- (1) Ālaya Vijñāna pervades all living beings
- (2) Knowledge is of three types: illusory, relative and absolute.
- (3) Both the external and the internal worlds are manifestations of the Ālaya
- (4) The six pāramitās are compulsory
- (5) For the attainment of the state of Buddha one must pass through the ten states of Bodhisattva
- (6) Mahāyāna is far superior than Hinayana which is selfish, individualistic and narrow and which has misinterpreted the teaching Buddha
- (7) The aim is to be one with the Dharmakīya of Buddha through spiritual experience (Bodhi).
- (8) Transcending the dualism of subject and object one must identify himself with the consciousness
- (9) From the transcendental standpoint there is no difference between the world and the liberation. With the attainment of equanimity and negation of multiplicity liberation can be attained here and now
- (10) The Reality is Dharmakīya i.e. the perfect pure consciousness which is Nirvāṇakīya from the worldly standpoint and expressed in Sambhogam from the point of view of creation

According to Lankavatāra sūtra all the Dharmas except Vijñānas are unreal. Buddha has only preached about Vijñāna. Nama, Roop and Aroop, three worlds, are mere transformations of this consciousness. No external things have any existence whatever is,

is *Vijnāna*. Similarly, according to Vasubandhu as well *Vijnāna* is the only reality. It expresses through subject and object. Hence Buddha has pointed out two bases of knowledge—internal and external. There is no individual soul nor external things because both are the manifestation of *Vijnāna* which cannot be known through intellect. It is known through direct experience. It can be known through pure person which is beyond the dualism of subject and object.

Vijnāna is of two kinds—*Pravṛtti Vijnāna* i.e., personal consciousness and *Ālaya Vijnāna* i.e., absolute consciousness. Individual consciousness is again of seven types—*Chakṣu Vijnāna*, *Śrotra Vijnāna*, *Dharma Vijnāna*, *Rasānā Vijnāna*, *Kāma Vijnāna*, *Mano-Vijnāna*, and *Kliṣṭa Vijnāna*. Of these the first six have been admitted by *Sarvāstivādins*. The seventh is the mediating link between the sixth and *Ālaya Vijnāna*. The first five consciousness lead to the knowledge of the things, *Manovijnāna* leads to thought on them and *Kliṣṭa Vijnāna* helps in their perception. *Ālaya Vijnāna* or *Chitta* is that which unites all these.

All these seven *Vijnānas* of the personal consciousness are born in the absolute consciousness and disappear into it. All these are momentary and changing. Thus, in fact the personal consciousness depends upon absolute consciousness.

Thus *Ālayavijnāna* is the *ālaya*, the home or storehouse of different types of *Vijnānas*. Hence in it are stored the passions in the form of seeds of all the *Vijnānas*. In time the seed manifests in the practical world in the form of behaviour and again merge into *ālaya*. Hence this *ālayavijnāna* is itself the empirical individual self. All types of knowledge remain in it. It is the basis of transmigration. It is also called *Chitta* and *Isthāgata paribha*.

According to *Yogācāra* the physical world has no existence apart from consciousness. Even if the existence of anything outside consciousness is admitted it cannot be known. However, if there is any external thing either it is atomic or made of several atoms. If it is atomic, it cannot be perceived because atom is very subtle and minute. Secondly, if it is made of atoms even then the whole thing cannot be perceived together. Now, if there is a question of the perception of one part the difficulty is the same, that either it is made of one atom or more than one and in both the conditions it cannot be perceived as has been discussed earlier. Thus there are many difficulties in accepting the existence of things external to the

mind. According to *Vijñānavādins* if the thing is not conceived as apart from mental knowledge all these difficulties are removed. Hence *Vijñānavādins* believe that all things external to mind are mental modifications. According to *Dharmakīrti*, there is no difference in the blue colour and its knowledge because the two are not independent of one another. Knowledge is necessary to know the things. Hence the thing cannot have any existence apart from knowledge. It is illusion to see things different from knowledge. Seeing two moons means defect of the eyes and not that there are actually two moons. Just as in dreams things are seen as external and yet they are in the mind, similarly, in the ordinary waking state as well things appear to be external in spite of being in the mind. The *Vijñānavādins* prove the non-existence of the external thing on the basis of momentarism as well. Things are known only after their creation, but they are destroyed in the very moment of creation. Hence there should be creation of the things and their knowledge both in the same moment. But the thing is the cause of knowledge and knowledge is the effect and cause and effect cannot be in the same time. The effect must be prior to cause. On the other hand, the thing is destroyed in the same moment and the question of its knowledge does not arise after its destruction. Thus the knowledge of the external things is impossible. Hence the thing which appears to be external should be taken as a mental concept.

It can be questioned here that if the object is a mere concept of the mind why does it not appear, disappear and change as desired. To this the *Vijñānavādins* reply that the mind is a mere stream in which the past experiences remain in the form of expression and whenever there is favourable condition for a certain impression the same impression manifests and results into knowledge. This can be proved with the example from memory. There are many impressions in the mind but at a particular time a particular impression is recalled.

The *Vijñānavādins* do not accept the empirical self of the ego as ultimate Reality. The man, because of the miseries of the world is the ego born of ignorance. Had there been any real ego either there should be liberation without effort or no liberation at all. The *Vijñānavādins* have called the empirical self as *Marovi nāra*. It is based on this *Ājāvināna* and along with it are attached four types of miseries: self concept, self illusion, self pride and self love.

As soon as the false idea of Manovijñāna is destroyed these miseries also disappear. According to Vasubandhu when the un-reality of the external thing is known, the Manovijñāna becomes unreal because the subject cannot remain without object. With the abolition of the distinction of the subject and object, the aspirant stays in absolute truth.

It should be noticed here, that Asanga and Vasubandhu have called only the empirical self as unreal. Pure consciousness or universal consciousness is the only Reality. It is self-enlightened. Knowing that this world is a conglomeration of impressions and that the ego and the object have no existence and all this is suffering, the wise man will leave behind the narrow life of the empirical self and attain universal consciousness. Following the great path, understanding the true principle of no-soul and the real meaning of Śūnyatā, the wise men, leaving the personal existence, attain pure consciousness, and become one with the universal consciousness. Some persons believe that Ālaya vijñāna is an ever changing stream of consciousness. But according to Lankāvatār Sūtra it is permanent, immortal and unchanging. It is beyond the dualism of subject and object. It is beyond origination, sustenance and destruction. It can be known through pure consciousness. It is substratum and object of the tendency of creation of the world. Hence creation is due to the eternal tendency which is motivated by ignorance. It is the manifestation of the personal Ālaya vijñāna. Pratyakṣa vijñāna or the personal consciousness can neither be called to be Ālaya nor different from it. It is intellect alone which differentiates between the Ālaya and the personal consciousness. In the end, from the transcendental standpoint there is no difference between them. Ālaya is inevitable and beyond the reach of the intellect. It is also called Tathāgatagarbha because it contains seeds of all the consciousness. It is eternal, original, pure, permanent, good, of the nature of light and the essence of all. It is attributeless. Thus though the Buddhists have tried to distinguish the Ālaya from the self described in the Upanisads, but this distinction is hardly cognisable.

From the multiple point of view Viṃśativādin admit two types of knowledge—Grahana and Adhyavasāya. Grahana is indirect and Adhyavasāya direct inference. The Viṃśativādin believe that the proof of things depends on something else (Parataḥ Prāmānyatva). They make two distinctions in the empirical truth

—Paratantra and Parikalpika The former is relative while the latter is imaginary

It is improper to compare Vijnānavāda with the subjective idealism in Western philosophy. In fact Vijnānavāda is absolute idealism. This Śāṅkara has misinterpreted both Vijnānavāda and śūnyavāda. The fact is that there is hardly much difference in Ālaya Vijnāna and the self of Upaniṣads. The Vijnānavādins have confined momentarism to the external or empirical world. The Reality is neither momentary nor eternal. But from the empirical standpoint it is eternal, immortal and permanent. The world is the manifestation of this Ālayavijnāna; the Tathāgatagarbha is not created through Manovijnāna or personal consciousness. To call the external world unreal only means that it has no existence apart from the universal or pure consciousness. In spite of comparing the external world with the dreaming, a difference has been made between the relative and the imaginary. The world is relative while the dream is imaginary though both are real only in the Ālayavijnāna and unreal outside. The Vijnāna pervades all things of the world and is their substratum. In the words of Sthiramati "Vijnāna alone is eternal and imperishable. It is blissful because it is eternal. Whatever is eternal is bliss and whatever is momentary is misery."

As soon as the false idea of Manovijnāna is destroyed these mistakes also disappear. According to Vasubandhu when the un-reality of the external thing is known, the Manovijnāna becomes unreal because the subject cannot remain without object. With the abolition of the distinction of the subject and object, the aspirant stays in absolute truth.

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NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

Q. 48. Describe briefly the four Pramanas according to Nyaya Philosophy.
(Poona 1959, Karnatak 1966, Baroda 1965)

What is the Naya concept of Vyapti ? How is Vyapti established ?
(Poona 1966)

Explain the nature of perception according to Nyaya. What are the different forms of it ?
(Bombay 1950 ; Baroda 1959 ; Karnatak 1966 ; Cal. 1971)

State the Nyaya view of syllogism and compare it with the Western view.
(Bombay 1950 ; Gujrat 1958 ; Karanatak 1965)

Explain the nature of inference according to Nyaya.
(Karnatak 1965, 1968 ; Bombay 1964, 1965 ; Meerut 1972)

What is the definition of inference in Nyaya logic ? Explain the main condition of inference.
(Cal. 1972)

Compare the Nyaya syllogism with Aristotelian syllogism. Which of these do you prefer ? Assign reasons for your preference.
(Bombay 1967)

KNOWLEDGE AND ITS DISTINCTIONS

In Nyāya philosophy knowledge is spoken of as the manifestation of objects. Knowledge lights its objects as does a lamp. Knowledge has two distinctions—valid (pramā) and invalid (apramā). According to Nyāya, valid knowledge is definite knowledge or real knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is, for example to know the snake as a snake and the bowl as a bowl. Valid knowledge has four distinctive sources viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Knowledge arising from sources other than these is called invalid or apramā.

(1) Perception—According to Gautama perception is uncontradicted knowledge which arises out of the proximity of object and sense organ, it is distinct and is unrelated to any name. According to this view, perception is that form of knowledge which results from the contact or nearness between the object and the sense organ, and which is apparent and real knowledge. For example, when any object is so near my eye that I have no doubts whatever as to its being real, then it is perceptual knowledge. If a distinct

object appears to me to be a human being and I have some doubts about this knowledge then inspite of the actual contact between the sense organ and the object the knowledge is not perceptual. In the same way knowledge or perception of the rope as the snake is not perceptual knowledge even though it is attended by any doubt. Hence illusory knowledge cannot be considered to be perceptual. The Nyāya philosophers have recognised six kinds of proximity—sanyog samyak samavāya sanyukt samaveta sama vāya, samaveta samavāya and viśheṣya bhāva.

This analysis of perception does not take into account the extraordinary and intuitive perceptions because there can be no knowledge of them without contact with senses. Knowledge of pleasure and pain etc., occurs without ostensible contact with the sense organs. In this way, the general characteristic of perception is not contact with the senses but rather immediate cognition. Perceptual knowledge of an object occurs only when there is cognition of it meaning thereby that in perception knowledge occurs without any past experience or inference. In this way some Nyāya philosophers have given the name perception (pratīti) to cognition implying therein that perception is such knowledge which is not the result of any other knowledge.

DISTINCTIONS OF PERCEPTION—ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY

Perception has been analysed in various ways. From one angle perception has two distinctions—ordinary (Laukika) and extraordinary (Alaukika). In ordinary perception knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extraordinary perception provides immediate knowledge even with the senses. Ordinary perception also admits of two distinctions—external (bāhya) and internal (mānas). External perceptions have five distinct types concerning with the five senses—visual (actual auditory, gustatory and olfactory). In internal perception the actual contact between the object and the mind produces knowledge of the pleasure pain hatred morality immorality etc. In this way the two kinds of perception internal and external admit of six distinctions. From another viewpoint ordinary perception has three distinctions—determinate (savikalpa) indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and recognition (Pratibhijñā). On the other hand extraordinary perception also has three distinctions—perception of classes (sāmānya lakṣaṇa) complication (jñāna lakṣaṇa) and intuitive (yogaja).

THERE ARE THREE DISTINCTIONS OF ORDINARY PERCEPTION

(1) *Indeterminate perception*—Gautama, in his sutras, accepts this distinction of perception. When the external organ comes into contact with the object, first of all a particular kind of knowledge known as 'sanmukh' or *avyākṛt* in Nyāya philosophy, arises in the self consisting merely of an awareness of the existence of the object without any knowledge of its name, qualities, etc. It is called indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) perception because it lacks any determining feature such as quality. It is the first undeveloped form of perception. Its existence is proved not by perception but by inference. According to the Nyāya philosophers, there should be indeterminate knowledge preceding determinate knowledge. These two states of perception are inferred because no relation can be established between the object and the quality without differentiating and distinguishing the two.

Determinate perception—Indeterminate perception can have practical utility. In determinate perception there is no doubt as to whether it is an animal or a human being or anything else. According to the Nyāya view, a moment before it arises, the knowledge of an object is devoid of characters such as name, class, etc., but following this, the next moment there is awareness in the same knowledge, of such characters of the object as name, class, shape, quality, etc., and the one indeterminate but same knowledge is manifested in practice in the form of sentences presenting knowledge. This is determinate (*savikalpa*) knowledge. In this way, determinate perception gives knowledge of the fact that 'this is a man,' 'he is black,' 'he is still' etc. It is the developed form of perception and it is on the basis of it that the practices of the world continue to function.

(2) *Recognition*—In this arises the feeling that the object now being perceived has been seen at some earlier juncture. To take an example, if upon now meeting the person to whom you were introduced a year ago you feel that he is that same individual, this knowledge will be called recognition. In this there is always the element of immediate experience.

THREE MODES OF EXTRAORDINARY PERCEPTION

(1) *Perception of classes (sāmānya Lakṣanā)*—That which is perceived by a common quality or attribute is different from ordinary perception and it, therefore, is called perception of classes. When we say that all men are mortal, the observation is based

upon the knowledge of the mortality of all men and this knowledge arises from the perception of classes. When, upon perceiving someone, we say that he is a man, we perceive manhood in him or, in other words, according to the Nyāya philosophers, knowledge of man arises from the perception of this common quality of 'manhood' which he shares with all men. It is on the basis of this same perceptual experience that we say that man is mortal because mortality is an attribute of manhood.


(2) *Perception by 'Complication' (jnana lakṣaṇa)*—This includes perceptions such as the ice looks cold, the stone appears solid and the grass soft. Here coldness, solidity and softness are subjects of tactual perception, then how can they be visually perceived. It is explained by the Nyāya philosophers thus. We have, on many previous occasions, perceived sandal wood. By smelling it at the same time as perceiving it visually a relation between its colour and its smell is established in mind. It is for this reason that the sight of sandal wood causes perception of its smell as well. In this example the present experience of smell is based upon a recollection of the previous smell. It is called perception by complication because it is based upon past experience. It is extraordinary perception because generally one sense organ does not perceive sensations of a different nature, which usually stimulate some other sense organ.

(3) *Intuitive perception*—It is the intuitive perception of all objects, and is peculiar to yogis who possess supernatural power. This experience can be had only by those who have achieved supernatural power after meditation and yogic practice. This power makes it possible for them to have perceptual knowledge of all objects past and future, complex and minute, near and far. Intuitive perception is also recognised by other Indian philosophers. The distinctions of perception are clearly illustrated in the following chart on the next page.

INFERENCE

According to Nyāya philosophy, the second source of valid knowledge is inference. Inference is the means to anumā knowledge. It is that knowledge preceding which there is some other knowledge. It is past or indirect (parokṣa) and takes place through the medium of some mark which is called the 'hetu' and bears the relation of invariable concomitance with the observed feature. Inference literally means that knowledge which follows some

other knowledge. The basis of inference is the relation of inevitable concomitance. The invariable relation between the *sādhya* and the *pakṣa* through the *hetu* is called *vyāpti*. Hence the *pakṣa* through the *hetu* is said to be knowledge gained through inference or *anumāna* is said to be knowledge of the presence of *parāmarśa*, or in other words, the knowledge of the quality of the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* through the *linga*, which is in the quality of *pakṣa* and is invariably related by *vyāpti*. For example, there is fire on the hill, because there is smoke on the hill and where there is smoke there is fire. Hence there is the relation of *vyāpti* or inevitable concomitance between smoke and fire. For this reason the presence of fire on the hill is inferred from the presence of smoke on the hill because of *vyāpti*, fire is invariably present where there is smoke.



CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE

In an inference there are three items and at least three sentences. These three constituents of inference are respectively called *pakṣa* and *hetu* or *linga*. These are similar to the three items, Minor, Major, and Middle, of the Syllogism of Western logic. *Pakṣa* is that part of the inference about which there is inference. *Sādhya* denotes that which is proved of the *pakṣa*. *Hetu* establishes that there is relation between the *sādhya* and the *pakṣa*. For

this reason *hetu* is also known as the means. To illustrate by means of example, in the above inference of fire on the hill, smoke is the means of inference. It is the *linga* or *hetu* or sign, the observation of which leads to the inference of the fire. This inference is based upon the invariable relation between fire and smoke. In this way the inference of fire from smoke has three parts—(1) There is smoke on the hill. (2) There is *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance between smoke and fire (of which we are already aware). (3) There is fire on the hill. Here the hill is the *pakṣa* because it is in relation to it that the inference is being made, fire is the *sādhya* because it is fire which is being proved of the *pakṣa* (hill), and smoke is the *linga*. In this way, from the standpoint of thought process, first of all in this inference is knowledge of *pakṣa* with the *hetu* then the knowledge of the *vyāpti* between *pakṣa* and *sādhya* and finally the decision about the relation of the *sādhya* with the *pakṣa*. But this same inference will be stated in the following manner—

There is fire on the hillside

Because there is smoke on the hill side

Where there is smoke there is fire as in the stove

COMPARISON WITH THE WESTERN SYLLOGISM

In this the first step is to establish a relation between the minor *pakṣa* and the major *sādhya*, the second is to describe the middle *hetu* and the final step is to give example to show the invariable relation of the *sādhya* with the *hetu*. This order of inference in Indian logic differs from the Western syllogism only in respect of the order of judgements which are the same in both cases. All three judgements of the foregoing example are similar to the Conclusion, Minor Premise and the Major Premise of the syllogisms respectively. In the syllogism the order is the following—Major Premise, Minor Premise and the Conclusion. In this way the order of the syllogism is the opposite of the order of the *anumāna*. In the syllogism, the major premise is stated first but in *anumāna* it is stated last. All three sentences of *anumāna* are categorical and can be either affirmative or negative.

INFERENCE FOR SELF AND OTHERS

Inference has been divided into two kinds according to the purpose for which it is meant (1) *Svārth* or for self and (2) *parārth* or for others. In the former distinction the inference is intended for oneself while in the latter it is for conveying knowledge to

others. In the former there is no necessity of presenting the statements in an orderly fashion but when it is a case of making another person understand it is necessary that the correct order of the sentences be adhered to. According to the Nyaya philosophers, inference for other consists of five constituents. An example of the five constituent inference follows :

- (1) *Pratijnā*—There is fire on the hill.
- (2) *Hetu*—Because (on the hill) there is smoke.
- (3) *Dṛṣṭānta*—Where there is smoke there is fire, as in the stove.
- (4) *Upanaya*—There is smoke on this hill.
- (5) *Nigamana*—Hence, there is fire on this hill.

Hetu shows the reason for the *pratijnā*. *Dṛṣṭānta* is a complete comprehensive sentence which, along with an example, shows the invariable relation between *sādhya* and *hetu*. *Upanaya* shows that the *dṛṣṭānta* sentence applies to this particular instance. *Nigamana* is that which results from its preceding sentences. In this inference the *linga* is observed thrice. The first time smoke is observed in the stove, second time in the hill and a third time when it is seen in relation to fire. This inference which has five constituents has been called '*paramanyāya*' by Gautama because it includes four *pramāṇas*. In Gautama's ancient logic inference has been divided into three kinds on the basis of the distinctions of *vyapti* into its kinds—*pūrvatva*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. Of these the first two are based upon the causal relationship while the last is not on this basis.

(1) *Pūrvavat*—'*Pūrva*' means first or preceding of the cause while '*vat*' means like. In this way *pūrvavat* inference is that which is like the previous, or in other words, one in which the effect is inferred from the cause. In this manner, in *pūrvavat* inference, the future effect is anticipated on the basis of the present cause. It is *pūrvavat* inference on perceiving the clouds in the sky when it is said that it will rain. In *pūrvavat* inference there is a cause-effect relationship between the *sādhana* and *sādhya*.

(2) *Śeṣavat*—'*Śeṣa*' means effect. In this way, inference of the cause from its effect is *śeṣavat* inference. Contrary to *pūrvavat* inference, here the causal relationship is between *sādhya* and *sādhana* in the *vyāpti*. In this, the previous or past cause is inferred from the present effect. To infer that it must have rained somewhere by observing an increase in the water in the river, its speed or its muddiness is to employ the *śeṣavat* form of inference. It is

also *śeṣavat* inference when, on examining one part of the whole it is deduced that the remaining must also possess the same qualities. Thus it is *śeṣavat* inference when from tasting a beaker full of sea water it is inferred that the water in the rest of the sea must also be saline. Commentators upon the *classica* have interpreted *śeṣavat* inference in a different way also. When the *po* *sible* are nullified and there is no possible material form left, then what remains is called '*śeṣa*'. Any inference through the medium of this *śeṣa* is called *śeṣavat* inference. For example being a characteristic quality sound is not in time space or mind. It cannot be the special quality of earth water fire air or soul because it is heard by the ears. That which is left is the sky. There is no further form of matter or *padārtha*. Hence according to *śeṣavat* inference it is proved that sound is the quality of the sky.

(3) *Sādhātodeṣṭa*. That inference which provides knowledge of any imperceptible or unperceived object is called *sādhātodeṣṭa* such as the inference of motion in the sun by observing it in the East in the morning and in the West in the evening. This inference is not based upon the relation of causality but is based on the fact that there is motion in the sun. It is inferred from the change of position because when other objects change their position motion is always apparent. Hence *sādhātodeṣṭa* resembles *ciriparison* to some extent.

Inference has been further divided into three by the neo-Nyāya school on the basis of the method of establishing *vyāpti* or the relation of invariable concomitance—*kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvaya vyatireki*.

(1) *Kevalānvayi*—This applies to the case where the means and the object are always found going together meaning thereby that case in which the *vyāpti* is established by an ascertained presence between the middle and the major term and in which there is no exception. For example

all knowable objects are nameable
the pot is a knowable object
therefore the pot is nameable

or that which can be known must also have a name. The pot can be known hence it must also have a name.

In the first sentence of this inference there is the relation of *vyāpti* between the subject and the object.

(2) *Kevalavyatireki*—Where the inference proceeds not from the agreement in presence of the middle and major term but from

Take it for granted that you have never seen a wild cow. A person dwelling in the forest informs you that it is not unlike an ordinary cow and possesses much the same shape. If, then, you come across some animal which resembles a cow and conclude that this is the animal known as a wild cow, then this knowledge is the result of comparison. Here, there is a relation between the name and the object of that name, or in other words, the animal known as the wild cow is similar to a cow. In this activity of comparison when we see the similarity between the cow and the wild cow, and recollect that the wild cow resembles a cow, only then do we know that its name is wild cow.

(5) *Testimony*—According to Nyāya philosophy, testimony is a reliable statement. A sentence is a group of words, and word is an entity which has the power to express some meaning. According to the ancient Nyāya system this power of being is due to God, while according to the later Nyāya philosophers it is endowed by tradition. The quality of being evidence or source of valid knowledge, is possessed not by all words, but only by the words of seers. If some individual has knowledge of the truth and presents this knowledge for the good of humanity, then his word shall be accepted as true. Knowledge comes about with the comprehension of the meaning and not only of the word. Hence, the knowledge of the meaning of the statements of seers is testimony.

DRSTĀRTHA AND ADRSTĀRTHA WORDS

Words have been sub divided into two classes according to the object of the meaning—*Drstārtha* and *Adrstārtha*. The former relate to the knowledge of such objects that are perceptible as statements of seers and ordinary persons who can be believed descriptions contained in religious texts concerning objects that have been seen, evidence given by witnesses in courts of law, believable facts concerning agriculture and the rituals described in religious texts for rain etc. The latter classification relates to imperceptible objects such as acceptable statement of common men, saints, religious leaders and religious texts, statements of scientists concerning atoms, beliefs of religious leaders concerning sin and virtue and the explanation of God, creatures and other things stated in the religious texts.

VEDIC AND LAUKIKA WORDS

The origin of the words forms another classification—(1) Vedic and (2) Laukika. Vedic words are those which are found in the Vedas, and Laukika words are those which are found in the other texts.

Nyāya philosophers, words originate with some person, be it a human individual or even God himself. Vedic words are the productions of God himself. Ordinary words are created by human beings. For this reason Vedic words are completely free from defects and delusion. Ordinary words can be true as well as false. The utterances of reliable individuals are treated as true.

It must have become evident from the foregoing description of Nyāya epistemology that in epistemological thought Nyāya philosophy is second to no other system of Indian philosophy. After going through the detailed and subtle description, no one can say that logic has not been adequately developed in Indian philosophy.

Q. 49. How does Nyaya prove the existence of God? Distinguish the Nyaya conception of God from the Advaita Vedanta conception of the same. (*Mysore 1963 ; Baroda 1963 ; Meerut 1971*)

WHAT IS GOD

According to Nyāya, God is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. He is the efficient, not the material, cause of the universe. He directs the activities of living souls. Just as an intelligent and benevolent father inspires the son to act according to his intelligence, capability and qualities, God also, in the same way, inspires living beings to act according to the tendencies acquired by them in the past and to win rewards appropriate to their action. It is He who determines the pains and pleasures of the jivas, provides their merits and awards their action appropriately. He creates the universe from the eternal entities such as atoms, space, time, ether, mind and souls which live with Him. It is because of His desire that the universe remains in its state of stability. In this way it is He who also sustains the universe. He employs His powers of destruction when it becomes imperative that the universe be destroyed. In this way, He is also destroyer of the universe. Substances such as space, time, etc., have the relation of body and soul to God, consequently they do not limit Him. He is, all powerful even though man proceeds according to virtues and sins. He has real knowledge of all objects and occurrences. He is, therefore, omniscient. He is the substratum in which knowledge exists. He himself is the knowledge. In Him the six perfections—majesty, almighty, all-glorious, infinitely beautiful, and infinite knowledge and perfect freedom from attachment—are present in full measure.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Nyāya philosophers have put forward all the ten proofs for the existence of God. Some of the important ones are the following:—

(1) *God is the creator of the organic objects of the universe*—There are two kinds of object in the universe—organic and inorganic. The atoms of space, time, ether, mind and earth, water, fire and air are perfect and eternal. Hence there can be no question of their creator. But objects other than these are neither atomic nor all-pervading (Vibhu). Hence, they must necessarily have some cause. Without the guidance and direction by an intelligent agent their material causes cannot possess the form or shape they are found possessing. This agent must possess the knowledge, the desire to attain the objective and the power to make an effort. He must also be omniscient; otherwise how can he have knowledge of such microscopic existence as the atoms? All these qualities of such an agent are to be found only in God. Hence the existence of God as the creator of the universe is proved.

(3) *God is the cause of the validity of religious texts*—Vedas are valid and authoritative, hence their creator, God, is also authoritative. Just as a science can be declared valid after testing only a part of it, the entire Vedas including its supernatural provision can be accepted as valid after testing the validity of its pronouncements about the worldly things. The validity of the Vedas depends upon their author. The author of the Vedas cannot be *jīva* since he cannot be cognizant of their supernatural and extra-sensory subjects. The author of the Vedas can only be one who can have perceptual and actual knowledge of the past, present and future, atom and cosmos, sensible and extra-sensory objects. In this way, the creator of the Vedas is God and their validity transpires from Him. Just as the validity of the sciences depends upon their creator so does the validity of the Vedas depend upon God.

(4) *Divine utterances also prove the existence of God*—The fourth proof that God exists is forthcoming from *śruti*, the Vedic script. The existence of God has been accepted by the Vedas. Upaniṣads and the Gītā. The existence of God can be proved by experience and not by logic. For this reason, those individuals who do not have personal experience should depend upon *śruti* or divine utterance. According to Kusumanjali, just as the sciences themselves and scientification are proofs of the truth of scientific laws, the *śruti* also is evidence for proving the existence of God.

UDAYAN'S ARGUMENTS

Udayan has deduced nine arguments, contained in the following sloka for proving the existence of God.

कार्यायोजनभूत्यादिः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः ।

वाक्यात् संख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविद्वयः ॥

(1) *Kāryāt*—The universe is an effect, hence it must have an instrumental cause. This cause is God.

(2) *Āyojanāt*—Atoms are inactive hence they must be provided with motion by God, which is necessary for their conjunction. Past tendency cannot impart motion to the atoms without God.

(3) *Dhṛtyādeh*—The creator and the destroyer of the universe is God. It is due to his decision that creation, stability and destruction take place.

(4) *Padāt*—Words get their power of giving meaning to their subjects from God.

(5) *Pratyayatah*—God is the author of the authoritative Vedas.

(6) *Shruteh*—*Śruti* establishes the existence of God.

(7) *Iksvatī*—Vedic sentences give utterance to moral laws. God is the author of moral laws. Vedic laws are divine.

(8) *Sarākhid Iśaśekhā*—According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the diatomic structure is not formed of the microscopic substance of two atoms but of their number two. The numeral one is perceptible but all the other numerals are mental concepts. At the time of creation the souls atoms ātma space time māna etc., are all unconscious or unintelligent. For this reason number will be dependent upon the mind of God and will be created by it. In this way it is necessary to believe in the existence of God.

(9) *Adṛṣṭi*—We experience the result of our actions and our qualities. Actions lead to merit and demerit and adṛṣṭi is the collection of merits and demerits. But the adṛṣṭi is unintelligent. Hence in order that there may be experience of the results of the adṛṣṭi, there must be God.

OBJECTIONS TO GOD AND THEIR ANSWERS

Some arguments have been given against the proofs for the existence of God which Nyāyikas have put forward. They have been answered by the Nyāya philosophers. The major ones among them are

(1) In connection with the foregoing third and fourth proofs for the existence of God it can be objected that they are interdependent and are consequently defective. But according to the Sarva Darsana Samgraha this interdependence is no defect because it can be a defect only when two subjects are interdependent from the same point of view. In this case from the view point of existence Vedas are dependent upon God because God is their author while from the viewpoint of human knowledge God is dependent upon the Vedas because it is through the Vedas that the human beings set to know God.

(2) The second objection to the Nyāya conception of God is that if God is the creator of this universe he must possess a body because without a body no activity can be indulged in. Nyāyikas answer this by saying that existence of God is either proved by the *śruti* or it is disproved. If it has been proved then this objection has no value and if it has not been proved then what is the use of raising this objection?

(3) The third objection to the Nyāya conception of God is concerned with the purpose which God has in creating the universe. God can have no purpose of his own in creating the universe because He is perfect. His purpose in doing it cannot be said to be for others because one who works for the good of others cannot be wise.

If this purpose is benevolence, then why are there so many unhappy individuals in this world? Hence, God cannot be credited with having created this world? Answering this objection the Naiyāyikas say that God has created this world out of compassion. The world having been created it is only natural that there should be pain and pleasure in the world, because the jīvātmas are attended by their respective adṛṣṭā. But God is not limited to His creation, just as mind is not the slave of His body but it helps Him in the achievement of his objective and acting to this end; in much the same way the universe does not make the God dependent upon another but helps Him in the realisation of His objective.

The conception of God professed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy does not appear at all correct. Śaṅkara has criticised this view. Thus Nyāya theism is undeveloped and incomplete.

Q. 50. The Nyaya Vaisesika are allied systems of philosophy. How are they allied? Do they differ in some way? If so how?

(Agra 1961)

SIMILARITY

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies are allied. The main points that they have in common are the follows :

- (1) The aim of both is mokṣa, or liberation of the jīva.
- (2) The root cause of pains is lack of knowledge.
- (3) Mokṣa implies complete freedom from pain.
- (4) Same form of the ātman.
- (5) Same ways of knowing the ātman.
- (6) Delineation of intelligence, knowledge, perception, inference, doubt, illusion, etc.
- (7) Both have postulated five distinctions of action.
- (8) Both are agreed on the nature of the universe.

DIFFERENCES

(1) *Scope*—Nyāya is particularly devoted to the study of the sources of knowledge. It has dealt only briefly, and that too from the general viewpoint, with the elements. In the Vaiśeṣika schools the elements have been discussed in detail. In metaphysics, they do not restrict themselves to the ordinary but their vision comprehends even the microscopic universe.

(2) *Categories and prameva*—In the Nyāya view, there are sixteen categories and nine pramevas whereas in the Vaiśeṣika school there are seven categories and nine substances.

(3) *Sources of knowledge*—In Nyāya, perception, inference, comparison, and testimony have been accepted as the four sources of valid knowledge. Vaisesikas accept only two, perception and inference, as the sources of knowledge. Both comparison and testimony are included in inference.

(4) *Perception*—According to Nyaya there are five kinds of perception concurring with the five kinds of sense organs (visual, tactual, auditory, olfactory and gustatory). But Vaisesika accept only visual perception.

(5) *Samavāya*—According to Nyaya the knowledge of samavāya can be had through perception. But according to the Vaisesika view samavāya is known by inference.

(6) *Hetvalīsa*—According to Nyaya there are five kinds of fallacies. On the other hand Vaisesika accept only three.

(7) *Dreams*—According to the Nyaya as opposed to Vaisesika view, dreams arising out of merit are true while those arising out of demerit are false.

(8) *Deity*—Nyāyikas are the followers of Śiva while the Vaisesika look upon Maheswara as the God of all.

(9) *Chemical Action*—Chemical action in Nyaya terminology is *pilpāka* while in the Vaisesika it is *pilupāka*.

(10) *Other subjects*—In addition to these, Nyaya and Vaisesika also differ regarding the status of action etc.

VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

Q. 51. What is Padārtha? Give a detailed account of substance and Inherence. (Kāthapur 1955)

What do Vaisesikas mean by Padārthas? Offer critical remarks on either samavaya or abhava.

(Karnatak 1966, 1968; Kanpur 1970)

What is the Category in Vaisesika philosophy? State and examine the categories of 'Dravya', 'Viśeṣa' and 'Samavaya'.

(Poona 1959)

Explain the Vaisesika categories of substance, quality and action.

(Baroda 1959)

What is category? State and distinguish the various categories admitted in Vaisesika.

(Bombay 1951)

What does a Vaisesika mean by a category? Describe the categories of samanya, samavaya and abhava.

(Poona 1962; Mysore 1962; Meerut 1972)

Explain the Vaishesika categories of Samavaya and Abhava.

(Cal. 1972)

Explain and examine the Vaishesika theory of universals.

(Cal. 1971)

PADARTHA OR CATEGORIES

Just as the Nyāya philosophy is devoted to the almost exclusive study of the sources of valid knowledge, Vaisesika philosophy devotes itself to metaphysical reflections. According to it, all the objects of the universe can be divided into seven categories or padārthas, the latter term denoting those objects which are known through the medium of a word. In this way these seven categories of reality comprehend all those objects in the world which can be named. These seven categories are—(1) Dravya or substance, (2) Guṇa or quality, (3) Karma or action, (4) Sāmānya or generality, (5) Viśeṣa or particularity, (6) Samavāya or inherence, and (7) Abhāva or non-existence. In these seven categories there are two distinctions—(1) Bhāva padārtha, and (2) Abhāva padārtha. The first distinction denotes those categories which have an existence, or those which are present. The first relates to being. The second distinction, non-being, is a later addition to the Vaisesika

philosophy by later commentators and is not originally discussed. The other six categories, with the exception of abhaya, are all existent and are included in 'being'.

(1) DRAVYA OR SUBSTANCE FIVE ELEMENTS

According to the Vaisesika view, dravya or substance is the substratum of action and qualities, and the material or constitutive cause of composite things produced from it, just as the cotton fibre is the cause of cotton cloth produced from it. Even though being different from quality and action substance is their substratum. Without it quality and action can have no existence. Substances are of nine kinds: (1) earth or *pṛthivī*, (2) water or *jal*, (3) fire or *tej*, (4) air or *vāyu*, (5) ether or *ākāśa*, (6) time or *kāla*, (7) space or *dāk*, (8) self or *ātma*, (9) mind or *manas*. Among these the first five are called *pudgala*. In each of these there is one such specific quality as colour, touch, etc. perceived by one of the external sense organs. The colour of the qualities of smell, water, that of taste, fire of form, air of touch, that of sound. These are perceived by the nose, tongue, eyes, skin and ears respectively. These sense organs are also believed to have originated in the earth, water, fire, air and ether. With the exception of ether, the other four physical elements are eternal or *nitya* in the form of cause, and non eternal or *anitya* in the form of effect.

Accordingly, the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are beginningless because they are not composite and consequently are eternal, but all the substances formed by the conjunction of these atoms, which therefore are effects, are not eternal because their constituent atoms can be separated or even destroyed. The fifth substance, the ether, is the basis of sound. The ether is not perceived because it does not satisfy the conditions of external perception in not being possessed of either a perceptible dimension or of any colour. It is inferred from the perception of sound and every quality must have a substratum and none of the other earth, air, water or fire can be its bearer. There are two reasons for this. In the first place the qualities of these substances smell, taste, form and touch are not heard whereas sounds of words are heard and are audibly perceived. In the second place sound is created even where these elements are absent. Sound cannot be the quality of space, time, mind and soul because they continue to exist even when there is no sound. In this way ether is the basis of sound being partless, the ether is one and eternal. It is everywhere pervading and infinite because its quality sound is perceived in all directions.

Like the ether, space and time are also not perceptible. They are one, eternal and all-pervading. Space is inferred by the know- of concepts such as here, there, near, far, etc. Time is inferred on the basis of concepts such as past, future, present, old and ancient. In this way, then, the ether, space and time are actually identical but they appear to be distinct because their qualities differ, and even their parts appear to be different.

SOUL OR ATMAN

The opinion of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers is the same as that of the Naiyāyikas on the subjects of soul. The soul is the basis of the phenomenon of consciousness, and it is eternal and all-pervading. It is perceived by the mind and is thus known. The souls in different bodies are also different. In this way there are many souls. Besides the soul of human beings called the *jīva* in the other form of the soul is the Paramatma who is one and the creator of the universe.

MIND OR MANA

The existence of the mind can be inferred from the following two factors—(1) As in the case of external substances of the universe, for the perception of which external sense organs are required, so is an internal sense organ required to perceive the internal categories composed of knowledge, desire, pain, pleasure, etc., and this internal sense is the mind. (2) In spite of there being contact between the object and the external sense organ knowledge does not occur without a mind. And, even when all the five senses come into contact with their respective qualities in different objects simultaneously, there is knowledge of only one in one particular moment. In this way, this not only proves the existence of the mind it also proves that the mind is atomic and partless. Had the mind not been an infinitesimal and atomic entity, it was possible for its various parts to come into contact with different sense organs simultaneously and for many perceptions to manifest themselves at the same time. But we find in practice that this does not occur. Hence, it follows that the mind is a partless or atomic form and is the internal sense of perception. The soul receives its knowledge of the objects through the medium of mind.

(2) QUALITY

According to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, quality is that category which subsists in substance but in which no other quality or action can inhere. Qualities cannot exist without substance and hence they are said to be other-dependent. As has been stated before

only substance can be the material or constitutive cause of action. It is of secondary help in the action. In view of the fact that all qualities are dependent upon substance, there cannot be any quality of quality. Quality also lacks action or motion. It resides reactively in its substratum, the substance. In this way it differs from both substance as well as action.

DISTINCTIONS OF QUALITY

There are twenty-four qualities—1 *rupa* or colour, 2 *rasa* or taste, 3 *gandha* or smell, 4 *sparsa* or touch, 5 *abha* or sound, 6 *sankhya* or number, 7 *parimāṇa* or magnitude, 8 *prthakātva* or distinctness, 9 *samyog* or conjunction, 10 *vibhaga* or disjunction, 11 *paratyā* or remoteness, 12 *aparatyā* or nearness, 13 *bodhi* or cognition, 14 *sukha* or reversion, 15 *duḥka* or pain, 16 *icchā* or desire, 17 *dveṣa* or reversion, 18 *prayatna* or effort, 19 *gurutva* or heaviness, 20 *dravyatva* or fluidity, 21 *sneha* or viscosity, 22 *samskāra* or tendency, 23 *dharma* or merit, 24 *adharma* or demerit. These qualities have been further subdivided as various tastes such as sweet, sour, saline, bitter, etc., or the sounds such as the articulate and the inarticulate. Magnitude is further divided into very small, medium and very big. Numbers start from one and proceed upwards.

CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION

Conjunction is the noun predicated of the relation of meeting of two substances capable of existing apart such as the relation of the hand to the pen. The causal relation is not a conjunctive relation because the separate existence of the cause of the effect is not possible. Disjunction is the name of the ending of conjunction or separation, such as happens when the pen falls from the hand. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy three kinds of conjunction are accepted:

(1) *Anvatarakarmaj*—where one substance meets another or conjoins another. (2) *Uphaya karmaj*—etc. takes place as the result of activity on the part of substances such as when two wrestlers meet. (3) *Samyog*—one conjunction takes place through conjunction, such as, the hand and paper. The hand touches the pen and the pen touches the paper. *samyogaj samyog*.

Disjunction has been subdivided into three, on the same basis as conjunction—(1) *Anyatar dharmaj*—where the action of one of the substances leads to disjunction ; as when the leaf falls from the tree (2) *Ubhaya karmaj*—where the disjunction of the two takes place through activity in both the substances as when two wrestlers break apart. (3) *Vibhāgaj*—where one disjunction leads to another as when the conjunction between the hand and the paper is ended when the pen, which is the link between the two, is put down.

REMOTENESS AND NEARNESS

Remoteness and nearness also have two distinctions—spatial and temporal. Temporal remoteness implies oldness while nearness indicates modernity. In the same way, spatial remoteness is indicative of great distance while spatial nearness denotes proximity.

COGNITION, PLEASURE, PAIN, DESIRE, AVERSION, EFFORT

Cognition (knowledge) has been treated in detail in the preceding discussion on Nyāya philosophy. And everybody is familiar with pleasure, pain, desire and aversion. Effort has three distinctions : (1) *Pravṛtti*—the effort for possessing some object, (2) *Nivṛtti*—the effort to be rid of something. (3) *Jivan yoni*—the activity of procreation.

FLUIDITY AND VISCIDITY

The cause of liquid substances flowing is their fluidity, such as is possessed by water. Similarly, substances like butter have the tendency to conjoin and form lumps, the tendency being named viscosity or *sneha*.

Samskāra or tendency also has three distinctions- (1) *vega* or *velocity*—by virtue of which an object possesses motion, (2) *bhāvanā* or *feeling*—due to which there is memory of recognition of some subject, (3) *sthiti sthūpakatva* or *oscillation*—by means of which some substance returns from a long distance to its original position such as a rubber ball.

Merit is a virtue which leads to proper activity and results in pleasure. *Demerit* is a sin which leads to improper activity and causes pain.

REASON FOR THERE BEING TWENTYFOUR QUALITIES

If all these distinctions of the various qualities were to be counted, their total number would be well nigh stupendous, but in these twentyfour qualities only the basic qualities have been

counted. The other qualities are only the distinctions of these and are included therein. In this way these twenty-four qualities are fundamental and it is by their conjunction that the other compound qualities are formed.

(3) KARMA OR ACTION. WHAT IS KARMA ?

Action or karma is the commonly used name of the fundamental dynamic qualities of substance. The inactive manifestation of substance is quality and its active manifestation is action or mobility. Substances combine and separate because of action. Action has no quality. Quality is dependent upon substance. Action cannot subsist in all-pervading substances because in them there is no change of position. Hence, the basis of action can only be material substances like the earth, air, fire and mind.

DISTINCTIONS OF KARMA

There are five distinctions of karma—(1) *utkṣepa* or throwing upwards. In this way, due to action the conjunction takes place with the higher plane. (2) *avalambana* or throwing downwards in which action leads to conjunction with the lower plane. (3) *ākunchana* or contraction which activity is designed to create conjunction in an ever nearer sphere such as twisting the hand. (4) *prasarana* or expansion. (5) *gati* or locomotion. Action other than the first four are comprehended by locomotion. The activity of substances such as earth, water, fire, etc. is perceptible but the activity of an imperceptible entity like the mind can not be known by perception.

(4) SAMANYA OR GENERALITY

Generality is that category by virtue of which various different individual beings are enumerated in one class and called by a common name, just as all beings are called by a word *ratna* indicating class, the examples of which are man, horse, etc. These have some general or common quality which exists in the entire class and is its characteristic. Objects possess similarity because of the general quality. The notion of the general quality Indian philosophers have submitted one of the following three opinions.

THREE DIFFERENT OPINIONS CONCERNING GENERALITY

(1) *Naturalism*—According to this view, generality is not essential quality but mere similarity to the beings belonging to the class.

other classes only by virtue of this name. The general has individual or separate existence. Among the Indian philosophies it is the Buddhist philosophy which has accepted this view.

(2) *Conceptualism*—The second view concerning generality is Conceptualism. According to this view, the general quality has no existence apart from the individuals and neither does it come from outside and enter into the individual. The individual and the general cannot be separated from each other. It is the essential quality or the eternal form of general individuals which is apprehended by our mind or intellect. This point is to be found in the Jaina and Advaita Vedānta systems of Indian philosophy.

(3) *Realism*—The third view of generality is realism. According to it the general is neither a mental thought or concept nor merely a name but has its own individual existence. The generals are eternal categories which, although separate from the individual, still pervade them. In this way, the general is included or mixed in individuals. It is only because of the general that there is any similarity between different individuals. It subsists in substance, quality and action. It is because of general that they are called by the same name or are said to belong to the same class. This view is propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśṣika among the systems of Indian philosophy.

DISTINCTIONS OF GENERALITY

From the point of view of pervasion generality is of three kinds—*parā*, *aparā* and *parāpara*. '*Parā*' is the most comprehensive, such as existence. '*Aparā*' is the name given to the least comprehensive such as potness. The third distinction, '*parāpara*' is between *parā* and *aparā*, an example of it being fluidity. With relation to existence it is *aparā*, and with relation to potness it is *parā*.

(5) VISESA OR PARTICULARITY

Viseśa is the very opposite of generality. *Viseśa* is the term indicating the unique or specific particularity or individuality of eternal substances which have no part. These substances are—space, time, ether, mind, soul and the atoms of the four elements. It is because of particularity that individuals are distinguished from each other and the atoms of the same substance considered separately. Particulars are those forms of substances by means of which they are known distinct from each other. Particulars are needed to distinguish between composite and noneternal objects, which are

effects such as chair, table, etc. The particular is in partless and eternal substances which are innumerable. Hence the particulars are also eternal, partless and innumerable. They are themselves recognizable. There can be no perceptual cognition of them because, like the atom they too are invisible.

(6) SAMAVAYA OR INHERENCE. WHAT IS SAMAVAYA?

According to Prātaṣṭhāpāda, inherence is that relation which exists in invariably conjoined (समसङ्ग) objects between which there is the relation of subsisting and substratum elements, and which is the middle term of the concept that this is in them. In this way, objects connected by inherence are so conjoined that they are inseparable. The following are conjunctions of inherence—quality and substratum, action and the doer, individual and class, particular and eternal element and substance, part and whole. In this way, there is cloth in cotton fibres, smell in the flower, motion in water, humanity in human being and these are due to samavāya.

INHERENCE AND CONJUNCTION

Vaiśeṣika has accepted two types of relationship—inherence and conjunction. These two differ from each other in the following respects:

- (1) Conjunction is momentary and non eternal while inherence is an eternal relationship.
- (2) Conjunction is the relationship which results from the connection of two substances. Inherence does not result from the conjunction of substances.
- (3) Conjunction results from the activity of elements or two objects. Inherence is always present in substances. The relation of conjoined substances is mutual.
- (4) Conjunction is an external relation whereas inherence is an internal relation. Conjoined substances are capable of existing apart. But substances related by inherence cannot exist separated. The part and the whole cannot remain apart.

(7) ABHYASA OR NON EXISTENCE. WHAT IS NON EXISTENCE?

Being entirely different from the foregoing six substances, non existence is regarded as the seventh category. Karada has accepted only six categories but in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra non-existence is mentioned in pramāṇa form. This category has been dealt with at length in the authoritative text of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, the Prātaṣṭhāpāda bhāṣya. Non existence is the absence of an object. N

body can deny the absence of the moon on dark nights. Hence it is necessary to include non-existence.

DISTINCTIONS OF NON-EXISTENCE

There are two main distinctions of non-existence :

(1) Sansargābhāva or the absence of one entity in another, such as the absence of heat in the moon.

(2) Anyonyābhāva or one object not being another just as the moon is not the sun.

DISTINCTIONS OF SANSARGABHAVA

This type of non-existence, sansargābhāva, also has three distinctions—(1) Prāgābhāva or antecedent non-existence, which means the absence of the substance which is effect before it is created, just as the absence of the substance of the pot in the clay before the clay is made into a pot. Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but it has an end. There was always the absence of the pot in the clay but with the construction of the pot the beginningless non-existence comes to an end.

(2) Dhvamsābhāva—or non-existence on the destruction of substance which is an effect just as the absence of the pot in its pieces after the pot has been destroyed. Dhvamsābhāva has beginning but it has no end. When the pot breaks dhvamsābhāva has a beginning in time but the pot can never come back or be recreated. Thus, this non-existence can have no end.

(3) Atyantābhāva or absolute non-existence – meaning that non-existence between two object which extends over the entire temporal expanse, past, present and future, such as the absence of coolness in fire. And absolute non-existence has neither a beginning nor an end. It is always there. The absence of coolness in fire will continue over all time. In this way, absolute non-existence is neither born nor destroyed.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SANSARGABHAVA AND ANYONYABHAVA

Sansargābhāva and anyonyābhāva differ from each other in the following respects :

(1) Sansargābhāva is the absence of relation between two objects. The latter is the absence of something in some other objects.

(2) Sansargābhāva is the absence of relation whereas anyonyābhāva is the absence of identity. A rabbit does not have any horns : in this example there is absence of relation between the

rabbit and the horns and it is an example of *sansargabhāva*. The donkey is not a horse, in this relation there is the non-existence of identity, and it is an example of *anyonyabhāva*.

CRITICISM OF THE CONCEPT OF CATEGORIES

The following objections have been levelled at the Vaiśeṣika concept of categories

(1) Vaiśeṣika philosophy has mentioned seven categories but substance appears to be the only category. Quality and action are dependent upon substance. Non-existence is relative to existence. In this way one of them can be said to be a category. And in the absence of these qualities and relationships even the nature of the substance cannot be determined.

(2) Substances have been stated as being nine in number of which ether is the basis of sound, space and time are based on experience and mind is the internal sense organ. In this way, actually, the only substances are the atoms of the four elements and the souls.

(3) Vaiśeṣika's acceptance of the soul as unconscious and many does not appear to be logical.

(4) According to the Vaiśeṣika, qualities cannot exist without substance and composite objects without parts. Then how can substance exist without quality and without general and particular traits.

(5) The Vaiśeṣika philosophers postulate that there is a particular in every atom and in every soul but they do not describe the particular.

(6) The Vaiśeṣika philosophers believe that if there is existence, there must be non-existence, but even they do not synthesize the two. Actually they are not prepared to adopt the cosmological viewpoint in their consideration of the category although this view is above the ordinary viewpoint. From the point of view of scientific analysis their concept of the category, which in effect is their metaphysics, is very important. But then they have failed to adjust among these different categories. In this respect *Sāṃkhya* and the *Vedānta* systems are far above them.

SĀṂKHYAN OBJECTIONS AGAINST VAIŠEṢIKA

Vaiśeṣika philosophy looks upon inherence as a category. Against it *Sāṃkhya* has raised the following fundamental objections —

- (1) It is incorrect to speak of conjunction as a quality of inherence as a quality because even though one is yutsiddha the other ayutsiddha they are interrelated.
- (2) Inherence is other than the objects which it relates another relation of inherence is required to relate this relation and there is no end to this chain.
- (3) If inherence is separated from both the objects that relates then wherein does it exist? If it is in the first objects then it cannot relate it to the second and if it is in the second then it cannot relate it to the first and one inherence cannot remain in both because it is indivisible. Hence inherence is impossible.

Q. 52. Write a short-essay on Vaisesika atomism.

Compare and contrast the atomic theory of Nyāya Vaisesikas with that of Greeks. (Cal. 1970)

Explain and discuss the Paramāṇuvāda of Vaisesika. (Gujrat 1964, Karnatak 1964)

(Bombay 1968, 1964, 1965; Gujrat 1958; Baroda 1963, 1965; Karnatak 1965)

PARAMĀNUVĀDA OR ATOMISM

According to the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, all composite objects of the universe are composed of the atoms of earth, water, air and fire. Hence the view of the Vaiśeṣika concerning creation is called atomism or paramāṇuvāda. Atomism postulates the cycle of creation and destruction of the non-eternal or temporary substances of the universe. The eternal categories or substances of the universe namely, ether, space, time, mind, earth and physical elements are neither created nor destroyed.

CREATION AND GOD

The Vaisesika atomism is spiritual. God is the one who directs the motion of atoms. God is the guiding principle controlling the motion of atoms. He creates motions in the material particles in order that the living beings may be rewarded or punished according to their past tendencies. Creation and destruction of the universe takes place in agreement with the wishes of God. Maheswara is the ruler and owner of the entire universe which is all he surveys. This cycle of creation and destruction is continuing over entire time.

CREATION OF ATOMS

Creation is the name given to phenomenon whereby the old order is destroyed and the new created. Upon God deciding to

create the universe the bodies and external substances appear as the means of rewarding the past tendencies of the living beings and they are even formed according to these past tendencies of the souls. These past tendencies then start instigating the souls in those directions. All these are the result of the universe, its four substances which are effects the diad, the triad and its various conjunctions. Atoms combine because of their motion. This motion is due to *adṛṣṭa* or past tendency and the activity of the *adṛṣṭa* is inspired by God. The combination or conjunction of two atoms is inferred. Being microscopic or infinitesimal it cannot be perceived. The triad or the *triāṇuka* is the smallest particle of matter that can be perceived. It is formed by the conjunction of three diads. Then in this same time period the elements have their origin. The elements formed out of these atoms are air, water, earth and fire. Once air is created it starts flowing in the external ether. Water is also mixed with the air and starts flowing. In the same way, earth and fire live in water. In this way, the entire universe comes into existence by the mere thought process of the God. It is the seed form of the material and fiery atoms. This universe is guided by Brahman or the World Soul who is the very manifestation of knowledge, detachment and excellence. Brahman guides the creation in such a manner that the individual souls continue to experience pain and pleasure according to their previous action. All this vast machinery is put into action by the desire of God.

DESTRUCTION

The circle of creation and destruction has no beginning. The souls get rest and space in destruction only after they have passed through many births and deaths continually experiencing pain and pleasure. One creation between two destructions is called *kālpa*. When the time is ripe the World soul also relinquishes its body like the common souls. God desires to bring destruction on the universe. The moment *Maheśwara* so desires the past tendencies of the souls vanish for some time and their bodies break up into their composite atoms. Similarly the physical elements also vanish when their composing atoms are dispersed. In the residuum are the atoms of the four elements, five eternal substances and tendencies created by the meritorious or notorious activities of the souls. They form the constitutive elements of the following creation. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas are *saṁkīrṇavādin*s and their view is also called the *Arambhavāda* or *paramāṇu kīrṇavāda*.

VAISESIKA AND GREEK ATOMISM

The Vaiseṣikas are agreed with the Greek atomism of Leucippus and Democritus that the atom is indivisible, partless, imperceptible, ultimate and eternal and it is material cause of this physical universe. But further the two views differ in the following respects :—

(1) According to the Greek atomism, the atoms are similar in quality, but they differ in respect of quantity or number. The Vaiseṣikas attribute a difference of both quantity and quality in the atoms.

(2) Greek atomists do not attribute any secondary qualities to atoms but the Vaiseṣikas accept these qualities in the atoms.

(3) The Greek atomists believe that atoms are by their nature dynamic but the Vaiseṣikas accept them as static by nature.

(4) According to the Greek view, souls are composed of these atoms but according to the Vaiseṣikas souls and atoms are different and both are individually but equally eternal and independent.

CRITICISM OF ATOMISM

Śaṅkara has criticised the Vaiseṣika atomism in the following manner :

(1) If there is qualitative difference in the atoms there should also be some difference in their weights.

(2) If the atoms have qualities then how can they be eternal? If the qualities of atoms are also eternal then how can it be accepted that there are no qualities in free souls and substances etc?

(3) If the qualities of the cause are transferred to the effect then why is it that the spherical nature of the atom is not transferred to the dyad and the minuteness and destructibility of the dyad is not transferred to the triad?

(4) If the effect is not in the cause then anything should be caused by anything else and not by some particular cause?

(5) Atoms are neither active nor inactive nor both nor neither. If they are active then creation will become permanent. If they are inactive creation will be impossible. They cannot be both active as well as inactive since these qualities are mutually contradictory and cannot stay together, as is the case with light and darkness. If

atoms are neither active nor inactive, then motion or activity should be introduced by some external cause

(6) Now, is this external cause past tendency (dṛṣṭa) or present tendency (adṛṣṭa) ? If it is past tendency then it cannot have existed before creation. If it is past tendency then it will always accompany the atoms and creation will become permanent, and if the atoms are not postulated to be in close proximity with past tendency creation becomes impossible. In this way it is impossible for there to be creation with atoms in any manner.

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SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

Q. 53. How does Samkhya establish Satkaryavada ? Explain fully. (Bombay 1158)

Explain the Samkhya doctrine of causation.

(Meerut 1972, Kanpur 1970)

According to Sāmkhya philosophy, that which does not exist cannot come into existence. and there is no absence of what is existent. The effect is concealed in the cause before it is produced. In this way, creation means the manifestation of that which is hidden, and destruction implies the concealment of that which is manifest. In this way, both creation and destruction indicate the discarding of one form or quality and adoption of another form or quality. The difference between the cause and the effect is one of quality or form. The effect exists in its cause. This view is called satkāryavāda. Because of their refusal to recognize the distinct existences of the cause and the effect the followers of this view are also called 'bhedasahiṣṇu abhedavādi'.

PRKRATI PARINAMAVADA

Even among those who accept the theory of the reality of the effect, as stated above, there are two opinions—pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda. According to pariṇāmavāda the cause really changes into the effect while according to vivartavāda this changing of the cause into the effect is not real but only illusory. Clay turning into pot is an example of pariṇāmavāda while the rope's appearing as a snake is an example of vivartavāda. In this way, according to pariṇāmavāda, the existence of the cause and effect is the same while according to vivartavāda the existence of the two is different or separate.

The Sāmkhya philosophers believe the theory of pariṇāmavāda while the Vedānta philosophers accept the theory of vivartavāda. In this way according to Sāmkhya, all creation is manifestation while all destruction is concealment. The distinction between cause and effect is only for practical purpose. Being only two different states of the same object, there is no difference between them. Rāmānuja, like the Sāmkhya, accepts pariṇāmavāda. But accor-

efficient cause is needed to make it manifest. In order to obtain oil it is necessary to crush the seeds. In the absence of this co-operating power or energy, the effect cannot be made manifest. Hence, the absence of the effect in the cause is dependent upon certain conditions. According to Vyāsa, these conditions are space time, form and shape. When the internal quality of an object is transformed it is called the qualitative effect but when only the external manifestation is changed it is called apparent result.

Q. 54. State the nature of Prakṛti according to Sāṃkhya. How does Sāṃkhya prove the existence of Prakṛti. (*Karnatak 1966*)

State the Sāṃkhya conception of Prakṛti. Show how Prakṛti is related to Puruṣa.

(*Baroda 1962 ; Poona 1966 ; Mysore 1962 ; Meerut 1971*)

Analyse the Sāṃkhya arguments for Prakṛti. What is exactly the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. (*Cal. 1972*)

MANY NAMES OF PR KṚTI

It is on the basis of their theory of causation that the Sāṃkhya philosophers deduce the ultimate cause of the universe, prakṛti. Everything has a cause but not prakṛti. It is the first cause. It precedes creation. All the effects of the universe are based and depend upon it. It is the first element of universe, and is therefore called 'pradhāna'. Lokāchārya writes that it is called prakṛti because it causes all the distortions, it is called 'avidyā' because it contradicts knowledge, it is called 'māyā', because it involves the peculiar creation.

It is very subtle and visible, and can be deduced or inferred only from its creations. For this reason, prakṛti is also known as 'anumā'. In the form of the unconscious element it is called jada and in the form of unlimited but always active force it is called 'shakti', and in the form of the unmanifested objects it is called 'avyakta' or unexpressed.

FIRST CAUSE THE UNIVERSE

According to Sāṃkhya, the entire universe is composed of objects which are effects and have their origin in material cause. Universe is a flow of causes and effects. Hence, It also must have a fundamental cause. The fundamental cause cannot be the soul or the self because the self is neither a cause nor an effect, besides which its nature contradicts the nature of objects found in the universe. According to the Chārvākas, Buddha, Jain and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the universe is composed of the atoms of

earth, water, fire and air. It is the contention of the Sāmkhya that the subtle elements such as mind, intelligence and ahmkāra or ego cannot have their origin in these physical elements. The cause of the universe should be such that, even though it is physical, it should be as subtle and infinitesimal as possible, should have no beginning and no end, and should be able to give rise to all the entities. All these qualities are to be found in prakṛti. Hence, prakṛti is the fundamental or first cause of all the objects of the world. It is eternal and absolute, because a relative and non-eternal element cannot be the fundamental cause of the world. It is a profound, inexhaustible and microscopic power or energy.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRAKṚTI AND OBJECTS

Objects which have their origin in prakṛti are effects, dependent, relative, many and non-eternal because they are born and they die, they are created and destroyed. Prakṛti is unborn, independent, absolute, one, eternal and beyond creation and destruction. Objects are limited, within the space time continuum but prakṛti is beginningless and endless. Being extremely microscopic, prakṛti is imperceptible and unmanifest. It is inferred from the objects which originate in it. Motion is present in it in the form of rajas. Objects are manifest while prakṛti is unmanifest. Objects are composite, prakṛti has no parts. Without a cause no effect can result. Hence, that which is the cause of all the objects and substances of the universe is prakṛti or pradhāna. Being very subtle it is not perceptible.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PRAKṚTI

The following proofs have been adduced in the Sāmkhya Kārikā in the form of a sloka, in order to establish the existence of prakṛti.

अदानाम् परिमाणान् समन्वयात् कार्योत् प्रवृत्त इव ।

कारणे कार्यं विद्यायादविद्यायाद ईश्वरकृतम् ॥

(1) *Bhedānām Parīmanāt*—All the objects of the world are limited, dependent, relative and have an end. Hence the cause which creates them should be unlimited, independent, absolute and unending prakṛti.

(2) *Bhedānām Samānvanāt*—The objects of the world possess some common qualities in spite of being different and due to this homogeneity they arouse pleasure, pain or attachment. Hence, there should be a general cause which can tie them in a common string, being possessed of all three qualities and being the sole

cause in which all the objects of the world originate, and which can synthesize, or which is possessed of one uniform nature.

(3) *Kāryataḥ pravṛtiteśca*—All effects arise out of cause in which they were present in unmanifest form. Evolution means the manifestation of that which is concealed. The energy which causes evolution in the universe should be inherent in the cause of the universe. This cause is prakṛti.

(4) *Kāraṇa kārya vibhāgāt*—Cause and effect are distinct from each other. The elements or objects are distinguished on the basis of cause and effect, e.g., mahat is the cause and ahamkāra is its effect. Effect is the manifest cause and cause is the unexpressed effect. Every cause has its effect. Thus the universe must also have a cause in which the entire universe lies unmanifest. This is the unmanifest or prakṛti.

(5) *Avibhāgāt Vaiśvarūpasya*—Sāṃkhya has accepted an identity between cause and effect. When it goes from the present to the past, the effect loses its identity in the cause. In the process every effect proceeds backward and is dissolved in its cause. In this way, in order that complete identity or homogeneity should be apparent in the universe, the mahat should also be dissolved in its cause. Hence, the unmanifest is that in which all the effects dissolve and the universe appears undifferentiated.

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAKṚTI

Iswara Krishna greets prakṛti by saying that we adore prakṛti which is unborn, red, white and black, the mother of all, the benefactor or nourisher of all, and that which assumes the entire multitude. According to Vyās, prakṛti is that which both is and is not, which does not have existence, in which there is no non-existence, which is unmanifest, partless and pradhāna.

Prakṛti is not so much existence as it is energy. We are not acquainted with prakṛti and the real nature of its qualities since our knowledge is limited only to the objective existence of the universe. It has neither touch nor sound. From the practical viewpoint it is no more than a name. But nevertheless, the fact of its existence is the absolute truth and is known by inference on the basis of objects of the universe.

(1) *Crūticitṛim*—Sāṃkhya has described prakṛti as independent and absolute but it does not appear to be so from the account given of it in the Sāṃkhya philosophy. It has three qualities and

hence the self, which does not have these qualities, is distinct from it. Prakṛti is dependent upon the self or puruṣa. Without the influence of the puruṣa prakṛti cannot evolve the universe, even though that influence may consist in mere proximity. It (prakṛti) creates and evolves only for the puruṣa. When the puruṣa comes to know it, for him prakṛti vanishes. In this way, it is better to rename prakṛti as ignorance or absence of knowledge. It cannot be absolute and independent.

(2) Prakṛti has been characterised as personal by Sāṃkhya, there are any number of sentences strewn about the books of Samkhya showing it to be personal. She is a dancer. She is female, she has superlative qualities, she is benevolent, she serves the puruṣa with detachment, is completely selfless. She is very delicate and withdrawing and cannot stand the stare of the puruṣa. She has the colours of the rainbow and tries to attract the puruṣa. In this way, prakṛti reflects the personality of a woman.

Q 55 Analyse the Samkhya concept of puruṣa. How does Samkhya try to establish that there are many puruṣas?

(Cal 1971 Bombay 67)

Bring out the nature of puruṣa. How are Puruṣa and prakṛti related?

(Poona M A 1968 Bombay 65)

What arguments are put forward by the Samkhya for the existence of the self (puruṣa)? Explain the nature of the puruṣa.

(Baroda 1963 Karnatak 66)

What is the nature of puruṣa according to the Samkhya? State their arguments in support of the existence of puruṣa.

(Poona 1966)

What is the nature of puruṣa according to the Samkhya? Are its arguments for the plurality of puruṣas conclusive?

(Kolhapur 1965)

Explain the nature of puruṣa according to the Samkhya and show its relationship with prakṛti.

(Agra 73)

NATURE OF PURUṢA (SELF)

After prakṛti, the other reality of the Samkhya philosophy is Puruṣa or self. Puruṣa is self, subject, the knower. It is neither the body, nor the mind (manas) neither ahaṃkāra nor intellect or buddhi. It is not the substance which has the quality of consciousness, but is itself pure consciousness. It is the basis of all knowledge and is the supreme knower. It cannot be the object of know-

ledge. It is the observer, eternally free, impartial spectator and peaceful. It is beyond the space-time continuum, change and activity. It is self enlightened and self-proved. It is all pervading, formless and eternal. Its existence cannot be doubted because in its absence, all knowledge and even doubt is not possible. He has been described as devoid of the three *guṇas*, negative, inactive, solitary witness, observer, knower and of the nature of illumination. Unlike the Vedānta, Sāmkhya does not believe the self to be of the nature of happiness (*Ānanda*). According to it, happiness and consciousness (*chaitanya*) are different. The *puruṣa* is of the nature of pure consciousness and is beyond the limit of *prakṛti*. It is inactive and is free from distortions. Its objects change but it itself never changes. It is above self-arrogance and aversion and achievement. Action, result, pleasure, pain etc., are the qualities of *prakṛti* and its distortions.

PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PURUṢA

The following arguments have been adduced in the Sāmkhya Kārika to prove the existence of *puruṣa*.

संसारं वसवर्षेणात् त्रिगुणादि विषयमोदादिष्टानात्
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावान् कैवल्यार्थं प्रयच्छते ॥

(1) *Saṅghāt Parāthavāt*—All composed objects are meant for someone else. The unconscious element cannot make use of them, hence all these substances are for *puruṣa* or self. The body, sense organs, mind, intellect are only the tools of the *puruṣa*. The three *guṇas*, *prakṛti* subtle body, all serve the purpose of the *puruṣa*. Evolution is teleological. Its purpose is to work for the *puruṣa*. It is only in order that the *puruṣa* may achieve his purpose that *prakṛti* manifests itself in the form of the universe.

(2) *Triguṇādi Viparyayāt*—All substances are composed of three *guṇas*. *Puruṣa* is the witness of these *guṇas* and is himself beyond them. The substances composed of the three *guṇas* prove the existence of the *puruṣa* who is not made of three *guṇas* and is beyond them.

(3) *Adbhutajñāt*—There should be a pure consciousness, which is beyond experience and is capable of synthesizing, to create many among all the experiences. All knowledge depends upon the knower. *Puruṣa* is the substratum of all practical knowledge. He must be present in all kinds of affirmations and negations. There can be no experience without him.

(4) *Bhoktṛbhāvat*—Unconscious prakṛti cannot make use of its own creation. A conscious element is needed to make use of them. Prakṛti is the one to be enjoyed, hence there must be someone to enjoy it. All the objects of the world create either pain or pleasure or indifference, but there must be some conscious element to experience these three feelings of pain, pleasure or indifference. Hence, there must necessarily be a puruṣa or self.

(5) *Kaivalyārtha Prayitī*—In the world there are many individuals who endeavour to gain freedom from the pains and displeasures of the world. For the desire of salvation to exist a person is needed to wish for salvation or mokṣa and to make an effort for it and attain it. For there to be any prayer there must be someone to pray. Hence it is necessary to accept the existence of puruṣas.

PLURALITY OF SELVES

In contradiction of Advaita Vedānta, and in agreement with the Jaina and the Mīmāṃsā philosophies, Sāmkhya accepts the plurality of selves. In their fundamental form these selves are the same but they are many in number. Their essence is consciousness which is the same in all souls.

PROOFS FOR PLURALITY OF SELVES

The following arguments are given to prove the pluralistic concept of selves and they are to be found in the Sāmkhya Kārikā :

अयं मरणं करुणानाम् प्रतिनिवृत्त्यापुनरुत्पत्तिरिव ।

पुनरुत्पत्तिरिव प्रतिनिवृत्तिरिव ॥

(1) *Janma marana Karanānām Pratiniyamāt*—The births, deaths and sensory activities of all individual beings are different. One is blind while another has two eyes. The difference is possible when there are more than one selves otherwise all would have died when one died, and all would have been blinded when one becomes so. But such is not the experience of every day life, hence there is a plurality of selves.

(2) *Ayugapat Prayitēcha*—All individuals are not possessed of the same tendencies. A different tendency is to be found in every different individual. In an individual one may find a positive tendency at a particular moment and a negative tendency in another person at the same moment. In this way the failure to find a concurrence of tendencies leads to the conclusion that there

are many *puruṣas*. If there were only one *puruṣa* then all beings should have been possessed with the same single tendency at one time.

(3) *Traigūḍyaviparyayat*—In all the individuals in the world, one finds different combinations of the three *guṇas*. Otherwise, every object in the world equally contains *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the three *guṇas*. But even then, one individual is *sāttvic*, another *rājasic* and yet another *tāmasic*. Those who are *sāttvic* have peace, light and pleasure. Those who are *rājasic* or have a preponderance of *rajas* have pain, disturbance and anger while the *tāmasic* are ignorant and prone to attachment. If there were only one *puruṣa*, then all would have been *sāttvic*, *rājasic* or *tāmasic*. But such does not appear to be the case. Hence, there are many selves.

CRITICISM

Sāmkhya has time and again confused between the worldly being and the unqualified witness, *puruṣa*. *Sāmkhya* has given ample evidence of the truly spiritual outlook in describing the soul as pure consciousness, the basis of knowledge, other-than three *guṇas*, witness, inactive, self-evident, invisible and absolute. But the proofs it has adduced to prove the existence of the *puruṣa* are applicable to the practical, psychological being and not to the spiritual soul. How can the spiritual self be *manas* and the recipient of experience? If the true existence of the universe as well as the eternally independent and free nature of the soul have to be postulated simultaneously, then actually, two types of *puruṣas*, the transcendental and the empirical, will have to be postulated.

Q. 56. What is the difference between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in *Samkhya* philosophy? Is the dualism of *Samkhya* logical?

(Lucknow 1957)

Why is *Samkhya* system called dualistic? Do you accept the *Samkhya* argument for a dualistic metaphysics?

(Baroda 1963)

Critically examine the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* according to *Samkhya* system.

(Bombay 1968)

For the difference between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* of the *Sāmkhya* philosophy, please see the preceding answers. This difference is clearly illustrated in the following table:

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRAKṚTI AND PURUṢA

<i>Prakṛti</i>	<i>Puruṣa</i>
(1) material	conscious
(2) object	subject

(3) of three guṇas	impartial, above the three guṇas
(4) one	many
(5) active	inactive
(6) in space and time	beyond space and time
(7) that which is experienced	that which experiences
(8) ignorance	of the nature of knowledge
(9) first cause of universe	above the universe
(10) cause of attachment	free

DUALISM OF SĀMĀHYA

Sāmkhya philosophy is dualistic. According to it prakṛti and puruṣa are of entirely contradictory natures as is also evident from the foregoing table. Prakṛti and puruṣa are completely independent and absolute. Evolution and distortion in the constituent elements takes place as soon as the puruṣa comes into close proximity with prakṛti. But the puruṣa never gets tied down or attached to the universe because he is eternally free. In this way, although Sāmkhya philosophy has made concerted efforts to establish some sort of relation between these two, it has failed to resolve their dualism.

DUALISM IS NOT ADEQUATE

By utilising the classic example of the blind and the lame Sāmkhya has tried to establish some relation between prakṛti and puruṣa simultaneously maintaining their dualism intact the while. According to Sāmkhya, just as the tree bears fruits or water flows because of the slope of surface or the pieces of iron are attached by the magnet or milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishments put forward by Sāmkhya are not logical. Not one of the examples given above suitably fits with or illustrates the relation between prakṛti and puruṣa. Samkara has remarked correctly that puruṣa being inactive and prakṛti being unconscious no third element can bring about any conjunction between them. Actually both prakṛti and puruṣa appear to be abstractions taken from the real concrete world. For purpose of intellectual consideration it is permissible to separate prakṛti and puruṣa conscious and material elements. But in doing this sight should not be lost of the fact that this division is merely for the purpose and facility of thought and in the real world there is only one absolute and eternal reality. In this way, the dualism of Sāmkhya is merely imaginary and in philosophy it cannot be accepted as the ultimate truth.

Q. 57. Write short note on—Samkhya conception of the three *gunas*.
(Cal. 1970)

According to Sāmkhya, the state of equilibrium of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* is called *prakṛti*. In this way, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are the three *gunas* in *prakṛti*. The word *guṇa* has three meanings in Sanskrit viz., quality, strand of rope, and secondary. The *gunas* of *prakṛti* are not qualities but substances. On analysis *prakṛti* is found to contain three kinds of substances. These are the three qualities, or, in the sense here used, the three constituent elements. These fundamental substances are the material elements of *prakṛti*. They are called *gunas* also because they ensnare the *puruṣa* by intertwining together like the strands of a rope. Besides, their name derives also from the fact that they are of secondary help to the *puruṣa* in his effort to achieve his end, liberation.

RELATION OF THE GUNAS

Sattva is believed to be white, *rajas* or *rajoguṇa* to be red and *tamoguṇa* or *tamas* to be black. These three *gunas* both contradict each other as well as co-operate with each other. None of them exists alone or is capable of existing alone. These three constituent elements are present in all the objects of the world in the same way in which fire and oil, though of mutually destructive or contradictory natures, help in giving light. Among them, each *guṇa* tries to suppress the other two, and in an object its nature corresponds to the *guṇa* which is the strongest of the three in that object. The other two constituent elements also continue to exist in the object but they now assume secondary importance. It is due to these three qualities that all the objects of the world are divided into desirable, undesirable and indifferent. These three constituent elements are continually changing. They cannot remain pure for a single moment because distortion is their nature.

SVARUPA AND VIRUPA TRANSFORMATION

There are two kinds of transformations that occur in the *gunas svarupa* and *virupa*. In the state of dissolution, every element is drawn into itself, away from its other counterparts, and becomes stable. It is changed into the homogeneous. In this way, *sattva* changes into *sattva*, *rajas* into *rajas* and *tamas* into *tamas*. This transformation is called *svarupa* transformation. Being each by itself, none of the *gunas* can do anything. Before creation, this state

of equilibrium exists. In the state of equilibrium, the *gunas* exist in the form of unmanifest groups in which there is no transformation, no object and none of the qualities such as sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, etc. This is the *prakṛti* of Sāmkhya. In creation, and till the stage of dissolution sets in, the *gunas* are in a state of constant flux and each tries to dominate the others. It is this flux of *gunas* that results in the formation of various objects. This kind of transformation is called *virupa* transformation and is changed into the heterogeneous. This causes creation.

Q. 58. Give an account of the Sāmkhya theory of evolution.

(Cal 1970)

Describe the evolution of the world according to Sāmkhya.


(Karnatak 1965 1968 Meerut 1972)

Explain the process of Evolution according to Sāmkhya philosophy. What is the importance of the theory of *Gunas* in this connection ?

According to the Sāmkhyas the universe evolves. This evolution takes place because of the contact between *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. The *puruṣa* individually cannot create because he is inactive, and in the same manner *prakṛti* cannot create unassisted because it is material. The contact of these two is necessary for creation to take place. The evolution of creation can take place through the activity of *Prakṛti* only when the energy of *prakṛti* is conjoined to the consciousness of the *puruṣa*. But how is this possible when they differ so much in their respective natures ? In explaining this apparent contradiction, Sāmkhya employs classic example of the blind man and the lame. The blind and the lame man can co operate with each other. The lame man can climb on the shoulders of the blind and can direct him along the correct path. In this way, both of them can reach the safe and desired spot. In much the same manner inactive *puruṣa* and unconscious *prakṛti* co operate in order to achieve the objective. This contact creates disturbance in the stability of the *gunas* and evolution starts. *Puruṣa* is needed to see, know and utilise *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* stands in need of *prakṛti* in order to experience, or to attain substances by distinguishing between himself and *prakṛti*. But how can there be any real contact of two contrary and independent

substances ? Realizing this difficulty Sāṃkhya has stated that there is no real contact between prakṛti and puruṣa but only nearness. The mere proximity of the puruṣa is enough to create disturbance and distortion in the state of equilibrium of the guṇas and to start evolution.

The constituents of the guṇas exist in a state of equilibrium even before creation. This state of equilibrium is disturbed when there is nearness of prakṛti and puruṣa. This is known as the state of guṇa kṣobha. In this, the first to change is the rajas, because it is active and dynamic by nature. Because of rajas the other guṇas are also activated. In this way, a seismic upheaval disturbs and



disrupts the stability of prakṛti. One constituent element tries to gain control over the others. The three elements are constantly

mixing and separating. This leads to the creation of many kinds of objects and beings, differing from each other because of the difference in the proportion of these three constituent elements which are to some extent found in every one of them.

सर्वत्रात्मनोऽपि सात्त्विकत्वात् प्रहृष्टिः, प्रहृष्टेऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः, प्रहृष्टोऽपि हृष्टः ।

(1) *Mahat*—The first distortion in evolution is mahat or mahān. Along with intellect, ego and mind, it is the cause of the entire creation. Mahat is the cosmic aspect of intellect, and intellect in the individuals is the psychological aspect of mahat. Mahat is both eternal and non eternal. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* has accepted past tendency in buddhi. The special function of the buddhi or intellect is decision and memory as it is the means of distinguishing between the knower and the known. It is by means of intellect that decision is given in any matter. Buddhi has its origin in the abundance of the sattva element. Its natural function is to manifest itself and other objects. With an increase in the sattva element, buddhi gains in virtue, knowledge, detachment and excellence. If the tamas element increases it is marked by such attributes as vice (adharma), ignorance (ajñāna) and attachment (āsakti). The qualities of sattva element are the proper qualities of the buddhi. Puruṣa can understand the difference that exists between himself and prakṛti, and can then contemplate or analyse his own real nature. In this way, buddhi differs from soul or ātmā. The soul is above all physical substances and qualities or guṇas. Buddhi is the basis of the actions of the jivātma or living being. When the element of sattva increases in the buddhi the image of the soul falls on it and enlightens or manifests the Buddhi. The functions of the sense organs and the mind are for the buddhi while the activity of Buddhi is for the benefit of the soul or the ātmā.

(2) *Ahaṁkāra*—Ahaṁkāra or the ego is the second product of evolution. The 'I' of the Buddhi or intellect and the pride of 'mind' is ego or ahaṁkāra. Buddhi is an intellectual concept while ahaṁkāra is practical. It is because of ahaṁkāra or ego that puruṣa looks upon himself as an active agent, desiring and striving after ends, and the possessor of properties. Ahaṁkāra is the basis of all worldly activities. The object is first perceived through the senses. The mind then reflects on these perceptions and determines their nature. Following this the attitude of 'mine' and 'for me' is attributed to these objects. Ahaṁkāra or ego is just this sense of 'I'.

DISTINCTIONS OF AHAMKĀRA

There are three distinctions of ahamkāra—

(a) *Vaikārika or sātत्वika*—In this there is preponderance of the element of sattva. In its cosmic form it gives rise to mind, the five senses and five organs of action. In its psychological form it gives rise to meritorious actions.

(b) *Bhūtādi or tamas*—In this it is the element of tamas which is dominant. In its universal form it forms the origin of the five subtle elements (tanmātras). In its psychological form it causes lethargy, indifference and disturbance.

(c) *Taijas or rajas*—In this the dominant element is rajas. In its cosmic aspect it supplies energy to both sattva and tamas to change into their products. In its psychological form it is responsible for bad activities.

This order of evolution, originating in ahamkāra, is given in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. It is accepted by Vāchaspati Miśra. But in Sāṃkhya Pravachana Bhāṣya Vijnānabhikṣu has accepted mind or manas as the only sense organ in which the sattva element is preponderant and which has its origin in the sātत्वic ahamkāra. The other ten senses are the result of the rajas ahamkāra, while the five tanmātrās or subtle elements have their origin in the tamas ahamkāra.

(3) *Mind*—The co-operation of the mind is necessary for both activity and knowledge. This is the internal organ which stimulates the other senses to attend to their respective objects. It is composite even though subtle and can be conjoined to all the senses simultaneously. The organs of perception (jñānendriyān) and the organs of action (karmendriyān) are external tools. Manas, ahamkāra and Buddhi are three internal organs. The vital processes are the functions of the internal organs. These internal organs are influenced by the external organs. Perception by the sense organs is of an indiscriminate or indeterminate nature, which is given a determinate form of the mind after it has determined the nature of the perception. The ego or ahamkāra takes command of the perception and likes or dislikes them accordingly as they are or not useful to the achievement of its purpose. And intellect decides whether these objects are to be adopted or rejected. The three internal organs along with ten external organs are called the thirteen kārana or organs. The external organs maintain

contact only with objects that are present. But the internal organs are aware of objects belonging to past, present and future.

(4) *Five senses (jñārendriyān)*—The five senses are skin, nose, eyes, ears and tongue. In fact, sense is an imperceptible energy or force which exists in the perceived part and apprehends the object. In this way then, the sense is not the eye but its power of visual perception. The senses are not perception. They are inferred from the functions that they perform. The five organs procure and produce knowledge of touch, smell, colour, sound and taste. All these are born because of the puruṣa and are the results of the ego or ahaṁkāra.

(5) *Five organs of action (kārmendriyān)*—The cause of the creation of objects and the organs of action and perception is the desire of the puruṣa to experience. The five organs of action (imperceptible powers) reside in these parts of the body—mouth, hands, feet, anus and the sex organs. They perform the following functions respectively—speech, handling, movement, excretion and reproduction.

(6) *Five subtle elements (tanmātras)*—The subtle elements of the objects are called tanmātras. There are five tanmātras in the five objects—touch, speech, colour, taste and smell. The tanmātras are very subtle and cannot be perceived. They are known by inference. But yogis or saints can perceive even them. According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, the tanmātras originate in the five physical elements, but contrary to this the Sankhya holds that it is the five elements that have their origin in the five tanmātras.

(7) *Five physical elements (mahābhūtas)*—The five physical elements originate in the five subtle elements in the following manner :

(1) Ākāśa or ether and the quality of sound originate in speech tanmātra. Sound is the quality of ether ākāśa, and it can be perceived by the ear. (2) The mixing of the sound and touch tanmātras results in the creation of air whose qualities are sound and touch. These qualities are born along with air. (3) The further mixing of the colour tanmātra with the sound and touch tanmātra creates the element of fire or agni and its qualities of sound, touch and colour. (4) The further addition of the taste tanmātra to the previous results in water. (5) And when the smell tanmātra is added to those of sound, touch, colour and taste, the element of earth comes into existence, in addition to its qualities.

smell, sound, colour, taste and touch. In this way, each new element that appears in this order possesses the qualities of the elements that have appeared before it, besides its own qualities. Accordingly, the characteristic qualities of earth, water, fire and ether are smell, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively.

FOUR KINDS OF ELEMENTS

In this way, there are four kinds of elements in the entire sequence of evolution—*prakṛti* or equilibrium, *vikṛti* or distortion or flux, *prakṛti vikṛti* and neither *prakṛti* nor *vikṛti*. *Puruṣa* is in neither *prakṛti* nor *vikṛti*. In the above mentioned twenty five elements, *prakṛti* is only *prakṛti*. *Mahat*, *ahamkāra* or ego, and the five *tanmātras* or subtle elements, together with five elements, are both *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. The other sixteen elements—five organs of perception, five organs of action, five physical elements and the mind or *manas*,—are only distortions or *vikṛti*.

TWO FORMS OF EVOLUTION

The order of evolution also has two forms - (1) psychical (*pratyayasarga* or *buddhisarga*), and (2) physical (*tanmātra sarga* or *bhautika sarga*). The first to appear are *Buddhi* or intellect, ego or *ahamkāra* and the eleven organs. In the second stage appear five subtle elements (*tanmātras*), the five gross physical elements (*mahābhūta*) and their products. The five subtle elements are imperceptible to the ordinary individuals and are hence called '*aviśeṣa*' or those devoid of perceptible peculiar qualities. In the physical elements and their products, are the qualities such as pain, pleasure and attachment, etc. Hence, they are called '*viśeṣa*' or particular. These peculiar or *viśeṣa* substances are of three kinds—(1) Gross physical elements. (2) Gross body—made up of the five elements. (3) Subtle body—is the name given to the group of *Buddhi*, ego, eleven organs and the five subtle elements. The gross body is the residence of the subtle body. The intellect, ego and the organs cannot function without physical substratum. *Vāchaspati Miśra* has accepted the existence of these two bodies, the subtle and the gross, but *Vijñānabhikṣu* has postulated a third kind of body, called the *adhiṣṭhāna śarīra*, which serves as a medium for the transfer of the subtle body from one gross body to another gross body.

PURPOSE OF EVOLUTION

The evolution of *Sāṃkhya* is not the mere combination of atoms. It is a teleological evolution. In an indirect manner every object in the world gives credence to the purpose of the soul or

Ātmā Just as an unconscious tree bears fruit or water flows because of the slope in the earth's surface or the pieces of iron are attracted towards the magnet or milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of its young, in the same manner every object unconsciously fulfils the purpose of the puruṣa be it liberation or be it experience. Prakṛti assists the puruṣa. Although puruṣa is inactive, indifferent and unqualified the benevolent prakṛti, maintaining detachment, works unceasingly towards the objective of the puruṣa. Prakṛti works for the liberation of the puruṣa. Although Sāmkhya has postulated prakṛti as the material as well the efficient cause while the puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect but instead of prakṛti it is puruṣa who should be considered the efficient and final cause of evolution. Despite their being of contradictory natures, the two co-operate like the oil, wick and flame of the lamp to manifest the purpose of the puruṣa and present it to the intellect. All organs are for the purpose of the puruṣa. The subtle body also is for the use of the puruṣa. In this way, the entire process of evolution, from mahat, the first distortion, to the physical elements the last distortion, aims at the liberation of the puruṣa. This evolution shall continue till all the puruṣas attain their liberation.

CRITICISM

(1) There is no logical basis for the order of distortions of prakṛti. Appearance of these distortions of prakṛti in the specific order named in Sāmkhya does not appear to be supported either by logical or metaphysical necessity. Realizing this fact, Vijnāna-bhikṣu said that śāstra is the only evidence in support of this order of evolution. But this implies acceptance of the fact that this order of evolution cannot be proved by argument.

(2) According to Dr Radhakṛṣṇan Sāmkhya has mixed up its spiritual or intellectual metaphysics with psychological facts. It has mixed up its own assumptions with the thoughts borrowed from the Upaniṣads. Hence the evolution of Sāmkhya is not adequate and logical.

Q 59 What significant points have you observed in the Sāmkhya theory of Evolution which distinguish it from the Darwinian theory of evolution? (Apr 1955)

In Western philosophy, the most influential and prominent theory that has been put forward in the sphere of evolutionism is that of Darwin. The Darwinian thought has made its mark upon thinking in every sphere of knowledge. In Indian philosophy, the

problem of evolution of the universe has been tackled by the Sāṃkhya system in most subtle and philosophical manner. Even though it cannot give a very successful description of cosmological evolution, being a dualistic system, yet it explains the order of progress from the subtle elements to the gross according to a psychological principle, and in this lies its achievement.

There is fairly wide difference in the Darwinian and the Sāṃkhya principles of evolution. Both these views have their own individual and distinct methods. The points that distinguish the Sāṃkhya view from the Darwinian conception of evolution are the following :—

(1) The Darwinian theory represents modern thought whereas the Sāṃkhya theory is an ancient principle of evolution.

(2) Darwinian theory is based on the researches of modern science whereas the Sāṃkhya view does not concur with science. The Sāṃkhya theory is a philosophical delineation of evolution whereas the Darwinian concept is scientific.

(3) Being materialistic, the Darwinian theory accepts merely a material substance or *puṭhā* as the ultimate element and tries to explain the universe on the basis of dynamic substance. According to the Sāṃkhya view, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are two existences or entities, *puruṣa* is inactive and conscious while *prakṛti* is active but unconscious. Evolutionary forces are set in motion by the proximity of these two entities. In this way, the Sāṃkhya view is dualistic while Darwin has supported a materialistic monism.

(4) Sāṃkhya evolution is teleological whereas according to Darwin there is no purpose behind evolution. According to Sāṃkhya there is a purpose behind the evolution of the universe. *Prakṛti* unconsciously evolves the universe for the experience of the many *puruṣas* and destroys the universe for the liberation of the *puruṣa*. But Darwin looks upon the process of evolution as a blind and mechanical process. The evolutionary process continues mechanically, proceeding from cause to effect and interminably.

(5) The Sāṃkhya theory is the theory of cosmological evolution. Darwin's view is the theory of biological evolution. The evolutionist principle of Sāṃkhya presents an analysis of the evolution of the universe, while the Darwinian theory reflects only upon the evolution of living beings.

(6) Darwin believes the various species of living beings to be mutable but the Sāṃkhya is silent in this matter.

(7) Sāṃkhya accepts the existence of many *puruṣas* or souls

and denies the existence of God. According to Darwin, the existence of neither God nor of soul is indispensable to the evolutionary process. Both the Sāmkhya philosophers and Darwin believe that mind evolves from matter but the soul has been awarded a distinct and superior existence by Sāmkhya.

(8) According to Darwin, matter is dynamic and acts in conformity with scientific laws to evolve the world. According to Sāmkhya, the evolutionary process is set in motion by the proximity of puruṣa and prakṛti, according to the principle of karma.

(9) According to Sāmkhya prakṛti evolves in order that the active agent may reap the reward of his actions. According to Darwin, the motivating force behind the process of evolution is the struggle for survival. In Sāmkhya philosophy, chance variation finds no place. Being a mechanical principle, the Darwinian theory of evolution does credit chance variations.

The differences between the evolutionist principles of Sāmkhya and Darwin can be better understood from the following table —

Darwin's view	Sāmkhya view
(1) Explains biological evolution	(1) Explains cosmological evolution
(2) Evolution starts when matter becomes active	(2) Process of evolution is set in motion by nearness of prakṛti and puruṣa
(3) Evolution is mechanical	(3) Evolution is teleological
(4) Motive behind evolution is struggle for survival	(4) Past actions are the inspiration behind evolution
(5) Both mind and soul are believed to originate in matter	(5) Accepts the spiritual form of soul distinct from the mind
(6) Atomistic	(6) Not atomistic
(7) Scientific	(7) Philosophical
(8) Proponent of materialistic monism	(8) Dualistic
(9) Modern	(9) Ancient

Q. 60. What is the Sāmkhya doctrine of liberation? How far do you consider it to be philosophically acceptable?

(Dombay 1964, Karnatak 1973, Meerut 1971)

THREE KINDS OF SUFFERING

According to Sāmkhya, life in this world is full of suffering. There are generally three kinds of suffering—(1) *Ārādhya-sukha*—It is

due to physical or mental causes, the intra-organic causes. It includes all kinds of bodily and mental discomforts. Disease, anger, and hunger etc., are *ādhyātmika* sufferings. (2) *Ādhibhautika*—These sufferings are induced by natural causes such as man, animals, birds, insects, etc. They are caused by external physical objects and are extra-organic. (3) *Ādhidivika*—These proceed from external but extraordinary senses such as stars, elements, ghosts, witches etc. Where there is *guṇa* there is suffering. Sufferings have their end in liberation. Even the life of heaven is controlled by the *guṇas*. The aim of man is to be rid of these three kinds of sufferings. Liberation or *mokṣa* means freedom from pain without any possibility of return to this state. This is *apavarga* or *puruṣārtha* or the summum bonum.

MEANS TO LIBERATION

The one method of obtaining liberation from suffering is knowledge of metaphysics. Ignorance is the cause of suffering. Ignorance means the failure to recognise one's own real nature. Not knowing the real nature of the soul, the living being identifies itself with the mind, or the ego and intellect, and is affected by their pleasure and suffering, and itself suffers. When the *jīva* recognises or realizes its real nature, *puruṣa* or *ātman*, it then ceases to be influenced by the sufferings of the ego, intellect or the mind. In this way, liberation can be attained only by realizing the difference between *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*.

NATURE OF PURUṢA

In the *Sāṃkhya* philosophy, *puruṣa* is free, of the nature of consciousness and inactive. It is beyond space and time, merit and demerit, attachment and liberation. It is reflected in the intellect. The *jīva* is deprived of its liberation only because it takes the image of intellect or the ego to be its real nature. All actions, pleasure and suffering, change and feeling, etc., are the distortions of the body. The soul is beyond all bodily and mental sufferings. It is not touched by the three kinds of suffering. *Puruṣa* is never bound it is only the ego that is bound. The *jīva* or living being achieves his liberation when he realizes his true nature. In its actual form, in the nature of soul or *puruṣa*, he is eternally free and liberated. In this way, being chained means ignorance of the difference between soul and not-soul, while liberation means realization of this difference. Action cannot lead to liberation. Good, bad or indifferent actions are all due to *guṇas* or the three constituent elements, and they create attachment. Good actions lead to heaven

while bad actions result in the agent going to hell. But just like worldly life, heaven and hell are also full of suffering. Only knowledge can procure liberation for the *jīva* because restriction or bondage is due to ignorance and can be removed only by knowledge. This knowledge is had by distinguishing between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Actions and their consequences, virtue and vice, pleasure and suffering are all in that which is the non-self. Constant reflection upon the knowledge that 'I am not the self', 'nothing is mine', and 'ego is untrue', purifies it and makes it absolute, divests it of its distortions and leads to liberation.

JIVANMUKTI AND VIDHAMUKTI

Sāmkhya philosophy has accepted both *jīvanmukti* as well as *videhamukti*. The *jīva* attains freedom the moment he realises the truth even though he may have to continue to live in the body for a short period because of actions accumulated in the past. Just as the wheel continues to revolve for some time even after the potter has ceased moving it, due to its prior motion, in much the same way, the body of the *jīva* continues to exist for some time longer after the attainment of liberation because of the past actions of the body, but the liberated *puruṣa* does not experience any relation with the body even though residing in it. Thus, no new actions are accumulated and they begin to lose their power. But final and complete liberation is attainable only after death, and in this there is no relation even with the body. This is *videhamukti*. In this state, complete liberation or *kaivalya* is attained after freedom from all kinds of bodies, subtle and gross, has been obtained. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, *videhamukti* is the only kind of liberation because as long as the body detains the soul, the latter is not entirely free from mental and physical distortions. According to the Vedānta, liberation or *mokṣa* is a state of happiness. According to the Sāmkhya both pain or suffering and pleasure are relative and inseparable. Hence, there is no happiness in the state of liberation. It is above both pleasure and suffering. It is beyond all qualities.

LIBERATION AND BONDAGE HAVE ONLY PRACTICAL REALITY

According to Sāmkhya philosophy both liberation and bondage are only practical. The *puruṣa* is not bound. Only the ego is bound and it is the ego that is liberated. *Puruṣa* is beyond both liberation and bondage. If the *puruṣa* did actually become bound it could not have freed itself even in a hundred lives because real bondage cannot be destroyed. It is *prakṛti* that is eventually

due to physical or mental causes, the intra-organic causes. It includes all kinds of bodily and mental discomforts. Disease, anger, and hunger etc., are *ādhyātmika* sufferings. (2) *Ādibhautika*—These sufferings are induced by natural causes such as man, animals, birds, insects, etc. They are caused by external physical objects and are extra-organic. (3) *Ādhidevika*—These proceed from external but extraordinary senses such as stars, elements, ghosts, witches etc. Where there is *guṇa* there is suffering. Sufferings have their end in liberation. Even the life of heaven is controlled by the *guṇas*. The aim of man is to be rid of these three kinds of sufferings. Liberation or *mokṣa* means freedom from pain without any possibility of return to this state. This is *apavarga* or *puruṣārtha* or the summum bonum.

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while bad actions result in the agent going to hell. But just like worldly life, heaven and hell are also full of suffering. Only knowledge can procure liberation for the *jīva* because restriction or bondage is due to ignorance and can be removed only by knowledge. This knowledge is had by distinguishing between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Actions and their consequences—virtue and vice, pleasure and suffering—are all in that which is the non-self. Constant reflection upon the knowledge that 'I am not the self', 'nothing is mine', and 'ego is untrue', purifies it and makes it absolute, divests it of its distortions and leads to liberation.

JIVANMUKTI AND VIDHAMUKTI

Sāmkhya philosophy has accepted both *jivanmukti* as well as *videhamukti*. The *jīva* attains freedom the moment he realises the truth even though he may have to continue to live in the body for a short period because of actions accumulated in the past. Just as the wheel continues to revolve for some time even after the potter has ceased moving it due to its prior motion, in much the same way, the body of the *jīva* continues to exist for some time longer after the attainment of liberation because of the past actions of the body, but the liberated *puruṣa* does not experience any relation with the body even though residing in it. Thus, no new actions are accumulated and they begin to lose their power. But final and complete liberation is attainable only after death, and in this there is no relation even with the body. This is *videhamukti*. In this state, complete liberation or *kaivalya* is attained after freedom from all kinds of bodies, subtle and gross, has been obtained. According to *Vijñānabhikṣu*, *videhamukti* is the only kind of liberation because as long as the body detains the soul the latter is not entirely free from mental and physical distortions. According to the Vedānta, liberation or *mokṣa* is a state of happiness. According to the Sāmkhya both pain or suffering and pleasure are relative and inseparable. Hence, there is no happiness in the state of liberation. It is above both pleasure and suffering. It is beyond all qualities.

LIBERATION AND BONDAGE HAVE ONLY PRACTICAL REALITY

According to Sāmkhya philosophy both liberation and bondage are only practical. The *puruṣa* is not bound. Only the ego is bound and it is the ego that is liberated. *Puruṣa* is beyond both liberation and bondage. If the *puruṣa* did actually become bound it could not have freed itself even in a hundred lives because real bondage cannot be destroyed. It is *prakṛti* that is eventually

liberated. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa has said that in actual fact, puruṣa is neither bound, nor liberated nor is he reborn. Bondage, liberation and rebirth are the attributes of only prakṛti. Prakṛti binds itself in its own seven forms, there is nothing more subtle or superior to prakṛti. It is so delicate that once the puruṣa sees her in her real form she does not confront him a second time.

CRITICISM

The following are some objections raised against the Sāṃkhya concept of liberation :—

(1) If the puruṣa is agent as well as the one who experiences then how is he free by nature ? And, if the evolution of prakṛti takes place in order to achieve its liberation, then how is he eternally free ?

(2) According to Sāṃkhya there is no happiness in liberation. Here they are guilty of having confused between happiness and pleasure.

(3) According to Praśastapāda, how can prakṛti come to know that the puruṣa has recognised her ? If prakṛti is by nature dynamic then how will she remain inactive in a state of liberation ? If there can be no destruction of an object, then how can ignorance be destroyed ?

Actually, the Sāṃkhya concept of mokṣa or liberation fits better into the background of Advaita Vedānta than that of Sāṃkhya.

Q. 61. Explain fully the nature of Prakṛti and Puruṣa according to Sāṃkhya and the relation between the two. (*Karnatak 1935*)

State and discuss the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti according to Sāṃkhya. (*E. m' s, 1950; Patna 1960, Gujarat 1959*)

For a delineation of the nature of Prakṛti and Puruṣa according to Sāṃkhya, and the relation between the two, please refer to answers to preceding questions.

CRITICISM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN PRAKṚTI AND PURUṢA

The following objections have been levelled at the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa as conceived by Sāṃkhya :—

(1) The purpose behind the relation between prakṛti and puruṣa is inadequate. If this purpose is liberation then there should be no creation after dissolution. If the purpose is experience then there should be no dissolution. For both liberation and experience to be the purpose simultaneously is contradictory. And if neither of the two is the purpose, then what is the purpose ?

(2) Not a single example adduced by Sāmkhya philosophy clearly depicts the nature of the relation between prakṛti and puruṣa. The example of the lame and the blind is inappropriate because in that case both the lame and the blind are conscious. The example of iron and magnet is also wrong because if prakṛti is attached to the puruṣa by the mere fact of their nearness, then dissolution can never take place and so will liberation be impossible because who will separate prakṛti from the puruṣa? The state of equilibrium of prakṛti will also not be attained.

In this way, in Sāmkhya philosophy, neither is the relation between prakṛti and puruṣa clarified and nor does there appear to be any cause of this relation. Actually, any relation between the two can be established only when the two are regarded as two forms of one ultimate element. The dualism of Sāmkhya can be appropriate only in a monistic background.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF YOGA

Q. 62. "The Yoga system is the natural complement of practical discipline to achieve the Sāmkhya ideal of Kaivalya." Comment.
(*Bombay 1959 ; Karnatak. 1965 ; Meerut 1971*)

Yoga is the practical path of realisation of the theoretical ideals of Sāmkhya philosophy. Both Sāmkhya and Yoga philosophies maintain that liberation can be attained only by knowledge. But the attainment of this knowledge requires suppression of the physical and mental modifications and gradual control over body, senses, mind, intellect and ego, so that the pure self may be realised. The realisation of the pure self requires the cognition that the self is beyond the body, mind, sense, intellect and ego etc. It is beyond space and time, liberated, eternal and beyond sins, disease, miseries and death. The realisation of this truth is the self-realisation. The Sāmkhya philosophy emphasizes the attainment of knowledge by means of study, concentration and meditation. The Yoga presents a practical path for the realisation of the self. It tells us the way by following which the self can be realised.

Yoga admits all the three pramāṇas accepted for Sāmkhya philosophy i.e., perception, inference and scripture etc. The 25 elements of the Sāmkhya philosophy have also been admitted in Yoga in which one more i.e., God has been added to it. Thus in their essential metaphysical foundations, both Yoga and Sāmkhya are the same. The Sūdhant of Yoga is necessary for the study of Sāmkhya philosophy. Hence, it is rightly said, "The Yoga system is the natural complement of practical discipline to achieve the Sāmkhya ideal of Kaivalya."

Q. 63. Give an account of Yoga Psychology. (*Karnatak 1969*)

Bring out the nature of the various levels of mental life as expounded by Yoga Philosophy. (*Raj. 1955*)

Write a short note on-Five Kinds of mental modifications.

(*Ajra 1959*)

The path of Yoga is based on sound psychological foundations. Hence to appreciate this path the psychology of Yoga must

first be understood. The most important element in the psychology of Yoga is Chitta. Chitta is the first modification of prakṛti in which there is the predominance of Sattva over Rajas and Tamas Gunas. It is material by nature, but due to closest contact with the self it is enlightened by its light. It assumes the form of anything in whose contact it comes. Due to the modification of the Chitta according to objects the self knows these objects. According to Yoga Sūtra, though there is no modification in the self, but due to the reflection of the changing Chitta Vṛttis, there is an appearance of change in it, just as the moon reflecting in the river seems to be moving. So as knowledge is not attained, the soul sees itself in these modifications of the Chitta and gets rid of attachment and aversion in the worldly pleasures and sufferings. This attachment and aversion is the bondage. The only way to get rid of this bondage is the control of the modifications of the Chitta. This control is the result of Yoga. In the words of Patanjali "Yoga is the cessation of the modifications of Chitta."

STAGES OF CHITTA

The chitta has five stages which are known as Chitta Bhumi. These five stages are follows —

(1) *Akṣipta*—This is the stage in which the Chitta is very much disturbed and remains running after the worldly objects, just as the Chitta of the demons or those intoxicated by the possession of superfluous money.

(2) *Mudha*—When there is the preponderance of the tamas just as when one is overpowered by sleep, the stage of the Chitta is known as *Mudha* e.g. the Chitta of the demons or of the intoxicated persons.

(3) *Vikṣipta*—This is the stage in which in spite of preponderance of the sattva guṇa, the Chitta is oscillating between the tendencies of successes and failures created by the rajas guṇas. The chitta of the gods and that of the beginners in yoga is of this sort. This differs from the *kṣipta* stage because due to the preponderance of sattva sometimes there is temporary ceasing of the modification of chitta in this stage.

(4) *Ekāgra*—The stage of the chitta when it is fixed on some one subject due to the preponderance of the Sattva is known as the *ekāgra* stage, just as the flame of the burning lamp remains always pointing to one side and does not flicker hither and thither.

(5) *Niruddha*—When only the samskaras remain in chitta after

the cessation of the modification, this stage is known as niruddha stage. It is this stage which is known as Yoga.

Of the above mentioned five stages, the first three are harmful in yoga and can be removed by practice. The last three stages are useful in yoga.

FORMS OF CHITTA

Because the chitta is of the nature of three gunas, it always remains changing due to the preponderance. With this preponderance three main forms of chitta can be noticed which are as under :—

(1) *Prakhyā*—In this stage the chitta is predominated by sattva guṇa and the tamas remains in subordination. In this form the chitta aspires for different powers of yoga e.g., Animā etc.

(2) *Pravṛtti*—When the tamas guṇa becomes weak, and the chitta is predominated by the rajas, it appears as enlightened and full of dharma, knowledge, renunciation etc.

(3) *Sthiti*—As the rajas is subordinated, the chitta, predominated by the sattva element, gets established in its own form and attains the discriminating reason. This form of the chitta is known as sthiti.

MODIFICATION OF CHITTA

As has been already pointed out, the chitta, in spite of being material, seems to be like living due to the reflection of the self in it. It is these changes in the chitta which are known as its vṛttis or modifications. These modifications are due to ignorance and their result is the bondage. These modifications are of five types which are as follows :—

(1) *Pramāṇa*—Like Sāṃkhya philosophy, Yoga has also accepted the three testimonies of perception, inference and scripture. By being outside through the sensation the chitta attains the form of object, this is known as pramāṇa. The inference and śabda pramāṇa in Yoga philosophy are the same as that in Sāṃkhya.

(2) *Viparyaya*—The false knowledge of anything is known as viparyaya. Vāchaspati Miśra has included doubt (Samśyā) also in viparyaya.

(3) *Vikalpa*—This is the knowledge in which the object which is known does not exist e.g., in the knowledge that consciousness is the form of the puruṣa, a distinction is made between the consciousness and the puruṣa which precisely does not exist. The conception of the two as distinct is vilalpa.

What is samadhi ? What are its various levels ? Discuss fully after yoga. (Col. 1971)

"Yoga is chitravatti nirodha." Explain. (Poona M. A. 1958)

What is Samadhi according to Patanjali ? How can it be attained ? (Poona 1966 ; Meerut 1971)

What is the purpose of the Yoga of Patanjali ? How is it achieved ? (Karnatak 1955)

To get rid of the kletas, the chitta must be controlled and concentrated. The Yoga philosophy has prescribed the following eight sādhanas for this purpose.

(1) *Yama*—Yama is the control of the body, speech and mind. The Yamas are five which are as follows :

(a) *Non-violence (Ahimsā)*—Ahimsā is the absolute absence of any form of injury to any living being.

(b) *Truth (Satya)*—Truth is to be exact in mind and speech i.e., to speak things as they are and to remember exactly as seen, heard or imagined.

(c) *Non-stealing (Asteya)*—Asteya includes both not taking or stealing another's property and not to have even a desire for it.

(d) *Celibacy (Brahmacharya)*—Brahmacharya is the control of attachment in the enjoyment of the senses, specially those of sex.

(e) *Non-possessiveness (Aparigraha)*—Aparigraha requires not to accept any unnecessary thing or collect it.

All the above mentioned yamas are necessary for the concentration of the chitta.

(2) *Niyama*—Another important step in Yoga is Niyama or following the rules of good conduct. These Niyamas are five which are as follows :

(a) *Cleanliness (Saucha)*—Saucha includes external cleaning through bath and pure diet etc., as well as internal cleaning through sympathy, friendliness, happiness and detachment.

(b) *Contentment (Santosha)*—Santosha means satisfaction in whatever is attained by sufficient and suitable efforts.

(c) *Patience (Tapas)*—Tapas includes the practice of tolerance of the cold and heat. It requires various types of hard practices.

(d) *Reading of religious scriptures (Svādhyāya)*—Reading of religious scriptures is very much useful in the spiritual advancement. Hence it is a necessary principle of good conduct in yoga.

(e) *Īśvara Pranidhāna*—The fifth niyama in yoga is to remember God and to surrender oneself to Him. This helps the aspirant in the practice of yoga.

(3) *Āsana*—The third step in the advancement of yoga is Āsana or posture. Āsana helps in the concentration of chitta and the control of the mind. Yoga has prescribed various types of posture e.g., Padma, Veera, Bhadra, Śeerṣa, Garuda, Mayūra etc.

These postures are very much helpful in the control of mind as well as of vital elements in the body. They also help in removing the sufferings due to cold and heat. As a matter of fact, posture is the control of the body. It also keeps the body free from disease and makes it strong. By it one can control the different external as well as internal organs in the body. Thus yoga philosophers had the valuable insight that the mental control requires discipline of the body as well.

(4) *Prāṇāyāma*—The fourth state in the practice of the yoga is prāṇāyāma or the control of the breath. This pre-supposes the control of the body through postures. By prāṇāyāma the aspirant controls the inhaling and exhaling of the breath which helps in the concentration of chitta. There are three main steps in prāṇāyāma.

(a) *Pūraka (Inhaling)*—The first step in the prāṇāyāma is to take in as much air as possible.

(b) *Kumbhaka (retaining of the breath)*—After the maximum amount of air is taken, the second stage in prāṇāyāma is to retain it for half of the time taken in inhaling.

(c) *Rechaka (Exhaling)*—The third stage in prāṇāyāma is to gradually exhale this air in almost the same time as taken in inhaling.

The time taken in all these three stages of prāṇāyāma is gradually increased so that in due course the aspirant can control the breath, thus helping in the concentration of the chitta.

(5) *Pratyāhāra*—The fifth stage in the path of yoga is Pratyāhāra. The introversion of the different sense organs by restraining them from their objects is known as pratyāhāra. By practice in this the mind of the aspirant is not disturbed by a worldly object even while he lives in the world. This requires very strong determination and repression of the senses.

The above mentioned five stages are known as external means. The remaining three stages are known as internal means. As a matter of fact the first five are merely preparatory to the later three which are directly concerned with yoga.

(6) *Dhāraṇā*—The sixth stage in the path of yoga is *Dhāraṇā*. *Dhāraṇā* is the concentration of the *chitta* on some object. This object can be external like the image of some God etc. It can also be internal as the part in between the eyebrows, the lotus of the heart. This the beginning in the stage of *saṁādhi*.

(7) *Dhyāna*—The seventh stage in the process of Yoga is *dhyāna*. When the knowledge of a certain object of concentration is continued in a process, it is known as *dhyāna*. This requires continuous meditation on the object of concentration. By it one has clear knowledge of the object. In *Dhyāna*, in the beginning the aspirant knows only the different parts or forms of the object and gradually he realises the whole of it. Thus by *Dhyāna* the aspirant has the real knowledge of the object.

(8) *Samādhi*—The last and the most important stage in yoga is *saṁādhi*. This is the culmination and the goal to which all other above mentioned seven stages are preparatory steps. When the process of concentration and the object become one and identical, negating the difference between the subject and object, this stage of absolute identity is known as *saṁādhi*. In this stage there is no separate cognition of the subject or the process of concentration and the *chitta* attains the form of the object. Thus in this stage the subject and the object as well as the process of concentration become one.

Samādhi or the cessation of the modifications of *chitta* has been conceived of two types :

(1) *Sampramāṇa* or *subhoga* (*attitude*) *Samādhi*—In this form of *saṁādhi*, some type of substratum of concentration remains and the aspirant has awareness of this substratum. This stage is reached when *chitta* is concentrated on some object. Due to this concentration, the same modification arises in the *chitta* and other modifications are annihilated. Due to concentration on one object there is a kind of *Prāṇa* which destroys other modifications. This leads to destruction of *Kleśas*, the loosening of the bond of *Karma* and enlightenment of the real knowledge. This is the stage necessary to the attainment of yoga. This form of *saṁādhi* is further subdivided into four types :

(a) *Samatā* (*Samatā*)—In this type the *chitta* becomes identical with the object and its form is the same as the form of the object. In this stage there is the awareness of some one object. Hence it is known as *Samatā*.

(b) *Savilekhya Samādhi*—In this type of Samādhi the chitta is identified with some subtle object, and assumes its form.

(c) *Sānanda Samādhi*—When the chitta is concentrated on some sātत्वika subtle object it increases sattva-guṇa which results in the attainment of bliss.

(d) *Sūsmiṭā Samādhi*—In this type the Asmitā itself becomes the object of concentration. Asmitā is the intellect reflecting in the chitta. It is subtler than the senses on which the chitta is concentrated in sānanda samādhi. The senses are born out of asmitā. Thus this type of samādhi is higher than the above mentioned three.

(2) *Asamprajñāta or Nirbeeja (Attributeless) Samādhi*—This is the highest form of samādhi in which the distinction between the knower, knowledge and known, disappears. In it there are no kleśas or attributes. Hence, it is known as nirbeeja or attributeless samādhi. This form of samādhi is also divided into two subtypes, which are as under:—

(a) *Bhava Pratyaya Samādhi*—Samādhi is disturbed due to ignorance. Bhava means ignorance. Ignorance means seeing of the self as not-self. In this form of samādhi only the saṃskāras of the passions remain. Thus the ignorance is not absolutely destroyed at this stage due to which even after the attainment of this stage the beings have to return to the world again.

(b) *Upaya Pratyaya*—In this type of samādhi the ignorance is absolutely destroyed due to arousal of prajñā. In it all the kleśas are annihilated and the chitta becomes established in true knowledge. This is the samādhi of the Yogis. It breeds the pleasure of the chitta concentration, knowledge etc.

FIGHT SIDDHIS

According to Yoga philosophy, the Yogis attain various siddhis by the practice of the path of Yoga. These powers are mainly of eight types and hence called Aṣṭa Siddhi or Aṣṭa Aśīrva.

(1) *Animā*—This is the power to become small like atom and so to disappear.

(2) *Laghimā*—This is the power to become light like cotton and so to fly away.

(3) *Mahimā*—This is the power to become big like mountains.

(4) *Prāpti*—This is the power to secure whatever is desired.

(5) *Prākūnya*—This is the power by which all the impediments in the will power are removed.

(6) *Vashitra*—This is the power by which all the living beings can be conquered.

(7) *Eshitra*—This is the power by which one attains absolute mastery on all the physical objects.

(8) *Yatraśānti, ārayitva*—This is the power by which all the desires are fulfilled.

The above mentioned eight siddhis can be used according to the wish of the yogi. But in the Yoga philosophy the pursuance of the path of the yoga for the attainment of these powers has been vehemently decried because that results in misleading the aspirant from the path of yoga. The ultimate end of the yoga is not the attainment of these powers, but the realisation of *Moksha*.

Q. 65. What is the place and nature of God in Yoga philosophy? What are the proofs of His existence adduced in this philosophy?

(*Ishta* 196, *Prāpti* 187, *Moksha* 164; *Esopar* 179,

Ishta 193, 195, *Akṣara* 124)

In what sense is Yoga seshara (Theist) Samkhya? Explain the Yoga arguments for the existence of God. (*Ishta* 184)

According to Vijñāna Bhāṣya, "The Yoga in order to avoid the difficulties of meeting the imputation of a partial or a cruel God has accepted *prāpti* in all its winding and unwinding." It was not only one of the many objects on which Yogis can concentrate their mind. The only purpose of *Isvara* is to do good to his devotees. Thus God in Yoga has only practical importance. The meditation on God's presence helps in the concentration of the Chitta. According to Patanjali, *Isvara* pranāyāma helps in the attainment of *Samādhi*. There is the old Yoga philosophy not much importance has been attached to God. Patanjali himself did not consider God's existence to solve the problems of the world. Prof. Max M. Butler has pointed out, "I do not consider, however, that Patanjali or Mithila was in the least inclined to abstract of Yoga the representation of the belief in one Supreme, the first and final attainment of Brahman's philosophy." But the latter Yoga seshara samskara, the existence of God from the time to time, is a part of the Yoga philosophy. There are marks for the existence of God in the Yoga philosophy.

The Yoga philosophy states that God is a part of the universe. In the Yoga philosophy, "God is a part of the universe, a part of the nature

kleśas of Avidyā, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveṣa, Abhiniveśa etc." The Jīva has to bear the fruits of his karmas and enjoys and suffers in the world. The God is free from all this. He is different even from the kevalī *i.e.*, the liberated man. The kevalī is liberated from the bondage, but God was neither in bondage nor ever will be. Hence he is different from kevalī. The liberated persons like Kapila etc., were first in the bondage and then liberated. The God, on the other hand, was never in bondage. Hence he is different from the Mukta Puruṣas also. The God is different from the Mukta Puruṣa, because such a Puruṣa, in spite of being liberated has the possibility of getting into bondage in future. The God is called Īśvara because of his powers of knowledge, desire and activity. He is omniscient and the substratum of all things. He has eternal knowledge and eternal bliss. He is transcendent and greater than everything else. There is no one equal or better to Him in virtues. As a matter of fact God is the name for Him who excels in all virtues. These virtues have been defined by the scriptures. God possesses all these virtues since eternity. He has always been Īśvara. He was always liberated. He is the teacher of the teachers like Kapila etc. Thus he is a particular person. Hence Patanjali has not considered God as different from the twentyfive elements of Sāṃkhya. The only purpose of God is to have compassion towards the living beings. He does nothing for his own sake but only for the sake of the world. He has resolved to help the worldly beings in creation and destruction, through the preaching of dharma and knowledge.

The Yoga philosophers have advanced the following arguments to prove God —

(1) The existence of God is proved by the scriptures. The scriptures including Vedas and Upaniṣads etc. have described God as the ultimate existence and the summum bonum of life.

(2) Existence must have a lowest and highest limit. Just as with regard to the quantity there is the smallest and the biggest similarly knowledge and power etc. must also have their highest limits, *i.e.*, there should be persons possessing the greatest knowledge and maximum power. Thus ultimate Puruṣa is Īśvara. Had there been another person equal to him in knowledge and power, the system of the world should be destroyed by their conflict. Hence God is unique.

(3) The union and disunion of Prakṛti and Puruṣa lead to creation and destruction respectively but because they are very

much different in nature, the union and disunion is not possible spontaneously. Hence there must be an efficient cause, responsible for the union. This efficient cause is God. Without the direction from God, the Prakṛti cannot evolve a world which is favourable for the self-evolution of the living beings.

According to Patanjali, Īśwarapranidhāna is also a means to attain samādhi. But the later Yoga philosophers considered it to be the best means, because God is not merely an object of concentration, but also the great Lord who removes the impediments from the path of aspirants and thus makes the path of Yoga easy. A true devotee of God and one who always depends on him, remains meditating on him and see him pervading the whole universe. Such a devotee gets the purity of the heart and the light of the intellect and other excellencies from the God. 'Pranava' is a synonym for God. The repetition and meditation of its meaning help in the concentration. By meditating on God with one pointed mind, the intellect is purified and all the impediments are destroyed. The aspirant realises his self through Īśwarapranidhāna.

The stage which the Indian philosophers entered through Yoga has been recognised as spiritual by many in East and West in ancient and modern times. Some of the modern psychologists, however, have compared Yoga with mysticism, auto-suggestion, and psychopathic states. Such a comparison only shows ignorance regarding the actual state of Yoga. Yoga is a practical affair and it is useless and unreasonable to say anything regarding it without practising it under the guidance of some able teacher. Every science has its own methods peculiar to it, its own experts and its own norms regarding the training to enter it. Yoga is a science like other sciences and hence has its own methods, expert and norms of training etc. Any criticism without following these is at best a partial judgment.

According to Prof. Gorge, all the verses of Patanjali Sutra concerning God are unrelated with the rest and even against its fundamental principles. Dr. B. K. V. Das has also supported this view. The God of Yoga is not the common human of life. He is not the creator or sustainer of the world, but only a particular power. Devotion of God is only one of the many means to reach the ultimate end. Vedānta Bhāṣya is also admitted God as *brahma*. In Yoga Atman is not related to God. It is admitted that Patanjali has not mentioned the presence of God in his Yoga. When God is

conceived as a particular Puruṣa the idea of union with Him is difficult to understand

As a matter of fact neither Sāṃkhya nor Yoga have given much importance to God nor do they conflict on this issue As it has been pointed out earlier, Yoga does not give much importance to God The Sāṃkhya on the other hand does not condemn God The two representative scriptures of Sāṃkhya Tattva Samasa and Sāṃkhya Kārikā have not even discussed the difficulties in the acceptance of God But some latter Sāṃkhya philosophers have condemned God on this very issue As Prof Max Muller has rightly pointed out ' This system is then without a creator or personal maker of the world but if we call it therefore as atheistic we should have applied the same name to Newton's system of the world and Darwin's theory of evolution though we know that both Newton and Darwin were thoroughly religious men ' Besides Kapila has also expressed faith in Vedas Hence in spite of the secondary importance of God in Sāṃkhya it cannot be called atheistic The later Sāṃkhya is however atheist Similarly, the early Yoga philosopher has given only a pragmatic place to God while later Yoga philosophers have developed arguments in support of His existence Thus in the early form of Sāṃkhya and Yoga there is not much antagonism on the question of God but on the latter form there has been enough discussion on this subject

MIMAMSA PHILOSOPHY

Q. 66. Give a brief account of the Pramanas accepted by the Purva mimamsa. *(Kerala 1963)*

Give a short account of the nature and functions of Arthapatti and Upamana and Pramana in the Mimamsa system. *(Kerala 1964)*

Explain Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi as sources of knowledge in the Mimamsa. *(Baroda 1969)*

Critically examine the mimamsa doctrine of Sabda Pramana. *(Gorakhpur 1973; Baroda 1973; Madras 1964; Bombay 1964)*

Why was Purva Mimamsa required to discuss philosophical problems? *(Lucknow 1963)*

State the Mimamsa argument for the eternal validity of the Vedas. *(Madras 1969)*

Explain the term Purva Mimamsa. Do you consider Mimamsa to be a philosophical system? *(Kerala 1966)*

WHAT IS VALID KNOWLEDGE

According to Kumarila Bhatta, valid knowledge is that which provides the experience of an unknown object, that which is not contradicted by other knowledge and which is free from other defects. The root 'pramāṇ' denotes rest or actual experience. It constitutes the knowing of an unknown element. Thus, valid knowledge is that which provides knowledge of the meaning of an unknown element.

DISTINCTIONS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE

It is not a distinctive of valid knowledge non-conceptual and perceptual. In non-conceptual knowledge there are five sources of valid knowledge—perception, comparison, testimony, non-assertion and counter-assertion. Of these the first, that is, non-conceptual knowledge has been accepted only by Kumarila Bhatta and his followers. As regards inference there is no difference between Mimamsa and the Nyaya system.

(1) *Perceptual knowledge*—The view of the Mīmāṃsā is that immediate knowledge is perception. There are two distinctions of perception—savikalpa or determinate and nirvikalpa or indeterminate perception. In the Bhāṭṭa view similar to the conception of Nyāya it is postulated that indeterminate perception precedes determinate perception. Perceptual knowledge results when there is actual contact between the object and the sense organs, preceding which conjunction there is only an awareness of the object in which knowledge is limited to knowing that 'it is'. As to what it is there is as yet no knowledge. For this reason it is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa jñāna. In the second stage the nature of the object perceived is determined on the basis of previous experience. In this there is knowledge of the name, shape, quality, class, etc., of the object and hence it is called determinate perception or savikalpa pratyakṣa. Perception provides knowledge of all the qualities. Contradicting the Buddhist and the Vedānta philosophers the Mīmāṃsā philosophers hold that in the first moment of contact between the object and the sense organs there is knowledge of many of the qualities of the external object. In the indeterminate state the object is present only in microscopic or unexpressed form and in the determinate state it develops like a seed and we have knowledge of the same object only this time it is more detailed.

(2) *Upamāna or Comparison*—Comparison is the attribute of knowledge arising out of similar cognition or perception of similar objects. Mīmāṃsā like the Nyāya accepts comparison as an independent source of knowledge but in the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy it is interpreted in an entirely different manner. According to Nyāya it is first known from the utterances of a reliable individual that the wild cow is like an ordinary cow or is similar to the latter. And then when an individual comes across a wild cow in the forest and upon perceiving it realises that it is like a cow, he knows that it is a wild cow. But according to the Mīmāṃsā it is realised on perception that this particular animal is similar to a cow. It is already known from the memory that the animal resembling the cow is a wild cow. Hence it is inferred that the animal which is presently perceived is a wild cow. In this way contrary to the view of Nyāya Mīmāṃsā believes that in comparison upon perceiving an object which has been perceived before it is inferred that the object remembered is similar to the object being presently perceived. Mīmāṃsā has accepted similarity as an independent

category. It is not a quality because there cannot be a quality in a quality. It does not mean complete unity or identity, but similarity in most respects. Hence it cannot be said to be generality of a class because the generality such as humanity remains the same in all the individual cases. Comparison cannot be accepted as subsidiary to perception, inference or testimony. It has been recognised as an independent source of valid knowledge.

(3) *Testimony as a source of knowledge*— Knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is said to be testimony when there is knowledge of the testimony in the shape of memory of the object. It is knowledge which arises out of sentences uttered by reliable individuals. And reliability is attributed of those who see the object in its real form. There are two distinctions of testimony—personal or *pauruṣeya* and impersonal or *apauruṣeya*. Utterances of reliable individuals are personal while Vedic sentences are impersonal. There are two kinds of Vedic sentences—(i) *Siddhārtha* sentences or those pertaining to objective existence, and (ii) *Vidhāyaka* sentences or those which convey the method of performing some activity or some mandate. Vedic sentences, concerned with the mode of performance of religious rituals, being of the *vidhāyaka* form, are themselves valid knowledge. According to *Mīmāṃsā*, the importance of the Vedas is only because of religious rituals. And sentences telling of objective existence are said to be complementary to the sentences which speak of the methods of religious rituals. In the absence of *vidhāyaka* sentences they have no value or utility. All sentences relating to the objective existence of the soul of Brahman to be found in the Vedas are related to one or the other *vidhāyaka* sentences inevitably. Perceptibly it is the object of such sentences to divert individuals from indulging in material activity and turning them to more desirable activity. The *vidhāyaka* sentences are also believed to be of two kinds—(1) *Upaśāyaka* and (2) *Atiśāyaka*. 'This is what he should do,' is a sentence of the former kind while, 'An example of the latter type would be—'Achieve heaven through charity for a whole month.'"

VEDAS ARE IMPERSONAL

The *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy does not accept God as the creator of the Vedas. According to them, God is not the author of the Vedas. It is the human mind that they are the creation of man. According to the *Mīmāṃsā*, the Vedas are eternal. Many arguments in favour of the eternal nature of the Vedas are put forward by *Mīmāṃsā*. Some of them are as follows—

(i) The most important argument from the philosophical viewpoint concerning the Vedas is based upon the eternality of world. The sound that is comprehended by the ear is the symbol of the eternal word. On every pronunciation the sound produced symbolizes only one word. In this way, sound and the word are separate entities. Sound is not eternal but word is eternal. For example, the sounds of 'a,' 'b,' etc., that we hear are only the symbols of these letters. If the letter 'a' is pronounced ten times there will be ten sounds but only one word. In the same manner even if the same word is spoken by different individuals the sounds produced will be different but the letter will be the same. In this way *a* is not produced by the sound but only manifested, because it is beginningless and eternal. In this way, the relation of the word and its meaning is not modern or symbolical but rather eternal and natural. Being the conglomeration or collection of such eternal and fundamental words, the Veda is eternal. In eternal form it is impersonal. In the written or spoken form it is merely the reflection of the eternal Vedas.

(ii) The saints whose names have perchance been mentioned in the Vedic mantras are not believed to be the authors of those mantras but are recognized only as the observer, lecturer or the promoter of the various Vedic schools. There is no mention of any name of the author of the Vedas, which hence are impersonal.

(iii) The Vedas cannot be the creation of a human being because they describe the awarding of prizes according to the past actions of the individuals, and human beings can have no knowledge of the relation between action and their results. The knowledge qualities rendered by the Vedas can be had by no other source of valid knowledge. In this way the Vedas are impersonal.

(iv) *Postulation (Arthapatti) as a source of knowledge*—Postulation as a source of knowledge can be illustrated by an example. Take it granted for the moment that we hear or see that Devadatta does not eat anything in the daytime, but in spite of this he is getting fatter. There is mutual contradiction between not eating in the daytime and getting more rotund. These two contradictions can be resolved only when we assume that he must be eating heavily in the night. This assumption can resolve the two contradictory facts and it becomes acceptable that Devadatta is getting bulkier even without eating anything in the day, by eating in the night. Thus the assumption of Devadatta eating at night is a postulation. We have never seen Devadatta eating his food at night, hence

knowledge gained by postulation is not perception or perceptual knowledge. It is not knowledge by testimony because we have never heard of Devadatta taking his food at night. It is also not inferential knowledge since there is no relation of invariable concomitance between physical rotundity and eating at night, or putting it differently, we cannot say that wherever there is physical rotundity, there is nocturnal dieting. In this way, postulation as a source of valid knowledge is not comprehended by any other source such as perception, inference, testimony etc. Consequently, the knowledge rendered by it is a peculiar or unique kind of knowledge and it has to be considered separately. There are two distinctions of postulations.

(1) *Drṣṭārthāpatti*—Where postulation is used to explain and elaborate upon any perceived incident, it is said to be *drṣṭārthāpatti*. For example the fact that Devadatta is getting fatter without eating in the day can be understood only by postulating that he eats at night.

(2) *Śrutārthāpatti*—Where postulation helps to explain and resolve some subject which is heard, it is said to be *śrutārthāpatti*. For example, the fact that the village from which Rāma hails is on the Jamunā can be understood only when this statement is interpreted as meaning that the village is situated on the banks of the river.

(3) *Anupalabdhi or non-perception*—Non-perception or *anupalabdhi* is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. When no knowledge of the object is possible through perception and other sources of valid knowledge it is had by non-perception. Non-perception is not perception. For example, there is no pot in this room. I do not perceive the non-existence of the pot in this room. Non-existence is no object which can come into contact with any sense organ. There can be contact between the eye and the pot, but how can there be contact between the eye and its absence? Actually, the knowledge of absence or non-existence is because of the non-perception of a perceivable object. If the pot is not visible in the room in the daylight we accept its absence or non-existence. The absence of an object from the situation in which it should be available is said to be its non-existence.

As has been said before, postulation which is propounded as a source of knowledge by the *Mīmāṃsā* is only a kind of inference. In this way, the four sources of valid knowledge accepted by *Mīmāṃsā*, namely perception, comparison, testimony and postulation,

are found in other Indian philosophies also. The fifth source of knowledge non existence is the only unique feature of Mīmāṃsā epistemology. But it is not a very important source, and even if it is said to be the absence it would not be very improper.

Q 67 Explain the Mimamsa theory of svataḥ pramānya. How does Mimamsa account for error?

(Poona M. A. 1968 Bombay 1968)

How does error present a problem to the purva Mimamsa philosophers? Give an account of the rival explanation of error given by Prabhakara and Kumarila. (Bombay 1965)

When we receive the knowledge of an object through any source then the question with which we are confronted is that is this knowledge in itself valid or is there need of any other proof of its validity? Does every source independently provide knowledge and is that knowledge in itself valid, or is it that one source generates knowledge while another gives evidence of its validity? Prāmānyavāda is aimed at a consideration of this very question. Nyaya philosophers support the theory of extrinsic validity (parataḥ pramānyavāda) while in the Mīmamsa the theory of intrinsic validity (svataḥ pramānyavāda) is given great credence.

PRINCIPLES OF INTRINSIC VALIDITY

Two main principles are involved in the theory of intrinsic validity or svataḥ pramānyavāda.

(1) The validity of knowledge is present in the material that creates the object.

(2) The knowledge of the validity of knowledge arises simultaneously with the knowledge itself.

In this way knowledge arises from the determinate source and after it has arisen without waiting to examine it on any criterion we accept it as valid. In perceptual knowledge we see the object clearly. Knowledge by testimony is received through meaningful and clear sentences. Inference is based upon an adequate middle term. Hence there is no need of examining knowledge. There is no contradiction between knowledge and action. Knowledge is real, the quality of the truthfulness or validity of knowledge is contained in it. In this way the truthfulness of knowledge is proved by itself. And on the contrary, evidence is needed to prove falsity or untruth. Any knowledge can be known to be false by us only when it is contradicted by some other source of knowledge. In this way, the falsity of any knowledge can be inferred. But this inferential evidence is needed only when there is some hindrance to belief other

wise knowledge of itself generates belief. We do not hesitate in moulding our conduct on knowledge received from perceptual sources, because we accept it at its face value without any discussion. Practical life is possible only because of this acceptance and belief. Prabhākara has distinctly stated that it is contradictory for there to be knowledge and false knowledge. Kumārila has also accepted this view. The main cause why the Mīmāṃsa philosophers accept the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge is that they believe in the Vedas. They believe the Vedas to be eternal, impersonal and intrinsically valid. Hence it is only logical for them to look upon knowledge as having intrinsic validity. Validity of the Vedas or by the Vedas in itself implies intrinsic validity. In this way, the Mīmāṃsā followers began to look upon the other sources of knowledge as intrinsically valid also. Otherwise in the Mīmāṃsā, the only source of valid knowledge is the Vedas.

PRABHAKAR'S VIEW

On the question of the validity of knowledge there are three opinion among the Mīmāṃsakas all of which accept intrinsic validity of knowledge, but this theory most closely resembles the view of Prabhākara. According to him, knowledge is self evident and self-enlightening. The intrinsic validity of knowledge is proved by its being self-enlightening. Hence, it does not need support from any other source to establish its validity.

KUMARILA BHATT'S VIEW

Bhatt's view is also amenable to the principle of intrinsic validity but according to it validity is not imparted by knowledge but by 'knowability'. In this view, in spite of knowledge being self-enlightening, there is no immediate awareness of it. Knowledge is generated by the sense. Actually, in the knowledge of the pot, a quality called knowability is generated in the pot upon its becoming known and it is this knowability that is perceptually known. Knowability will result only when there is knowledge of the pot, and the pot's becoming known depends upon there being knowledge of the pot. In this way, knowability cannot be created without there being any knowledge. The Mīmāṃsā philosophers accept the existence of knowledge originating in postulation in order to have a basis for the creation of knowability.

MURARI MISRA'S OPINION

According to Murari Misra validity is determined not by 'knowledge' but by 'anuvyavasāya'. In this way, when the sense

organ and the object come into contact there is knowledge that this is a pot. In order to test the accuracy of this knowledge or to determine it, there is the *anuvyavasāya* that I know this pot. The later *anuvyavasāya* determines both the awareness of knowledge of the pot as well as its validity. It differs from the Nyāya view in that in the latter's opinion there is doubt in the first knowledge whereas in Mīmāṃsā's opinion there is no such doubt.

THEORY OF EXTRINSIC VALIDITY

Contrary to the Mīmāṃsā view the Nyāya philosophers advocate the theory of extrinsic validity (*paratahprāmānyavāda*). For example, when there is knowledge of the pot resulting from the contact between the pot and the sense organ, this knowledge is marred by doubt. This is named '*vyavasāya*' by the Nyāya philosophers. I have knowledge of the pot is called '*anuvyavasāya*' by them. This latter assertion proves the validity of *vyavasāya* or previous knowledge. Thus, knowledge is not self evident, but rather it is extrinsically valid. This view of the Nyāya philosophers has been refuted by the Mīmāṃsā philosophers.

CRITICISM OF THE NYAYA VIEW

(1) According to the Nyāya view, the validity of every knowledge is generated by causes other than those which create that knowledge. The validity of perceptual knowledge is dependent upon the perfectness and freedom from defect of the sense organs concerned. But according to the Mīmāṃsā, causes in addition to the freedom from defect of the sense organs are also of assistance to perceptual knowledge.

(2) According to the Nyāya view the validity of every knowledge is determined by inference. Contrary to this Mīmāṃsā asserts that the non validity of knowledge would be established in this manner, besides which there is the defect of infinite regress. The validity of '*a*' would have to be proved by '*b*' and that of '*b*' by '*c*' and so on, and this chain of validations would never cease. Besides this, before accepting the validity of any knowledge recourse is always had to inference. Its purpose is to remove the obstacle from the path of knowledge. Once the obstacle is removed, the validity as well as the knowledge of this validity, besides the knowledge itself, becomes evident. If inference fails to remove the obstacle, that knowledge cannot arise again.

But the principle of intrinsic validity of Mīmāṃsā is the common sense view and it has neglected to solve many problems

Actually, this philosophical system does not have a particularly important place in the epistemological field, Its specific field is ritualism. It is more a theory of ritualism than a philosophy. But this does not mean that Mīmāṃsā has no importance whatsoever. Dr. Das Gupta has very trenchantly remarked that for a Hindu there is the utmost importance of the Mīmāṃsā literature.

Q. 68. Write short note on-Mimamsa theory of Illusion.

Analyse the Mimamsa theory of error and compare it with the Nyaya theory of false perception. (Cal. 1972)

AKHYATIVAD

Prabhakar has refused to admit the existence of illusion. This view is therefore, known as Akhyātivād. According to him illusion and knowledge are contradictory. Knowledge is self-illuminated and always real. Illusion is the understanding of one thing as another. In the illusion of rope as snake, there is contact of visual organ with rope and the resulting knowledge is that of snake. The knowledge of snake is neither perception nor inference. It is due to memory. This arousal of memory is due to defects of visual organ or absence of sufficient light which leads to failure in the cognition of special characteristics of rope. On the other hand the characteristics of snake are remembered. While the rope is in the external world the snake is in the self. Rope is the object of vision while snake is that of mind. Therefore both the knowledge are different though real. Illusion is the confusion of both these types of knowledge. It is due to the failure in distinguishing between the two. It is not a knowledge in itself. This view about the nature of illusion is known as Akhyātivād.

VIPARIT KHYATIVAD

According to Kumārila Bhatta in illusion there is the knowledge of activity in the absence of activity. This leads to the perception of unreal as real. While seeing snake in rope, when it is said that this is snake, both subject and predicate are true in this statement. Both exist in the world. The cause of illusion here is not non-existence of either but the conjunction of two distinct things as subject and predicate. Illusion is not there in the objects but in their relationship. This illusion leads to contradictory behaviour such as running to escape while seeking snake in rope.

Both Prabhakar and Kumarila agree that illusion influences behaviour more than knowledge. Both take illusion as exception. According to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, as a general rule all knowledge

is real Our every day life depends on our faith in the reality of knowledge Illusion is the exception to this rule But exceptions do not invalidate the rule

Q 69 Briefly describe Mīmāṃsā metaphysics and theory of causation.

METAPHYSICS

In metaphysics, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers are realists and pluralists The world is constituted of three types of elements—(1) Body in which the self enjoys the fruits of his actions (2) Sense organs and motor organs as the means of experiencing pleasure and pain (3) External things as objects of enjoyment Besides the objects of perception, there are many realities which are not subject to perception such as heaven, hell, soul, gods etc The creation is based on karmas The Mīmāṃsā philosophers, therefore, do not admit any purpose of God in creation In their atomic theory of the creation of the world, the atoms are not activated by God as it is in the Vaiśeṣika view The atoms are constantly activated due to the natural law of karma so that a world is constituted in order that the selves may experience the consequences of their karma The world is eternal There is no origination or final destruction of the world The self is atomic, eternal and imperishable Besides the nine elements postulated by Vaiśeṣika philosophers, some Mīmāṃsā philosophers admit darkness and sound They also admit the existence of substance, genus, quality, activity and absence

THEORY OF CAUSATION

About causation, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers maintain the theory of energy Nothing sprouts from the fried seed because the potent energy of the seed is finished in the process of burning. Fire inheres the power of burning and the light that of lighting Had there been no potent energy in the cause, even a burnt seed should lead to sprouting This phenomena can be explained only by the theory of potent energy in the cause in whose absence no effect is observed As a burnt seed loses such energy it does not sprout

According to Nyāya view, in the above mentioned example, the seed does not sprout not because of the absence of potent energy but due to the presence of certain impediments If these impediments are removed the cause originates the effect In this connection, the Mīmāṃsā philosophers point out that even in

Nyāya view one has to admit the presence of something other than mere cause *i.e.*, absence of impediments. Then instead of admitting the power of causation in the element of absence, why not accept the presence of a potent energy in the cause itself?

Q. 70. Write short notes on theory of Apūrva and nature of self in Mīmāṃsa philosophy.

THEORY OF APURVA

The theory of Apūrva in Mīmāṃsā philosophy has been postulated on the basis of the above mentioned theory of unseen energy. According to Mīmāṃsā philosophers, the deeds performed in this world create an unseen force known as Apūrva *i.e.*, some thing which was not there before the performance of deeds. This force in due course leads to consequences in the form of diverse experiences. This law of Apūrva is a part of the wider law of Karma. According to the law of karma all deeds lead to the accumulation of these results.

NATURE OF SELF

The Mīmāṃsā view concerning bondage and liberation of self resembles the views presented by other Indian systems having faith in Vedas. Mīmāṃsa philosophy is pluralist. According to it every body possesses a distinct self. Thus there are as many selves as bodies. The self is eternal, imperishable substance. It does not die with the death of the body but exists to reap the fruits of his deeds. According to Mīmāṃsā philosophers, consciousness is not the nature of self, but an adventitious quality emerging in particular circumstances. In the conditions of deep sleep and liberation, consciousness is not found in the self due to the absence of sense object contact.

According to Kumarila, there is no knowledge of the self along with the knowledge of objects. Self is the object of self consciousness. In other words, when we concentrate on self we realise 'I exist'. In this connection Prabhakar does not agree with Kumarila. According to him the self cannot be the subject and object of the same knowledge. The concept of self-consciousness is inadequate. One thing cannot be both doer and deed at the same time because the functions of doer and deed are mutually opposite. Contrary to the view of Kumarila, Prabhakar maintains that in every objective knowledge self is apprehended as doer. For example when I look at a pot I say that I am seeing a pot. Here there is a consciousness of 'I' along with the perception of pot. As against

this view, Kumarila points out that if the knowledge of self accompanies every knowledge then the awareness that I am knowing this pot should occur with every objective knowledge. But the knowledge of self does not always accompany objective knowledge. Sometimes it happens and sometimes not. It is therefore distinct from objective knowledge. The opposition of doer and deed is merely verbal. Had there been a real opposition between the two, the Vedic statements like 'know thyself' and the worldly statements like 'I know my self' should have no meaning. If self is not the object of knowledge, how could the existence of self in the past may be remembered? The past self can be an object of memory of only the present self because it is not the knower of the present knowledge. Thus it is clear that the self can be an object of knowledge.

In fact both the view of Prabhakar and Kumarila are true in their own context. They are however, wrong only where they downright reject the opposite view as totally false. While self is the object of self consciousness, it is also known in every objective knowledge. This view has been supported by many contemporary philosophers in East and West.

Prabhakar and Kumarila also disagree on the question of the knowledge of knowledge. According to Prabhakar every objective knowledge involves three constituents viz., knower, known and knowledge. For example in the knowledge 'I know this pot' the knower I, the known pot and the knowledge of pot are present as knower, known and knowledge. According to Prabhakar all these three are known simultaneously. This is known as threefold knowledge. Thus while knowledge illuminates knower and known it is also self-illuminated. As against this view Kumarila maintains that just as the forepart of the finger cannot touch itself similarly knowledge can not be its own object. According to this view knowledge can not be known directly but only through inference based upon indirect awareness. A thing is either known or not known to us. If it is known, it is inferred on the basis of its knowledge that we know that object.

Q. 71. Write short note on-Mīmāṃsā Philosophy of Religion

In the religion of Mīmāṃsā philosophers, Vedas occupy an important place that they hardly need any God. Vedas are impersonal and reservoirs of knowledge. The ritualistic

bonum of religion. Hence according to Mīmāṃsā religion means fulfilment of duties prescribed by Vedas. The statements of Vedas are the criteria for duties. Good life means living according to Vedas.

RITUALISM

Mīmāṃsā philosophy is a branch of Vedic religion. In the Vedic age yajnas were performed to propitiate Indra, Varuṇa, Sūrya and other Gods so that they may help the devotees in the realization of their goal, and in eradicating evils. In Mīmāṃsā school ritualism was given so much importance that the status of Gods became secondary. They only remained names to which offerings were made while performing rituals. There is hardly any description of their qualities or worship in Mīmāṃsā scriptures. The author of Prakaraṇa Panchika has gone to the extent of saying that the chief aim of yajna is not the worship or propitiation of Gods but purification of soul. One should selflessly act upon the duties prescribed by the Vedas. The Vedas distinguish between actions due to desire, actions due to routine and actions as means to achieve some purpose. While the first are performed to achieve certain worldly aims the last two are performed solely because of their prescription by Vedas. Thus ultimately Vedic ritualism becomes duty for duty's sake. This however is different from the concept of duty in Gīta. In Gīta duty is not for duty but for deity. Mīmāṃsā concept of duty, on the other hand, is a secular principle. It resembles Kant's concept of duty.

HEAVEN AND LIBERATION

The old Mīmāṃsā philosophers maintain that whoever wants to go to heaven must perform yajna. Thus the summum bonum of life, according to them, is heaven or permanent pleasure. But the later Mīmāṃsā thinkers, like other Indian philosophical systems, accepted liberation as the ultimate end. Liberation is freedom from bondage. One who acts due to desire has to take birth again and again. After knowing that the worldly pleasures are mixed with pain, one becomes disillusioned and leaves all desires. Desireless action and self-realisation lead to the annihilation of past saṃskāras. This in its turn leads to elimination of bondage and cessation of the cycle of birth and death. According to Prakaraṇa Panchikā, in the state of liberation the self is emancipated from the bondages of body, senses, mind etc., and is never again caught in

the cycle of birth and death. There remains no consciousness in the self and hence it can not experience pleasure and pain. Liberation, according to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, is not a state of bliss. In it the self achieves its real nature beyond pleasure and pain. No more description of the state of liberation is possible. It should be remembered here that some later Mīmāṃsā philosophers as pointed out by Pashupati Nath Shastri, accepted the Vedānt theory of liberation as bliss.

CRITICAL EVALUATION

Though Mīmāṃsā has been given a place among traditional six systems of Indian philosophy but there is hardly any metaphysics in it. In fact, it is not a philosophy but a science of rituals. It is known as Pūrva Mīmāṃsā because historically it is earlier than Uttara Mīmāṃsā. It explains actions and as action precedes knowledge it is also logically prior to Uttara Mīmāṃsā. Being the science of action it is different from other systems of Indian philosophy. Its conception of bondage and liberation has been borrowed from other systems. Its conception of self is inadequate. The theory of validity of knowledge as found in it is a common sense principle. It has not tried to solve the subject object relation in knowledge.

The form of religion in Mīmāṃsā is also undeveloped. The status of Vedic Gods has become so much secondary in it that they are almost useless. Ritualism has overshadowed religion so much that it has hardly any relation with God. Ritualism again is not based on any independent rational analysis but on the literal obedience to Vedic presumption. This extreme emphasis on ritualism in Mīmāṃsā philosophy led to reaction in the form of many religious cults which tried to free religion from the clutches of ritualism.

Thus while Mīmāṃsā does not present philosophy worthy of its name it is useful in the understanding of Vedic religion. In fact its aim was not an enquiry into reality but an enquiry into 'Dharma' as it is clear from the opening statement in Jaimini Sūtra. Thus the system is more important from the pragmatic and worldly point of view. It is a source of understanding various aspects of Vedic religion the law morality ritualism heaven and hell, worldly duties etc. It is valuable as a guide to ceremonials and rituals of Hindu Vedic religion.

NON-DUALISM OF SAMKARA

Q. 72. Discuss the comparative importance of Tarka and Sruti in the philosophy of Samkara.

Or

Explain Samkara's theory of knowledge. (Meerut 1972)

The Non-dualism of Śaṅkara is a rare contribution of India to the philosophical world. Even before Śaṅkara and also after him many philosophical systems were developed in India which proved to be unique in different spheres, but from the integral spiritual standpoint the Advaita philosophy holds a position which is unrivalled by anyone else. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the philosophy of Upaniṣads may not satisfy those who follow the path of devotion, but from the standpoint of philosophical discussion it is certainly the best and most original. Thus whether we may agree or disagree with the Advaita philosophy it must impress so far as its subtle insight and perfect logic is concerned.

According to Śaṅkara the so-called means of knowledge do not give us knowledge, but remove ignorance since they are based on the distinction of subject and object while the real knowledge is beyond these and other distinctions. But just as the disappearance of the illusion of snake means the knowledge of the rope, similarly, the very removal of ignorance means knowledge. As a matter of fact there is no sharp line to divide the removal of ignorance and the beginning of knowledge. Knowledge is the disappearance of the ignorance, since while it is always existent, the ignorance keeps it covered and un-noticed. The means of knowledge work in the field of ignorance itself. Knowledge requires no means nor any proof, since it is self-illuminated and self-proved. Hence knowledge *i.e.*, the self and Brahman occupy a prominent place in Advaita philosophy, while epistemology has been given a subordinate place. Advaita philosophy denies the reality of the truth of name and form as present by the same organ and so it cannot rely upon the knowledge given through sense, nor can it make any use of it to support its contentions. However helpful it may be in common sense life. Hence according to Śaṅkara all means of knowledge and all knowledge acquired through them are unreal from the transcen-

dental standpoint But none can deny their importance in the practical world before one gets the transcendental knowledge

In Vedānta 'pramā' means the knowledge which is uncontradicted It does not include knowledge through memory Hence it is that knowledge which has never been attained before It has been objected here that in perception the complete object is known only by linking the present perception with the perception of the moments already passed But according to Vedānta there is only one state of the mind so far as there is one object of perception Hence there is no question of the antecedent and subsequent

According to Vedānta, there are three pramāṇas i.e., perception (Pratyakṣa), inference (Tarka) and scripture (Śruti) .

(1) *Perception*—The identity of the subject and object consciousness by Chitta concomitance adopting the form of the external objects is perception Hence according to Vedānta, in perception the subject and the object become identical, because in fact both are the same consciousness The subject and the object remain separate due to the covering of ignorance But by the direct union of the Antahkarana through the sense it takes the form of the object and shines in the form of that particular object illumined by the self due to the removal of the covering of ignorance This definition of perception according to Vedānta in spite of being very much imperfect from the scientific standpoint, clarifies the fact that it is the same consciousness that exists in the subject and the object which appear to be separate due to ignorance

(2) *Tarka or inference*—Inference is the knowledge which results by the past impressions based upon the awareness of concomitance The awareness of concomitance leaves the impressions on the unconscious and when these impressions are awakened by perceiving that object again, the result is inference, e.g., after one is aware of the relation of concomitance between the fire and the smoke, he will infer about the existence of fire by the awakening of the impression of the awareness of Vyāpti due to the perception of smoke The awareness of Vyāpti is the result of the seeing of the two things together and never finding any contradiction in their relation According to Vedānta only one example is sufficient to establish the Vyāpti relation and it does not need many instances If one finds appearance of silver in nacre one can infer on its basis that all things besides Brahman are mere appearance Hence Vedānta admits only concomitance in presence It does

not admit other types of concomitances admitted by Nyāya philosophy. Against the Nyāya philosophy, Śamkara admits only three premises of an inference.

(1) *Pratijnā*—Everything different from Brahman is unreal.

(2) *Hetu*—Because all things are different from Brahman.

(3) *Udāharaṇa*—So all things are unreal as seeing of the silver in nacre.

SRUTI OR SCRIPTURE

In Vedānta, Āgama or Veda has been admitted as an independent *pramāṇa* (testimony). Vedas are impersonal and eternal, though they are not such as written scriptures. According to Advaita philosophy, Vedas begin with the beginning of the creation and disappear with its disappearance. God begins the creation along with Vedas. After destruction or *pralaya* they remain in the mind of the God and he remembers them till the next creation and expresses them on that occasion. The Vedānta philosopher does not ask like *Mīmāṃsā* and Nyāya to prove the absoluteness of Vedas. Vedas are self-proved. Memory is true when it is based upon scriptures.

Regarding the nature of *Upamāna*, *Arthāpatti*, *Śabda* and *Anupalabdhi* etc., Advaita Vedānta agrees with other Indian philosophical systems.

THE RELATION OF TARKA AND SRUTI

The relation of *Tarka* and *Śruti*, reasoning and scripture is an important question in the context of Vedānta philosophy. Śamkara sometimes favours one while at other times he seems to favour another. He has favoured the scripture to the extent of calling himself a mere commentator. On the other hand, sometimes he considers reasoning as very much better than *Śruti*. At one place he says that reasoning is based upon the help of *Śruti*. At another place he says that reasoning alone is sufficient for the knowledge of Brahman. In the commentary on *Kāthopaniṣad*, first of all, the reasoning has been criticised. It has been said that the knowledge of reality cannot be attained through reasoning. But it should be noticed here that by reasoning Śamkara means dialectical reasoning of *Śuśka Tarka*. He gives several arguments against the validity of reasoning. Of these some important ones are the following.

(1) If reasoning is left in its own course, it can prove any thing. Hence reasoning should be based upon scriptures.

(2) Due to the difference in the intelligence of persons, a man's reasoning can be refuted by another's more cogent reasoning

(3) Reasoning cannot take us anywhere. We cannot hold an assembly of the logicians of the past, present and future to decide about the truths which have been reasoned out by them in different ways

Against the above arguments refuting the validity of reasoning, Śamkara imagines the following six arguments :

(1) Reasoning is required even to criticise the validity of reasoning

(2) Reasoning is necessary to decide the truth in the mutually contradictory senses of the scripture

(3) If a man's reasoning can be refuted it is by another's more cogent reasoning itself, because self criticism is characteristic of reasoning

(4) The result of not admitting reasoning can be either agnosticism or scepticism which cannot be escaped without reasoning

(5) Even the scriptures have admitted the validity of reasoning. Yākṣa, the author of *Nirukta*, has said that the reasoning itself is *Rṣi*

(6) If reasoning does not take us to any definite conclusion, it means it is not the real reasoning. As a matter of fact reasoning also can be of two types—*Suṣka Tarka* and *Suddha Tarka*. Of these the first is not infallible while the second gives us real knowledge

After giving these arguments in favour of reasoning, Śamkara admits that reasoning has validity at least in some cases and yet he does not admit that reasoning is valid in the case of Brahman. But very soon Śamkara is found to be vehemently supporting the case of reasoning. In the *Tarkapāda* of his commentary of *Brahma Sutra*, Śamkara has tried to prove Brahman only on the basis of reasoning. In the commentary on *Gaudapāda Kārikā* Śamkara has said that even by reasoning Brahman can be known.

Thus sometimes Śamkara favours scripture while at other times he supports reasoning. According to Prof. Ranade, Prakāśananda and Govindānanda, Śamkara has given a higher place to scripture than reasoning. According to Prof. A. C. Mukerjee, Śamkara has maintained reasoning to be higher than scripture. But he further points out that both reasoning and scripture are based upon reason and it alone decides about their validity. By accepting this view the apparently contradictory quotations in the

Śamkara regarding the relation of scripture and reasoning can be synthesized. In the knowledge through identity, the contradictory becomes complementary.

Q. 73. What is the nature of Brahman according to Śamkara ? Why is his philosophy negatively called as Advaita ?

(Bombay 1968; Baroda 1963)

Compare the views of Śamkara and Ramanuja regarding Brahman.

(Poona M. A. 1958)

Explain clearly what Śamkara means by "Brahma Satyam jaganmithya."

(Karnatak 1966)

What, according to Śamkara, is the nature of Brahman and how is Maya related to it ?

(Kolhapur 1966, Meerut 1971)

Clearly explain the nature of Brahman, Jīva and their relation in Advaita Vedānta.

(Cal. 1970)

The whole of the Vedānta philosophy can be summarised in a line, "Brahman is true, the world is false and the Jīva and Brahman are not different." According to Śamkara, Brahman is the highest transcendental truth. It is perfect and the only truth. It is the ultimate summum bonum of human efforts and the basis of knowledge. The ultimate truth is non-contradictory. It is existent, beginningless and unchanging. It is the highest knowledge. By the knowledge of Brahman the knowledge of the world, which is really ignorance, disappears, because the knowledge of the Brahman is the basis of the knowledge of the world. Hence the knowledge of the Brahman is the eternal truth.

Brahman is the knowledge, the knower and the known. These distinctions of the process of the knowledge do not apply in the case of Brahman knowledge. Brahman is the essence of all things. It is the only ultimate existence. It is unconditioned, and self-illuminated. Hence it is non-dual, attributeless and unconditioned.

According to Śamkara, only the Nirguṇa Brahman is the ultimate truth. The Upaniṣads have described Brahman both as Saguna and Nirguṇa. The former has been called as the Apra Brahman while the latter has been called Para Brahman. The para Brahman is unconditioned, without particulars and without qualities. The Apra Brahman is conditional, with out particulars and qualities. Existence, Consciousness and Bliss are the characteristics of Para Brahman. Rāmānuja has accepted both Saguna and Nirguṇa to be the ultimate Brahman. But according to Śamkara, it is ignorance to admit two forms of Brahman since in reality only the Nirguṇa form is true. Due to ignorance it appears as Saguna Īśvara and

limited Jiva. The distinction of the devotee and deity is only on the pragmatic level. On the transcendental level, Brahman is all power and beyond the karmas and intellect. It is the object of

According to Śamkara, there is no distinction between the self and Brahman. Both are beyond the senses, the mind and the intellect. Whatever is in the self, is also in the not self. By this synthesis of the Brahman and Ātman, Śamkara negated all types of dualism and established a metaphysical, epistemological and axiological non dualism. Brahman is present everywhere in the form of the soul. Whatever is in the macrocosm is also in the microcosm. This identity of the self and the Brahman is based on the logic of infinite as described in the Upanisads. In the limited world, nothing remains when equal comes out of equal. But in the world of infinite the perfect remains when the perfect is taken out of the perfect. As a matter of fact, according to Śamkara the creation and the destruction of the world have only pragmatic importance, it is seen

According to Śamkara, the existence is also consciousness and whatever is conscious, it alone exists. The knowledge is the knowledge of existence and existence is itself of the form of knowledge. Thus Śamkara does not make distinction between metaphysical and the epistemological reality. Brahminhood is said to be the liberation. Śamkara has described Brahman, liberation and soul in the same terms. As a matter of fact all these three are one and the same. This metaphysical, epistemological and axiological synthesis of Advaita Vedānta is unrivalled in the history of philosophy. There are no distinctions in Brahman. There is no distinction of the knower, knowledge and known in it, nor any distinction of the waking, dreaming and sleeping, consciousness and unconsciousness and sub consciousness etc. Brahman is beyond the world of name and form. In it there is no appearance and disappearance. In spite of thus admitting Brahman to be beyond all distinctions, Śamkara has not taken it to be a negation or nihil. Brahman can be realised by immediate intuitive knowledge. Brahman is of the nature of bliss. But this bliss is merely an object of experience. Hence by calling Him bliss, Brahman does not become attributed

Really speaking, Śamkara's distinction of Brahman here is in the sense of "Neti Neti". Brahman is existent, because it is not non-existent, conscious, because it is not unconscious, and bliss, because it is not of the nature of pain. It is identical because it is beyond time. It is unchanging, since it is beyond space. Knowledge is not its attribute, but its nature. It is Nirguṇa because it is beyond all guṇas.

In spite of calling Brahman Nirguṇa Śamkara has denied that it is nihil, though some have called him "Crypto-Buddhist." The Upaniṣads have called the Brahman attributeless-attributed ("Nirguṇoguṇi"). According to Śamkara only they call the Nirguṇa Brahman as Śūnya who are deficient in intelligence. There is no distinction of space, time, qualities, movements and consequences etc. in Brahman. It is beyond all the distinctions of present, past future, cause and effect etc. It is beyond the physical world. Thus Brahman is beyond the senses, mind and intellect, though it does not mean that he is unknowable. He is the object of immediate experience. In fact, all knowledge has two aspects, where it makes the objects known, it also gives the knowledge of the knower, since without the knower the knowledge is impossible. This knowledge of the world is due to the light of Brahman. In the words of Śvetāśvatāra Upaniṣad. "By its light all this is lighted. By its illumination all this is illumined." Brahman is perfect. It has no separate divisions. It is one and homogeneous. The word Brahman has been derived from the root 'Brh', hence literally also Brahman transcends the world. According to Rāmānuja, there is self-distinction in Brahman. The worldly objects are distinguished from the objects of their own species as well as that of the other species. But being non-dual, Brahman is beyond all self-distinction as well as the distinctions in one's own species and from that of others. It is not non-existent and yet is absolutely opposed to all knowable objects. Brahman being transcendent is beyond all differences.

According to Taittiriya Upaniṣad, "That from which all the physical world has been born, that from which born all these live and that to which all these return, desire to know it, that alone is Brahman. Brahman is the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer of the world. He is infinite, omnipotent and omnipresent. He is the substratum of all the physical universe." Śamkara has taken Brahman as cause, precisely in this sense. The world is the reflection of Brahman. It is not its creation or effect. The reflection does not affect Brahman, just as the Māyā influences only

those who are ignorant and never the magician (Māyātā) himself. He is the highest generality because all is in it and by its knowledge everything else is known. It is due to ignorance that the Brahman is seen as the world of many names and forms. In fact the whole world is Brahman itself. He is immutable and eternally contented. The world is mortal, material and painful. Hence Brahman is the only truth and all else is false.

Brahman is indescribable. The Upaniṣads have described it by calling *Neti Neti*. To call it indescribable means that it can not be described in the pragmatic language because it is beyond the senses, mind and intellect. Indescribable does not mean unknowable since Brahman can be realised. Only it is not a subject of intellectual concepts. He is the knower, the light of the light, the conscious light and the soul of all. He is self-illuminated. Like the sun he illumines himself and also illumines everything else. It is not object. Its knowledge is the knower's knowledge. It is only by going beyond the universe that the *jīva* realises the real nature of Brahman and that of his own inner self.

In personality there is the distinction of self and not self. According to the Ramanuja, Brahman has personality. He is the ultimate person. But Sāṃkāra admits Brahman as beyond all distinctions and impersonal. He is beyond personality. He is neither knower nor doer but pure knowledge. According to Sāṃkāra, knowledge is not an activity but Brahmanhood, since in activity or evolution there is imperfection, change or motion, while Brahman is beyond all these. Brahman is beyond pleasure, pain, attachment, aversion, good and evil. He is infinite. He is Being, not Becoming. In him there is no chance or evolution. He is immutable. He is beyond the desires and purposes. Hence the Brahman of Sāṃkāra is beyond the God of Ramanuja.

In Sāṃkāra's philosophy the main proof for the existence of Brahman is the spiritual experience. But as a philosopher, Sāṃkāra has tried to give systematic testimony to prove the existence of Brahman. Of these the main are as follows —

(1) *Proof from Scriptures*—Sāṃkāra has developed his philosophy on the basis of the Upaniṣads, Gīta and Brahma Sūtra. Hence the verses of these scriptures are the greatest proof to admit Brahman as the ultimate truth. Sāṃkāra has called himself a commentator and not a philosopher. He has tried to give systematic form to the sayings of all the Upaniṣads. The innumerable great sentences like 'I am Brahman', 'All is Brahman', etc.,

scattered in different Upaniṣads are proofs of the concept of Brahman in Advaita philosophy. The scripture is the proof of the existence of Brahman, and Brahman is the eternal source of the scriptures. In the sequence of time Brahman Precedes Vedas, while in the epistemological sequence Vedas precede Brahman. Hence there is no fallacy of circular reasoning here.

(2) *Etymological Proof*—Brahman is a substratum of the universe, since as Śamkara points out, "because it is according to the root Bṛh". The root Bṛh means evolution. Hence literally speaking Brahman means all transcending existence. Like the ontological proof of Descartes, Śamkara has tried to prove the existence of Brahman by the literal meaning of the word. It goes without saying that Deussen was not true when he said that there is no such proof in Indian philosophy. By attributing infinity and other similar qualities to Brahman, Śamkara has referred to its literal meaning.

(3) *Psychological Proof*—After giving the etymological proof, Śamkara has said that being the self of all the existence, Brahman is known to everyone. Deussen calls this psychological proof. But further emphasizing the above statement, Śamkara points out that every man feels the existence of his own self and no one is ignorant of it. Thus it becomes a complete scientific argument, since it not only points out to positive evidence, but also negates all evidence in opposition.

(4) *Teleological Proofs*—The world is so systematic that its origin cannot be admitted as material. Hence the very system of the universe is a proof of its conscious cause as Brahman.

(5) *Regressus Ad infinitum by not admitting Brahman as the original cause*—According to the Upaniṣads the world has no beginning. It is the reflection of the ultimate reality. This ultimate reality is the original cause of Brahman. If it is asked that what is the cause of the Brahman, it will be subject to the fallacy or regressing to infinity, since the question of the cause of cause will always arise. Hence the existence of Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe is self proved.

(6) *The proof of immediate experience*—The intellectual proofs regarding the existence of Brahman are only helpful to understand Him intellectually. But beyond the mind, intellect and senses, the only valid proof for the existence of Brahman is immediate experience. By immediate experience all dualism disappears and one

realises the non dual Brahman. It is the object of Sādhana. It is not proper to try to understand the entire Advaita philosophy by means of intellect alone. It is only after direct experience that one can grasp the essential meaning of Vedānta. It has been rightly said that Vedānta cannot tell us what is Brahman, but only what the Brahman is not. Brahman is described so that one may not take it to be a nihil. According to Upaniṣads Brahman is an object of experience, the intellect should not reason about it. It is hence that the saying goes "Silence is Brahman."

Q 74 Explain the place of Iṣvara in the Vedānta of Sāmkara

(Karnatak 1963)

In the philosophy of Śāmkara the world is merely a reflection of the ultimate reality. In fact, neither the individual nor the universe nor God have existence apart from Brahman. From the question of creation it is merely a pragmatic problem and God has been brought in only to solve it, otherwise there is neither a creation nor a creator. It is the Nirguṇa Brahman itself that has been admitted as Saṁguṇa for the pragmatic purposes of worship etc. Śāmkara's philosophy advocates Satkāryavāda and in that too the Vivartavāda and not Parināmvāda. In fact, the Brahman is the only material and efficient cause. The world of name and form is merely an imposition on Brahman. This illusion is due to ignorance and to remove this ignorance is the aim of Vedānta. Hence it is plain that God is also a merely pragmatic postulate.

In fact, the Nirguṇa Brahman is the only truth. Brahman is pure, transcendental, free, eternal and unconditional. Brahman covered with Māya, is Iṣvara. He is the reflection of Brahman. Besides Brahman. He is nothing. Brahman is impersonal, while Iṣvara is the ultimate person. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the physical universe. He is the mediating link between the Brahman and the universe. The world of name and form is present in Him in the seed form. He is becoming while Brahman is being. Brahman realisation leads to liberation while living. The worship of Iṣvara leads to gradual liberation. Brahman is the object of immediate experience. Iṣvara is the object of worship. Brahman is the transcendental truth while Iṣvara is merely a pragmatic truth. On the transcendental level there is no distinction between Iṣvara and Brahman, since in it all the dualisms of the individual, universe and God disappear.

Creation is the expression of the self power of God in the world of space and time. Before creation the world of name and form

present in God. After destruction it again merges into God. But because the Karmas of the Jivas are not destroyed, they have to return again to the world of the creation and become inevitable. Otherwise the world is beginningless. Prakṛti is God's power. Creation and destruction are different stages of the beginningless universe. Īsvara requires no instrument to create the world. He creates the world by His power of Māyā. He has no purpose in creation, because He is perfect. The world is His Līlā. The creation is His nature.

By calling the creation beginningless, Śamkara escapes the objection that whether there were merit and demerit of the individual in the beginning. Without individual there can be no merits and demerits, while without merits and demerits there is no cause of the individual. Hence the world is beginningless, and the karmas are also beginningless. As one sows, so he reaps. Hence the pains, sufferings and evils present in the world are not due to Īsvara, but results of the past karmas of the jivas. Thus moral problem cannot be raised against Īsvara, nor can he be called to be imperfect as creator. The gross, material and divided universe assumes seed form and leaves its particular characteristic, while returning to its original cause—the Īsvara. Hence purity is not affected by it. Externally, the universe is absolutely different from Īsvara, but essentially it is the same. Hence, it is relevant to ask how the material universe is created by the conscious Īsvara. Like the waking, dreaming and sleeping stages of man, the world is also manifested in different forms due to ignorance. The materiality and other limitations of the world and individual do not affect the Īsvara since though Śamkara is Satkāyavādin he is not Parīṇāmavādin. The world is the reflection of Īsvara, hence its nature does not affect Him. God is the controller of the actions, the Karmādhyaṅsa. He is all knower. His knowledge is intuitive, direct, without senses and beyond ignorance. He is the witness of the universe. He creates the bodies of different Jivas according to their actions and so also the object of their enjoyment.

He is beyond merit and demerit. In Him there are no imperfections of attachment and aversion, pleasures and pain and sins etc. He is the basis of morality. He is immanent and omnipresent. He is the ultimate infinity. He is eternal, one and pure consciousness.

In spite of being omnipresent, Īsvara also assumes particular forms and thus he can be worshipped. He is kind to his devotees

and helps them in their spiritual efforts. He is the ultimate person, He is the helper in the attainment of liberation. He is the basis of all *dharma*s.

The above mentioned conception of God is different from that of Nyāya philosophy in the following aspects

(1) The God of Nyāya is an individual creator like Viśvāmītra Śamkara's God, in spite of being a creator, is infinite and perfect. The God of Nyāya is without demerits, ignorance, *pramāda* etc. He is the basis of merit, knowledge and *saṁādhi*, the existence, consciousness and bliss, omnipotent and the controller of the *karma*s and yet he creates and sustains the world like a father and is by the actions of the individual. He is omniscient, eternal, conscious and pure bliss and yet he has desires. Hence he is an individual. He creates the universe due to compassion. His purpose is the spiritual evolution of the individual. Śamkara has criticised such a conception of God. If the creation is according to *karma*s, there is hardly any place for compassion and if the compassion has still the same role to play, God becomes partial and imperfect.

(2) The God of Śamkara is immanent as well as transcendent. The God of Nyāya is beyond the universe. In both God is an instrumental cause, but in Śamkara's philosophy, God is also the material cause.

(3) Nyāya tries to prove God on the basis of the *Sāṁśnyato-dṛṣṭi* inference. Śamkara like Kant admits that the existence of God cannot be proved by an intellectual argument, but its only proof is the scripture.

(4) According to Nyāya philosophy every efficient cause requires necessary knowledge, desires and efforts as in the case of human action. But according to Śamkara, only knowledge is sufficient. There is no need of desire and efforts of the creator in creation, because if it is so it needs an earlier desire and earlier effort, since there is a problem of creator and so on and thus one arrives on the fallacy of regressing *ad infinitum*.

Though Śamkara does not accept *Īśvara* as ultimate reality, yet like a systematic philosopher he gives proofs for the existence of God. These arguments are as follows.

(1) *Cosmological Argument*—The valid and systematic world of multiple names and forms cannot be a creation of material *Prakṛti* as that in Śamkara's philosophy or that of the movements of atoms in Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In the *Tarkapāda* of his famous commentary on the *Brahman Sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, Śamkara has

elaborately criticized the theories of creation in Śamkhya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies. It goes without saying that the traditional arguments against the theory of creation do not apply on Śamkara's views.

(2) *Teleological Argument*—In the creation of the world there appears a system, an order, a harmony. The structure of various animals and above all of the human beings can puzzle even the greatest minds. Even the best artist finds satisfaction in attempting to copy the Nature, hence how can this beautiful world be the work of some unconscious material Prakṛti? Only a conscious God can be the creator of this universe. He creates the world to fulfil the purposes of the individuals. He is omniscient and so he creates the universe according to the desires of the individuals. Taking the seeds of names and forms of the Māyā he creates a systematic world. The system explicit everywhere in the creation testifies to the purpose of the creator. This is the teleological argument to prove the existence of a conscious God as creator of the world.

(3) *Moral Argument*—One finds a wide difference in the status of different individuals in the world. One enjoys pleasure while another suffers pain. One is born with a silver spoon in his mouth another cannot make both ends meet, even after much labour. If the world is a moral order, why is there all this injustice? If the creator and sustainer of the world is not a wicked spirit, why is there so much pain, misery and sins? It is to give a moral interpretation of this inequality that Kant has taken resort to the postulate of God. Śamkara brings here the doctrine of karmas. All the inequality in the lots of the individual is due to their past karmas. Only the doctrine of karma can satisfactorily give a moral interpretation of such wide differences found among the individuals and beings. According to Mīmāṃsā philosophy, this karma is an imperceptible power, named Apoorva which creates the good and consequence. But if this Apoorva is itself an unconscious power, how can it create the good and bad consequences? It can be done only by some conscious power. Hence according to Śamkara it is only God who awards and punishes the individuals according to their karmas. He is the controller of all actions. This is the moral argument to prove the existence of conscious God who systematically awards and punishes different individuals according to their deeds.

This moral argument has also been presented in a somewhat different form. It is the Śruti which formulates the moral principles,

but the validity of Śruti is based upon its creator, the God. It is only because they are the commands of God that the principles laid down in Śruti are categorical. It is He who decides about moral principles since He is the ultimate end of all. The actions opposed to him are wrong while those according to him are right. Hence the existence of God is proved as the ultimate end and the source of the moral principles.

Both God and individuals are mere worldly realities. Both are the reflections of Brahman, both possess pure consciousness. Both are Brahman itself from the transcendental standpoint. Thus from the transcendental standpoint both are same, but from the practical standpoint there is a whole world of difference between them. The Jivas have also been held as parts of God though God is without parts. The knowledge, power and existence of the Jivas is limited. The God is omnipresent, omniscient, infinite, all bliss and perfect. The Jivas are related by merits and demerits. God is beyond both and controls them. The Jivas make efforts for liberation. God is eternally liberated and helps the Jivas in their efforts. The Jivas are active, while it is God who gives them initiative. The Jivas are enjoyers, the God is free. Thus the Jivas are worldly while the God is beyond the world. But ultimately all this dualism is meaningful only on the practical plane. By the realisation of Brahman all this dualism disappears. According to Rāmanuja, however, this dualism is not due to ignorance, but eternal. Between Jiva and God there is the relation of part and whole, controlled and controller, mode and substance. Of these two views regarding the relation of individuals and God, Śamkara's philosophy does satisfy the demands of reason while in Rāmanuja's philosophy, on the other hand, there is no place for immediate mystic experience and intellectual philosophy.

Q 75. Discuss fully Śamkara's account of the nature of self
(Bombay 1963 63)

What is the nature of Jiva according to Śamkara? How is it related to Brahman?
(Karnatak 1968)

Śamkara has not admitted any dualism between the self and the Brahman. Self is without particular characteristics. It is itself Brahman. It is all pervading and omnipresent. It is one, non-dual, partless, beyond space, time, ultimate and true. As a matter of fact, Śamkara has described Brahman, self and liberation almost in the same terms. According to Dr R P Singh, Śamkara has established

an axiological harmony in all these. According to different temperaments, different interpreters have emphasized different aspects of this synthesis. Dr. Radhakrishnan has emphasized the Brahman aspect of this trinity. Prof. A. C. Mukerjee lays emphasis on the self aspect. Prof. Ranade, on the other hand, specially emphasized the mystic experience. But Śamkara has established an Advaita which is the same from all sides. According to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, the Brahman and self both are perfect. If the self is taken out of Brahman, Brahman still remains perfect. "That is full, this is full, from that full this full has been taken and yet whatever remains is also full." Brahman is omnipresent in the form of self. In the psychological argument to prove the existence of Brahman, Śamkara has emphasized precisely on this unity of the self and Brahman. According to Śamkara Brahman exists, since everyone of us feels the existence of self and none denies its existence. Both self and Brahman have been described as Existence, Consciousness and Bliss, eternal, omnipresent, self of all, self-established immutable etc.

According to Śamkara self is present in every stage of consciousness. Man passes through different stages of consciousness i.e. waking, dreaming and sleeping but in every stage he experiences that he exists. By an analysis of the state of deep sleep, Śamkara has proved the Vedānta's view regarding the nature of self. This analysis seems to be more cogent than the solutions found by the Western philosophers, including James and Bradley etc. Most of the arguments against the eternal nature of self are based on the hypothesis that the stage of deep sleep is unconscious. But according to Śamkara's analysis this external unconsciousness is due to the non-existence of the objects of consciousness and not due to the absence of consciousness itself. Śamkara has distinguished between self-consciousness and pure consciousness. Pure consciousness is eternal but in the absence of object it is not experienced in the form of self-consciousness. Consciousness is the nature of self. The self perceives even in the state of deep sleep, though in the absence of the external objects, it appears not to be perceiving. The consciousness is not an activity of the self, but this is just as the light is the nature of the sun and not its quality. In the absence of object, the sun will not enlighten anything and yet this makes no difference in its light. The eye cannot see the eye, it can only be seen in the mirror. Similarly, some external object is required for self-consciousness. The Western Vedāntins like Deussen etc.,

failed to evaluate the real importance of Śāmkara's analysis of deep sleep. Like Kant, Śāmkara has particularly emphasized the epistemological aspect of self. The experience "I hope" is sufficient to establish the continuity of self in man. Without self no experience or knowledge is possible. The knowledge of change is possible only through an unchanging knower.

Śāmkara has called the self, conscious or knowledge. According to him it is a universal truth that knowledge is not possible without knower. It is this fact which he has emphasized in the III chapter of his *Upadeśa Sahaśrārī* and the commentary on the *Praśnopaniṣad*. Knowledge does not create the objects as is sometimes supposed by the idealists like Berkeley. But without knowledge the existence of the object is almost equal to non existence, because it is meaningless. Like the realists, Śāmkara admits that the object is outside the mind, but then like Kant he thinks that mind alone gives meaning to the external world. Modern psychology also supports his views. It is impossible to prove that the object exists without its being known. It is impossible that there may be colour without some eye to perceive it. The knowledge of an object must precede before some judgement about its existence. According to Śāmkara no one can prove that there is some object which is not known and the effort to prove this is as much meaningless as to admit that there is colour without the existence of eyes. Taking this argument further, Śāmkara says, "Even the non existence of any object cannot be established in the absence of knowledge." According to Sureśvara all objects are by the self.

The self cannot be denied. It is non contradictory. It is beyond all activities. It is always present. It is neither external nor internal. It is the centre of the mind, senses and the world of external objects. The meaning of the objects depends on their relation with this centre. It is the power of consciousness and the seer of

always depends on the existence of self. The self is the witness of the universe.

The self is the basis of all testimonies. Hence it is proved even before the use of any testimony. The self is *Svayamsiddha* while the not self is *Āgantuka*. The self is beyond all testimonies. It is not effect because every effect has its cause. It is the cause or substratum of all the objects and itself beyond the cause and effect.

etc. Against the Western philosophers, like James and Hume and the Buddhist philosophers, Śamkara argues that the self cannot be a process or changing, because the knowledge of every chance requires an unchanging knower. Against the materialists like Lokāyatika etc., Śamkara says that they confuse the Swayamsiddha self with Āgantuka. The self is the source of all testimonies and hence cannot be condemned by any testimony. Even the negation of the self is impossible in the absence of self. It goes without saying that this argument as laid by Śamkara is a strong reasoning against the view of the modern materialists, including Holt, Watson and Russell as well as against the old materialists including John Toland, Diderot and Cabanis etc. According to Śamkara there are two elements in perception, Bodha and Vṛtti. Bodh is self-proved, permanent, seer and witness. Vṛtti is Āgantuka, changing, unstable and object. In the states of deep sleep and Turiya there is no vṛtti, but bodha. Hence they are not unconscious states. They are conscious, but not self-conscious because of the absence of vṛtti. This analysis of Śamkara finds support in the views of the Western philosophers, like Green and Kant.

Self is without attribute, without parts, all-pervading and non dual. The Jiva is conditional, possesses parts like Antahkaraṇa etc., limited and many. The self is ultimate and transcendental, while the Jiva is pragmatic and psychological. Due to the mind, intellect and ego, the Jiva is personal. The self is impersonal. The Jiva is not a part or mode of self, but it is a reflection. Its instruments are due to ignorance and Māyā.

The Jiva is the doer, enjoyer and seer. The self is non-doer. In it there is no distinction of the cause, action and consequences. All distinctions are due to ignorance. The self is eternally liberated. It is not caught in the enjoyments of the world. It is conscious and of the nature of light. It is attributeless consciousness as such. It is beyond the merit and the demerit, pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion, desire and volition, action, bondage, liberation and transmigration etc., the characteristics of Jiva. The Jiva is caught in right and wrong, profit and loss, fame and defame etc., while the self is free from all these. The Jiva has a subtle body and a causal body. Its external body is composed of the five elements, sense organs and vital power, while the subtle body is composed of the five sense organs, five motor organs, five prāṇas, mind and the intellect. It remains in the waking, sleeping and dreaming stage. The self is Turiya which is unconditional, homogeneous and

immortal), Jiva is the object of the concept of 'I'. The self is known through immediate experience. The self is beyond space, time and causality. It is of the nature of bliss, conscious and divine. But this distinction of the Jiva and self is valid only on the pragmatic level. On the transcendental level in the philosophy of Samkara all dualism disappears. The distinction of Jiva and self is due to ignorance and Māyā. As they disappear on the transcendental level this distinction also disappears and the real essence of the Jiva, i.e., the self alone remains. Thus ultimately the self or the Brahman is the only eternal truth, all else is ignorance and adventitious.

Among the Western philosophers John Locke, like the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers of India maintained that consciousness is the quality of self. In this view self is merely an unconscious substance. The consciousness is a quality originated by the contact of the self with the mind and sense organs. According to Jayanta, in the contact of mind the self is conscious, while without it, it is unconscious. In the Tarkapada of his commentary on Brahman Sūtra, Samkara has indicated that according to some followers of Kaṇāda consciousness is born in the same way, just as the red colour is created in the jug by the contact of the fire. According to Samkara the main fallacy in such a view is to misunderstand the Swayamsīdha self as Āgantuka. If the self is always joined with the mind, the memory, perception, etc. should always happen, but such is not the case in experience. The self is attributeless, without particulars, unique and unattached. Scriptures are against the Nyāya view. The consciousness is not the quality of self but its nature. The self is of the nature of consciousness, right witness, always existent and pure eternal Bodh. It is always conscious.

The above arguments also apply against the conception of the materialists and the Vijnānavād in Buddhists. All objects depend upon the consciousness. Hence consciousness itself cannot be an object and while matter is one of the objects of self the self can not be matter. The self is of the nature of both. All the concepts are its objects and the mental modifications are its concepts. Hence the self cannot be Ālayavijñāna. It is rather the witness of changing states of the Ālayavijñāna. According to Kumāṛila, the self is the generator of knowledge. Samkara on the other hand, maintains that it is beyond activity and enjoyment. The knowledge is created and destroyed, hence if the self is based on it, it becomes with part

non-eternal, impure and pragmatic. But the self is eternal. It is without distinctions of knower, known and knowledge. It is not adventitious but self-evident.

Like the Western philosopher, Bradley, Nāgārjuna admits the self as Śūnya. By utilizing his fourfold logic, Nāgārjuna has tried to prove the self as non-existent like the son of a barren woman. Though Śamkara has been sometimes called a Crypto-Buddhist, but he has vehemently criticised nihilism and warned against the confusion of Brahman or self with Śūnya. Against nihilism he has gone to the extent of saying that since nihilism is opposed to all testimonies, it is not worthy of getting the respect of even being criticised. But then he has not left this topic here, he has further pointed out that in the basis of every logical denial there must be some affirmation. If all the object are negated even the negation becomes impossible and consequently the objects which are negated are affirmed. In his commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, Śamkara has indicated this fact by emphasizing the epistemological aspect of self. Even if it is left un-decided, whether the subject of knowledge is existent or non-existent, the consciousness of Jñāna must be pre-supposed by every object. In his commentary on Prasnopaniṣad, Śamkara has pointed out that the nihilists should at least admit that the knower is knowable and eternal. In the absence of the knower, even the negation of knowledge is unimaginable. Without knowledge even the existence of ignorance cannot be conceived. Hence Jñāna, consciousness and self is self-evident and the source of all testimonies.

Q. 76. What is Adhyāsa? How does Samkaracharya put this concept to a metaphysical use. (Karnatak. 1955, 1956)

In an argument in his famous commentary on Brahman Śūtra, Śamkara has distinguished between the self and the not-self and warned against confusing the two to be one. "In the field of 'I' and 'thou', subject and object, which are opposed to each other in nature like light and darkness, when it is proved that they cannot exist inter-dependently, it appears to be still more illogical that their characteristics can be imposed on one another." Thus neither the self nor its characteristics can be imposed on one another. This false imposition is known as Adhyāsa. In the words of Śamkara, "The imposition of something in the form of memory that has been seen earlier or somewhere else is Adhyāsa." Thus Adhyāsa is an illusive perception. The cause of the illusion

is the confusion of the imposed with that on which it is imposed Śamkara has defined *adhyāsa* as 'Smṛti Rupah Paratra Pūrva Dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ' In this definition of *Adhyāsa* *Avabhāsa* means false perception of some object The use of the word *Dṛṣṭa* according to Vāchaspati Misra shows that the object is not real but merely imaginary The present object cannot be imposed hence the imposition is of some object seen earlier The object of imposition is somewhere else and that is why imposition is illusion Thus the *adhyāsa* is the result of the mixture of truth and untruth

(1) *Ātmakhyātivāda*—While defining *adhyāsa* Śamkara has indicated some other views about it As he says, 'Some other person defined *adhyāsa* as the imposition of some *dharma* at some where else' According to *Vijnānvādins* the external world has no independent existence but due to ignorance there appears to be an external world The imposition of the idea on this external world is *adhyāsa* This view is known as *Ātmakhyātivāda*

(2) *Anyathakhyātivāda*—According to *Sautrāntika* Buddhists the imposition of the mental concept on the external world is *adhyāsa* This view is known as *Anyathākhyātivāda* The *Nyāya* philosophy has also presented a view similar to this

(3) *Akhyātivāda*—Some other philosophers defined *adhyāsa* 'as the imposition of an object on another due to illusion caused by the failure to understand the distinction between the two objects' Such is the *akhyātivāda* of the *Mīmāṃsā* philosopher *Prabhākara* Misra

(4) *Asatkhyātivāda*—According to some other philosophers when an object is imposed on another then the existence of a quality in the second as opposed to that of the first is imagined This view is known as *Asatkhyātivāda*

By a survey of the above definitions of *Adhyāsa* Śamkara arrives at a common element in them and concludes that in *adhyāsa* an object is imposed on another This definition is not merely for the students of philosophy, but also for the common man It proves Śamkara's view about *adhyāsa* which has already been explained

Beside the definition of *adhyāsa* already given, Śamkara gives yet another definition of *adhyāsa* saying that the appearance of something in something other than it is known as *adhyāsa* Thus when one sees rope as snake and the silver as nacre it is *adhyāsa*. Here some thing has been perceived as something else Similarly, when a man sees the self in the not self i.e. body intellect etc.,

which are entirely different in their nature from the former, it is said to be *adhyāsa*.

It may be questioned here that if the self is always a subject, how can anything be imposed on it? How can any object in its characteristic be imposed on the self? Similarly, it may be said that if the self is not the reality and the non-self is merely an illusion or reflection, how can *adhyāsa* be possible since *adhyāsa* needs at least two objects.

To this Śamkara replies that the self is not a known object, because it is the object of the concept of 'I'. In the concept of 'I' the self is seen as the doer and the enjoyer. The self is the object of immediate experience, because by its disappearance the whole universe will be in dark. Hence ultimately Śamkara maintains that the self is the object of immediate experience. It goes without saying that the first answer is merely a preface to the second reply, because Śamkara has followed the Upaniṣadic successive method of showing the Arundhatī Star. In spite of putting the whole truth at once he reveals it only gradually. In his philosophy also, here is an effort to take the enquirer gradually to the transcendental level through the Prātibhāsika and pragmatic levels.

Now the question remains that if the self is the only truth, how can *adhyāsa* be possible? To this, Śamkara replies that there is no such principle that only an existent object should be imposed on another object. Thus the imposition is possible even in the absence of one of the objects, just as while the sky is said to be blue, the blue colour is imposed on the sky, though we do not see the sky but only the blue colour. Similarly, in spite of the self being the only reality, the not-self can be imposed upon it. This *adhyāsa* is the basis of the workings of *Māyā*.

In brief, the *adhyāsa* is of the nature of ignorance. Its work is to create the sense of doer and enjoyer in the self. Its proof is the common experience of everyone.

According to Śamkara the scholars have called the above behaviour as ignorance, while the understanding of the real essence of things after knowledge is said to be *Vidyā*. Ignorance or *Avidyā* is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indescribable. All the objects of the empirical world are due to *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* is false knowledge. It is the cause of the power of *Māyā*. It overshadows the self and the Brahman. It remains in the *Jīvas* in the form of *karmas*. It is due to *Avidyā* that the *Jīva* does not know his real

form Avidyā is eternal and natural, but it can be destroyed through knowledge. It is the worldly behaviour.

Adhyāsa is not Avidyā, but its consequence. Both Avidyā and Jīva are eternal. Liberation from Avidyā is necessary for the destruction of Adhyāsa. This liberation from Avidyā is precisely the aim sought by the study of the Vedānta scriptures.

Q 77 Explain and examine the Advaita concept of Māya.
(Cal 1972, Madras 1962, Mysore 1962, Gujrat 1964, Meerut 1972, Kan 1970)
Show how Samkara uses the concept of Māya. (Bombay 1955)

What is Māya according to Samkara? Determine its significance in his philosophy. (Poona 1966, 1965, 1960, Karnatak 1965)

What according to Samkara is the relation between Brahman and the world? Is the world illusory? Give reasons for your answer. (Madras 1966)

Avidyā and Māyā are the subjective and objective forms of the same phenomenon. Avidyā is in the Jīva, it is the characteristic of its intellect. Māyā is the creative power of the world of name and form. As the knowledge dawns, the Avidyā disappears, but Māyā is eternal like Brahman since it is the power of qualified Brahman / i.e., Īśvara. But in another context Avidyā has also been said to be eternal, since the Māyā exists in it in the seed form. As a matter of fact just as there is identity between the self and the Brahman, similarly the Māyā and Avidyā are the same. Both are personal and both are universal. Really speaking, Śamkara has used the following terms in almost similar meaning.

Māyā, Avidyā, Ajñāna, Adhyārope, Vivarta, Bhrānti, Bhrama, Nāma Rūpa, Avyakta, Akṣara, Beeja Sakti, and Moolā Prakṛti etc. The words Māyā, Avidyā, Adhyāsa and Vivarta have been particularly used in almost the same sense. But some of the post-Śamkarite Vedāntins have distinguished between Avidyā and Māyā. According to them, Avidyā is negative and in the individual, while Māyā is positive and all pervading.

Brahman together with Māyā is Īśvara. Māyā is its power. It is the origin of the world of name and form. Names and forms are neither existent nor non-existent, they are the seed forms of the universe. They are the constituents of the Prakṛti of Īśvara. The creatorship of God depends upon the sprouting of these seeds of Avidyā. He knows them even before creation. It is due to them that he is omniscient. His omnipotence depends upon them. It is through them again that he creates all the elements and be-

Apart from God there is no existence of names and forms, though God himself is different and pure-consciousness. The world is merely a play or *Līlā* of *Iśvara*. Due to this *Māyā* the inactive God becomes active, *Māyā* is said to be *Mahā Māyā*. God is called *Mahā-Māyin*. *Māyā* is not independent like the *Prakṛti* of *Sāmkhya*, it depends on God. It is due to *Avidyā* or *Māyā* that one God is seen in many forms. *Māyā* is deep sleep or universal ignorance in which the ignorant *Jivas* remain sleeping. This is the condition before creation. It is from this that God creates the universe,

Śamkara has described the following characteristics of *Māyā* or *Avidyā*.

(1) *Māyā is eternal (Anādi)*—*Māyā* is the power of God. It is through it that God creates the universe. Hence like God it is also eternal. Even after destruction it remains in the God in seed-form.

(2) *Māyā is God's power (Iśvara-Śakti)*—*Māyā* is the power of God. It absolutely depends on him and cannot exist separate. It is not separate from God and there is a relation of identity between the two.

(3) *Māyā is material and unconscious*—Like the *Prakṛti* of *Śamkhya*, *Māyā* is material and unconscious. It is opposed to nature of Brahman in the same way just as the *Sāmkhya Prakṛti* is different from *Sāmkhya Puruṣa*. But unlike *Prakṛti* it is neither real nor independent.

(4) *Māyā is Bhāvarūpa*—*Māyā* is *Bhāvarūpa*, though it is not real. By calling it *Bhāvarūpa*, i.e., of the nature of existence, it is shown that it is not negative. As a matter of fact, *Māyā* has two aspects. In the negative aspect it is the covering of reality and keeps it covered. In the positive aspect it creates the universe as the reflection of Brahman. It is ignorance as well as false knowledge.

(5) *Māyā is destructible through knowledge*—As the knowledge dawns, *Māyā* disappears. The liberated soul is beyond the influence of *Māyā*. The disappearance of *Avidyā* leads to the appearance of *Vidyā*. As the rope is known the snake disappears, similarly as the real nature of the self is known the world of name and form i.e., *Māyā* ceases to have any existence.

(6) *Māyā is Vyāvahārika*—*Māyā* is *Vyāvahārika* or merely pragmatic reality. It is of the nature of reflection. On the trans-

cidental level only the Brahman is true, Māyā is its reflection in the practical world

(7) *Māyā is indescribable*—Māyā is existent, because it is eternal like God and the creative power of the universe. It is non-existent, because apart from God it has no existence. It is real since it is existent in the state of ignorance. It is unreal, since it disappears with the dawn of knowledge and does not limit the Brahman. Lastly, it can neither be said as existent non-existent (*Sad Asad*), because these are mutually contradictory. Hence Śāṅkara has called the Māyā to be "existent non-existent indescribable". Thus Māyā cannot be described.

(8) *Māyā is of the nature of Adhyāsa (Adhyāsa Ropa)*—Just as the snake is imposed on rope and the silver on nacre, similarly the Jivas engrossed by Māyā see the attributeless Brahman as the world of many names and forms. Adhyāsa is due to Māyā or Avidyā. Hence the Māyā is said to be Mool Avidyā or the basic ignorance. In the form of Avidyā, it is also said to be Tool Avidyā.

(9) *Māyā is the substratum and object of Brahman*—The Māyā is the substratum and object of Brahman, though just as the imposition of the blue colour on the colourless sky does not affect the sky itself or just as the magician is not influenced by his magic, similarly, the Brahman is not influenced by Māyā.

(10) *Māyā is Asiddha*—Avidyā is unmanifested and God-dependent. It is of the nature of Māyā, the eternal sleep. All the distinctions are due to Avidyā. Māyā is of the nature of false conceptions. The nature of Avidyā is to cover knowledge. This is done in three ways :

(a) In the form of false knowledge

(b) In the form of doubt

(c) In the form of ignorance

But it does not affect Brahman. Avidyā is not non-existent like the son of a barren woman. Since it is experienced it is absolutely existent as it is destroyed by immediate experience. Had it been non-existent, nothing could come out of it. Had it been existent, all the objects created by it should also have been existent. Hence, like Māyā Avidyā also cannot be called existent, non-existent both or neither. Avidyā is indescribable. What is Avidyā? How, when and why is the Jīva caught in it? How do the Brahman and Avidyā go together? Whose Avidyā is it? These are the

questions which Śamkara has not answered, because they are beyond the limits of philosophy. Ultimately the human being cannot claim complete knowledge. At least it is not possible through reason that Brahman is the object of immediate experience. The expression of this immediate experience has its own limitations in philosophy. Not only the Indian philosophers, but also the Western philosophers, like Bergson, Bradley and Kant etc., admit these limitations. As a matter of fact there is identity between the world and the Brahman, and they are the same. Hence the question of their relation does not arise. The world is a reflection of Brahman. The reflection is not independently existent. It is the Real itself, though in essence it is seen as separate. Śamkara has logically criticized all other explanations of the relation of Brahman and the world and proved that this relation is indescribable and beyond the limits of logic. The causal relation cannot be applied in the case of the Brahman and the world. Śamkara admits the doctrine of 'Ajāti' of Gaudapāda. Evolution, change, progress and becoming, all are mere illusions. The word Māyā represents the limits of human knowledge. Human knowledge is limited to this world alone. The eternal Brahman is an object of immediate experience. The solution of this 'Why' is beyond the limits of philosophy. The world is not Parīṇāma, but Vivarta. In Parīṇāma, the cause and effect have the same nature while in Vivarta, they are different. Māyā is not a substance, hence it cannot be the material cause of the universe. It is merely the instrumental cause of the universe. Like the warmth in the fire, it remains with God. It can be inferred by its effects.

Śamkara has used different analogies to explain the nature of the world. Of these the most important are Rope and Snake, Nacre and Silver, the city of Gāndhāra, the dream, the foam, the Māyā, the Alāt Chakra, the seeing of double moon, the illusory elephant and the jugglery etc. These analogies have been used to point out that the Brahman is the only truth and whatever is different from Brahman is false. According to the logic of the Advaita philosophy, Brahman cannot be One and Many, Being and Becoming at the same time. As Śamkara points out, if both were true, the worldly man should not be caught in the mire of untruth. Nor can it be said that the liberation is attained by knowledge and in that condition the knowledge of one should not surpass the knowledge of many. But this does not mean that Śamkara has taken the world as mere dream or mental concept,

Śamkara's efforts for social and religious reformation in India are ample proofs that he did not believe the world to be a dream. To understand the real meaning of *Māyā*, Śamkara's doctrine of *Vivarta* should be clearly understood. Śamkara has clearly distinguished between the philosophical and the worldly standpoint and also synthesized both. He is not prepared for any compromise in the field of philosophy. The world is unreal and hence it cannot find any place in reality. But then the unreal too has its degrees. There is distinction between the *Vyāvaharika* and the *Pratibhāsika* unreality.

Thus according to Śamkara all the objects can be divided into three categories—

(1) *Pratibhāsika*—The objects belonging to *Pratibhāsika* level are those which manifest in the dreams or illusions but are contradicted by the experiences of the waking stage.

(2) *Vyāvaharika*—The objects belonging to *Vyāvaharika* level are those which manifest in the waking state but it cannot be said to be real due to their contradiction with logic, e.g., the cloth, the jug, etc.

(3) *Paramārthika*—The *Paramārthika* level is the transcendental level or pure existence which appears in all other states which is uncontradicted and whose contradiction cannot be imagined.

Hence Śamkara has clearly distinguished between the dream and the worldly experience. The ignorance resulting from both has also been distinguished. The experience of the *Pratibhāsika* objects is personal and due to immediate ignorance, called *Avidyā*. The experience of the *Vyāvaharika* objects is universal and due to relatively permanent ignorance, called *Māyā*. As a matter of fact the world is between reality and unreality. According to Śamkara just as the existence of the causal Brahman remains in all the three times, similarly, the universe also does not lose its essence because the effect is non-different from the cause. Again the multiple objects of name and form are real so far as their essence is concerned. But in their particular form they are unreal.

The real modification of any substance is known as *pariṇāma* e.g., the conversion of milk into curd. As against this the appearance of the modification of a substance is known as *Vivarta* e.g., the appearance of rope as a snake. Both these views are *Satkārya* *avasthā* as they believe that the effect has existence in the cause. The *Sāṃkhya* and the qualified monism believe in *Pariṇāma* *vāda* while *Advaita Vedānta* maintains the theory of *Vivarta*. Thus Śamkara

maintains Satkāryavāda in the form of Vivartavāda. The effect according to him is non-different from the cause. The earthenware is nothing else than earth. The golden ornaments are the gold itself. Again, the effect and its material cause are invariably related. The effect cannot exist without cause. The ware cannot be separated from the clay, nor can the ornaments be conceived apart from gold. It is illusion to maintain that the effect is something new which was non-existent earlier and which has been newly born. Essentially, it was always existent in its material cause. The creation of the reality from the unreal cannot be imagined. The substance can change one form for another. If the real could come out of unreal, the oil should be extracted from the sand and not only from oil seeds. Due to the activity of the instrumental cause no new substance is born, but the form latent in the substance is manifested. Hence the effect is non-different from the cause and exists in it. The effect is merely a form of the cause. Hence the causal relation is not a real change. The changing world is merely a reflection. This reflection is due to adhyāsa. Adhyāsa is due to Avidyā. Both adhyāsa and avidyā are eternal, hence the world also seems to be eternal.

According to Saṃkara the Sāṃkhya philosophers have failed to understand the real meaning of Satkāryavāda. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, in spite of the presence of the effect in the material cause, it is the real modification or *pariṇāma* of it, since it assumes a new form. According to Saṃkara this means that what was unreal has become real. Thus the very doctrine of Satkāryavāda is negated. The change of the form is not a real modification. The form is merely a state of the substance or the material cause which is inseparable from the substance. The existence of the form is due to substance. In spite of the change of the form the substance remains the same. While waking, dreaming and sleeping, Devadatta remains Devadatta. Again, the form is not separate from the substance. If the form and substance are different, it is impossible to relate them, because to separate the two objects the help of a third thing is imperative. Then to relate this third thing with the first and the second, the fourth and the fifth objects will be required. Thus the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* will follow. Hence the form is not different from the substance. Thus the change of the form is merely a reflection. In the independent Advaita books, like Chitsukhi, Advaita Siddhi and Khandan Khind

Khādyā many wonderful arguments in favour of Vivartavāda have been presented

Where Samkara has proved his Vivartavāda by arguments from scriptures, he has also shown that by admitting this theory, many difficulties regarding creation can be removed. By admitting it a parināma, it is impossible to explain creation. If the God is conceived as a creator, and the world is taken as a creation out of the unconscious prakṛti as separate from Him, is also accepted. The assumption of prakṛti to be real and dependent on God has also its difficulties. In this hypothesis, either the prakṛti is merely a part of God or non-different from Him. If like Rāmānuja, the former alternative is accepted, the God also becomes mortal and with parts like the physical objects. If prakṛti is taken as non-different from God, then the evolution of prakṛti means the conversion of God into world. Thus after creation there remains no God different from creation. Hence it is clear that if a partial or complete modification in it is accepted, He does not remain worthy of being called God. According to Samkara all these difficulties are removed when the doctrine of Vivarta is accepted.

It is on the basis of the doctrine of Vivarta that the Advaita philosophy maintains the relation of reflection (Pratibimba) between the Jīva and Brahman. The reflection of infinite consciousness on the mirror of Avidyā is Jīva. Just as the moon causes many reflections in different pools of water and the reflections differ in their cleanliness according to the degree of cleanliness of the water and also appear to be stable or moving if the water is stable or moving, similarly due to the nature of Avidyā, the Jīvas, the reflections of the infinite, appear to have different forms and types. Two things are clear by the analogy of reflection. First, it is one Brahman which reflects differently in different Antahkaranas due to different Avidyā, and secondly it also points out that the clearness of the reflection of the Brahman will be proportionate to the clearness of the Antahkarana.

But there is one grave defect in the theory of reflection. If this theory is admitted, the liberation of Jīva means its destruction, because when the mirror of Avidyā is destroyed its reflection should also disappear. Hence to save the existence of the Jīva some Advaita philosophers have established Avacchedavāda. In the theory, the analogy of the space in the jug (Ghataśūnya) has been used. As a matter of fact, the space is all pervading and one but with this distinction of the jug etc., it appears to be in different

form, and from the practical point of view this itself is admitted to be real. Similarly, in spite of Brahman being all-pervading and one, it appears to be many in the form of the Jivas and the objects due to Avidyā. Thus though the Jiva is limited and finite, it is non-different from the Brahman. The meaning of the liberation is to break all the limitations imposed by Avidyā and to become the unconditional Brahman. This view is known as Avacchedavāda.

Q. 78. What is liberation according to Samkara? State the means of attaining it. (Baroda 1955)

In his commentary on Brahman Sutra, Samkara has given an elaborate distinction of the nature of liberation. Liberation or Mokṣa is the transcendental truth, immutable, eternal, all-pervading like the space, devoid of all activities, eternally contented, partless, of the nature of self light, that where there is no distribution of the merits and demerits, cause and effect, the present, the past and the future, that disembodied state is liberation. The liberated self regains his real form in the Advaita Brahman Siddhi. Mokṣa is said to be liberation of the self from Avidyā. According to Chitsukhāchārya, Mokṣa is the attainment of incessant bliss. Mokṣa is eternal. The self is eternally liberated. Hence nothing new is gained in liberation since otherwise it shall be non-eternal.

As a matter of fact there is hardly any demarcation line between the achievement of knowledge and liberation. The Upaniṣads have maintained that the knower of the Brahman becomes Brahman. Mokṣa means seeing the self in all. It is the status of identity with Brahman. The Brahman's knowledge culminates into the experience of Brahman. In Brahman knowledge there is no difference of the knower, known and knowledge. From the transcendental standpoint the self, the Brahman and the liberation are the same. The self is Brahman. It is eternally liberated. The liberation is the annihilation of the awareness of multiplicity. It is not the destruction of the worldly names and forms, since really speaking the transcendental self has no relation with the universe. As it has been said in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, "This puruṣa is non-attached." The Mokṣa means the identity of Brahman and the Ātman. This identity is not the imposition of Brahman on Ātman. According to Samkara knowledge is not an activity. Hence the attainment of liberation is not an activity. As the covering of Avidyā is removed from the liberated soul, one knows one's real essence. This is liberation. Liberation is not due to

knowledge, but it is knowledge itself. In the words of Padmapāda Mokṣa is liberation from the false knowledge. False knowledge breeds misery. As it disappears, the misery also disappears.

Just as Śamkara's Brahman is different from the Śūnya of the Mādhyamika philosophy, similarly Mokṣa is different from Nirvāṇa. Mokṣa is not negative. It is bliss. Like the Apavarga of Nyāya, the self does not become conscious in the Mokṣa of Vedānta, but rather appears as the pure consciousness which is its real nature. According to qualified monism, in liberation the self does not become Īśvara, but appears like Him, lives in His contact, dwells in His country and remains attached to Him. But in Advaita the liberated self sees everyone in the self and nothing else. Unlike the Buddhist's conception of Nirvāṇa the self is not annihilated in the Mokṣa of Advaita, but only its conditions are destroyed. The liberated self is non-different from Brahman. From the liberated individual the names and forms of the world disappear and elsewhere he sees the same Brahman. The Mokṣa is not attained through self-purification since self-purification is an activity. The Mokṣa is attained through knowledge which is not an activity, but itself existence. Mokṣa is eternal, pure and of the nature of Brahman.

Śamkara believes in the possibility of gradual liberation. Commenting on a verse in Praśnopariṣad regarding the concentration on Om, he says that such concentration leads to Brahmaloka where we gradually attain complete knowledge. On another place, Śamkara has maintained that the worship of the attributed Īśvara leads to purification from sins, the attainment of bliss and gradual liberation.

According to Śamkara Mokṣa does not mean the cessation of the body, but the extinction of ignorance. Hence he believes in liberation while living (Jīvan Mukti). Just as the wheel of a potter remains moving even after the pot is made, similarly the man remains living even after attaining liberation, because there is nothing to stop the earlier continuity of life. Śamkara has here given the example of a man who sees double moon due to some defect in the eye and cannot stop seeing like this in spite of knowing that in fact there is only one moon. For a liberated person all the activities are in Brahman. The post-Śamkarite Vedāntins have presented several views regarding liberation while living. According to some Avidyā remains for some time even after being extinguished.

According to others for the liberated person there is no existence of the body or the world. The state of liberation while living is also known as disembodied liberation (*Videha Mukti*).

According to Śamkara, Mokṣa or the disembodied state of the self is eternal. It is questioned here that if the self is eternally liberated, what is the need of efforts for liberation. On the other hand, if the liberation is achieved by efforts, it seems meaningless to call the self as always existing, established in its own glory, eternally liberated etc. A subtle analysis here will further show that in Vedānta everywhere two types of self have been conceived. Of these Empirical Self (*Vijnāna Ātmā*) is the enjoyer and bound while the metaphysical self (*Paramātmā*) is immutable and eternally liberated. Forgetting his eternal self the Jiva identifies himself with the empirical form. The essential nature of the Jiva is however the metaphysical self. The meaning of *Avidyā* is the dualism of the Jiva and the metaphysical self. To remove this dualism by establishing the identity of the self is the aim of Vedānta. Hence the metaphysical self is eternally liberated, but the empirical self requires study, meditation and concentration etc., to achieve liberation. By this means the Jiva leaves the dualism and recognises the true nature of the metaphysical self and thus attains liberation. But some persons have raised an enquiry as to why the Jiva is caught in *Avidyā*. According to Deussen and Pārth Sārathi Miśra Śamkara does not explain the cause of *Avidyā*. But as a matter of fact it is impossible to explain the cause of *Avidyā*. *Avidyā* is eternal just as the self is eternal. To question why there is *Avidyā* is like questioning why there is self? Ultimately, even the philosophical solutions have got a limit. Beyond that limit, the human intellect should keep silent and follow the path of spiritual experience.

Thus without bothering to enquire about the nature of *Avidyā* Jiva should make efforts to attain liberation. In this effort Śamkara has admitted the knowledge of Brahman not as means, but as the end in itself. It is ultimate end. Those who point out that there is no place for morality in Śamkara's philosophy forget that the Indian philosophers have never given the ultimate status to morality. Most of the Indian philosophers believed that beyond the moral level there is the religious level and beyond the religious level there is the spiritual level. To reach this spiritual level is the ultimate end of human beings. But spiritual aim does not deny, still less negate, the moral aim. It takes to it and proceeds further

after its fulfilment. Hence upto a certain limit the Advaita Vedānta exhibits the importance of moral and religious means to attain the ultimate end of life. Samkara has himself considered the fourfold means (Sādhana Chatuṣṭaya) as necessary for a man to become worthy of studying Vedānta. These fourfold means are as follows:

(1) *Discrimination between eternal and ephemeral*—The enquirer in the philosophy of Vedānta should have the capacity to distinguish between eternal and ephemeral objects as a necessary prerequisite for his study.

(2) *Detachment towards worldly and other worldly enjoyment*—The second condition required for the student of Vedānt is detachment towards all types of enjoyments and their desires worldly as well as other worldly.

(3) *Śama, Dama etc*—Along with discrimination of eternal and ephemeral and detachment from the enjoyments, the enquirer should possess the means of Śama, Dama, Shraddhā, Samādhān, Uparati and Titikṣā. The meaning of Śama is to control the mind while Dama means the control of the senses. Shraddhā means keeping faith in the scriptures. Samādhāna means concentration of the mind in the attainment of knowledge. Uparati means aversion from the disturbing actions. Titikṣā means the practice of bearing heat and cold etc.

(4) *Desire for liberation (Mumukṣatva)*—The last though by no means the least condition for the Sādhaka of Vedānta is a strong determination for the attainment of liberation and a burning desire for it.

After conquering the passions etc. by the above mentioned fourfold means, Samkara prescribes the necessity of hearing (Shravaṇa), of the concentration (Manana) and meditation (Nididhyāsana). Thus the aspirant for the knowledge of Brahman should take to hearing the teachings of Guru. After the annihilation of the false impressions and the establishment of strong faith in the reality of the Brahman, the teacher teaches the aspirant the secret of Tattvamasī (That Thou Art). Then the aspirant concentrates on this truth with one pointed mind and meditates upon it again and again. By this he gradually begins to realise the truth and the real nature of the self. Such a complete realisation is the culmination of the knowledge of Brahman. This is liberation. By this all the dualism disappears, the doubts and attachments are removed and the supreme bliss is attained. The liberated man serves the society

and living beings, while he is alive and does not return to bondage after leaving the body.

Q. 79. "The advaitavada of Samkara has no place for ethics."

Discuss.

(Bombay 1964)

According to some critics, "the Advaitavāda of Samkara has no place for ethics as it raises the supreme ideal of life above good and evil". Thus it has been pointed out that there is no place for ethics in Śamkara's philosophy. According to Śamkara, Brahman is the self, while the world is unreal. The ultimate end of man, according to Vedānta, is the attainment of Brahman consciousness. Thus Brahman is beyond the dualism of right and wrong. It is beyond all dualisms. Thus, according to Advaita Vedanta, man's aim is to reach a status of non-dualism which is beyond all dualism, because dualism is Māyā or Avidyā while non-dualism is the Brahman or Reality. This end undoubtedly is beyond ethics, since as Kant has pointed out, moral is the level of the dualism of right and wrong. On the moral level man must have both the alternatives of right and wrong, and he must voluntarily choose the right one of the two, if he cannot choose the wrong, if he is bound to choose the right due to his innate nature, if there is no conflict regarding the two in his mind, he is not on the moral level. Thus, as a moral philosopher pointed out, "Virtue lies in its antagonist." This analysis amply clarifies that the summum bonum of man in Śamkaras philosophy is beyond ethics.

But this does not mean that there is no place for ethics in Śamkara's philosophy. The aim of life, according to Śamkara is beyond what is achieved through life. Again, even after the realisation of the ultimate end, the liberated person does not leave society or the world, nor becomes interested in it. Śamkara's life itself is a glaring example of this fact. He was not only a great philosopher but an equally great social reformer. It is only on the transcendental level that Śamkara has negated all dualism. On the pragmatic level, the dualism of the right and wrong is as much true as all other dualism. Before the achievement of liberation man must have due consideration for the right and wrong, and after liberation is achieved such a consideration becomes superfluous because the liberated person, essentially established in the Brahman consciousness, does only that which is always right as it directly follows from the ultimate good, the Brahman. Thus though the

right and wrong, the sympathy, pity, forgiveness and other virtues might be relative and of the lower level for the liberated person, but neither he acts against them because that too is also due to dualism and nor has he to make effort to act according to them, since it becomes spontaneous

As a matter of fact, Samkara has not admitted knowledge and *Niṣkāma Karma* as mutually opposed. The action opposed to knowledge is the action due to desire. It is that which leads to ignorance, *Avidyā* and bondage. Samkara has emphasized the importance of *Niṣkāma Karma*. By knowledge and detachment the practical efficiency is even more increased because after being relieved from attachment and aversion, the liberated man remains balanced, even in the face of greatest misfortunes. The aspirant works for self-purification before liberation and after liberation he works for the purification of those who are still in bondage. In this work he has no vested interest of his own, because all his interests have been fulfilled. This work is not guided by any other worldly motive as name fame, etc. This gives him a wonderful power of action. Attainment of liberation transforms all his life. By the transformation, the moral values are even more glorified and spiritualised. This gives a new inspiration, energy, peace and stability in the practical life. Thus the ultimate end in Vedānta philosophy is undoubtedly beyond right and wrong but instead of negating them, it rather leads to their ultimate fulfilment.

QUALIFIED MONISM OF RAMANUJA

Q. 80. Compare and contrast Ramanuja's conception of God with Sankara's. (Cal. 1970)

Discuss the relationship between the Individual self and God in the Visistadvaita school of Vedanta. (Poona 1966)

What is Ramanuja's conception of the Absolute? Compare it with that of Sankara. (Boribay 1958)

Explain the relation between Jiva and Isvara in the system of Ramanuja. (Karnatak 1968)

Explain the relation between Brahman and Jiva in Ramanuja's theory. (Cal. 1972)

ISVARA IS UTILITARIAN CONCEPT

In Śaṅkara's philosophy Isvara is only a utilitarian concept. the question of creation is an academic problem and Isvara has been postulated only in order to solve it. Otherwise, there is neither a creator nor is there any creation. In actual fact, Brahman is the sole material as well as efficient cause. The world of names and forms is merely a disfigurement of the absolute Brahman. This illusion is due to ignorance and it is the aim of Vedānta to remove this ignorance. Thus, it is only natural that Isvara be only an empirical or utilitarian concept.

ISVARA AND BRAHMAN

According to the philosophy of Śaṅkara, absolute Brahman is the only truth. It is pure, transcendental, free, eternal and absolute. Brahman covered by ignorance is Isvara. It is the distorted image of Brahman. It is nothing other than Brahman. Brahman is impersonal, Isvara is the highest or best being or person. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the practical world. He is the link between the universe and Brahman. He rewards the living beings according to their action. He is the effect of Brahman whereas Brahman is above all actions. Brahman is being whereas Isvara is becoming. The worship of Isvara brings

relief from the cycle of life and death whereas the worship of Brahman brings freedom from life itself. Brahman is the object of realisation while God of Īswara is the object of worship. Brahman is the transcendental reality whereas Īswara is only the empirical reality. On the transcendental level there is no difference between Brahman and Īswara because at this level all dualism is resolved.

CREATOR OF UNIVERSE

Īswara is the creator of the universe. Creation is the manifestation of the will power of Īswara in the spatio-temporal universe. Before creation the universe of names and forms exists in seed form. At the time of dissolution it settles in or dissolves in Īswara. But as the actions and the resultant past tendencies of the jīvas are not destroyed they have to come into the world again and for this reason there must be creation. Prakṛti exists in Īswara. Creation and dissolution are different states of the beginningless world. Īswara does not stand in need of any efficient cause for creating the world. He creates the world by his power of Māyā. He also has no purpose in creation because he himself is complete. The world is his play. Creation is his nature.

ISWARA IS PERFECT

Īswara is above merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma). He is not disfigured by imperfections such as attachment, aversion, pleasure, suffering, sin etc. which mar his perfection. He is the protector of all and the basis of morality. He is all-prevading and omniscient. He is perfect and without an end. He is eternal, one and pure consciousness.

ISWARA IS TO BE ADORED

Even though He is all-prevading, Īswara assumes specific forms. And in this way He can be worshipped. He helps his worshippers and assists them in their prayer. He is the perfect person. He also helps in the attainment of liberation. He is the basis of religion.

EFFECT OF ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS

By postulating creation as without beginning, Śaṅkara avoids the objection as to who was the first, the jīva or merit and demerit (dharmādharmā)? Without the jīva there can be no award of actions in the form of merit or demerit and without there being the result of actions there is no reason why the soul should assume the

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By postulating creation as without beginning, Śaṅkara avoids the objection as to who was the first, the jiva or merit and demerit (dharmādharma)? Without the jiva there can be no award of actions in the form of merit or demerit and without there being the result of actions there is no reason why the soul should assume the

form of jiva. Hence, the universe is beginningless. Actions also have no beginning. As one sows, so he reaps. Thus the pain, suffering, vice and other undesirable elements that one sees in the world are caused by the results of the action of jivas and not by God or Īswara. Hence the moral problem cannot be raised against Īswara and neither can He be said to be imperfect because He is the Creator. The gross, unconscious and heterogenous world loses these qualities when it reassumes its original seed form. Hence, it does not affect the purity of perfection of Īswara. In its eternal form the universe is entirely different from Īswara. But in its fundamental form it is the same. Hence, the question as to how did the unconscious originate in the conscious Īswara is meaningless. The various forms that the world assumes because of ignorance are comparable to the waking, dreaming and unconscious conditions of human beings. The material nature of the universe and the jivas does not affect Īswara because although Śamkara does accept satkāryavāda or the theory of the reality of the effect before its emergence, he is not an atomist. The world is only the distorted image of Īswara, hence its nature does not affect Īswara. Īswara is the one who metes out the rewards, he is the one who controls them. He is omniscient. His knowledge is intuitive, non-perceptual, without the senses and above ignorance. He witnesses the world. He gives bodies to the different jivas according to their actions and creates substances according to their actions.

RELATION TO JIVA AND ISWARA

According to Śamkara, both Īswara and the jiva have only empirical reality but even among them, Īswara is the director and jiva the directed, Īswara is the benefactor and jiva the benefacted. Both are the distortions of Brahman, both are pure consciousness, both are Brahman from the transcendental viewpoint. In this way, on the transcendental level both have the same nature but on the empirical level there is a great difference between the two. Jivas have also been accepted as a part of Īswara although He is said to have actually no parts. The knowledge, power existence, etc., that the jivas possess are limited. Īswara is all-pervading, all-knowing, without end, happiness and perfect. The jivas are influenced by the authority of merit and demerit and are controlled by it, whereas Īswara is above both of them and is their determinant. Jiva makes efforts for attaining liberation and Īswara is his inspiration. The jiva is bound while Īswara is free. The cause of enjoy-

ment of experience (bhog) is worldliness and Īswara is not worldly. But ultimately this entire dualism is on the empirical level. According to Rāmānuja, this distinction is not generated by ignorance but is perpetual. The relation between Īswara and Jīva is one of substance and attributes, whole and part, controller and controlled. Śamkara's philosophy does not satisfy the requirements of religion while in Rāmānuja's philosophy there is resolution of mysterious intuition and philosophical intellectuality.

BRAHMAN IS ISWARA ACCORDING TO RAMĀNUJA

According to Śamkara, Brahman is the transcendental reality and Īswara is only an empirical reality. Thus, Śamkara postulates a distinction between Brahman and Īswara. But according to Rāmānuja Brahman and Īswara are one. According to Śamkara Brahman is without qualities, but Rāmānuja conceives of this absence of qualities in the sense that Brahman does not possess any impure qualities originating in Prakṛiti, but does otherwise possess qualities. He is the perfect personality 'puruṣottama'. He is possessed of perfect and eternal qualities such as truth, knowledge and happiness. He is eternal and unchanging. There is no difference between the Brahman who is possessed of qualities and the Brahman who is not.

NATURE OF BRAHMAN OR ISWARA

Brahman is eternal, all pervading, subtle, all knowing, without end, all powerful and possessed of innumerable qualities. He is the basis of the entire universe. He is its material as well as its efficient cause. He is the Lord (Īswara). He is the highest god. He rewards all. He directs activity. He is the protector of worshippers. He is of the nature of unending knowledge and happiness. His qualities are eternal, unlimited, innumerable, without designation, incomparable and completely pure. He is the soul in all. He is the bridge or link leading to immortality. He is eternal, immortal and unity. He possesses the knowledge and power to create, sustain and destroy the world, possesses power, excellence, independence, action and concentration. He gives knowledge to the ignorant, power to the weak, pity to the suffering, forgiveness to the criminal or guilty, energy to the dimwitted, repentance to the crooked, goodness to the bad and reconciliation to the angry. His body is glorified by the six qualities (śṛṅgaśaṅkṣaṇa) of strength, excellence, virility (virya) and

FIVE FORMS OF ISWARA

According to Rāmānuja, the forms of God are of five kinds—(1) *para*, (2) *vyūha*, (3) *vibhava*, (4) *antaryāmi*, (5) *archāvatāra*.

(1) *Para*—This is also called *vāsudeva-svarūpa*. This is above the notion of time. This never has any product, and in it there is undisturbed happiness. It is this form which is called *ṣaḍguṇya-vgraha*. The saints in heaven see it with their eyes and knowledge.

(2) *Vyūha*—It is the efficient cause of the drama of the universe. It is present in 'Sankarsaṇa', 'Pradyumna' and 'Aniruddha'. It is for evincing love towards the worshippers and devotees and for protecting the worldly. In this form apparently there are only two qualities. In Pradyumna there is excellence while in *vyūha* and Aniruddha there are strength and fire. Sankarṣaṇa leads to military preparation and destruction of the world, Pradyumna to religious preaching and Aniruddha to the creation of the four varṇas and other pure classes, and the substance of temporal creation.

(3) *Vibhava*—It is of two types even though it has no end, primary and secondary. *Mukhya* (primary) *vibhava* is a part of God and conjoined to the body. Devotees worship this form. This is the manifestation of God. Secondary manifestation is the name given to '*svarūpāvesa*' and '*saktyāvesa*' manifestation. This manifestation of God takes place in order to punish the wicked, to establish religion and to award the meritorious saints.

(4) *Antaryāmi*—In this form, God enters into the soul of the *jīvas* and controls all their tendencies. It is through the medium of this form that God helps the *jīvas* in all situations in places like heaven and hell.

(5) *Archāvatāra*—This is the adorable image of God which lives in the idol which concurs with the interest of the worshipper.

CRITICISM

According to Rāmānuja, conscious and the unconscious are the bodies of God, but the difference between the body of God and its soul is not clear. Actually, if conscious and unconscious is the body of God then He should be susceptible to pain, sufferings, imperfections and defects etc. Rāmānuja asserts that God is not influenced by the changes of this world and by the sufferings or short-comings of the body in the same manner in which the soul is not affected by the vicissitudes of the body. But in such a state the

soul becomes the soul of the universe and not of an individual body, and it cannot therefore be considered to be many. The assertion that the soul of God is unchanging and perfect while His body is changing and defective cannot be expected as logical.

Rāmānuja has sought to combine the Brahmanvāda of the Upanisads with the theism of Pāñcharātra. But if God is pervading the entire universe then how can He be the soul of the universe at the same time that he is the supreme personality residing in heaven? Actually the very task of synthesizing theism with the Vedantic tradition is so difficult that it is inevitable that some difficulties should creep in. Then Rāmānuja has also employed Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa, Pāñcharātra and Āgama etc., in addition to 'prasthānatraya'. Not all the theories of the Vaiṣṇava view can be synthesized with the monism of the Upanisads. One of the two must either be distorted or given a secondary position. Rāmānuja tried to synthesize the two while maintaining them intact. It need hardly be pointed out that any other attempting the same would have met with even greater failure. Rāmānuja in his philosophy tried to fulfil the demands of both religion as well as philosophy. Because of Saṃkara's Bhāṣya being existent he was compelled to refute it at every step in order to establish or strengthen his own opinion. In actual fact the only way of achieving a synthesis between Advaita and Vaiṣṇava views is to accept the former as transcendental truth and the latter as an empirical truth. This does not prove or imply the falsity of the empirical truth. It has only to be accepted as secondary and relative. Sarvajñātmā muni says that Rāmānuja's philosophy (pariṇamavāda) is only the elementary stage of Saṃkara's philosophy (vivartavāda) and the two are not mutually contradictory. If Saṃkara's view is studied from the view point of a commentator like Kōkileśvar Shastri then there would be no objection to accepting this fact.

Q 81 What is the distinction between Saṃkara's Advaita Vedānta and Ramanujas Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta regarding the nature of Brahman. Explain. *(Poona 1955, Agra 1973, Kanpur 1970)*

State and explain the points of disagreement between Ramanuja and Saṃkara. *(Karnatak 1960)*

Explain and criticize Ramanujas theory of Brahman.

(Bombay 1966)

According to Saṃkara Brahman is both above the universe and also pervading it. From the practical or empirical standpoint

Brahman is within the universe but from the metaphysical or transcendental viewpoint Brahman is above the universe. This is the real form of Brahman. This is Parabrahman. There can be two standpoints for reflecting upon Brahman—the practical or empirical, and the transcendental or cosmological.

(1) *Empirical viewpoint*—From the worldly viewpoint the world is real. From this viewpoint, Brahman is possessed of qualities and the root cause of creation, is creator, sustainer, destroyer, all-knowledge and all-powerful. It is in this form that Brahman is the Īswara of the worshippers.

(2) *Transcendental viewpoint*—From this viewpoint, Brahman is without qualities and his characteristics are truth, knowledge and happiness. Brahman is of the nature of truth and unlimited knowledge. In order to clarify this point, Samkara has adduced the example of a cowherd who when he enacts the part of a king on stage is the victor and the administrator but in actual fact he is neither a king nor a victor.

In explaining Brahman as He Himself is, and not in relation to the world, Samkara makes frequent use of the example of magician (māyāvi). Only those individuals regard the magician as inexplicable or wonderful, who are unable to fathom his magic and become ensnared in it. But those who are not astonished by the magician's tricks but are able to understand them, are not prone to consider him as anything out of the ordinary. In the same manner those who are deceived by the world are wont to consider it as real and to look upon Brahman as the creator of it. But for those who have solved the mystery of the universe, it is only an illusion and for them there is neither any actual creation nor any creator.

But how can synthesis between these two forms of Brahman, the worldly and the one which is beyond the world be established? If Brahman is within the confines of this world and pervades it, then how can He avoid the imperfections that are inherent in it? According to Samkara, just as the actors are not in reality influenced by the parts they depict on the stage and their personal life remains independent of their stage roles, in the same manner, Brahman is not influenced by pleasure, pain and other flux of the world.

BRAHMAN WITH AND WITHOUT QUALITIES

In this way, the universe and the qualities to be found in it when viewed from the practical viewpoint are real and its creator

is also true. Iswara or Brahman possessed of qualities is the object of worship of devotees. In his real form as beyond the universe Brahman is without qualities and is indeterminable. Brahman is not untruth and unconscious. His real nature cannot be determined. He is beyond all distinctions whether of class or of kind.

IMPLICATION OF NEGATION

To employ adjectives to describe Brahman or to say anything positively about Him is to limit him. All that can be said of Brahman is that he is not this, not that *viz.*, negative. There are not two Brahman, one with qualities and the other without qualities. There is only one Brahman. Just as the stage actor of an acting company does not become a different man on coming out of the theater, in the same way, while appearing possessed of qualities to one who perceives Him from the empirical standpoint Brahman at the transcendental level is absolutely devoid of qualities.

IMPORTANCE OF ISWARA

Samkara does not deny the importance of Iswara even though he regards him as illusory from the transcendental viewpoint. Samkara has spoken of three levels. At the lowest level the universe appears to be real and true. At the second level the universe and Iswara both appear to be real and true. At the highest level, Brahman is the only reality. But the knowledge of absolute Brahman cannot be had by perception. The worship of Brahman possessed of qualities acts as a stepping stone to the ultimate realization of the absolute Brahman.

RĀMANUJA'S BRAHMAN POSSESSES QUALITIES

According to Rāmanuja, Brahman is the treasure house of qualities, is possessed of qualities and particulars. When the Upanisads say that Brahman is without qualities they do not mean that there is absence of form or qualities, but rather that the qualities characteristic of being whose power is limited are not to be found in Brahman. The Vedānta philosophers accept three kinds of distinction —

- (1) *Sajātīya* distinction of classes such as between human beings and elephants
- (2) *Vyāptīya* distinction such as between one individual and another
- (3) *Svagātī* distinction such as between the hands and feet of of the same person

According to Rāmānuja, of these three kinds of distinctions those that do not apply to Brahman are the first and second distinctions because there is no other substance which belongs to the same class or different class compared to Brahman. But Brahman is characterised by the third kind of distinction. Even though Brahman is the sole existent, no substance exists independently of or separated from Brahman. But in Brahman there are elements of Jiva and matter. Both these elements are real. Rāmānuja's view is 'Viśiṣṭādvaita.' According to him, Brahman is one in spite of being differentiated from the conscious and unconscious or living and material elements.

BRAHMAN : CAUSE AND EFFECT

According to Rāmānuja, Brahman or Īśvara is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. In the states of dissociation, the physical world is destroyed and both the conscious and the material elements exist in seed form inherent in Brahman. This has been called Brahman as the cause. After creation, Brahman is manifested in the form of bodied jivas. This is said to be Brahman as the effect.

IMPLICATION OF UPANISADIC NEGATION

The negation of Brahman in the Upanisads has been interpreted by Rāmānuja in a manner differing from the interpretation that Śaṅkara placed upon it. According to Rāmānuja, where the Upanisads have denied the existence of physical objects and have described Brahman as unknowable, in effect negating Brahman thereby, they have spoken of Brahman as the cause, and not denied His possession of qualities as interpreted by Śaṅkara.

RAMANUJA'S ISVARA

Rāmānuja's Īśvara is possessed of qualities. He both inheres in the universe as well as transcends it. He has a specific personality which consists of desires and purpose. He is the object of worship and prayer. He grants liberation to the devotees and is the sea of benevolence. Rāmānuja's view concerning God resembles Western Theism.

Īśvara (Rāmānuja)

(1) Īśvara himself is the Brahman possessed of qualities.
He is the supreme person.

Unqualified Brahman (Śaṅkara)

(1) Brahman is without qualities. He is non-dual, pure consciousness, beyond space and time.

(2) Iswara, jiva and universe all have transcendental reality. None of them is unreal.

(3) Iswara has self distinction. He is identity in differences. Truth, consciousness and happiness are among His qualities and attributes.

(4) Brahman and Iswara are not different. Iswara is Brahman.

(5) Iswara in the form of Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the universe.

(6) Iswara is the object of worship. He liberates jivas out of benevolence when they worship Him.

(7) Even after having attained liberation, jiva cannot become Iswara.

(8) Rāmanuja's view is Viśiṣṭādvaita in which Iswara is sullied with qualities.

(2) Brahman is the only ontological reality. Other objects are only empirically real.

(3) Brahman is beyond distinctions. Brahman, rising above the distinction of knower, knowledge and known, is Himself perfect knowledge and pure consciousness which is true and of the nature of happiness.

(4) Iswara is Brahman coupled with ignorance. Iswara is conditioned Brahman. Iswara does not have ontological reality.

(5) The creator of the universe is Iswara. It is He who is also its protector and destroyer as well as moral governor. Brahman is above all these functions.

(6) Liberation can be attained by achieving knowledge of Brahman.

(7) Having achieved salvation, the jiva attains his nature of Brahman.

(8) Saṃkāra's view is monistic in which Brahman has been accepted as the only reality.

CRITICISM

According to Rāmanuja, conscious (chid) and material (achid) are real parts of Brahman. In that case, Brahman should be affected by the distortions of the physical world. In trying to solve this dilemma, Rāmanuja has had recourse to many assumptions. First of all, by means of the example of the body and the soul, he tries to communicate that just as the soul is immune to the flux taking place in the body (because it is distinct from the body) in the same way Brahman is not susceptible to the variations of the universe because he is distinct from it. Rāmanuja has further adduced the example of king and his subjects in solving the same problem.

The subjects suffer pain or enjoy pleasure as they carry out or neglect the orders of the king. Similarly, Brahman remains unaffected by the modification in the physical or mental world, because Brahman is unchangeable. Rāmānuja conceives of Brahman as a particular and the universe as his quality (*viśeṣaṇa*).

None of these three analogies is successful in adequately conveying the relation between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* because the relation of the soul to the body or of the king to his subjects is not the relation that holds between the whole and the part. Rāmānuja is himself aware of these difficulties. At one stage he has gone so far as to accept that the real nature of Brahman is indeterminate and He is not influenced or distorted by the modifications of the universe. If this statement is accepted as authoritative then the variable physical element will no longer be the nature or internal characteristic of Brahman but will instead become Brahman or the absolute characteristic. But such a course would weaken Rāmānuja's central thesis that conscious and the unconscious elements are real or actual parts of Brahman.

Q. 82. What is the status of the physical world in the philosophy of Samkara and Ramanuja. (Allahabad 1959)

Compare and contrast the views of Samkara and Ramanuja regarding the relation of Brahman and the world.

(Baroda 1962)

Explain Ramanuja's refutation of Samkara's doctrine of *Māyā*.

(Meerut 1972)

UNCONSCIOUS (ACHID) ELEMENT

Rāmānuja has given the name *āchid* to *prakṛti*, or material substance. The unconscious element is material and devoid of deformation and distortion. There are three distinctions in it, the following :—

(1) *Suddha sattva*—In this, *rajas* and *tamas* do not exist. It is eternal and creates knowledge and happiness. Its qualities are sound, touch, etc.

(2) *Mīra (mixed) sattva*—In this all the three *guṇas* exist. It is this which is called *prakṛti*, ignorance, and *māyā*. The five objects of perception, five organs, five physical elements, five *prāṇas*, *prakṛti*, *mahat*, ego and mind are among its transformed products.

(3) *Sattva śūnya*—Time has been said to be the unconscious element devoid of *sattva*. There is no *guṇa* in it. Eternity, effi-

ciency and creation and dissolution are comprehended by this 'time'. It is the cause of the products of prakṛti and natural objects.

Pure and mixed sattva are the constituents of the objects of experience of jīva and Īswara, places of experience and the substance of experience.

EVOLUTION OF CREATION

All physical objects arise out of the unconscious and material elements. Rāmānuja considers the Upaniṣadic description of the evolution of creation to be true in every detail. The all powerful Īswara creates the universe of diverse objects out of Himself of His independent volition. Both conscious and unconscious elements are present in Brahman. Agreeing with Sāṃkhya philosophy, Rāmānuja accepts prakṛti as an indestructible and eternal existence. But in contradiction of Sāṃkhya, he believes prakṛti to be a part of God and to be guided or motivated by him. In the state of dissolution prakṛti exists in a subtle unmanifested form. Īswara creates the universe out of this prakṛti according to the past actions of the jīvas. Prakṛti is divided into three elements by the will of Īswara—fire, water and earth. All gross objects emerge upon the gradual mixture of the three elements. Three elements are the invariable constituents of all the objects in the world. This process of gradual mixing is called 'nirṛta kāraṇa'.

WORLD IS REAL

According to Rāmānuja creation is as much real as Brahman. Sentences which propound the Upaniṣadic negation of multiplicity and to establish unity mean no more than that objects have no place independently of Brahman. They are real in the form of being dependent upon Brahman. Prakṛti is Brahman's power. Brahman is its material as well as efficient cause. The effect is not the distortion or the illusion of its cause but its product. All evidence tends to establish the reality of the universe. The universe is real although its material or gross objects are not eternal. The effect is inherent in its cause. How can the effect be unreal or illusory if the cause is true? Conscious and unconscious are the attributes of Brahman. Between them and Brahman a relation of part and whole exists. They are in Brahman. Between them and Brahman there is apṛthaksiddhi* or inseparability. Indivisible Brahman can assume the form of the diversified universe by His power. Brahman is the creator, to Viṣṇu falls the duty of sustaining the world while Rudra is its destroyer. All these are the various

aspects, of Brhman. In His form of the all-pervading Īswara is the creator, sustainer as well as destroyer. All these activities are only His play. His mere desire is sufficient to transform his energy into the universe. According to Śamkara. Brahman is real while the universe is unreal or false, and there is no difference between the two. According to Rāmānuja there cannot be correspondence between true and false elements. If it were so, then Brahman is false. Thus Rāmānuja refutes Samkara's view.

BRAHMAN PARINAMA VADA

According to Rāmānuja it is Brahman who creates, destroys and sustains the universe. In a state of dissolution, both conscious and unconscious elements exist within Brahman in seed form. The conscious and the unconscious are always existing although their objects and forms are susceptible to continuous change. In the absence of objects in the condition of dissolution, Brahman exists and is possessed of pure consciousness and unmanifest unconsciousness. This is called 'kāraṇa Brahman', or Brahman as the cause. It is contended by Rāmānuja that wherever in the Upaniṣads objects have been denied real existence and the negatives have been employed in describing Brahman it is this Brahman, as the cause, that is implying. When creation takes place Brahman is manifested in the form of bodied jīvas and physical objects, in this condition being known as 'kārya Brahman' or Brahman as the effect. Thus, Rāmānuja like Sāṃkhya believes that the effect is existent before it is manifested (Satkāryavāda), but he differs in accepting Brahman as the original cause (Brahman parināmavāda) and not prakṛti, as accepted by Sāṃkhya in their doctrine of prakṛti parināmavāda.

THE WORLD IS THE SPORT OF ISWARA

The creation of the universe is no more than a matter of sport for Īswara. According to Rāmānuja, Īswara does not indulge in the creation of the world because of some external necessity, because he is perfect. All his desires are satisfied. He is unprejudiced and creates the objects of the world according to the action of the jīvas. He rewards them with pleasure or pain according to their actions.

MEANING OF MAYA

Īswara has been described as a magician (māyāvī) in the Upaniṣad. Rāmānuja interprets it thus: the power of Īswara for

creating the universe is as astonishing as the power of the magician Māya means that power of Īśvara which creates unusual objects

In this way Rāmaṇuja's description of Māyā differs from the explanation put forward by Saṃkara

Prakṛti and Māya

Prakṛti (Rāmaṇuja)

Māyā (Śaṃkara)

(1) Prakṛti is real. It is not unreal and indeterminate

(1) Māyā is indeterminate

It is neither real nor unreal

(2) The knowledge of prakṛti as the universe is true. No object is unreal. The universe is real

(2) Knowledge of Māyā as the universe is illusory, not real

(3) The sentence ostensibly denying the reality of the world means only that there is one Brahman at the root of all multiplicity, not that the world does not exist

(3) According to this sentence of the Upaniṣad, multiplicity is unreal

(4) Prakṛti is the unconscious element present in Īśvara. It exists in subtle seed form and it is with this that Īśvara creates the universe. It is the real or actual product of the unconscious element

(4) Māyā is the power of Īśvara. It does not exist in Īśvara in element form. It is merely His desire or wish

(5) The unconscious element existing in God is susceptible to distortion (hence in Īśvara also) and this is real

(5) This power of creation appears to be prakṛti of the world only to those persons who see it as the world and not its fundamental Brahman nature

(6) Prakṛti itself appears in the form of its past remaining elements and the entire universe is pervaded by it

(6) The universe itself is not Māyā. Māyā is not transformed or changed but it is only the magical power of Īśvara which due to ignorance reflect Brahman in the form of the universe

(7) According to Parīṣamāda, prakṛti actually changes into the world

(7) According to Parīṣamāda, Māyā is the effect of intuition. The universe is the illusion of Brahman

well as the state of liberation or mokṣa can be explained by calling it qualified monism. He has interpreted statements of the Upaniṣads in this same relation. For this reason, Rāmaṇuja's philosophy is called qualified monism

Q. 84 Distinguish carefully between the views of the two systems of Vedānta about the nature of Ultimate Reality ? Which do you prefer ? Justify your preference. *(Agra 1951)*

What are the main differences between the viewpoints of Saṃkara and Rāmaṇuja regarding the nature of reality ?

(Poona 1959)

What is bondage according to Rāmaṇuja ? Explain the means suggested by him to get rid of bondage. *(Madras 1966)*

Monism (advaita) and qualified monism (viśiṣṭādvaita) are two distinct schools of thought in Vedānta philosophy. The proponents of the two were Saṃkarācārya and Rāmaṇuja. The most authoritative text of monism is 'Sāṃkhya Bhāṣya' while that of qualified monism is 'Śrī Bhāṣya'. As is evident from the difference between the two schools, they entertain differing views regarding the ultimate reality. According to monism, the ultimate existent is non-dual and one. According to qualified monism, on the other hand, the ultimate reality is of course non-dual but there is scope for quality within this non-duality. It is for this reason that this view is called qualified monism

OPINION CONCERNING BRAHMAN

Roughly speaking, the ultimate reality is studied in three forms—Self, World, and God. According to the view held by the monistic school, Brahman is not possessed of any qualities or of any distinctions. According to the qualified school of monism, Brahman possesses both qualities and distinctions. In the monist opinion, Brahman is believed to be above God, as, according to Saṃkara, there is difference between Īśvara and Brahman. Brahman is without qualities, is the only reality, and thus, in the end even Īśvara is unreal. In the qualified monism it is held that Brahman does possess qualities and hence no distinction is made between Brahman and Īśvara. Īśvara is Brahman or in other words, it is Brahman Himself who, in the form of Īśvara creates the world.

VIEWS CONCERNING SELF

In the monistic school of thought there is no distinction

between Self and Brahman. Śamkara has interpreted different authoritative sentences from the Upanisads in the sense that they deny all duality between Self and Brahman. In this way, Self is nothing other than Brahman. Ignorance, according to Śamkara, consists in nothing other than in considering the Self to be an entity distinct from Brahman. And it is the aim of Vedānta to remove this ignorance. On the other hand, Rāmānuja has accepted non-duality between Self and Brahman but this non-duality is of a qualified kind. In this, the Self is a part of Brahman but is itself not Brahman because the part can never be the whole. According to Rāmānuja, the sentences from Upanisads interpreted by Śamkara as negating the duality between Self and Brahman, imply not an identity between Self and Brahman but the unbreakable relation between them. In fundamental forms Self and Brahman are alike just as the part and the whole are one but by reason of this, part and whole cannot be said to be identical.

VIEWS ON LIBERATION

Difference in opinion regarding the relation between the self and Brahman leads to differing opinions on the subject of liberation. It is conceived differently by the monistic school. According to Śamkara, the monist, Self is eternally free because it is Brahman. To think of it as differing from Brahman is to display ignorance. Liberation or mokṣa consists of getting rid of this ignorance, or, in other words, realizing the identity of Self and Brahman. Brahman is happiness, hence liberation is a state of happiness. On the other hand, in Rāmānuja's qualified monism, the identity between Self and Brahman is not postulated. Hence, Rāmānuja accepts four kinds of liberation—sāyujya or becoming attached with Īswara, sāmīpya or existing in the vicinity of Īswara, sānnidhya or existing in the proximity of Īswara and the one that should have been mentioned first instead of last, sālōkya or living in the valley of Īswara. In none of these states does the Self become Īswara or Brahman.

OPINIONS REGARDING THE WORLD

Similarly, the opinions of the monistic and the qualified monistic schools concerning the world differ. According to Śamkara the world is Māyā and false or unreal, it has nothing to do with Brahman. According to Rāmānuja the world is the sport of Īswara and is constituted of its part. Both the conscious and the unconscious elements are the self-distinctions of Brahman. In this way,

the world is not unreal. It is real because nothing created by Īśvara is unreal.

It depends upon one's own choice as to which one of the two is preferred or found more concurrent with one's own viewpoint. One can however make a generalisation that the logically minded person will find the monistic viewpoint more agreeable whereas the individual in whose mental make up it is emotion which is preponderant will find the view of qualified monism more acceptable. This tendency is due to the fact that while the monistic school satisfies the intellect and mind of the student, the view presented by the qualified monistic school will appeal more to the emotions and feelings. From the philosophic and purely logical standpoint the more adequate or proper view is that of Śaṅkara although in being logical it has not paid the least regard to feelings. On the other hand, Rāmaṇuja's view satisfies the demands of religion although from the point of view of logic it is open to many logical objections and is even probably logically incompatible. The demand of religion is that the devotee should always enjoy the happiness of worship. The worshipper himself never desires to become God; he wants to live near God, wants to exist in his vicinity, wants to live in the land of God. In this is his salvation. The view of qualified monism concerning liberation satisfies desire of the devotee. Similarly Rāmaṇuja's conception of self and the Brahman is superior to Śaṅkara's from the religious viewpoint. If even Īśvara is false and unreal then religion is reduced to mere wishfulfilment. It is not possible to worship that which is devoid of qualities. The dualism between the devotee and Īśvara is necessary for the purpose of love. Pringle Pattison, a Western scholar has written correctly: It requires two to love and to be loved, two to worship and to be worshipped. It is for this reason that the religious individual tends to look upon the world as an act of God. On the other hand there are many difficulties in regarding the world as the result of divine action. In Rāmaṇuja's opinion, there is no place for mystic experience in which the devotee experiences an identity with the object of his devotion. This satisfaction can be derived from Śaṅkara's philosophy.

In this way, it can roughly be said that in considerations of ultimate reality Śaṅkara's philosophy offers satisfaction to the demands of logic and philosophy while the view propounded by Rāmaṇuja affords satisfaction to demands of religion. Śaṅkara's view of monism is not likely to satisfy the religious and emotional

individual. On the other hand, Rāmānuja's concept of qualified monism is not likely to satisfy the logical minded men. But there are very few individuals who can be classed as purely rational and intellectual or purely emotional. Most individuals possess both the emotional and the rational strains in them, and this is as it should be because otherwise the man will become onesided. Philosophy and logic cannot replace religion and neither can religion do this for philosophy or logic. Human beings need both of them, which are, in fact, complementary. Thus we like not one or the other of monism or qualified monism but rather both of them, because if even one of the two the heart and the intellect, remains unsatisfied, the individual will be dissatisfied and his development will be one sided and incomplete.

